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Daniele Franco
* 
This volume brings together the papers presented at the 11
th Banca d’Italia Public Finance 
Workshop, held in Perugia from 26 to 28 March 2009. 
The workshop examined the issue of pension reform with the aim of highlighting the recent 
analytical developments and the most important policy issues. It discussed the implications of 
pension reforms for labour supply, retirement decisions and labour mobility, as well as their impact 
on saving and investment decisions and financial markets. It considered how changes in the design 
of pension systems impact on income distribution within and across generations. It also examined 
the effects of reforms on macroeconomic developments. Finally, it appraised the political economy 
of pension reforms, their contribution to the achievement of fiscal policy goals and the role of 
pension rules in fiscal policy frameworks. 
Banca d’Italia is grateful to the institutions which contributed to the success of the initiative, 
to the experts who provided research papers and to all who came to Perugia to take part in the 
discussions. 
This volume extends the analysis of fiscal policy issues carried out in the previous 
workshops, which were devoted to Indicators of Structural Budget Balances (1998), Fiscal 
Sustainability (2000), Fiscal Rules (2001), The Impact of Fiscal Policy (2002), Tax Policy (2003), 
Public Debt (2004), Public Expenditure (2005), Fiscal Indicators (2006), Fiscal Policy: Current 
Issues and Challenges (2007) and Fiscal Sustainability: Analytical Developments and Emerging 
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Over the last decades, pension systems have been reformed in most developed countries. 
Further reforms are under way or are being discussed. Changes are prompted by the need to adjust 
pension arrangements to the new demographic, economic and social conditions, while trying to 
safeguard the essential achievements of social protection schemes: the possibility to transfer 
resources to the after-retirement part of life, the reduction of the risk of outliving one’s resources, 
and the decline of poverty among the elderly. 
Pension reforms are mostly driven by the need to control outlays. Most developed countries 
are ageing: the ratio of the elderly-to-working age population has already reached historically 
unprecedented levels and is projected to increase further. The ageing process is driven by progress 
in life expectancy and low fertility rates. Demographic changes increase the demand for transfers 
and services for the elderly. Public pension schemes bear much of this pressure. In spite of the 
reforms introduced over the last twenty years, the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP is still 
expected to rise in most OECD countries. In the euro area it is set to increase from 11 per cent of 
GDP in 2007 to a peak of 13.9 per cent in 2053. While the reform debate largely reflects the 
concern about these long-term expenditure developments, with the sustainability of PAYG systems 
being frequently questioned, policy changes are sometimes also invoked in order to improve budget 
balances over the short and medium term. 
Reforms may also try to counter the adverse effects of the pension system on the labour 
market and to improve the distributive effects related to the composition of public spending. Over 
recent decades, while life expectancy increased, the participation rates of the elderly fell 
significantly in most industrialised countries. The average effective retirement age is about 60 in 
most European countries. One explanation for the low participation rates in Europe is that PAYG 
systems are not neutral with respect to the retirement decision. Indeed, in many countries social 
security provisions are such that the pension wealth of a worker decreases with the age of 
retirement. Even if the trend towards lower activity rates seems to have come to a halt, the present 
levels of participation rates are considered too low in view of the ageing process. There is also a 
growing awareness that, in order to achieve higher employment rates, countries need both to 
improve the design of pension schemes and to take action in the labour market. 
The surge in pension spending has contributed to improve the economic conditions of elderly 
citizens, traditionally one of the groups most subject to high poverty. Poverty rates for older 
citizens have dropped and are now similar to the population average: in some European countries 
they are actually lower than for younger people. This has led to the question whether more public 
resources should be channelled to welfare programs targeting the needs of other social groups. The 
rise in the ratio of pensioners to the active population could lead to an increase in contribution rates 
and compress the resources available for other potentially problematic groups of citizens. 
All pension reforms basically tackle one issue: how to grant adequate living standards to an 
increasing number of elderly citizens without imposing an excessive burden on the public finances. 
However, very different approaches have been implemented: from parametric changes to 
traditional PAYG public schemes to the introduction of new pension formulas (such as notional 
funding) in PAYG schemes, to the development of funded schemes. Even within the same broad 
line of reform, the specific changes introduced are usually significantly different from country to 
country, reflecting national traditions, problems and priorities. 
————— 
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While the need for changes in pension rules is often widely recognised, the introduction of 
reforms is usually politically difficult. This reflects the importance of pension systems in all 
developed countries. Most citizens either contribute to finance them or draw benefits from them: 
individuals’ plans and decisions are influenced by social security rules over a large part of their 
lifetime. Pension systems absorb sizeable public resources, influence the labour and capital 
markets, and affect income distribution both within and across generations. These features make 
reforms an extremely complex task. 
All reforms are likely to hurt some categories of citizens or some generations, in terms of 
cuts to their social security wealth or a higher tax burden. Reforms can however improve the 
incentive structure of the pension system. The removal of distortions, such as the incentive to retire 
early, can have positive effects on economic growth. Reforms should both ensure the 
macroeconomic sustainability of pension systems and improve their microeconomic features. 
Pension reforms represent an interesting test to evaluate the ability of each country to adjust 
its institutions to the new developments, manage complex long-term problems and reconcile 
multiple objectives. Interestingly, the need to reform pension systems has spurred the development 
of new policy solutions, such as bipartisan committees, and new technical tools, such as long-term 
projections. International organisations and the European Commission have played an active role in 
the pension policy debate and helped to elicit government preferences, widen the technical 
discussion on the issue and improve the availability of information to assess the sustainability of 
the public finances. 
The papers presented at the workshop were organized in four sessions, mirrored by the 
sections in this volume. Section 1 examines the impact of pension reforms on the labour market 
and their implications for investments in human capital and productivity growth. Section 2 is 
devoted to the impact on capital markets, and specifically to the effects of the increasing role of 
funding. Section 3 considers how changes in the design of pension systems impact on income 
distribution within and across generations. The analysis is complemented by comments on some 
macroeconomic implications of the reforms. Section 4 deals with the political economy  of pension 
reforms and their role in the broader fiscal policy context. 
 
1  Pension reform and the labour market 
Section 1 includes papers dealing with the interaction between pension system design and 
labour market functioning. 
In their paper, El-Mekkaoui De Freitas and Oliveira Martins address four empirical puzzles 
concerning the life-cycle theory: i) an excessive (relative to what theory predicts) consumption 
drop at retirement; ii) an excessive amount of savings in old-age; iii) the lack of a clear negative 
relationship between the generosity of PAYG systems and private saving rates; and iv) the lack of a 
positive relationship between increases in longevity and increases in saving ratios. The authors try 
to shed new light on these puzzles with a blend of theory, informal reasoning and empirical 
analysis. First, they set up a 2-period OLG model in which the relationship between longevity and 
saving ratios can be either positive or negative. Second, they argue that a change in the preference 
structure in old age (namely, a decrease in the demand for private consumption goods and an 
increase in the demand for health-related and other ”welfare” goods), if coupled with a generous 
public pension and health system, can explain both the drop in consumption at retirement age and 
the excess savings after retirement. Finally, they argue that the relationship between the size of 
PAYG systems and private savings may also depend on the size of the healthcare system. 
Regression analysis on a panel of 18 OECD countries seems to be consistent with the proposed 
explanations of the four puzzles.  Introduction  15 
In his contribution, Paul Rodway summarizes and updates recent work done at the New 
Zealand Treasury on the New Zealand public pension scheme. The scheme provides a flat rate, 
universal, non-means-tested pension benefit. Early-retirement provisions are basically absent and 
pensions are paid even if individuals continue to work after the eligibility age. The paper shows, 
using aggregate data, that participation at older ages tends to decrease in response to reductions in 
the minimum eligibility age, and vice versa. Furthermore, using survey data, it documents that 
receiving pension benefits significantly and negatively affects the chance of being in the labour 
force. All in all, it appears that the New Zealand superannuation scheme, despite having no explicit 
financial disincentives, for many senior workers is still a barrier to continued participation in the 
labour market. 
Ahuja and Paserman discuss recent pension reforms aimed at prolonging working lives in the 
27 member states of the European Union. Indeed, in the framework of the so-called Open Method 
of coordination, member countries have agreed on a set of common policy objectives concerning 
social protection systems. In particular, promoting longer working lives is a policy priority. To this 
end, a number of countries have legislated increases in the minimum retirement age (albeit often 
with a long phase-in period). Some countries have also introduced actuarial reductions for those 
retiring before a “normal” retirement age and/or actuarial premia for those postponing retirement 
after that age. Legal obstacles to receiving pensions while continuing to work have also been 
reduced while the link between the amount of benefits and that of contributions have been 
strengthened. Finally, access to early retirement schemes and unemployment benefit schemes 
specifically targeted at older workers has been restricted. The authors document that, partly as a 
result of these reforms, the employment rate for older workers (55-64) increased from 37 to 
45 per cent during the 2001-2008 period. However, they argue that to benefit to the full from 
pension reforms, it is also necessary to sustain the demand for older workers through lifelong 
learning policies and incentives for employers. 
Argimón, Botella, González and Vegas estimate the impact of social security wealth and the 
rules for the calculation of benefits on the transition to retirement in Spain. They use data on the 
employment and contribution histories of a sample of men aged between 60 and 70, drawn from a 
large administrative data set (all the individuals in the sample were in principle able to retire, 
according to the rules of the Spanish system). Using these data, they build measures of social 
security wealth and proxies for the financial incentive to retire implicit in the rules for benefit 
calculation (among such proxies are the replacement rate and the change in the social security 
wealth of workers who decide to postpone retirement by one year). Lastly, they estimate a duration 
model in which the dependent variable is the length of the period between the moment at which a 
person becomes entitled to a pension and the moment at which the pension is actually claimed. The 
results show that this period is shorter for larger pensions. Moreover, workers tend to postpone 
retirement if they are compensated with a suitably higher flow of pension payments. The paper also 
overviews the main implications of the current crisis for pensions. In particular, the authors argue 
that the rise in unemployment may severely affect the future pensions of young workers. It may 
also push older workers into early retirement and hamper the implementation of reforms aimed at 
reducing pension expenditure. Finally, it may dent the pension wealth accumulated in funded 
schemes. 
Arpaia, Dybczak and Pierini build a comprehensive data set of the pension reforms legislated 
in the EU between 1990 and 2006. They classify the reforms in three broad classes: fundamental 
changes to the old-age scheme (i.e., changes in the way the pension system is financed and/or in the 
eligibility conditions), non-fundamental changes to the old-age scheme and changes to early 
retirement schemes. They use the reform data set to conduct a “policy experiment” to assess the 
effects of such reforms on participation rates. It turns out that the benefits of reforms are somewhat 
elusive and depend on the age bracket, the gender and the nature of the reform. The effects are 16  Daniele Franco, Maria Rosaria Marino and Pietro Tommasino 
often non-significant and/or negative. The authors conclude that it is crucial, in order to maximize 
the labour market effects of pension reforms, to provide enough information to workers and to 
avoid lengthy and uncertain phase-in periods. 
In his contribution, Kovács describes the challenges the Hungarian pension system is 
currently facing, and discusses the possible policy solutions. The Hungarian system underwent a 
structural reform in 1997. It now has two mandatory pillars: a defined-benefit PAYG system and a 
fully-funded defined-contribution scheme. The first problem discussed in the paper is the very high 
number of disability pensioners below retirement age limit (currently around 10 per cent of the 
active population). This problem dates back to the political transition out of socialism, which 
caused a sharp rise in the unemployment rate. In fact early retirement and disability pensions were 
used as a way to cushion the social costs of the transition. The second problem – also related to the 
functioning of the labour market – is the low contribution density. The author concludes that the 
time is ripe for an open debate about what changes to the pension rules are best suited to foster 
labour market participation in Hungary.  
Commenting on El-Mekkaoui De Freitas and Oliveira Martins, Clemens suggests that the 
existence of a bequest motive and the possibility to change labour supply in the face of unexpected 
changes in longevity might both have a role in explaining the empirical problems encountered by 
the life-cycle theory. He also suggests that a decline in the demand for private goods at older ages 
could attenuate the welfare effect of the slowdown of growth due to ageing. Commenting on the 
paper by Rodway, he argues that New Zealand employment patterns are not surprising, given that 
even a flat-rate non-means-tested scheme can discourage labour supply, as it is implicitly a tax on 
labour. Moreover, the fact that willingness to work decreases in the presence of pension benefits 
can be attributed to an income effect. Concerning policy options for the future, he supports 
increases in the eligibility age (possibly linked to changes in life expectancy), while he remains 
sceptical about increasing the role of funded pension schemes. He also argues that the rise of 
single-person households is likely to reduce spending automatically, as willingness to work seems 
to decrease for those having a non-working spouse. 
In commenting on the papers by Argimon et al. and Ahuja and Paserman, Jędrzejowicz 
points to two potentially important issues: involuntary retirement and minimum pension 
guarantees. In particular, he argues that generous minimum pension guarantees may have an impact 
on labour supply at older ages, even if its direction and magnitude are still the subject of debate in 
the empirical literature. He also adds further elements to the list of pros and cons of funding 
featured in the paper by Ahuja and Paserman: on the one hand, he highlights the political economy  
advantages of pension reforms based on funding (as they are more difficult to revert); on the other, 
he points to the significant risks inherent in investing on financial markets. Finally, Jędrzejowicz 
briefly describes the current challenges to the Polish pension system, mostly related to the labour 
market effects of some of its rules (e.g., the low retirement age for women and the insufficient 
accumulation of pension rights for many low-wage workers with discontinuous careers). 
As regards the paper by Kovács, Köhler-Töglhofer points out that Hungary’s problems are 
similar to those of other countries: even if in Europe there has been, on average, a significant rise in 
older workers’ participation rates in the last decade, many countries have lagged behind. As regards 
the paper by Arpaia et al., she points out that reform packages often include very heterogeneous 
reform measures. Thus, from a policy perspective, it would be important to check for the labour 
supply impact of specific measures or factors. She notes that the lack of any clear-cut short-term 
impact of reforms might be due to the fact that people do not change their plans quickly when the 
system changes. Moreover, reforms may have long phasing-in periods.   Introduction  17 
 
2  Pension reform and capital markets 
Section 2 is devoted to the impact of pension reforms on the capital market and in particular 
to the effects of the increasing role of funding. 
Draper and Westerhout study the effects of the introduction of a fully-funded DB pension 
scheme in the context of an OLG model, in which the rate of return on equity is stochastic and 
labour supply is endogenous. In the model, households have a finite life of uncertain length; there 
exists a pension fund which receives contributions from working generations and pays pensions to 
retired generations; households are obliged to participate in this pension fund. Pension benefits 
relate to the individual’s labour history, but are unrelated to both capital market rates of return and 
the length of life: shocks to pension wealth are absorbed by changing the contributions that the 
pension fund levies upon working cohorts. In such a model, a trade-off emerges between the 
welfare improvement due to an increased degree of market completeness (as the pension scheme 
protects against longevity risks and financial market risks) and the welfare decrease due to labour 
supply distortions (to protect pensioners against adverse fluctuations of financial markets, a tax on 
labour is implicitly levied on workers; moreover, this tax burden is sub-optimally distributed 
through time). However, the authors propose a calibrated version of the model in which the 
introduction of the pension scheme turns out to improve welfare significantly. 
Gillingham, Leive and Tuladhar describe the various ways in which the financial market 
crisis might affect workers, pension funds and governments. In 2008 the impact of the stock market 
decline on global pension assets was substantial (roughly 40 per cent, according to the authors’ 
estimates for the G20 countries). Some individuals, especially those near to retirement, may have 
been severely affected. However, the authors note that, in most countries, the richest part of the 
population was disproportionately affected by the losses. Moreover, they used a simulation to show 
that the performance of individual accounts over the past 45 years has been quite satisfactory, even 
if internal rates of return differ markedly across cohorts. DB pension plans were affected by the 
crisis as well, since their assets/liability ratio declined sharply; therefore they could be obliged to 
increase contributions and/or cut benefits in order to restore an adequate level of funding. 
Governments will also be affected by the fall in asset prices: indeed, they often provide guarantee 
schemes that offer insurance against the loss of assets in private DB plans due to employer 
insolvency; in addition, some governments also guarantee minimum benefits or minimum rates of 
return to defined-contribution pension plans. Finally, there is the possibility that governments will 
be forced by strong political pressures to compensate pension plans for at least a portion of the 
reductions in asset value they suffered. The authors warn that in no case should government 
responses compromise fiscal sustainability. 
Moreno and Santos argue that demographic changes and the degree of funding of the 
pension system can influence savings rates, the current account and financial development in 
emerging market economies (EMEs) in several ways. Their first point is that theory predicts a 
negative link between dependency ratios on the one hand and both savings and investment on the 
other Moreover, available empirical evidence suggests that the current account tends to improve 
when the dependency ratio decreases. This is obviously important for economies which are 
projected to suffer from population ageing in the coming years (for example, China). Their second 
point is that the positive link between the degree of funding of the pension system and saving rates 
is likely to be weaker than predicted by theory due to several factors, such as the lack of financial 
literacy. Therefore, reforms aimed at privatizing pensions, which are discussed in many EMEs, 
might be less beneficial than expected. Their last point is that in many EMEs there is a positive 
correlation between the degree of funding and financial development, and that a higher degree of 
financial development could in turn reduce current account surpluses: this could provide the 18  Daniele Franco, Maria Rosaria Marino and Pietro Tommasino 
benefits that some EMEs have sought from foreign exchange market intervention and foreign 
reserve accumulation, without the associated disadvantages. 
The paper by Rofman, Fajnzylber and Herrera describes the recent pension reforms adopted 
by Argentina and Chile. The procedures and results of these reforms and the reasons for them are 
different, although they share some characteristics. The structural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s 
sought to improve the long-term fiscal sustainability of the pension systems and their institutional 
design, while transferring part of the economic and social risks from the government to 
participants. However, in recent years the authorities in both countries identified the insufficient 
coverage among the elderly and the inadequacy of benefits as the most critical problems. As a 
result of differences in political economy  and institutional constraints, the responses were 
different. In Chile, a long and participatory process resulted in a far-reaching reform that focused 
on the medium term results through a carefully calibrated adjustment. In Argentina, instead, 
reforms were adopted through a large number of successive normative corrections, with little 
public debate about their implications and immediate impact on coverage and the public finances. 
The slower stepwise approach taken by Chile’s authorities will probably ensure better outcomes 
and more sustainable results than in Argentina. On the other hand, Argentina’s bolder and faster 
reforms resulted in an immediate response to a current problem. Most of the elderly excluded from 
the system received a pension benefit within a year, improving their welfare immediately, while in 
Chile the process of reaching all beneficiaries will be more gradual. 
Rezk, Irace and Ricca carried out an analysis of fully-funded pension regimes based on 
individual accounts implemented since the 1980s in six Latin American countries (Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay), in order to ascertain whether they were conducive to 
increasing aggregate savings and helped to strengthen domestic stock markets. To this end, they 
used a version of the life-cycle model. The authors also studied the impact on private savings of a 
group of economic and demographic variables which the related literature usually links to the 
performance of both defined-benefit and defined-contribution pension systems. The impact of 
individual accounts systems upon aggregate private savings was assessed under different scenarios 
such as: homogeneous and heterogeneous individuals, voluntary and compulsory contributions and 
loose and tight borrowing constraints. The theoretical analysis made it possible to prove that only 
under mandatory contributions and operating liquidity restrictions would private savings be 
unambiguously increased by pension fund assets. 
The paper by Cuevas, González, Lombardo and López-Marmolejo explores how privatizing 
a pension system can affect sovereign credit risk. The authors analyze the importance that rating 
agencies give to implicit pension debt (IPD) in their assessment of sovereign creditworthiness. 
They show empirically that financial analysts judge IPD and financial public debt differently as a 
consequence of their understanding of the intrinsic differences between the two, but this could also 
reflect myopia on the financial analysts’ side, possibly due to their not being fully aware of the 
obligations entailed by IPD. The authors find that rating agencies generally do not seem to give 
much weight to IPD, focusing instead on explicit public debt. However, by channelling pension 
contributions away from the government and creating a deficit of resources to cover the current 
pension liabilities during the reforms’ transitional periods, pension privatization reforms may 
transform IPD into explicit public debt, adversely affecting a sovereign’s perceived 
creditworthiness, thus increasing its risk premium. The apparent lack of attention paid to IPD in the 
assessment of sovereign creditworthiness could be an indication that markets, though concerned 
over contingent liabilities, simply do not trust the available measures of IPD, which are subject to 
considerable error. In this light, accompanying pension reforms with efforts to offset their 
transition costs through fiscal adjustment would help preserve a country’s credit rating. Should a 
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follow a gradual parametric approach to improve the sustainability of the PAYG pension system 
before undertaking the transition to a fully-funded system. 
The paper by Leiner-Killinger, Nickel and Slavík addresses the risks for public finances 
associated to moving to funded pension systems in a volatile economic environment, such as that of 
the new EU Member States. The authors take stock of the available data on pension assets and 
combine them with data on inflation and other financial market developments. They argue that 
risks for the public finances stem only partially from potentially large variations in pension 
incomes due to stock market developments, as the share of pension funds invested in stocks tends 
to be comparatively small. The risks are higher for those new Member States where the limited 
diversification of assets and the relatively large fraction of total assets held in government debt 
securities limit the possible positive impact from systemic pension reforms. Should pension 
incomes turn out to be inadequate, governments might be induced to step in, thus implying a 
smaller reduction in the general government budget burden than anticipated. As a consequence, 
while maintaining multi-pillar pension systems remains of the utmost importance, a wider 
diversification of assets and better financial knowledge are decisive.  
Commenting on the Draper and Westerhout paper, Afonso claims that the privatization 
message and its implications were not too clear in the article and wonders if the absence of perfect 
capital markets would cause significant changes. He also points out that some sensitivity analyses 
making use of calibration parameters would be useful to see to what extent some results still hold. 
Afonso asserts that the paper by Gillingham, Leive and Tuladhar provides input for some questions 
and further thinking on how governments should react in a crisis in terms of supporting the losses 
suffered by pension funds. He then argues that pragmatism should help and prevail when dealing 
with the problem of allowing past private profits to become current or future public losses. As 
regards the article by Rezk, Irace and Ricca, Afonso stresses that the thesis put forward by the 
study (mandatory pension fund regimes have a positive impact on private saving) is different from 
what is reported in other studies (i.e., Freitas and Martins, 2009). He suggests that an alternative 
way to address the question would be to use a consumption specification as in Feldstein (1974 and 
1982) to assess how pension funds’ assets impinge on private consumption and influence the 
current account balances, on the basis of their relationship with private savings, government 
savings and investments. 
In commenting on the paper by Moreno and Santos, Cuccaro emphasizes the role that a 
widespread informal sector has in explaining low contribution density in many emerging market 
economies, while the lack of appropriate institutions might partly explain the portfolio composition 
of pension funds. Commenting on the paper by Rofman et al., Cuccaro suggests that it is important 
to discuss the fiscal conditions and the context in which pension reforms were implemented. In the 
same vein, she underlines that the recent pension measures in Argentina might reflect the pro 
cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. Therefore, the reduction of the pro-cyclical behaviour 
constitutes an additional challenge. In the short term, the main challenge is that of managing the 
pension system in a less favourable fiscal environment and with limited access to the capital 
market. Finally, the enhancement of the independency of social security institutions is also crucial. 
Setting up the proper legal framework to guarantee the transparency, efficiency and predictability 
of the administration of the pension fund is another pending issue. 
Eich discusses the articles by Cuevas, González, Lombardo and López-Marmolejo, and 
Leiner-Killinger, Nickel and Slavík. About the first paper, he claims that rating agencies are not 
alone in facing the challenge of translating long-term trends into an assessment of the public 
finances. For example, following the reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact, the European 
Commission puts greater emphasis on long-term budgetary developments in its assessment of EU 
public finances. One innovation over recent years has been to incorporate implicit pension 
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uses quantitative and qualitative indicators to derive its assessment and, for instance, to weigh up 
the potential long term benefits of reforms against their potential short-term fiscal costs. 
Admittedly, many countries have not been very successful themselves in deriving clear policy 
objectives from the analysis of long-term trends. Commenting on the paper by Leiner-Killinger, 
Nickel and Slavík, Eich argues that the current economic crisis shows that occupational pensions 
are under immense pressure and that private pensions have also done badly in most countries. This 
proves the usefulness of a mixed system, with unfunded social security pensions complementing 
funded occupational or private pensions. On this basis, he claims that governments ought to be 
determined to ensure that, in the long-term, both occupational and private pensions play their 
respective roles successfully. 
 
3  Pension reform, redistribution, macroeconomic impact 
The papers presented in Section 3 deal with the impact of changes in the design of pension 
systems on income distribution within and across generations and with the macroeconomic 
implications of reforms. 
Brender examines the distributive effects of Israel’s restructured retirement benefits system 
using ten stylized representative prototypes of the most common Israeli household composition and 
employment profiles. He concentrates on the joint effects of tax benefits for pensions and the 
public Old Age Allowances program’s contributions and disbursements on lifetime income 
distribution, net replacement rates at retirement and lifetime consumption smoothing. The author 
finds that the system is neutral in terms of its effects on lifetime income distribution, except for the 
top income decile which gains less than the others. Furthermore, forced pension savings result in a 
net loss for many low-income households, distort their consumption path and lead to 
post-retirement net replacement rates that he deems “too high”. Finally, evidence points to rational 
and active behaviour of households with respect to these incentives, questioning the need for the 
compulsory pension savings enacted recently. 
Dekkers, Buslei, Cozzolino, Desmet, Geyer, Hofmann, Raitano, Steiner, Tanda, Tedeschi 
and Verschueren stress that the demographic changes that Europe will face in the coming decades 
will have profound consequences not only for the sustainability but also for the adequacy of social 
security schemes, including pensions. The paper aims at assessing the consequences of the Ageing 
Working Group projections on the adequacy of social security pensions. The authors use a 
microsimulation model and examine three countries: Belgium, Germany and Italy. Adequacy is 
assessed on the basis of the replacement rate, the redistributive impact of pensions and the different 
risks of poverty. Pension beneficiaries are compared to wage-earners. The replacement rate will 
follow different patterns: in Belgium and Germany it will decline until the beginning of the 2030s 
and recover later, in Italy it will show a continuous decrease. In all three countries income 
inequality declines from the working age to the retirement age and the risk of poverty among 
pensioners first increases and then decreases. The pension reforms implemented in the three 
countries have similar effects on income redistribution and poverty levels; these effects are 
particularly strong in Italy.  
Using data from the EU survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC), Franco, Marino 
and Tommasino provide evidence that there are sizeable differences across EU countries with 
respect to the diffusion and intensity of poverty and that poverty rates change significantly across 
age groups, types of households and individuals of different occupational status. In some countries, 
poverty rates among young and elderly citizens are much higher than among working age 
individuals. The paper shows that, while pre-transfer age-poverty profiles are rather similar across 
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elderly people out of poverty. The authors propose new parameters for the appraisal of the 
age-orientation of government spending, which are useful in explaining national age-poverty 
profiles: countries with smoother age-poverty profiles are those with elderly-oriented and 
children-oriented welfare states, where the transfer system is relatively more effective in lifting 
children and elderly people out of poverty. These countries mainly belong to the so-called social 
democratic group of countries. At the other extreme, Southern European countries show a 
pronouncedly V-shaped age-poverty profile. In these countries the transfer system channels 
relatively few resources toward families with children and with elderly people and, as a 
consequence, is relatively ineffective in lifting these groups out of poverty. 
The paper by Ramaiah focuses on the Indian government’s recent initiatives to reform the 
pension system in the light of the pressure exercised by demographic factors. A newly defined 
contribution system was introduced in 2004. The author stresses that there are some policy issues 
which need to be addressed for its success. The first point raised is that the voluntary nature of the 
system, along with poor financial literacy and the attitude of households towards financial savings, 
prevents the system from achieving optimum coverage. A priority would therefore be to design an 
effective, efficient and accessible system for a heterogeneous workforce. The second point raised 
relates to the provision of an adequate retirement income. Ramaiah highlights the importance of 
extending coverage to as many people as possible so that subscribers might substantially gain in 
terms of lower fees and charges and high returns. Finally, the paper notes that India has the world’s 
youngest and fastest-growing working-age population and that public policy has a critical role to 
play. It will be necessary to include those working in the informal economy in the pension system 
in the years to come. 
The paper by Barrell, Hurst and Kirby deals with the effects of pension reforms on some 
consequences of the crisis. According to the paper, the rapid introduction (but slow 
implementation) of a policy to extend working lives could alleviate the sharp rise in the national 
debt stocks of the euro-area countries and the United Kingdom due to the crisis and the fall in 
equilibrium output caused by the contraction of the capital stock. The paper analyses the effects of 
a possible extension of working lives in the euro-area and the United Kingdom and draws a 
distinction between the impact of these changes on output and income in open economies with 
capital mobility. The authors find that lengthening working lives will, in due time, increase 
consumption and restore the equilibrium capital stock. If consumers and firms recognize that they 
will have to work longer and hence have a higher income, consumption and investment would 
increase, helping to offset the impact of the recession. In addition, tax revenues would grow and 
pension spending decrease. These gains by the government could be used to improve services, cut 
taxes or pay off debts. 
The results presented by Zaidi indicate that OECD countries significantly differ in terms of 
the rate of poverty of elderly citizens. Using a country-specific relative poverty line, he finds that 
almost 13 per cent of the elderly people living in OECD member countries are poor. Countries with 
low poverty rates for the elderly generally have a good social safety net in the form of a basic 
pension and/or they offer strong redistribution in the earnings-related contributory pension schemes 
in the form of minimum guaranteed pensions. Single women and the oldest age cohort (aged 75+) 
have, in general, a much higher poverty rate compared with other subgroups. For women this is 
mainly due to the features of their working career; while for the oldest individuals the reason lies in 
the lack of pension coverage during the earlier part of their working career and in the indexation of 
pension benefits to price dynamics rather than income dynamics. The paper shows that poverty 
rates for all age groups above 50 declined, while those for people below that age they rose, owing 
to the success of past pension policies in providing adequate pension benefits. However, in view of 
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benefits. Thus, in the absence of longer work careers, it is likely that future generations of elderly 
citizens will be poorer more often than the rest of the population. 
The main purpose of the study conducted by Fall and Ferrari is to analyse the impact of 
demographic factors on pension systems and to consider the role that a reserve fund can play in the 
context of the adjustments needed to balance the accounts of the pension schemes. The study does 
not deal with the question of the financial management of the reserves. In particular, in the 
projections presented in the paper, a purely normative assumption has been used for the return on 
reserves, corresponding to the average return on bonds over the long period. Actually, reserve 
fund’s investments could turn out to be more profitable than the repayment of government debt, 
thereby generating leverage. A reserve fund can go overweight in risky (and hence high-yield) 
assets as long as the disbursement horizon is distant, thus benefiting from attractive returns 
combined with limited long-term risks. By defining its schedule of income and disbursements, the 
Pension Reserve Fund can optimise its returns for a given level of risk. However, even with a 
distant and well-defined disbursement horizon, investment in the Fund would still be riskier than 
paying down the public debt. Leverage is obviously not contradictory with the Fund’s assigned 
objective. But this leverage cannot be taken as the prime function of a reserve fund, and its size 
cannot be precisely calibrated on this basis. 
Commenting on the Barrell et al. paper, Cottarelli highlights some critical aspects. First, he 
suggests to verify whether there are empirical studies supporting the idea that raising the retirement 
age will increase people’s perception of their life expectancy. Second, the adoption in the paper of 
a unique equation describing the transfers of pensions and unemployment benefits to the population 
for all countries neglects the existence of the country-specific features of the pension system. Third, 
from a purely accounting perspective, stating that it is possible to finance the cost of the crisis by 
increasing the retirement age by two years is misleading, given that, even before the crisis, the 
increase was thought to be necessary to ensure debt stability in the long run in European countries. 
Concerning the paper by Zaidi, Cottarelli argues that the results could potentially be very sensitive 
to the measurement methods and the definition of poverty adopted. Therefore, some sensitivity 
analysis would be required to strengthen their robustness. He lists important drawbacks of using 
relative poverty measures, especially for pensioners. 
In his discussion of Brender’s paper, Follette suggests to investigate further into the 
adequacy of the Old-Age Allowances (OAA) program in preventing poverty for low- and 
moderate-income families, given that the stylised households used in the simulations may not 
capture all the variations in work and household formation experiences. He then elaborates on 
Brender’s conclusion that the mandatory defined contribution program is too large for many 
households as it will deliver too much income in the retirement years and result in too little 
disposable income during working years. He suggests to scale down the mandatory pension 
program in order to reduce the amount of over-saving at the low end of the distribution. The 
relative importance of the OAA and the pension plans could be shifted towards pensions 
proportional to income and away from the flat benefit. As regards the paper by Ramaiah, Follette 
argues that even if in India a newly-defined contribution scheme was recently introduced, coverage 
has not been expanded, and a series of risks have been shifted on to households. He then focuses on 
other points not addressed by the paper. How much did the public finances improve as a result of 
the reforms? Who paid for the financial hole in the PAYG system determined by the shift from 
PAYG to funded systems for new entrants? What options are available to expand coverage in the 
private sector? How do the administrative costs for the Indian plan compare with those of other 
countries?  
Before commenting on Franco et al. and Dekker et al., Paul examines the distribution of 
poverty among age groups in France in 2007, pointing out that, as stated in the first paper, poverty 
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family allowances are not means-tested and therefore are insufficiently targeted on low-revenue 
families. Paul raises a few criticisms about the use of poverty indicators expressed in monetary 
terms and notes that the informal economy, self-consumption and family support are not taken into 
account in measuring poverty. Turning to Dekkers et al., he notes that in France poverty among the 
elderly is lower than among the working age population. Nevertheless, there is a risk of a reversal 
of this situation as a consequence of the rise in unemployment, which makes it difficult to get full 
pension benefits, and of the ageing of the population, which threatens the financial balance of 
PAYG pension systems. He stresses that results from the MIDAS model should be taken with 
caution for different reasons. For instance, the model does not take into account incomes different 
from pensions. and even very small adjustments in the parameters related to demography and 
economic growth may substantially change the results. 
 
4  Pension reform and fiscal policy 
Session 4 examines the political economy of pension reforms and their role in the context of 
fiscal policy. 
The paper by Gonand investigates the issue of the choice of different reforms of the PAYG 
pillar on the basis of the degree of aversion to intergenerational inequality and the rate at which the 
welfare of future generations is discounted. The effects of pension reforms on economic growth, 
households’ intertemporal utility and social welfare are simulated with a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with overlapping generations parameterised on four countries with different 
demographic patterns (France, Germany, Japan and the United States). The model shows that a 
no-reform scenario, in which taxes are increased to balance spending, leads to a lower rate of 
economic growth. It also shows that no pension reform is Pareto-improving in the four countries 
considered: all reforms reduce the welfare of the baby-boomers and increase that of their children 
and future generations. If expenditure savings are achieved via cuts in the replacement rate, 
baby-boomers bear most of the welfare cost of the reform, while younger generations benefit from 
it. A rise in the average age of retirement would smooth the intergenerational redistributive effects 
associated with the reform. 
Carone and Eckefeldt evaluate the impact of recent pension reforms in EU countries on the 
basis of the 2009 round of long-term projections of pension expenditure carried out by the Ageing 
Working Group of the EU. In the coming decades, demographic factors are projected to be the 
main driver of pension expenditure growth. They are expected to be partly counterbalanced by the 
decline in the coverage ratio (thanks to the increase in the retirement age), less generous public 
pension transfers and the increase in the employment rate, especially of older workers. In several 
countries these developments have been enhanced by recent reforms. A comparison of the 2009 
projection exercise with that of 2006 gives some additional indications about the impact of recent 
reforms: in many countries the fall in coverage is more accentuated in the latter projection, thus 
offsetting the dependency effect to a greater extent. Moreover, in several countries the offsetting 
impact of the reduction in benefits has increased, compared with the 2006 projection. Both these 
developments reflect the effects of the pension reforms. The authors note that more policy action is 
necessary in many countries, in particular in order to increase the retirement age and the 
employment rate of older workers. 
Clavijo analyzes the pension and healthcare reforms implemented in Colombia in the 1990s 
and in the first decade of the new century. While pension reforms aimed at curbing expenditure, 
health reforms aimed at broadening the coverage of publicly-provided care. Parametric pension 
reforms focused on increasing the retirement age and curbing replacement rates. They reduced the 
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that further reforms are necessary to achieve fiscal sustainability. It is also necessary to improve the 
incentives implicit in pension rules, reduce payroll taxes levied on firms and increase the retirement 
age. Reforms have significantly increased healthcare coverage. This has boosted spending, which is 
now relatively high with respect to other countries. The public healthcare deficit is expected to 
increase further in the coming decades. Clavijo stresses that it is important to tackle the labour 
informality problem. Through their impact on contributions to pension and health systems, labour 
market reforms can have important effects on the public finances. 
The paper by Cunha, Paulo, Sousa Pereira and Reis examines the reforms implemented in 
the Portuguese pension system in recent years. From the mid-1970s pension expenditure increased 
fast because of generous pension rules and the ageing of the population. The reforms introduced in 
1992 and in 2002 have been reinforced by additional reforms in 2005 and in 2006. Key features of 
the latter were the curb on public sector employees’ special provisions, the introduction of a 
sustainability factor linking new pensions to life expectancy and the introduction of new rules for 
the indexation of benefits. The paper evaluates the implications of these rules, which are very 
progressive and will reduce the gap between larger and smaller pensions. They show that high 
wage contributors will have lower incentives to postpone retirement: they will face a trade-off 
between the initial pension level and the future updates. The authors also point to the need for a 
better understanding of how the sustainability factor affects the decision to retire. 
Matsuo examines the structure and prospects of the Japanese pension system in the context 
of the challenges posed by population ageing and the high current public debt. Social security 
expenditure accounts for almost half of the general expenditure in the Japanese budget and is 
growing rapidly. In the coming years the first baby-boomers will retire. Therefore, pension reform 
is deemed indispensable for the sustainability of social security and the overall Japanese fiscal 
position. Matsuo describes the main features and implications of the reform introduced in 2004, 
which aimed at making the pension system sustainable for the next 100 years and at limiting the 
burden for the working-age population. The reform set a ceiling on the pension system contribution 
rate and introduced a new mechanism for the indexation of pension benefits. Pensions will not be 
fully adjusted to changes in prices, either upward or downward. The reform has also set a minimum 
level of 50 per cent for the ratio of first and second pillar pensions to the average income of 
employees. 
Melguizo, Muñoz, Tuesta and Vial analyze the fiscal costs stemming from pension reforms 
introducing mandatory individual capital accounts managed by the private sector. They examine 
the experience of Chile, where individual capital accounts have been in operation for almost 30 
years. They also evaluate the more recent Chilean reform, which strengthened the solidarity pillar, 
and the pension reforms introduced in Colombia, Mexico and Peru. They argue that, while it is 
difficult to export the Chilean experience to other countries with different political and economic 
structures and institutions, the Chilean reform provides several important indications. It shows that 
a key factor for the success of a system based on individual retirement accounts is the proper 
functioning of market institutions, especially the financial markets. The protection of property 
rights and minority shareholders is crucial. Regulation is also important, though it can be 
introduced gradually and pragmatically. Fiscal policy is also paramount. The transition costs tend 
to be high and persistent, making fiscal consolidation prior to the reform advisable. The functioning 
of the labour market is also important: widespread informality limits the coverage of the pension 
system. If informality is pervasive, it may be necessary to establish a large solidarity pillar, 
although this can act as a disincentive to formalization. 
Langenus comments on the papers by Carone and Eckefeldt and by Gonand. Concerning the 
former paper, he notes that the new AWG projections show that, in spite of the new demographic 
scenarios and the recent reforms, the projected increase in pension expenditure in the coming 
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cautious about the assumption underlying the projections: the assumed increase in the employment 
rate of older workers may require changes in labour market institutions, and the decline in 
replacement ratios can raise social sustainability problems. Moreover, it is not clear whether the 
policy environment required to permit high net migration is or will actually be in place throughout 
the projection period. Langenus also points to the problems met in comparing AWG projections 
when trying to disentangle the impact of reforms, revised assumptions and changes in projection 
models. As regards the paper by Gonand, Langenus points to the difficulty of translating analytical 
results into clear policy recommendations. He notes that the comparison of utility, welfare, income 
and consumption levels of different cohorts is quite complicated. He suggests discounting the 
welfare of future generations. He also suggests that EU fiscal rules can help governments to take 
action in favour of future generations. In particular, more ambitious medium-term objectives can 
increase the pre-funding of ageing costs. 
Eckefeldt comments on the papers by Cunha et al. and Matsuo. With reference to the first 
paper, he writes that the pension reforms introduced in Portugal go a long way towards enhancing 
fiscal sustainability. The sustainability factor plays a big role in this regard, while the new 
indexation scheme presents interesting and innovative features. However, the substantial decrease 
in the benefit ratio introduces a risk element in terms of pension adequacy. Concerning this aspect, 
Eckefeldt notes that, in spite of the reforms, the benefit ratio for public employees will remain 
much higher than for the general social security pensions. The Japanese pension reform will also 
significantly reduce the income of pensioners compared to that of workers. Eckefeldt indicates that 
the guaranteed 50 per cent benefit ratio is achieved via an increase in the government contribution 
to the pension system, which will require a major tax reform. He praises the fact that the 2004 
reform enhances transparency and a more effective allocation of pension funds: this can increase 
the “political sustainability” of the pension system. The improved information to workers on their 
accrued pensions will raise awareness of retirement income and could also lead to an increase in 
private savings. 
Ter-Minassian, while appreciating the analysis carried out by Clavijo, argues that more 
details concerning the methodology and the assumptions used to project the future liabilities of the 
public pension system would allow readers to better assess their realism. A sensitivity analysis 
would also be useful. In addition, she suggests that Clavijo evaluate the political and social 
feasibility of his proposal to link the retirement age to life expectancy and to specify what further 
parametric changes would be necessary to reduce the replacement rates for the public system. As to 
the private pillar, she suggests to evaluate the impact of rates of return on pension portfolios lower 
than the historic figures, which appear relatively high in an international perspective. 
Ter-Minassian notes that the paper by Melguizo et al. presents an interesting overview of pension 
reforms in Chile, pointing both to achievements and shortcomings. The paper highlights the 
trade-offs between the social objective of preventing old-age poverty and the economic objectives 
of preserving incentives to contribute to the pension system and minimizing fiscal costs. She 
suggests that the authors expand the analysis of the 2006 reform, both in terms of the reform 
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While the empirical evidence tends to support some predictions of the life-cycle theory, a 
number of puzzles remain: an ageing-consumption, an ageing-saving, a saving-capitalisation and a 
saving-longevity puzzles have been put forward in the literature. This paper analyses the links 
between these puzzles and develops a model relating usual life-cycle variables, social transfers 
(public health care expenditures and the generosity of pension systems) to the level of savings. A 
reduced-form model using a panel of 18 OECD countries is tested, confirming the proposed 
explanations for the puzzles, together with other factors such as public deficits (Ricardian 
equivalence) and the population structure. We found that the relative generosity of welfare systems 
have a significant negative impact on household saving rate. It can also explain why the increase 
in longevity does not have had in general a positive impact on the household saving ratio. 
 
1 Motivation 
The life cycle model is the main framework used in economics to understand the relations 
between ageing, consumption and saving behaviour. While main predictions of the life cycle theory 
tend to be supported by empirical evidence, a number of puzzles remain. The literature has put 
forward four main types of puzzles: an ageing-consumption puzzle, an ageing-saving puzzle, a 
saving-capitalization puzzle and a saving-longevity puzzle. 
The first puzzle concerns the tendency for consumption to decrease in old age. This stylised 
fact observed in all OECD countries, seems to contradict the idea that households save in order to 
maintain their consumption level after retirement. Second, significant levels of savings are 
observed at old age. Another puzzling fact is that countries with generous PAYG system and health 
care system (welfare goods) have the highest private saving rate. In contrast, in countries where 
pension funds are well developed, the private saving rate is much lower. Finally, an increase in 
longevity by increasing the duration of the retirement period could be expected to increase the 
saving ratio.
1 However, when empirically tested, the sign of longevity variables in traditional 
saving equations is often negative. 
An extensive literature has put forward potential explanations for each of the puzzles, but, to 
our knowledge, there has been no attempt to bring all of them together in an integrated view. We 
argue in this paper that the four puzzles are interlinked. As discussed below, the interaction 
between consumption and provision of welfare goods and the level of retirement income can 
indeed explain a large part of these phenomena. In order to highlight the role of these determinants 
and their links, it is instrumental to compare household saving behaviour, health and retirement 
systems of two country groupings: those with PAYG systems and those with fully-funded systems. 
————— 
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Other traditional determinants of savings have also to be brought into the picture, in particular the 
role of Ricardian compensation between private and public savings, as well as income. 
The paper begins with a review of empirical facts on consumption, savings and pensions that 
generate the puzzles referred above. In order to guide our intuition concerning the relationships 
among the key variables, we develop in Section 3 a two-period life cycle model where we consider 
the optimal welfare consumption, welfare transfers, the generosity of pension systems and 
longevity. In Section 4, we get back to the facts and present some possible explanations of the 
ageing puzzles. In Section 5, we then present econometric panel estimates that combine both the 
relationships derived from the theoretical framework, other additional effects and controls often 
used in the empirical literature. A final section concludes. 
 
2  The ageing puzzles: consumption, saving and longevity 
The most useful framework to study the link between ageing, consumption and saving is the 
life cycle model (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Friedman, 1957). In its simplest version, 
individuals live two periods. In the first period each person earns a wage from his or her labour 
supply and in the second period the person is retired. Individuals save from their wage income to 
provide for second period consumption with a constant rate of interest (i.e., the rate of interest does 
not vary with the level of saving). The main result obtained from this framework is that the 
consumption is smoothed: the individuals will save in order to transfer purchasing power to the 
period of the retirement. 
But some empirical facts on consumption, pension and saving do not fit well with the basic 
life-cycle model. The first puzzle concerns the link between ageing and consumption. A large body 
of literature has found that consumption falls significantly at retirement, a fact somewhat in 
contradiction with life-cycle consumption smoothing. This applies over a number of countries (e.g. 
US, UK and Italy), across different time periods and across different measures of spending. This 
stylized fact is displayed in Figure 1, relating levels of household consumption by age for the US 
and several European countries. 
While household survey data suggest that total consumption displays a hump-shaped profile 
across age-groups,
2 this is not equivalent to say that the consumption profile is hump-shaped over 
the life cycle mainly due to the existence of cohort and time effects.
3 Nonetheless, they would 
suggest that the pure consumption-smoothing hypothesis is only partly supported by the micro 
data.
4 
Several explanations of this puzzle have been put forward. Allowing for uncertainty, Banks, 
Blundell and Tanner (1998) suggest that unanticipated shocks that occur around the time of 
retirement could explain the fall in spending within the context of the life-cycle model. Bernheim, 
Skinner and Weinberg (2001) suggested that workers do not adequately foresee the decline in 
income associated with the retirement. Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) argue that the drop in spending 
————— 
2  To be precise, the consumption profile is hump-shaped across households headed by individuals belonging to different age groups. 
3  Due to the lack of data, it will be assumed that the snapshot picture of total consumption per household by age-groups approximates 
the life-time consumption profile of a cohort (e.g. static ageing as opposed to dynamic ageing). This approach takes an agnostic 
view on how a combination of various household characteristics in conjunction with institutional factors in each country affects the 
life-cycle consumption pattern. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) suggest that the bias induced by the use of age-groups 
instead of cohorts may not be very large for the estimation of the hump-shaped consumption profiles. 
4  Attanasio (1999) provides an overview of competing theories of consumption behaviour over the life cycle. Note that when the age-
income profile is more hump-shaped than consumption, the above observed age-consumption patterns are still compatible with 
some consumption smoothing over the life cycle.   Consumption Structure, Welfare Goods and Retirement Income: Linking the Ageing Puzzles  31 
 
can still be explained by 
an extended version of 
the life-cycle model, 
where certain work-
related consumption 
expenditures stop at 
retirement and market-
purchased goods and 
services are substituted 
by household home 
production. The latter 
could be the case of 
long-term care services, 
which often are provided 
informally within 
families. However, in a 
more recent paper, Hurd 
and Rohwedder (2006) 
argue, like others, that 
the reduction in 
consumption cannot be 
explained by the simple 
one-good life cycle 
model with forward-
looking consumers. 
Many factors such as 
leisure or poor health 
could also explain the 
decline in spending. 
Along these lines, Smith 
(2007) argues that 
retirement is involuntary, 
largely reflecting ill 
health status and 
redundancy, and likely to 
be associated with a 
negative wealth shock. 
The second puzzle 
is closely related to the 
previous one, although is 
not equivalent. With 
a certain stability of 
retirement incomes and a 
decline in consumption, 
positive saving at old 
ages can be observed 
(see Börsch-Supan et al., 
2000; Börsch-Supan and 
Winter, 2001). However, 
it is puzzling that 
Figure 1 
The Consumption-saving Puzzle 
United States 
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey, US, 2002; Household Budget Survey of Eurostat and 
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individuals cannot anticipate this fact and continue to save at old age, in particular in countries with 
generous welfare goods (high pension replacement rates and health care coverage). 
Bloom et al. (2003) and Sheshinski (2004) suggest that higher life expectancy may increase 
the need for additional precautionary savings, despite the effect of improved health care on the 
length of desired working life. Moore and Mitchell (1998) also conclude that Americans are not 
preparing adequately for retirement as a couple would need to save 20 per cent of annual earnings 
between 1992 and the time of retirement (at 62) to have a replacement rate of 61 per cent. A single 
woman would need to save around 32 per cent of her income to have a replacement ratio of 
54 per cent at age of 62. They conclude, despite seemingly large accumulations of total retirement 
wealth, the majority of older households will not be able to maintain current levels of consumption 
into retirement without additional saving. Bernheim et al. (2001) argue their results are difficult to 
reconcile with the life-cycle model and that they are more likely to be the result of household 
behaviour not governed by rational, farsighted optimization. Khitatrakun and Scholz (2004) note 
that tax incentives, like IRAs and 401(k) are not needed and may lead to excess savings. Finally, a 
largely evoked, but not well documented, reason for saving at older ages is the existence of bequest 
motives. 
The third puzzle arises from the fact that countries with fully funded systems have the lowest 
private saving rates. In principle, the introduction of a fully-funded pension system should induce a 
decline in the replacement rate of PAYG systems and, according to the life-cycle model, increase 
aggregate savings. Figure 2 shows that while saving rates have been decreasing steadily in all 
countries, the countries with PAYG systems have persistently displayed higher household saving 
rates and the gap has widened over time. 
In a seminal paper, Feldstein (1974) highlighted a negative link between PAYG pension 
systems and household savings. But, subsequent empirical tests on the impact of pension systems 
on household saving have produced mixed results (e.g., Edwards, 1996; Callen-Thimann, 
 
1997; Corsetti, Schmidt-
Hebbel, 1995)  and 
Murphy and Musalem, 
2004). Confirming earlier 
Feldstein’s results, 
Edwards (1996) found 
that the social security 
system has a negative 
impact on private saving 
using a sample of 32 
countries (developed and 
developing countries). 
Baillu and Reisen (1997) 
also found a positive and 
statistically significant 
impact of pension funds 
on savings using a panel 
of 11 countries for the 
period 1982-93. In more 
recent study, Bosworth 
and Burtless  (2004) did 
not find an 
econometrically signific-
ant impact on private  Source: OECD ABD Database and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 2 
The Saving-capitalisation Puzzle 
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saving for a set of 11 countries during the period 1971-2000. Murphy and Musalem (2004) 
considered 43 countries for the period 1960-2002 and found that mandatory contribution to funded 
pension systems increase national saving. It could be noted that it is quite difficult to compare these 
studies due to the heterogeneity of samples and estimation methods. 
That the introduction of pension systems may decrease, increase or be neutral on savings has 
several potential explanations. Under defined benefits, if pension wealth can be seen as a substitute 
for private accumulation and therefore there could be a decrease of the household saving when a 
pension system is introduced. Moreover, pensions are usually paid in the form of annuities. 
Without pension annuities, the employee would be forced to accumulate more to finance their 
retirement period. Thus, by offering annuities, pension plans could reduce savings. Another 
explanation is related to earlier retirement decision, as individuals who retire earlier are forced to 
save more in order to finance a longer period of retirement. Imperfect capital markets can also 
prevent households from borrowing freely, thereby forcing them to save more than they otherwise 
would. In this case, insofar as mandatory private pension funds may increase financial deepening 
and reduce borrowing constraints they would decrease household savings. 
The fourth puzzle is related to the impact to impact of longevity. Bloom et al. (2003) argued 
that higher life expectancy should lead to an increase of precautionary savings, but empirical work 
has often suggested an opposite sign. This could be seen as a sort of “saving-longevity puzzle”. 
More recently, Bloom et al. (2006) have also shown that in the absence of strong saving retirement 
incentives, such as in PAYG systems, an increase in longevity does not induce higher savings. 
 
3  Ageing consumption, saving and longevity: theory 
To guide our investigation of the ageing puzzles, we now develop a simple life-cycle model. 
Following Bohn  (1999) and Chakraborty  (2004), we consider a two period overlapping 
generation’s model with a survival probability.
5 This provides a tractable framework to think about 
the different determinants of savings at the individual level. Our aim is to consider the institutional 
settings of the welfare system during retirement and how they impact saving behaviour. Therefore, 
we specify a model combining Pay-as-you-go (PAYG), funded pension retirement incomes and 
welfare transfers (e.g. public health insurance). Each agent lives two periods and optimises her/his 
consumption and saving over the life-cycle. In the first period, each agent splits her disposable 
wages wi into consumption (Ci) and saving (Si): 
  i i i w S C ). 1 ( α − = +  (1) 
where α is the rate of social contributions. In the second period, we assume that only a welfare 
good consumption (e.g. Health) is considered Hi.
6 As we are mainly interested in the demand-side 
drivers of household savings, we assume here that income growth and the interest rate are 
pre-determined. 
To finance consumption in the second period, the agent receives a PAYG pension with a 
replacement rate β, the accumulated saving accrued by the return on capital r and a given amount 
of welfare transfers T. Note that the amount of savings accumulated for the second period has to be 
scaled down by the survival probability pi, given that when it increases you have to spread your 
————— 
5  See also Drouhin (2002). In another context, Jorgensen and Jensen (2008) also incorporate the survival probability a stochastic OLG 
model with endogenous labour supply. 
6  This assumption does not entail a loss of generality in the model, as we could have introduced a composite consumption good in the 
form δ.C + (1–δ).H, with the weight δ changing from period 1 to period 2. 34  Najat El-Mekkaoui de Freitas and Joaquim Oliveira Martins 
consumption over a longer retirement period.
7 By definition, the income from the PAYG system and 
the welfare transfers are not affected by changes in the longevity (at least at the individual level): 
  i i
i
i i T S
p
r




. β  (2) 
Note that we did not introduce a pure time-preference parameter, as usual in perfect foresight 
models. Under uncertainty, the survival probability captures the effect of the discounting parameter 
(see Chakraborty, 2004).
8 To simplify, we omitted the index corresponding to the time period. 
Solving for Si in (2) and replacing into (1), we obtain the inter-temporal budget constraint: 
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First-order conditions imply that:  
 











where λi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Using these conditions we 
obtain the usual consumption smoothing rule: 











As in Bohn (1999) and Chakraborty (2004), we assume thereafter that the u(C) = Log(C) and 
idem for H.
9 We get then a simple relation between Ci and Hi:  
  i i C r H ⋅ + = ) 1 (  (7) 
Now replacing (7) into the budget constraint: 
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+ ⋅ − = ⋅ + β α  (8) 
The optimal level of consumption in each period can be derived: 
 













































7  Using a survival probability is identical to modelling the length of life in the retirement period. Note that this probability gives an 
indication of the life expectancy. By normalising the duration of one period to one, life expectancy is by definition (1+p). For 
example, if period 1 is equal to 60 years and total life expectancy is 84, the survival probability in this context is (24/60)=0.4. 
8  See Bohn (2001) and Jensen and Jørgensen (2008) for an alternative specification. 
9  A log utility implies homothetic preferences. Nonetheless, the main results of the model used in this paper derive from the existence 
of the conditional life expectancy and from the intertemporal budget constraint.   Consumption Structure, Welfare Goods and Retirement Income: Linking the Ageing Puzzles  35 
By using the expression for the optimal consumption above and equation (1), we derive the optimal 
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The derivative the optimal saving ratio s vis-à-vis the survival probability has interesting properties, 
when interacted with key parameters characterising the generosity of the welfare system. 
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  (11) 
For reasonably small values of β, an increase of the survival probability increases the saving 
ratio. This is the expected intuitive result, i.e. when an individual experiences a higher longevity 
he/she has to save more in order to ensure an adequate consumption level in the second period. 
Assume that the interest rate is equal to 3 per cent, the contribution rate is 20 per cent and the 
welfare transfers are equivalent to 10 per cent of the wage income. From (11), the threshold for the 
replacement rate is around 72 per cent. For larger values of this parameter, an increase in the 
survival probability induces a decrease in the saving ratio. The intuition is as follows. Assume that 
α, r and T are equal to zero, and β > 1. This implies a negative saving ratio (equation 10). Then an 
increase of the survival probability would generate an expected income above the initial 
consumption level. Consumption smoothing would then require a higher consumption and lower 
saving.
10 To some extent, variation in the welfare transfers ratio (Ti/wi) also induces a change in the 
sign of  i p s ∂ ∂ , but only for very large values of β. 
Under the current prevailing replacement rates in most OECD countries, our model could 
therefore provide an explanation for a possible negative effect of longevity on savings. The 
“longevity puzzle” would be only a priori in contradiction with life-cycle theory. 
The derivatives of the saving ratio (s) vis-à-vis the other key parameters in the model are 
defined in a non-ambiguous way, as follows: 
  0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ≥ ∂ ∂ ≥ ∂ ∂ ≤ ∂ ∂ ≤ ∂ ∂ ≤ ∂ ∂ i i i w s r s s T s s α β  (12) 
The saving rate is expected to be a decreasing function of the replacement ratio, welfare 
transfers to older people and the rate of social contributions (α). In other words, the systems 
providing large transfers and generous retirement income (typically PAYG) are expected to have 
ceteris paribus lower individual saving rates. Conversely, the saving ratio depends positively from 
income and the interest rate. 
Assuming that all individuals are identical in each period, one can derive an aggregate saving 
by taking the weighted average of savings of the two segments of the population. Given that 
savings in the second period are by definition zero, the aggregate saving ratio is simply the product 
of the individual saving rate by the share of the active people on total population (or one minus the 










































α  (13) 
where S and Y are aggregate saving and gross household income. As suggested by life-cycle theory, 
————— 
10  In the case where there is no perfect consumption smoothing, an increase of the replacement income could actually induce excess 
savings in the second period. 
(10) 36  Najat El-Mekkaoui de Freitas and Joaquim Oliveira Martins 
the aggregate saving ratio is expected to be negatively related to the share of old people in the 
population. 
 
4  Back to the empirical evidence 
There are a number of additional empirical facts that combined with the insights from the 
theoretical model may help to understand the ageing puzzles. 
The first fact relates to consumption structure and how it evolves with age. Household 
survey data allow an assessment of the age-group specific composition of consumption expenditure 
by broad categories of goods and services. Figure 3 shows the relative level of consumption for 
main items and age group for the US. Most expenditure items display a hump-shaped profile. The 
consumption level per capita increases steadily with age, peaks at middle-age then decreases. Only 
health consumption increases with age. The same profiles can be observed for other countries 
(cfr. Oliveira Martins et al., 2005). 
While health care is one the few consumption items increasing with age,
11 it is also heavily 
subsidised. The shares of publicly provided health services to household income increased steadily 
countries (e.g. France, Sweden, UK and USA, see Figure 4). The ratios varying from 5-7 per cent 
of household income in UK and US to 10-15 per cent in France and Sweden. 
At the same time, average replacement rates increased in most countries (Figure 5).
12 For 
example, in France, Italy and Portugal they reached above 80 per cent. In US, starting from a lower 
basis they reached close to 55 per cent in the early 2000s. In Sweden they have declined following 
pension reform to around 55 per cent. By 2003, average replacement rates in PAYG systems are 
around 58 per cent compared with 44 per cent in fully-funded systems. As many PAYG systems 
are currently unsustainable, this should induce a decline in replacement rates over time. 
How the interrelations among these basic facts can explain the puzzles? The changing 
structure of consumption with age, together with a large subsidy for welfare goods and increasing 
replacement rates could provide an explanation for both the ageing-consumption and ageing-saving 
puzzles. If old-age consumers shift their consumption structure towards goods that are heavily 
subsidised and receive substantial retirement income, this could both induce a decline of observed 
consumption expenditures and a surplus of saving at older ages. This hypothesis will be tested in 
the next section. 
To investigate how the saving rates are related to the introduction of fully-funded systems, 
we ran a simple regression of household saving
13 rates (SAVit) on the rate of capitalisation (CAPit, 
defined as the ratio of pension fund assets on GDP) for a set of 25 OECD countries for the period 
1993-2005. We use both an OLS pooled regression and a fixed-effect model. To avoid a potential 




11  Note that age by itself is not a major driver of health care expenditures, but other factors such as the proximity to death, the effects 
of income and technological progress. In contrast, the expenditures of long-term care are mainly determined by the age profile (see 
Oliveira Martins and de la Maisonneuve, 2007, for a discussion). 
12  Average replacement rates are defined here as the ratio between average pension benefits to gross average wages. They were 
computed using the data OECD Pension and ADB databases. 
13  Household saving is defined here as household disposable income less consumption. Household income consists primarily of the 
compensation of employees, self-employment income, and transfers. Property and other income – essentially dividends and interest 
– are evaluated in the light of business income and debt interest flows. The sum of these elements is adjusted for direct taxes and 
transfers paid to give household disposable income. Note that SNA93/ESA95 has changed the concept of disposable income for 
households (compared with SNA68/ESA79) so as to include private pension benefits and subtract private pension contributions.  














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: OECD Health and ADB databases. 
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Capitalisation appears negatively correlated to saving rates. As our theoretical model 
suggests that PAYG systems should display lower not higher saving rates (see Figure 2), this is a 
saving-capitalisation puzzle. A possible explanation could be related to compensation between 
private and public savings or Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974). When government budgets are 
running on debt or public pension systems are not sustainable, households anticipate a required 
increase in future taxes and/or lower transfers and adjust their current level of savings accordingly. 
To check this point, we split our sample in two groups of countries: those offering a large coverage 
by PAYG and those having large fully-funded systems. The latter group include Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and the US. All these countries have private 
pension assets close or above 100 per cent of GDP. 
In both groups, the countries with the largest budget deficits also display the largest saving 
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Legend: SAV: household saving rates (in percent of Household income); BAL: Public budget balance (in percent of GDP). 
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Now, if we run the same regressions for the sub-set of OECD countries with fully-funded 
systems we obtain the following results: 
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The OLS pooled regression model shows a positive impact between capitalisation and saving 
ratios. However, the introduction of fixed-effects changes the sign of the capitalisation coefficient. 
In other words, within countries, the increase in capitalisation is concomitant with a decrease in 
saving rates. A possible way to reconcile this result with our model would be to take into account 
the widespread increase of replacement rates, noted above. Despite the introduction of fully-funded 
systems, the latter could still induce a decline in savings. 
 
5  Revisiting the ageing puzzles: empirical tests 
Drawing from the above results, we are now in a position to test a reduced-from model 
embodying both the long-term determinants of the saving rates suggested by the theoretical model, 
as well as other determinants. The specification accounts for a variety of saving determinants 
identified in the literature (e.g. Edwards, 1996; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven, 2000; 
Musalem 2004). The list is as follows: 
(i)  Short-term and macroeconomic determinants: 
-  Public budget balance (in percent GDP) 
-  GDP per capita growth 
-  Long term real interest rate 
(ii)  Social security and welfare systems determinants: 
-  Ratio of Public health expenditures on Household income
14 (proxy for the provision of welfare 
goods) 
-  Average replacement rate (in public and private pension systems)
15 
(iii) Structure of the population: 
-  Shares of prime (25-59) and old-age (60+) population 
-  Ratio of life expectancy at 60 to life expectancy at birth
16 
To test for the hypothesis discussed above, we also introduced interaction terms. The first 
term is the product of public health spending ratio with the replacement rate. This captures the 
combined effect of the subsidization of health goods and pension income. By creating an excess 
income at older ages, it is expected to have a positive sign on total household savings. The second 
————— 
14  Note that the ratio to household income is a better measure of the amount of transfers than GDP, as the latter by definition does not 
include the PAYG income. 
15  We used this variable because it the only available for a large sample of countries and years. A better proxy could eventually be the 
replacement rate of the retiring cohort in each year. 
16  As noted above, in the context of our two-period life-cycle model, the survival probability can be defined as the ratio of the numbers 
of years in retirement (period 2) to the numbers of years in period 1 (taken at 60 years). It is then straightforward to see that the term 
pi/(1+pi) in equation (13) is equal to ratio of life expectancy at 60 divided by the life expectancy at birth. 42  Najat El-Mekkaoui de Freitas and Joaquim Oliveira Martins 
 
term is the product of the replacement rate by the share of the old population. While a high 
replacement rate may discourage saving for the active population, it may also contribute to 
generate excess income after retirement. 
The empirical test covers 18 OECD countries
17 and the period 1970-2003. Annex 1 provides 
descriptive statistics on the different variables used in the regressions. The estimates were carried 
out using country fixed-effects. A time trend captures an eventual spurious correlation among 
saving rates and explanatory variables (alternative specifications are also provided in Annex). We 
also present separate regressions for the sub-set countries with mainly PAYG and fully-funded 
systems.
18 
Most estimated coefficients are significant and have the expected sign (Table 1). The level of 
the public budget balance has a negative impact on savings, i.e. budget deficits tend to increase the 
saving rates. Among others, this result is compatible with the Ricardian equivalence, although the 
size of the estimated coefficient is below one indicating that there is no full compensation between 
public and private savings.
19 This helps explaining the saving-capitalisation puzzle, as suggested 
above. 
The real interest rates impact positively saving rates, though the former not being significant 
in PAYG countries. The coefficient of GDP per capita growth is negative. But this control has 
often an ambiguous sign in saving equations. In line with the life-cycle model, an increase in the 
share of old-age population (60-99 years) has a strong negative impact on the saving rate for the 
total sample and for the PAYG systems. The share of prime-age population (25-59 years) is only 
significant for PAYG countries. 
More importantly, in accordance to our theoretical framework, the generosity of pension 
systems and subsidisation of health goods impact negatively on saving rates. Both the Public health 
expenditure ratio and the average replacement rate have negative and significant coefficients for 
the overall sample. The magnitude of the effects for the health transfers is large. An increase of one 
percentage point of public health spending ratio to household income induces on average a 
decrease of 1.7 percentage points in the household saving rate (ranging from 0.5 to 2.5 percentage 
points in the sample).
20 In contrast, the combined effect of the replacement rate is rather small. 
The estimates also show that larger health transfers combined with pension income has a 
positive impact on the saving ratio. This helps explaining the ageing-saving puzzle. The interaction 
between replacement rates and the share of old-age population has also a positive impact on 
savings. This result is compatible with the fact that old-aged households could display excess 
income when there is no perfect consumption smoothing (see footnote 10). 
Finally, the sign of the life expectancy ratio is negative but not significant. This is 
compatible with equation (11) above, showing that the impact of survival probability on savings is 
not monotonic. The time-trend is also not significant. In annex additional specifications were also 
carried out, basically confirming the results from the base specification. 
 
————— 
17  Unfortunately, not all variables were available to all OECD countries thus the sample had to be restrained to Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK 
and the US. 
18  PAYG systems: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden; Fully-funded 
systems: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK and the US. 
19  This is line with other empirical results in the literature (e.g., Serres and Pelgrin, 2003; de Mello, Kongsrud and Price, 2004). 




Econometric Estimates of Household Saving Rate
* 
 
  Total  PAYG systems  Fully-Funded Systems
  (1) (2) (3) 




  (–6.814) (–5.977) (–3.261) 
Real interest rate  0.183
**  0.0818 0.299
** 
  (2.356)  (1.016) (2.073) 




  (–5.628) (–6.789) (–2.778) 
Share of pop 25-59  0.165  0.693
**  0.676 
 (0.607)  (2.168)  (0.962) 
Share of pop 60-99  –2.031
*** –1.734
***  –1.681 
  (–3.509) (–2.790) (–1.605) 
Public health exp. ratio  –3.277
***  –0.864  –3.822
*** 
  (–5.622)  (–1.026)  (–2.921) 
Public health exp. ratio*replacement rate  0.0250
**  –0.0170 0.0294 
  (2.158)  (–1.202) (0.854) 
Replacement rate  –0.588
***  –0.0761 –0.268 
  (–3.726)  (–0.477) (–0.540) 
Replacement rate*Pop 60-99  0.0282
*** 0.0190
*  0.00668 
 (2.878)  (1.917)  (0.231) 
Ratio Life exp. 60/Life exp. birth  –31.72  –61.47  –10.03 
 (–0.420)  (–0.605)  (–0.0739) 
Time trend  0.113  0.180  –0.1000 
 (0.863)  (1.135)  (–0.344) 
Constant  65.56
**  23.78 37.51 
  (2.468)  (0.647) (0.771) 
Number of observations  245  134  111 
Number of countries  18  11  7 
R-squared  (within)  0.647 0.719 0.716 
F-Test 36.0  26.0  21.36 
p-value  0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
*  Defined as household saving on household income. All models include country Fixed-effects (not reported). T-statistics are in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Hausman specification test of the fixed-effects vs. the random-effect model is also 
provided (p-values in parenthesis indicate the fixed-effect cannot be rejected at 95 per cent confidence level). 
PAYG systems: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden; Fully-funded systems: 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK and the US. 44  Najat El-Mekkaoui de Freitas and Joaquim Oliveira Martins 
 
 
6 Concluding  remarks 
Some empirical facts on consumption, pension and saving do not fit well with theory. Four 
types of puzzles have emerged: an ageing-consumption, an ageing-saving, a saving-capitalisation 
and a saving-longevity puzzle. While most studies in the literature have analysed these puzzles 
separately, the originality of this paper is to integrate these four puzzles together. We developed a 
life-cycle theoretical model. Inspired from this model and a number of other determinants of 
savings analysed in the literature, we then estimated a reduced-form econometric model. 
Our empirical results show that the four puzzles are linked together. The changing structure 
of consumption with age, together with a large subsidy for welfare goods and increasing 
replacement rates provides an explanation for both the ageing-consumption and ageing-saving 
puzzles. If old-age consumers shift their consumption structure towards goods that are heavily 
subsidised and receive increased retirement income, this induces a decline of consumption and a 
surplus of saving at older ages. Accordingly, higher replacement rates and larger public provision 
of health care contribute negatively to the savings rate. Furthermore, the level of the public budget 
balance has a negative impact on savings. This explains the observed saving-capitalisation puzzle. 
Finally, in line with standard life-cycle effects, we also showed that an increase in the share of the 
old-age population has a strong negative impact on the saving rate. 
Finally, concerning the longevity-saving puzzle, our estimates did not provide significant 
results. Nonetheless, our theoretical model can explain why with large replacement rates an 
increase of the survival probability may induce a negative effect on savings. 




Descriptive Statistics of the Variables used in the Econometric Estimates 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
    
Household saving ratio  612 10.08  6.26  –12.82  30.23 
Public budget balance  529 –2.78  3.45  –16.38  7.84 
Real interest rate  599 3.05  3.64 –17.82 14.25 
GDP per capita growth  675  2.18  2.37 –9.16 10.70 
Share of pop 25-59  507  46.08 2.89 37.44 51.79 
Share of pop 60-99  522  16.76 3.10 10.53 24.85 
Public health exp. ratio  535 9.39  2.68  3.13  16.22 
Public health exp. ratio*replacement rate  329 526.20 181.14 194.71  961.48 
Replacement rate  392 52.61  13.78  28.78  89.87 
Replacement rate*Pop 60-99  355 929.74 347.44 369.78 2007.54 
Ratio Life exp. 60/Life exp. birth  681 0.26  0.01  0.23  0.30 
    
 
ANNEX 2 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS WITH ALTERNATIVE ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES 
In order to test the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications, we also carried out 
estimates using the random-effect model (Table  3) and the dynamic panel estimator using the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) method (Table  4). Note that, according to the Hausman test, the 
random-effect model is not accepted against the fixed-effect model (our preferred specification). 
In general, the signs of estimated coefficients are robust. The long-term real interest rate, the 
GDP per capita growth and public budget balance keep the same signs and roughly the same 
magnitudes. The share of old-age (60+) population also remains negative, while the effect of the 
share of prime-age populations is positive. The health expenditure ratio (the proxy for the provision 
of welfare goods) is robustly negative, as well as the replacement rate. The interaction terms are 
also robust as they display the same signs as in the base specification. The coefficient on the 
relative life expectancy only appears negative in the case of the random-effect panel and for funded 
systems. 




Econometric Estimates of Household Saving Rate, Random-effect Model
* 
 
  Total  PAYG Systems  Fully-funded Systems 
  (1) (2) (3) 




  (–6.775) (–4.432) (–2.147) 
Real interest rate  0.149
*  0.194 0.227 
  (1.907)  (1.573) (1.403) 




  (–5.390) (–3.229) (–3.126) 




  (2.192) (5.551) (9.375) 
Share of pop 60-99  –1.234
**  –0.343 0.163 
  (–2.402)  (–0.898) (0.155) 




  (–6.349) (–3.653) (–3.373) 




  (3.109) (2.158) (2.165) 
Replacement rate  –0.524
*** –0.612
***  –0.148 
  (–3.364) (–2.752) (–0.412) 
Replacement rate*Pop 60-99  0.0179
** 0.0148
**  –0.0211 
  (2.018) (1.977)  (–0.870) 
Ratio Life exp. 60/Life exp. birth  –60.07  36.98  –368.2
*** 
 (–0.897)  (0.856)  (–4.196) 
Time trend  0.00446  –0.0650  –0.645
*** 
  (0.0386)  (–0.745)  (–6.086) 
Constant  49.28
**  –0.785 16.61 
  (2.066) (–0.0372) (0.675) 
Number of observations  245  134  111 
Number of countries  18  11  7 
R-squared  (within)  .. .. .. 
Wald-test  377.3 402.8 307.9 
Hausman-test (p-value)  37.23  99.64  .. 
 (0.0)  (0.0)  .. 
 
*  Defined as household saving on household income. T-statistics are in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. The Hausman 
specification test of the fixed-effects vs. the random-effect model is also provided (p-values in parenthesis indicate the fixed-effect 
cannot be rejected at 95 per cent confidence level). 
PAYG systems: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden; Fully-funded systems: 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK and the US. 




Econometric Estimates of Household Saving Rate, Dynamic Panel Estimates
* 
 
  Total  PAYG Systems  Fully-funded Systems 
  (1) (2) (3) 




  (10.57) (5.898) (6.127) 




  (–4.181) (–4.551) (–1.901) 
Real interest rate  0.153
** 0.197
***  0.145 
  (2.491) (2.824) (1.331) 




  (–7.373) (–7.815) (–3.688) 
Share of pop 25-59  0.102  0.213  0.451 
  (0.476) (0.789) (0.762) 
Share of pop 60-99  –0.958
* –2.143
***  0.251 
  (–1.858) (–3.388)  (0.255) 
Public health exp. ratio  –2.351
***  –0.239  –2.043
* 
  (–5.027)  (–0.280)  (–1.931) 
Public health exp. ratio*replacement rate  0.0197
**  –0.0170 –0.000989 
  (2.149)  (–1.202) (–0.0364) 
Replacement rate  –0.356
**  –0.267 0.297 
  (–2.348)  (–1.355) (0.721) 
Replacement rate*Pop 60-99  0.0133  0.0297
***  –0.0105 
 (1.514)  (2.787)  (–0.430) 
Ratio Life exp. 60/Life exp. birth  30.40  –88.72  –23.37 
 (0.548)  (–1.056)  (–0.232) 
Time trend  0.0403  0.287
**  –0.0794 
 (0.428)  (2.164)  (–0.342) 
Constant  26.57 48.67 0.891 
 (1.342)  (1.549)  (0.0221) 
Number of observations  215  116  99 
Number of countries  18  11  7 
 
*  Defined as household saving on household income. Regressions were carried out using the dynamic Arellano-Bond estimator. 




PAYG systems: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden; Fully-funded systems: 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK and the US. 
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 PUBLIC PENSIONS AND THE LABOUR MARKET IN NEW ZEALAND 
Paul Rodway
* 
From 1977, New Zealand has had one of the simplest public pension systems in the world, a 
basic, universal pension – concentrating on the prevention of poverty in old age, with some 
success. The present set-up implies that without means tests, recipients can continue working, 
receiving a practically universal payment from their 65
th birthday, and with only limited options for 
taking the pension before age 65. 
This paper samples work done at the New Zealand Treasury about the drivers of the decision 
to cease being active in the labour market. Hurnard (2005) analysed how changes in the eligibility 
age for New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) twice in the past 30 or so years have influenced older 
people’s decisions to participate actively in the labour market. Enright and Scobie (2009) have 
recently used survey data to quantify the separate effects of NZS, other income, health status, 
education, marital status, wealth, and so on, on the decision to participate for older workers, or to 
reduce the hours of working. 
While labour participation of older workers has risen since the gradual lift in the eligibility 
age from 60 to 65 between 1992 and 2001, there still is a 50 per cent fall-off in participation 
between people aged 60-64 and 65-69 year olds. So New Zealand Superannuation, despite having 
no explicit financial disincentives, is still for many older than 65 a barrier to continued 
participation in the labour market. The coming acceleration of population ageing means that 




This paper reviews recent work done in the New Zealand Treasury on potential drivers of 
older people’s decisions to reduce the hours spent working or to withdraw completely from the 
paid workforce. It shows that the country relies almost on a universal public scheme where the 
objective is poverty prevention, rather than publicly supported income replacement. 
Population ageing is likely to increase the number of people 65 and older over the next 
40-plus years and produce little growth in the population between 15 and 64. This structural change 
will challenge New Zealand’s long-term economic growth prospects and our ability to maintain a 
stable public debt path. A way of meeting part of this challenge might be for older people to work 
longer (either by extending their paid working lives or working for more hours or both) and public 
policy may have a role in facilitating such a change. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the pension system in operation in 
New Zealand since 1977, while Section 3 shows how older people have participated in the labour 
market in New Zealand and compares this with participation in other OECD countries. 
Section 4 then updates work done by Hurnard (2005) analysing how employment and 
retirement patterns among older people have responded to changes in public pension policy, 
especially to the age of eligibility for the universal pension (now called New Zealand 
————— 
* New  Zealand  Treasury. 52 Paul  Rodway 
Superannuation, NZS). The modelling indicates that eligibility for NZS is accompanied by a fall in 
participation of at least 24 percentage points. 
 While the aggregate modelling says something about the effects of NZS on participation of 
older people, sorting out the relative effects of many potential drivers requires analysis of detailed 
survey results. Since Hurnard’s paper was published, work on two surveys has given us some 
insights into this issue. 
Then Section 5 picks up some of the results of Enright and Scobie (2009, forthcoming) about 
the factors associated with people aged 55-70 continuing in the labour force on a full- or part-time 
basis, rather than retiring. This study uses the first wave of a new longitudinal survey of health, 
work and retirement conducted by Massey University in 2006. Relative to being married to a 
non-working spouse, being separated, a widow/er or married with a working spouse tends to raise 
the probability of remaining in the labour force, while receiving NZS (or a benefit) lowers the 
working probability (by 16 percentage points). Levels of significance of these factors are briefly 
compared with results using Statistics New Zealand’s Survey of Family, Income and Employment 
(2002-05) restricting the sample to 55 and older. 
Finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions from these studies about the policy implications 
for labour participation by older New Zealanders. 
 
2  Public pensions in New Zealand 
A small country, as far from Europe as it is possible to be, New Zealand has conducted many 
social experiments, including introducing a public pension system in 1898. Since then, in this area, 
we have tried targeting, universality, different levels of generosity, dual public pensions, and 
changes in the eligibility age of our public pension system. The regime introduced in 1977 set up 
the broad outlines of the present NZS. 
Pension systems have two main goals: first, to prevent destitution in old age by redistributing 
income to poor pensioners (social protection) and secondly to help workers maintain their living 
standards in retirement (earnings replacement). NZS follows the New Zealand (and Anglo 
countries’) tradition of coming down firmly on the side of social protection. 
International and national reports rate New Zealand’s universal flat-rate public pension 
scheme highly in achieving the objective of the prevention of poverty in old age. For many, NZS is 
a major source of retirement income. Figure 1 shows that the poverty rates for New Zealanders 
aged 65 and over compare very favourably with other OECD countries (also see OECD, 2009). 
Positive Ageing Indicators (a report released by the Ministry of Social Development, 2007) 
says older people in New Zealand generally have adequate incomes that provide them with a 
reasonable standard of living. This assessment varies with population subgroups and is not so 
positive for older Māori and single people, especially single women. The adequacy of NZS 
payments is reflected in the low levels of poverty and hardship among the older population. The 
report says this conclusion also depends on the high levels of mortgage-free home ownership in the 
current cohort of older people. It is important, the report notes, that future generations of older 
people enter retirement as home-owners – either mortgage-free or with small mortgages – as 
mortgage-holders and those who live in rental accommodation are among the most disadvantaged. 
That report ties NZS with other forms of savings and wealth. Are we saving enough so that 
consumption can continue beyond the years of paid work?  Research by Scobie and his 
collaborators (2007, for example) on modelling consumption smoothing for 45- to 64-year-olds 
based on wealth surveyed in the Survey of Family, Income and Employment (SoFIE) suggests that 
the highest proportion of inadequate savers fall in the middle income group (couples with incomes   Public Pensions and the Labour Market in New Zealand  53 
 
Figure 1 
Lower Poverty Rates among Older People than for the Total Population 
in One-third of OECD Countries 































Source: OECD (2005), Society at a Glance, Social Indicators. 
 
between $15,000 and $50,000). As expected, for the majority of people in the lower income group 
(quintile 1) no further saving should be required as NZS offers a higher income than their projected 
pre-retirement income. Wealthy individuals and couples (quintile 5) would not need to save more 
than they are doing already. Overall, 70 per cent of single individuals and 50 per cent of couples 
are estimated to require no more saving for retirement. This work, in other words, suggests that for 
the majority, NZS is playing a role at providing a base for consumption in retirement for the lower 
income groups. 
Since 1977, New Zealand has changed the parametric settings many times, often after heated 
debate, and has twice made changes, with little warning, to the age at which the pension can be 
taken up. Promises to improve settings are often part of political platforms and these settings are 
the subject of deals between potential coalition partners. 
The latest change to the NZ pension system is the addition of an auto-enrolment scheme with 
private individual accounts (KiwiSaver), a variant of a compulsory scheme that was introduced in 
1975 and lasted for only a year and another proposed scheme that was comprehensively rejected in 
a referendum in 1997. The first KiwiSaver accounts were opened on 1 July 2007 and it has been 
taken up enthusiastically so far by about 40 per cent of the labour force under 65. 
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• universal, 
•  paid at a flat rate, 
•  almost impossible to access before 65, 
•  paid if working or not. 
NZS is now available to everybody (subject to a residency requirement) on turning 65. It is 
paid out at a rate, for a couple, equal to around 66 per cent of the average ordinary-time earnings, 
net of tax, and generally grows with growth of the average wage.
1 At present about 520,000 people 
receive “Super,” about 95 per cent of people aged 65 and older. 
The fixed age of eligibility means there are very limited options for someone wishing to 
retire before that age, unlike the situation in many other countries. There is no trade-off between 
the amount of NZS and when you start to receive it. Before age 65, the only public support is 
through the income-tested benefit system, where payment is lower than NZS, subject to tight 
income tests, and other conditions (such as the requirement to look actively for work, or being sick 
or an invalid). The one exception is for the younger partner of someone 65 and older who can 
choose to receive NZS, but the combined NZS payment is abated against their joint incomes. This 
“non-qualified spouse” (usually female) can therefore receive NZS before 65 and explains the 
tendency for early retirement of some females.
2 
Since the late 1990s, NZS has not been income- or asset-tested. The payment level is 
unconnected to past income. Most importantly, a person can receive NZS and still remain in work. 
This means there is no implicit tax on earnings beyond age 65, since you can receive NZS while 
continuing to work. As a result of these institutional settings, the financial conditions around 
eligibility for NZS tend to discourage early retirement. 
In addition, since 1999 it has been unlawful for an employer to require the retirement of an 
employee just on the basis of age. This has probably been a driver of the rise in employment rates 
among those above NZS eligibility age. 
Two changes to the eligibility age have occurred since the mid-1970s: an instantaneous drop 
in 1977 and a progressive increase in the age from 1992 to 2001. As Hurnard notes, these two 
natural experiments enable us to estimate the strength of the labour force response to NZS 
eligibility age by older workers. 
OECD’s  Pensions at a Glance (2007) examines the role of private pensions across the 
OECD. In 1990, the coverage in New Zealand was 23 per cent of workers. By 2006 only 
14 per cent of the labour force was covered by private schemes. This fall may be a consequence of 
the success of NZS at poverty prevention over the past three decades. The OECD report concludes 
that for New Zealanders to reach retirement incomes at average OECD rates, voluntary provision 
needs to be boosted by something around 5-7 per cent of earnings for an average earner. 
Shortly after the present pension system was introduced in 1977, the fiscal cost rose to 
around 8 per cent of GDP. Subsequently lowering of the relativity with wages, raising of the age of 
eligibility through the 1990s, lower birth rates in the 1930s, some income-targeting and a buoyant 
economy have brought the ratio of total payments to GDP down to 4 per cent. But the accelerating 
ageing of the population suggests that by mid-century the ratio will return to 8 per cent, or more. 
————— 
1  It is indexed to the CPI, but the net amount paid to a couple must lie between 66 and 72.5 per cent of the net average wage. As 
wages generally grow faster than consumer prices, this usually means that it grows with wages. 
2  This gender difference is supported by OECD estimates of the average effective age of retirement in New Zealand for the period 
2002-07: 63.9 years for women and 66.5 for men. These estimates are derived from changes in participation rates over a five-year 
period for successive cohorts of individuals aged 40 and over (OECD, 2009).   Public Pensions and the Labour Market in New Zealand  55 
 
Figure 2 






















Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics for countries other than New Zealand. NZ data are taken from Census documents (in 1971 and 
1976, these have been adjusted for a change of coverage of “actively engaged”).
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Public pension expenditure, health and aged care are the items in public spending that are most 
dependent on population changes and other pressures. Hence an awareness about what the effects 
of changing or not changing our public pension system mean for other spending is important for the 
on-going debate about fiscal sustainability over the coming decades. 
 
3  Trends in older labour force participation 
Across many OECD countries, the trend since the 1970s has been for people to retire at a 
younger age, despite evidence of rising life expectancy. Figure 2 shows the generally falling rates 
of labour force participation rates in selected OECD countries among males in the age group 55-64 
and rising rates for females. 
The figure for males shows New Zealand’s experience stands in contrast with (some) other 
countries. All shared the declining trend in older male participation from 1971 to 1991. The reasons 
for this trend are the increasing coverage and generosity of retirement benefits and actuarially 
unfair returns from postponing retirement. This changed in New Zealand from 1991 onwards and 
has continued to 2006 (and beyond). Some countries have introduced policies that are starting to 
slow or reverse this trend. The picture is similar for older females, but the break since 1991 has 
been overlaid on a generally rising trend in participation. 
It is also instructive to look at 2006 census data on full-time and part-time employment rates 
(Figure 3). For both men and women, the overall employment rate falls by about 10 percentage 
points between 64 and 65, the present age of eligibility for NZS. 
————— 
3  There are two sources of NZ participation data: the 5-yearly censuses for single years of age, 15 to 90+, labour force status, and the 
Household Labour Force Survey, 5-year age groups, 15-19, . . .60-64, and 65+, quarterly, starting in 1986. Here we use the census 
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Figure 3 





















Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census 2006. 
 
Many factors can influence individual decisions about when to leave paid work. Financial 
factors could include accumulated assets, current and prospective earnings and the value of any 
pensions. Examples of non-financial reasons for leaving the labour market include poor health, 
family care responsibilities, the retirement of a spouse, informal age-based discrimination, layoffs, 
and a wish to do voluntary work or to enjoy more leisure time. 
The next section uses aggregate census data and an analysis of changes in public pension 
policy settings to estimate the strength of each of these factors. The following sections summarise 
work using unit record data of a cross-sectional survey (so far) and a longitudinal survey to explain 
the variability of individual retirement behaviour. 
 
4  Effect of NZS on aggregate participation 
This section updates the work of Hurnard (2005) in using a simple aggregate model to 
explain the effect of changes in the age of eligibility on participation trends. Two policy changes in 
opposite directions are used to estimate the effects of these changes. These were very rapid policy 
decision processes and transitions compared with those in other countries. 
The first change occurred in 1977 when the qualifying age for universal superannuation was 
suddenly dropped from 65 to 60 and at the same time the amount paid was boosted. For 40 years to 
the mid-1970s, New Zealand had two pensions: the universal pension for those 65 and older and an 
income-tested Age Pension already available at 60 and claimed by about one third of 60-64 year 
olds. Figure 4 shows the proportion of men in full-time employment aged 60-64 fell much more 
than those of a slightly younger age group. Those aged 65 and older show the effect of the larger 
pension on offer. The trend towards higher participation by women in their 50s becomes reversed 
from 60 in response to eligibility for superannuation. 
The second change happened between 1992 and 2001. In 1989, the government announced 
that the prospective rise in pension costs would be addressed by gradually lifting the eligibility age 
from 60 to 65 between 2006 and 2025. Then the economy went into recession. With little debate or 
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Figure 4 























Source: Rochford (1985). 
 
Figure 5 
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Source: Statistics New Zealand Census documents and Hurnard’s adjustments of data for 1976. 
 
immediately with the transition taking place over the following decade. The short notice disrupted 
the retirement plans of older workers, but a Transitional Retirement Benefit, income-tested but not 
work-tested, helped to ease the transition. The 1991 census captured labour market behaviour 
before the announcement and the transition was complete by the 2001 census. The 1996 census 
marked the half-way point. Figure 5 shows the rise in participation rates for males aged 60-64 was 
20 percentage points or more between 1991 and 2001. 
The data for the Hurnard study consist of census participation rates for people aged 45 and 
older for the seven census years from 1976 to 2006 covering the period of eligibility age changes. 
Definitions of the labour force participation have changed over the years, reflecting the exclusion 
of part-time employed and then the change in the number of hours per week constituting part-time 
employment. The data from 1976 are adjusted to reflect the current definition of a labour force 
participant: someone who works regularly for one or more hours per week or is unemployed and 
seeking work in the week prior to the census. 
From Figure 6, note that rates for younger females generally rise from census to census, 
while rates for the males generally are static or falling. Also the 60-64 year age groups show a 
change in trend compared with the younger groups for both sexes. 
Hurnard developed a relatively simple model that controls for the general unemployment 
rate, age group, whether that age group is currently eligible for NZS, gender and a secular rising 
trend in female participation. This model can explain a high proportion of the variation in 
participation rates. 
All the coefficients in Table 1 are statistically significant at the 99 per cent level except for 
one age-group dummy. When the unemployment rate, an indicator of the tightness of the labour 
market, rises, participation falls. Both male and female participation lowers with age, as you might 
expect as a result of factors such as the maturing of private savings and rising health problems. 
Over the period, when eligibility for NZS is triggered, male participation drops by a further 
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Table 1 
Determinants of Labour Force Participation 
Dependent Variable: Age Group/Gender Participation Rates in Census Year 
(percent) 
 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  t-stat 
Constant 98.76  66.62 
Unemployment rate for year to census date 
(percent)  –1.19 –6.16 
Eligibility of age group for NZS  (0, prop,1)  –24.25  –8.80 
Female eligibility for NZS  (0, prop, 1)  16.35  2.95 
Female near eligibility for NZS  (0, prop, 1)  –11.27  –3.87 
Female  (0,1)  –42.79  –19.77 
Log time trend for females not eligible for NZS 
(trend based on 1976=1, 1981=2, …)  18.41 16.16 
Dummy, males 50-54  –2.05  –1.24 
Dummy, males 55-59  –8.60  –5.18 
Dummy males 60-64  –26.29  –11.79 
Dummy, males 65 and older  –52.89  –16.44 
Dummy, females 50-54  –6.97  –4.20 
Dummy, females 55-59  –15.25  –6.57 
Dummy females 60-64  –24.92  –6.47 
Dummy, females 65 and older  –36.04  –7.91 
Adjusted R square    0.99 
Observations   70 
 
Source: Update of Hurnard (2005) to include Census 2006. 
 
become eligible for NZS (–24.25+16.35). Put another way, if the eligibility age in 1991 had been 
65 instead of 60, then participation rates of people aged 60-64 would have been 24 points higher. 
The regression results also indicate that average participation rates for women fall if they are 
within five years of becoming eligible for NZS. This “non-qualified spouse” effect is estimated to 
lower participation in the near-eligible band by 11 percentage points. This reflects the “joint 
retirement” decision by couples when the male (typically) starts to receive NZS. An estimated 
6 per cent of couples take this option. 
It is worth remarking that eligibility for NZS lowers participation rates for men and women, 
despite the incentive to stay on working (no legal retirement age, NZS is not work tested, absence 
of early retirement provisions, crowding out of private provision). For many in the lowest quintile 
of income, NZS is a good replacement for income received in the year before 65. For many, 65 is 

























Source: Enright and Scobie (2009). 
 
5  Other drivers of older participation 
The next stage of analysis is to examine unit record data in an attempt to sort out what 
factors are driving people to decide whether to participate, or not, in the labour market, or to 
change from full-time to part-time work. Since Hurnard, the results of two surveys have become 
available: Statistics New Zealand’s longitudinal Survey of Family, Income and Employment 
(2002-05) and the Massey University’s Health, Work and Retirement survey (2006, first wave). 
Enright and Scobie (2009) have drawn on results of the HWR survey. This survey is 
designed to investigate factors surrounding work and retirement for those aged 55 to 70. It is a 
national sample of around 6,000 respondents with a heavy over-sampling of Māori. 
Among many other things, their paper addresses the question whether the age of 
eligibility for NZS affects the decision to remain in the labour force. It examines such questions, 
using logistical regressions to predict behaviour based on binary and continuous data. 
“Retirement” is not tied down precisely in the survey. As some respondents say they are 
continuing to work after retirement, it may mean for them the period after age of eligibility for 
NZS. 
Figure 7 certainly supports the proposition that there is a deterrent effect. For males in the 
sample, the probability of participation in full-time work falls with age as was also shown in the 
census data (figure 3). There is a predictable drop at 65, but even so almost 20 per cent of males 
remain in full-time employment at 70. Contrast this with part-time employment which rises with 
age, except for only a small fall back at 65. Despite this, at age 66 more than 40 per cent remain 
active in the labour force. 
The female patterns have some differences. The probability of being in part-time 
employment is much higher than for males until age 68 and drops at 65 by as much as the full-time 
rate. At the age of eligibility of 65, participation rates for males and females fall by more than 
20 per cent. This is twice the size of the fall in the British state pension at age 65. Enright and 
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Table 2 
Factors Associated with the Decision to Work, by Sex 
 
Explanatory variable  Male  Female 
Physical health  ***  *** 
Mental health  ***  ns 
Age ---  --- 
Secondary education  ns  *** 
Tertiary education  *  *** 
Years in New Zealand  ***  * 
Separated ***  *** 
Widow/er ***  *** 
Never married  ns  *** 
Married with working spouse  ***  *** 
On a benefit  ns -- 
Receiving NZ Super  -- -- 
Receiving other super ---  ns 
No. of dependents  ***  ** 
Plan to stop work  ---  --- 
Family health important  *  ns 
Positive retirement reasons important  -  ns 
Negative retirement reasons important  *  ** 
Income of other family members  ns  ns 
Wealth ns  ns 
 
ns = not significant at the 10 per cent level. 
*** = significant at the 1 per cent level; ** = significant at the 5 per cent level; * = significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Source: Enright and Scobie (2009). 
 
While the data indicate falls in participation at 65, it is difficult to sort out from this how 
much is due to NZS and how much is due to other factors such as health, marital status, age, 
ethnicity, region, income, wealth, other forms of super, and so on. These need to be controlled for. 
To this end, Enright and Scobie run logistical regressions with dependent binary variables such as 
“working,” equal to one if the respondent is in the labour force, and zero otherwise. 
As an example, Table 2 shows only those variables that are significant (generally). Health 
status, as measured by the mental component score, has no significant effect on the labour force 
participation decisions of women. This contrasts with males, whose decisions to work are strongly 
related to both their physical and mental scores. Having a tertiary education significantly raises the 
probability of males and females are working. Compared with being married to a non-working 62 Paul  Rodway 
 
Table 3 
Factors which Change the Probability of Males Remaining in the Labour Force 
 
Probability of Remaining in the Work Force 
(percent) 
Variable  Unit 
Change 




Married with working spouse  Binary  76  94  +18 
Widowed Binary  76  93  +16 
Separated Binary  76  91  +14 
No. of dependents  1  85  90  +5 
Tertiary education  Binary  88  91  +4 
Family health important  Binary  88  92  +4 
Negative aspects of retirement 
important  Binary 89  92  +3 
Physical health  5 units  90  92  +2 
Mental health  5 units  90  91  +1 
Years in New Zealand  5 years  90  91  +1 
Age 1  year  90  89  –1 
Positive benefits of retirement 
important  Binary 92  88  –4 
Receiving NZ Superannuation  Binary  92  76  –16 
Receiving other superannuation  Binary  91  75  –16 
Plans to stop work entirely once 
retired  Binary 93  63  –29 
 
Note: Variables whose coefficients are not statistically significant are omitted from the table. 
Source: Enright and Scobie (2009). 
 
spouse, for both men and women, being separated or widowed significantly lifts the probability of 
working, as does having a working spouse. Receiving a benefit or NZS significantly lowers the 
chance of being in the labour force for both males and females.Surprisingly, the level of total 
wealth and the level of income of other household members have no effect on the probability of 
males or females working. Enright and Scobie suggest that the wealth results might be because the 
survey does not record liabilities and so cannot test for the effect of net wealth. In addition, the 
implied stock of wealth associated with NZS forms a major share of the total retirement wealth of 
many New Zealanders, but is not included in the wealth questions. This may reduce the incentive to 
accumulate wealth and hence it may be possible that some of what is actually a wealth effect is 
being picked up by the highly significant effect of receiving NZS. 
In interpreting the effects in a logit regression, it is useful to consider the magnitudes as well 
as the significance. Tables 3 and 4 therefore show the estimates of the marginal effects – the   Public Pensions and the Labour Market in New Zealand  63 
 
Table 4 
Factors which Change the Probability of Females Remaining in the Labour Force 
 
Probability of Remaining in the Work Force 
(percent) 
Variable  Unit 
Change 




Separated Binary  50  92  +42 
Married with working spouse  Binary  50  87  +37 
Widowed Binary  50  84  +34 
Tertiary education  Binary  73  84  +11 
No. of dependents  1  78  86  +8 
Negative aspects of retirement 
important  Binary 79  85  +7 
Physical health  5 units  81  83  +2 
Years in New Zealand  5 years  81  82  +1 
Age 1  year  83  81  –2 
Receiving NZ Superannuation  Binary  85  68  –16 
Receiving a benefit  Binary  83  61  –22 
Plans to stop work entirely once 
retired  Binary 87  56  –31 
 
Note: Variables whose coefficients were not statistically significant are omitted from the table. 
Source: Enright and Scobie (2009). 
 
percentage point change in the probability of working for a one unit change (or in the case of the 
health variables, five units) in the significant variables.
4 
The probability of remaining in the labour force, in contrast to being retired (no paid work), 
is calculated by setting all variables in the logit regression, except the one of interest, to their mean 
values for continuous variables or zero for binary variables. The calculation is then repeated with a 
change made to the variable of interest. For the physical and mental health scores a difference of 
five units was chosen, as a change of this magnitude is deemed to be clinically significant. 
Male and female results are broadly similar. Changing marital status produces the largest 
changes in the probability of working. The probability that males who are not separated or divorced 
are in the workforce is 76 per cent. For those who are, the probability of working rises to 
————— 
4  The health variables in the table are indexes constructed from 22 questions in the survey. The study also estimates the separate 
effects of 19 chronic diseases on the probability of remaining in the work force, again holding constant as many variables as 
possible. Arthritis, blood pressure and heart conditions are the illnesses having the largest aggregate affects on LFP. In all studies of 
the effect of health on retirement, there is the question of causality; Is it possible that work status influences health? And can this 
influence be corrected by appropriate statistical methods? Enright and Scobie attempted to find suitable instrumental variables 
which might determine health status, but not influence the labour-supply decision. These attempts proved unsuccessful. 64 Paul  Rodway 
 
Table 5 
Factors Influencing the Choice of Full-time Work among Those in the Labour Force 
 
Variable Male  Female 
Physical health   ns  ns 
Mental health   ns  ns 
Age   ---  --- 
Māori ns  *** 
Main urban  ns  * 
Tertiary education  -  ns 
Separated   ns  *** 
Widowed **  ** 
Married with working spouse  ***  ns 
Receiving a benefit  ---  --- 
Receiving NZ Superannuation  ---  -- 
Receiving other superannuation  ---  -- 
Has a super scheme  ns  *** 
No. of dependents  ***  ** 
Income of other members of household  ---  ns 
 
Note: ns = not significant at the 10 per cent level. 
*** significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level; * significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Source: Enright and Scobie (2009). 
 
93 per cent or so, meaning that the marginal effect is a rise of around 16 percentage points. For 
females, the figures rise from 50 to 92 per cent for those separated or divorced, a marginal effect of 
42 percentage points. At the other extreme, a clinically significant improvement in physical health 
raises the probably by only 2 percentage points for both sexes. NZS shows up, after holding other 
things constant, as having an appreciable and significant negative effect on the decision to remain 
in the labour force (–16 percentage points). 
The survey has some insights on the choice between full- and part-time work, given that a 
person is employed (full = 30 or more hours per week). In this case, the logit regression model is 
estimated with a binary dependent variable set at 1=full-time and 0=part-time using only those 
employed in the sample. The levels of significance for factors were similar to the decision to work 
or not outlined above. The exception was the health measures, where the probability that a person 
in the labour force chooses full-time employment is not significantly related to either the physical 
or mental health scores. So while physical health status has a significant effect on the decision to 
join the labour force, the survey indicates that if a person is employed, their choice about full- or 
part-time work does not depend on their health status.
5 
Both sexes have a lower probability of working full-time as they age, receive a benefit or 
have income from superannuation and where the income of other family members is higher. On the 
other hand, they are more likely to be in full-time employment if they are Māori (in the case of 
————— 
5  The discussant expressed scepticism that a “clinically significant” change in physical or mental health could have only a small 
marginal effect. The authors concede that perhaps a five-unit change is too small to produce sensible effects on participation.   Public Pensions and the Labour Market in New Zealand  65 
females), are separated or widowed and have a working spouse (for males), and have more 
dependents. 
The very large longitudinal SoFIE survey also throws some light on the effects of health 
status on labour market participation. Holt (2009) has used the first three waves in a major study of 
this relationship covering ages from age 15. SoFIE does not contain direct information about the 
effect of NZS. Enright and Scobie restrict the SoFIE sample to 55-70 and find similar levels of 
significance for various factors as for the HWR survey. Being on a benefit significantly reduces the 
probability of older people working in both surveys. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper is a brief guide to some recent work done at the New Zealand Treasury, 
principally on the effect of New Zealand Superannuation on the labour market behaviour of older 
people. The first study, using aggregate time series data, deals with the effects of changes to the age 
of eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation on the effects of on the decisions by older workers 
to retire. The second, covering a much wider set of issues than just this topic, draws on a recent 
survey of about 6,000 individuals and shows the effect of factors such as New Zealand 
Superannuation, health status, education levels, and marital status, on the decisions by older 
workers to retire or reduce their hours. 
These results add to the international evidence on the question of the disincentive effect of 
pension policy on the decision to remain in the labour force, even under the fairly benign 
arrangements in New Zealand. 
Many factors, financial and not, can affect the employment decisions of older workers. 
Enright and Scobie have shown that changes in marital status compared with a base of having a 
non-working spouse are associated with a large rise in the probability for remaining in work. 
Smaller rises occur with better health status. Becoming eligible for NZS or receiving a benefit 
tends to be associated with a large fall in the probability of working. 
The acceleration of population ageing means that, under the present structure, payments of 
NZS will double as a share of GDP over the next 30 plus years (Treasury, 2006). Driving this are 
the post-war baby boom, more people surviving to 65, and rising life expectancy at 65. Health 
status may be improving, but the signs are mixed. Functional disability rates appear to be falling, 
but chronic disease rates may be rising. This makes it difficult to tie down long-term health costs 
and whether the effect of improving health status on participation can be depended on to lift 
participation of older workers. 
Changing the parameters of NZS would help both the economic growth and the fiscal 
position – weakening the indexation or indexing the age of eligibility to changes in period life 
expectancy at 65, but such changes have been ruled out by the current Government. 
A decision to maintain present settings for NZS (principally, age of eligibility and indexation 
to average nominal wages) will mean that fiscal sustainability will require offsets in other areas of 
expenditure or potentially growth-harming rises in tax rates. 
If health status continues to improve along with life expectancy at 65 and levels of education 
rise, more older people may continue to work past 65. This has several benefits. They maintain 
strong connections with society, potentially build greater retirement savings, and add to GDP and 
tax, at a time when the working age population under 64 is experiencing only weak growth because 
of population ageing. 66 Paul  Rodway 
KiwiSaver, the government-promoted defined contribution scheme, may help maintain the 
overall participation rates of older workers. Older higher income individuals will contribute more 
in tax, and are also likely to be more educated and experienced. Preliminary calculations, however, 
show that the contribution rates are not sufficient to provide sufficient annuity income, along with 
NZS, to achieve an acceptable income replacement rate for median- and high-income couples and 
individuals. 
Policy changes that soften the fall in participation after age 65 will be beneficial for 
individuals, the economy, and the fiscal position. One suggestion is to allow NZS payments to be 
diverted to a worker’s KiwiSaver account which unlike now would be permitted to continue for 
several years after 65. This would allow people a choice to continue working and get a larger 
payment of NZS due to returns on their savings when they finally stop paid work. 
The present severe recession may produce a fall in participation of older workers as firms 
reduce their staff. On the other hand, the loss of wealth by older workers, reflected in the price of 
houses and equities, associated with the recession over the past year, may cause people in their 60s 
during the next decade to decide to remain in work after 65 to recoup these losses. 
   Public Pensions and the Labour Market in New Zealand  67 
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AN AGEING EUROPE AT WORK: 
ARE THE INCENTIVES TO WORK SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE AND 
SUSTAINABLE PENSIONS IN THE FUTURE? 
LESSONS FROM THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION 
Asees Ahuja
* and Ruth Paserman
∗ 
1 Introduction 
Traditionally, pension systems have generally been designed for a different demographic and 
socio-economic situation than that prevalent today. Pension systems have typically been designed 
with contribution rates, working patterns, monthly benefits, and retirement ages that have been 
established to suit an era with shorter life expectancy, longer weekly working hours, shorter 
holidays, a different distribution of labour between men and women and higher fertility rates. The 
entry of women into the labour market has not been sufficient to address the increasing 
demographic dependency ratios due to longevity increases and low fertility rates. 
The more than doubling dependency ratios in the European Union by 2050
1 illustrate the 
exertions on the public expenditure due to the ageing population and the growing proportion of the 
inactive population. The economic dependency ratios have worsened also due to shorter working 
lives (Figure 1). The relative costs of social security systems are expected to increase, including 
pension expenditure as well as expenditure on long-term care, health care and other social services 
for the elderly. At the same time a shrinking number of labour-active would bear the burden of the 
increasing expenditure. 
On average, pension expenditure today, makes up more than 40 percent of social protection 
expenditure aggregated in EU Member States.
2 As the population ages, European countries have 
experienced a decade of ongoing reform to their old age pension systems to make them more 
financially sustainable and adaptable to changing demographics. On average, if there were no 
offsetting factors, such as the increase in employment rates, higher coverage of beneficiaries in 
schemes, increasing retirement ages, or lower benefit levels, demographic pressure alone would be 
estimated to relay into an increase in public pension by over 70 per cent in real terms in the 
EU15.Projections show that recent pension reforms will curb the rise in public pension expenditure 
from around 9 percentage points between 2007 and 2060 to 2.4 percentage points, so that so that 
projected expenditure would reach 12.5 per cent of GDP in 2060. At the same time, public 
spending on pensions is not expected to rise in parallel with the old-age dependency ratio. In 2060 
people over the age of 65 will get, on average, a smaller share of GDP from public budgets.
3 This 
reflects, to a large extent, that the financial challenge addressed in pension reforms may have spilt 
over into a social or adequacy challenge. 
Pension reforms providing expenditure sustainability must not do so solely at the cost of 
lower pensions, from a social sustainability point of view. The main instrument for policy exchange 
and coordination between the Member States in the area of pensions and social protection is the 
Open Method of Coordination (hereafter OMC). Lessons from the OMC implemented by the 
European Union has indicated the importance of emphasizing the need to increase the ratio of 
————— 
∗  European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities DG. 
  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the institution. 
1  The dependency ratio is measured as the ratio of people over 65 to people of working age (aged 15 to 64). 
2 Source:  ESSPROS. 
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labour active in order to ensure that financially sustainable and yet adequate pension can be 
provided despite demographic pressures and pension reforms. 
The mathematics of the issue is straightforward. In an ageing society where more people are 
living longer and relatively people are working less, either more people have to work more or 
longer to sustain the same relative monthly pension benefits as in the past, contribution rates have 
to be increased or the relative monthly benefits have to be cut. Most countries have chosen a 
mixture of these solutions in order to deal with the pressures on their pension from an increasing 
number of benefit recipients. Many pension reforms have, therefore, incorporated legislations into 
their pensions systems to prolong working lives and to give increased incentives and possibilities 
for individuals to work longer. 
The aim of this paper is to look at the effects of pension reforms on the prolonging of 
working lives and how successfully they help attain the goal of reaching financially sustainable and 
adequate pensions as observed within the OMC for the 27 Member states (EU27) of the European 
Union (EU). Section 2 of this report defines the role and summarize the main findings of the OMC 
in the area of pensions in the context of the Lisbon Strategy. Section 3 analyses the different types 
of incentive structures that have been used in pension systems in EU Member States. Section 4 
discusses possible impediments to these incentive structures through related financial security 
schemes and labour market conditions, whilst Section 5 shows the importance of information 
formation in order to ensure the effectiveness of work incentives. 
The main source of the findings in this paper are from the OMC, unless stated otherwise, 
primarily from the Joint Report of 2009 and the two part study on Promoting longer working lives 
through pension reforms by the Social Protection Committee (SPC).
4 
————— 
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2  The OMC and pension policy 
2.1  The Open Method of Coordination in the field of pensions in the context of the Lisbon 
Strategy 
Pension reforms require long term strategies. The process of reform itself is lengthy as 
pensions reforms are usually built on broad consensus as they are a fundamental part of our social 
protection systems and of social cohesion. Furthermore, Member States dedicate significant 
amounts of public expenditure to old age provision, which in light of demographic trends is set to 
grow significantly. Therefore reforms of pension systems should be seen both in the context of 
ensuring adequate and sustainable retirement provision, and in the context of sustainable public 
finances as a whole and sustainable growth across the EU. 
The Laeken European Council of December 2001 recognised that there could be significant 
benefits by enhancing dialogue and cooperation on issues related to the reform of pension systems. 
It endorsed common objectives of adequacy, financial sustainability, adaptability, and a working 
method based on the OMC. 
The basic structure of this coordination process is as follows: Member States and the 
European Commission have agreed to work within the OMC on social inclusion and social 
protection. The open method of coordination works through the common setting of objectives by 
the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, the reporting by the Member States on the 
basis of these objectives, and the Commission synthesising the findings in a report which is 
subsequently endorsed by the Council. Then, at the EU level, overall progress, challenges and 
arising areas of future concern are reported on, as are the type of action to be taken. 
 
 
Common objectives for pensions 
The common objectives of the OMC in the field of pensions are to provide 
adequate and sustainable pensions by ensuring: (g) adequate retirement incomes 
for all and access to pensions which allow people to maintain, to a reasonable 
degree, their living standard after retirement, in the spirit of solidarity and fairness 
between and within generations; (h) the financial sustainability of public and 
private pension schemes, bearing in mind pressures on public finances and the 
ageing of populations, and in the context of the three-pronged strategy for tackling 
the budgetary implications of ageing, notably by: supporting longer working lives 
and active ageing; by balancing contributions and benefits in an appropriate and 
socially fair manner; and by promoting the affordability and the security of funded 
and private schemes; (i) that pension systems are transparent, well adapted to the 
needs and aspirations of women and men and the requirements of modern 
societies, demographic ageing and structural change; that people receive the 
information they need to plan their retirement and that reforms are conducted on 
the basis of the broadest possible consensus. 
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Concerning pension reforms, there is agreement that pension systems should provide 
adequate retirement incomes in a financially sustainable way while adapting to societal and 
economic change and that the objectives of adequacy and sustainability are mutually reinforcing 
and need to be achieved together. 
 
2.2  Main lessons learnt from the OMC 
The pension’s strand of the OMC has shown that pension reform in Europe has basically 
been triggered by long term projections showing increasing pension expenditure and the financial 
unsustainability of pension systems. In order to, simultaneously, ensure the continued financial 
sustainability of pensions and provide an adequate replacement income at retirement Member 
States employed a mix of different types of pension designs: public and private, pay-as-you-go and 
funded, mandatory and voluntary. At the same time they have also sought to underpin changes to 
pension systems by improvements in labour markets, notably by raising employment rates of 
women and older workers. 
Over the last decade reforms have improved sustainability by braking and counteracting the 
effects of declining ratios of working years to retirement years and of workers to pensioners. The 
2006 report reiterated that financially sustainable systems must be balanced with adequate benefits. 
The 2007 and 2008 joint reports included in-depth analyses of specific issues, dissemination of 
policy findings and development of indicators for progress towards the common objectives. 
Amongst these issues were the three main findings in the OMC to date: 
•  the identified need for more people working more and longer and the subsequent creation of 
incentives to prolong working lives and close early exit pathways, 
•  a reinforcement of the link between contribution and benefits balanced by a reinforcement of 
minimum pensions for those that will not manage a full contributory history, 
•  greater pre-funding of pension schemes to help to smooth the demographic transition by 
bringing forward some of the pension expenditure. 
Most countries have recognised the need of more people working more and longer. 
Therefore, during reforms Member States have built work incentives into the design of pension 
systems. Some prolong working lives at the end of the individual’s career, through actuarial benefit 
calculations based on remaining life expectancy calculations. Others provide financial incentives to 
promote labour activity throughout the career by increasing the minimum eligibility requirements 
of contributory years for a full pension or strengthening the link between contributions and 
benefits. 
 
3  Incentive structures in pension systems 
Meeting the pension challenge is essentially about balancing the periods of life out of work 
with those in work and hence closing the gap between shorter contributory lives and longer 
retirement periods – with the first resulting from later labour market entrance and decreased 
employment rates of older workers and the second triggered by premature exit and longevity. 
Maintaining the adequacy and sustainability of pension provision in an ageing society depends 
crucially on more people working more and longer. The 2007 Joint Report identified the need for 
16 out of 25 Member States to promote longer working lives and increase the employment rates of 
older workers further in order to cope with future burdens on pension and social security systems 
without compromising the adequacy of benefits (CZ, DK, GR, ES, FR, IT, CY, LT, LU, MT, NL, An Ageing Europe at Work: Are the Incentives to Work Sufficient to Provide Adequate and Sustainable Pensions in the Future?  73 
 
AT, PT, SI, FI, and SE).
5 
The 2009 Joint Report 
reemphasized this 
message stating the need 
for more people to 
work more and longer 
throughout their careers. 
Some Member States 
have sought to respond 
through new initiatives in 
pension and labour 
market policies as 
depicted in the latest 
round of National 
Strategy Reports for 
2008-10. Despite 
progress in recent years 
in many Member States 
(for instance LV, BG, 
LT, DE, SK, EE and 
NL), there is still a need 
for extending working 
lives across the Union 
even further as the 
working age population 
shrinks in comparison to 
the overall population. 
Pension systems can support labour market objectives through the inclusion of all labour 
active groups, by signalling appropriate ages of retirement and by establishing economic incentives 
(bonus/malus systems) in support of desired behaviour. Although activity and employment rates 
are influenced by a whole range of factors unrelated to pensions, the norms about retirement and 
retirement practices are primarily influenced by the institutional framework created by the state 
legislation. Rules of pension accruals, the pensionable age and designs of early retirement benefits 
represent signals for workers and employers that impact on the process of age management. 
As Members States are seeking to reestablish a sustainable balance between contributory 
working years and years spent in retirement they are faced with a combined need for: lowering the 
entry age, widening the contributory base, lowering the incidence and length of careers breaks and 
increasing the effective labour market exit age. A number of Member States have widened the 
financial base of a pension system through increases in the contribution rates or by promoting 
coverage of groups previously not covered (self employed, atypical workers). However, most 
efforts have been directed at influencing the effective labour market exit age. 
Recent pension reforms in EU member States have included different types of designs and 
incentive structures to encourage lengthier careers or a mix of these. Typically, most incentive 
structures for longer working lives in retirement systems are focused on extending working lives 
closer to retirement rather than earlier in the career. More focus is often put on postponing labour 
market exit and typically, the incentive structures include increasing statutory retirement and 
pension eligibility ages; improving flexible retirement options, allowing and encouraging people to 
————— 
5  Please see Annex 1 for a list of the EU 27 abbreviations. 
Figure 2 
Projected Old-age Dependency Ratio in EU 27, 2010-60 
(percent)
* 
*  This indicator is defined as the projected number of persons aged 65 and over expressed as a 











2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 206074  Asees Ahuja and Ruth Pasermann 
 
 
continue working, by 
allowing for possibilities 
to combine work and 
retirement; and 
introducing more 
actuarial calculations of 
pension benefits and 
bonus/malus systems 
which give reductions 
and increments in 
benefits for earlier or 
later retirement. The 
positive effects of 
reforms during the last 
decade to encourage 
delayed exits from the 
labour market effects can 
be seen in the improving 
employment rates of 
older workers. 
In most cases, 
incentives to extend 
working lives need to be 
given also to younger 
workers, especially 
in light of the observed 
increase in labour 
market entry ages. High 
unemployment figures 
for younger workers also 
indicate that young 
people are not 
entering the labour 
market to the same extent 
as before. A common 
approach is to increase 
the link between 
contributions and 
benefits by moving 
towards a life cycle 
approach by extending 
the number of years 
needed to obtain a full 
pension.  
Since the young of 
today are the old of 
tomorrow high 
unemployment levels 
among the young might  
Figure 3 
Employment Rates for Workers 
in Different Age Groups Over Time 
Figure 4 
Change in Employment Rates Between 2000 and 2008 
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lead to lower pensions in the future and thus higher future poverty rates. Even more so if persons 
caught in unemployment during their working life are unable to affect their pensions levels later by 
prolonging their working lives to make up for the long periods out of gainful employment. This can 
cause a persistent poverty trap. High and persistent unemployment rates among the young also 
threaten the generational contract between young and old, inherent in most pension systems. 
It is also interesting to note that developments in employment rates for the age group 65 and 
over also show rises in the vast majority of Member States since the year 2000. This indicates a 
move toward older workers staying in work beyond the age of 65, which has traditionally been 
considered the age for retirement in most EU Member States. The overall change in the 
employment rates of those above the age of 65 and their actual level is still low at an EU level 
averaging at around 4 per cent. 
 
3.1  Raising retirement ages and increasing flexibility 
Politically, pension reforms are difficult to initiate and implement due to the 
inter-generational nature of pension systems. Legislating increases in the retirement age of the 
statutory scheme is one of the more effective and definitive methods of delaying retirement, but 
also one of the more difficult reforms to implement. The legislated retirement age is socially 
connected with a sense of right and tradition and thus is politically unpopular to increase. The 
inter-generational characteristics of most statutory pension schemes add a perceived sense of 
unfairness if an increase in the retirement age is implemented. Furthermore, rules regarding the 
receipt of benefits from other social protection systems may also be connected to the statutory 
retirement age, sometimes making it economically expensive to carry out such increases. 
As of today, there are Member States where the statutory retirement age is below 65 with no 
current legislation to raise this age. (e.g., BG, EE, FR, IT LV, LT, HU, MT, SI, SK). A number of 
EU Member States have, however, legislated an increase in the statutory retirement age, but often 
the legislation is softened in its design. For example, most Member States have chosen to phase in 
the reforms on retirement ages over a long period, thus being raised primarily for younger cohorts 
(e.g., CZ, DK, DE, LT, MT, UK). This also tends to dampen some of the current political 
responsibility with regards to the actual implementation of these legislated reforms (see Annex 2). 
In many Member States, a more viable solution to increasing the retirement age is to 
primarily aim for an equalisation of retirement ages between women and men. Some Member 
States foresee such an equalisation in the near future (e.g., BE, LV, HU) whilst others, even in this 
case, have longer transitional rules (e.g., EL, EE, LT, MT, AT, CZ).Whilst closing the gap between 
the retirement ages for men and women, Some countries still do not legislate a full equalisation 
(e.g., BG, RO, SI), whilst others have so far not taken any steps in this direction (e.g., PL). 
Other Member states have instead chosen to introduce a flexible minimum pension eligibility 
age at which old-age pension benefits can be received (often below 65) but with actuarial 
reductions to the pension the earlier it is retrieved (e.g., FI, SE). Under specific circumstances more 
flexible paths out of employment into retirement can help to promote longer working lives 
especially if possibilities to combine work and retirement are given, particularly for groups that 
may not have chosen a full-time employment over full-time retirement. 
The increase in the employment of older workers over the past decade is partly due to a rise 
in part-time work, notably by men. About 25 per cent of employment among older workers in the 
EU-15 is now part-time and 22 per cent in the EU-27. Therefore, a number of Member States have 
designed their systems allowing individuals to take a share of their pension whilst continuing to 
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Source: Eurostat (2008), EU Labour Force Survey, annual. 
 
States (CZ, ES, FR, IT, NL, FI, and SE).
6 Experience in Member States however shows that whilst 
possibilities for work time reduction can be essential for facilitating and encouraging people to 
remain in work after 60, introducing more flexible retirement provision requires a careful design to 
ensure the desired results. If the structure of incentives and the focus on a proper target group of 
workers (for instance in terms of age) is badly designed, the flexibility may lead to a shortening 
rather than an extension of working lives. Ineffective designs may also not be able to lure groups 
others than those that would have extended their working lives in any case leading dead weight 
costs for the pension systems. 
The introduction of increased flexibility, therefore, also calls for increased monitoring of 
retirement behaviour and of the actual labour market exit age. In all but a few exceptional cases 
(Table 1), labour market exit on average takes place prior to the legislated retirement or old-age 
pension eligibility age, indicating the opposite effects of flexible rules and the possibility to exit the 
labour market early through other types of financial security schemes. 
————— 
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Table 1 




Effective Exit Age from the 
Labour Market  Country 
Males Females Males Females 





* 64.1  64.1 
Czech Republic  61y 6m  59y 8m  61.8  59 
Denmark 65  65  62.5  61.3 
Germany 65  65  62.1  61.6 
Estonia 63  59y  6m  62.6
+ 62.6
+ 
Ireland 65  65  63.5  64.7 
Greece 65  60  61.8  60.4 
Spain 65  65  61.8  62.3 
France 60  60  58.7  59.1 
Italy 65  60  60.5  60 
Cyprus 65  65  :  : 
Latvia 62  61  :  : 
Lithuania 62y  6m  60 :  : 
Luxembourg 65 65  :  : 
Hungary 62  60  61.2
** 58.7
** 
Malta 61  60  :  : 
Netherlands 65  65  62.1  62.1 
Austria 65  60  61.3  60.6 
Poland 65  60  61.4
* 57.5
* 





* 65.5  63.2 
Slovenia 63  61  :  : 
Slovakia 62  62  59.7
* 57.8
* 
Finland 63-65  63-65  62.3  62.5 
Sweden 61-67  61-67  64.2  63.7 
United Kingdom  65  60  63.8  62.6 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: * 2007 data, ** 2005 data, *** 2004 data,




Difference in Net Theoretical Replacement Rates for an Average Earner 
Working until the Age of 63 and 67 with 38 and 42 Contributory Years Respectively 















3.2  Giving financial incentives to delay retirement 
A common way to promote longer working lives for older workers pursued in recent reforms 
is to strengthen the bonus-malus system in schemes with delayed and early retirement possibilities. 
This is a crucial instrument in prolonging working lives as pension eligibility ages become more 
flexible. Workers who decide to work longer are rewarded for every additional month or year in 
work. 
In a number of Member States higher accrual factors as a reward for later retirement, or 
lower accruals as penalties for early retirement, were recently introduced or increased (e.g., BE, 
BG, CZ, ES, GR, HU, NL, PT and UK). The incentive structures differ significantly between 
Member States as can be interpreted using calculations on theoretical replacement rates.
7 
Calculations show that in most Member States delaying retirement results in higher 
theoretical replacement rates, while earlier retirement usually results in lower theoretical 
————— 
7  Theoretical replacement rates defined in accordance with the methodology agreed upon by the Indicator Sub-Group (ISG) of the 
Social Protection Committee (SPC), show the ratio of pension income to earnings at the point of retirement increase or decrease with 
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replacement rates. In all but a few Member States (e.g., DK, ES, FR, HU, IT, LU, SI, UK), the 
increments in pensions for prolonged working lives are higher than the fall in replacement rates 
with earlier retirement. In most cases the difference is small, but there is a trend towards rewarding 
late retirement more than early exit is penalised. 
Yet, experience is showing that the impact of these specific measures can be rather limited. 
For instance the pension bonus introduced in France by 2003 reform attracted only 7.6 per cent of 
older workers to defer retirement in 2007. In Sweden, the use of the flexibility in the retirement 
ages is being exercised, but just as many people tend to take out their retirement earlier as later 
compared with the previously fixed retirement age of 65. These examples show that people may be 
more attracted to the idea of early retirement rather than the financial incentives provided for 
delayed retirement. In many countries the flexibility of systems is not used also indicating a lack of 
information and the strong establishment of previously fixed retirement ages. The reestablishment 
of such norms is sometimes confirmed through other schemes and social insurance systems. 
In some Member States no specific incentives are given for extending working lives beyond 
the actual retirement age in the statutory retirement schemes (e.g., IE, LU, MT, NL, CY). 
Typically, these schemes are defined-benefit where the possibilities for flexible retirement are 
restricted, as in Malta. In other cases they are flat rate schemes where the number of contributory 
years needed for a full pension is lower than those used in the calculations of theoretical 
replacement rates and thus do not show any incentives to work longer after 40 years of contribution 
and at the age of 65 (e.g., IE, LU, NL). In these Member States there are, however, greater 
incentives to work longer in the private sector occupational pension schemes. Although the work 
incentives are usually lower than in other Member States’ statutory schemes in all the above 
mentioned countries except the Netherlands. In Member States where the pensionable age is 
planned to be higher than 65 in 2046 (e.g., DE, UK), the effects of deferring retirement beyond the 
legislated retirement age are not captured by the exercise. 
On the other hand, those Member States with the highest changes in replacement rates per 
extra year worked are also typically countries that have large defined benefit components, but with 
more flexible retirement conditions (e.g., CZ, EE, AT, PT, SK). In notional-defined contribution 
schemes the financial incentives for delaying retirement are typically calculated on an actuarial 
basis taking into consideration remaining life expectancy at the point of retirement (e.g., SE, PL, 
LV, IT), whilst in defined contribution schemes the transformation of investments into an annuity 
are also often actuarially calculated. 
The effectiveness of actuarially calculated incentive structures needs to be further monitored 
to ensure that the financial incentives are sufficient to postpone retirement. At the same time, the 
generosity of the incentives in defined-benefit schemes need to be balanced with their cost in the 
pension system and also deadweight problems connected to the risk of subsidising those who 
would in any case have postponed retirement. 
 
3.3  Extending contributory periods 
Minimum contributory periods in order to receive a full pension are generally being 
extended. As the time spent in retirement is generally increasing due to increasing longevity, so 
must the time spent contributing to one’s pension in order to avoid an imbalanced burden on 
working age populations, which can decrease their incentives to work. 
Contribution periods required for a full pension have been recently increased in some 
Member States (e.g., CZ, FR, AT), so the link between contributions paid into the system and 
benefits paid out has been tightened. In France, for example the statutory retirement age is the same 




Average Seniority at Retirement and Remaining Average Life Expectancy at 60, 2006 
 
Average Seniority at Retirement of New Flows of 
Retirees in Statutory Retirement Schemes Seniority 
(Including Non-contributory Periods) 
Life Expectancy at 60 
Country 
Males Females  Males  Females 
Belgium 42.6  30.5  80.8  84.9 
Bulgaria n.a.  n.a.  76.2  80.3 
Czech Republic  44.4  39.6  78.2  82.4 
Denmark 35.7  20.3  80  83.3 
Germany n.a.  n.a.  81.1  84.8 
Estonia 45.6 42.9  75.9  82.2 
Ireland 27.5  20.8  80.8  84.5 
Greece 40.3  30.4  81.4  83.9 
Spain 40  31.7  81.7  86.5 
France n.a.  n.a.  82  87 
Italy 34.9  27.9  81.4
** 85.9
** 
Cyprus n.a. n.a.  81.8  84.2 
Latvia 30  29  75.2  81.1 
Lithuania 37.5  34.2  75.5  81.5 
Luxembourg 42.9  38.8  80.7  84.4 
Hungary 39.9  38  76.5  81.6 
Malta 29.1  23.5  80.1  83.8 
Netherlands n.a.  n.a.  80.8  84.5 
Austria n.a. n.a.  81.1  85.1 
Poland 36.5  33.3  77.7  82.9 
Portugal 32.3  23.9  80.4  84.6 
Romania n.a.  n.a.  76.7  80.5 
Slovenia 30  24  79.4  84.3 
Slovakia n.a.  n.a.  76.5  81.4 
Finland 30.9 28.6  80.6  85.5 
Sweden 40  34  81.8  85.2 




* 2005 data, 
** 2004 data. 
Source: National Data and Eurostat. An Ageing Europe at Work: Are the Incentives to Work Sufficient to Provide Adequate and Sustainable Pensions in the Future?  81 
 
In other countries, the lengths of contributory periods have been redesigned to correspond 
more to the pension eligibility ages rather than the concept of a full pension. The pension is instead 
calculated in accordance with the number of years during which the pension is accrued. In both 
these cases there is clear move towards extending the number of contributory years in pension 
schemes, a so-called life-cycle approach. 
The issue of the balance and the link between contributions and benefits as well as the 
transparency of this link are important for the financial sustainability of both defined-benefit 
pensions systems (that are common among statutory pay-as-you-go systems), and for 
defined-contribution schemes, for which it is inherent in the system. 
Experience in some Member States shows that extending contributory periods is politically 
more acceptable than the increasing the pension eligibility age in statutory schemes. Increasing the 
link between benefits and contributory periods also encourages longer working lives during the 
whole period of the career rather than just at the end of the career. It encourages shorter career 
breaks, earlier entry into the labour market and delayed retirement. 
A lifecycle approach to contributory periods also allows for a more fair calculation of 
pension benefits as it is closer to the concept of “getting what you paid for”. This is often to the 
advantage of those with a longer and more flat earnings career rather than those with a short and 
steeply increasing earnings career. Therefore, if the right to receive a full pension depends on the 
contribution period, people who start working at a late age are not unduly rewarded. For example, 
women and low income earners often have earnings careers that develop more slowly than those of 
men and high income earners. For women, this is due to the wage structure in typically female 
dominated professions, career breaks and a higher degree of part-time work. Reforming pension 
provision to incorporate such a design gives encouragement to work longer, minimise career breaks 
and to move out of the black economy. 
Reinforcing the link between contributions and benefits, however, has to be also combined 
with a careful monitoring of the accrual of pension rights during breaks in careers that reasonably 
should not be penalized, such as child care, other caring responsibilities, unemployment, sickness 
or education leave. 
Calculations of theoretical replacement rates can show us how different types of career 
breaks are protected within the pension system. For example, given that the distribution of care 
burdens today are still mainly borne by women, it is important to monitor the effects of policies 
whereby replacement incomes and pension entitlements are given for care-related absences from 
the labour market in order to avoid the arising of new dependency traps. As caring years have a 
significant negative effect on women’s long-term participation in the labour market in many 
Member States, a careful balance must be struck between care crediting and incentives to get 
women back into paid work. 
In many Member states, absences from the labour market for childcare are typically 
protected to a certain extent for the first few years of absence and usually the protection is equally 
spread over these years (Figure 7). In a few Member States pension rights for up to three years of 
absence are so well protected that calculations show no drop in replacement rates (e.g., CZ, ES, 
LU, MT, FI). Whilst this improves the adequacy of benefits accruals during childcare absences, the 
work incentives in the system can be questioned. In the Czech Republic, the retirement age for 
women is decreased depending on the number of children they bear and the years of retirement 
before the age of 65 are accredited giving no change in the replacement rates. In Malta, where the 
minimum statutory retirement age is 61 and only 30 contributory years are needed for a full 
pension, the replacement rates do not change with a prolonged or shortened retirement age in this 
exercise which is based on a 36 year contributory period. However, recent legislation credits social 




Difference in Net Theoretical Replacement Rates for an Average Earner 
Entering the Labour Market at 25 and Retiring at the Statutory Retirement Age 
















* The calculations assume two children are born and that the timing of the childcare years is such that full childcare benefits are received 
for each child. Retirement at the legislated statutory retirement age for women is calculated here. Please note that the values for CZ, ES, 
LU and MT are equal to 0 and should not be interpreted as missing. 
Source: SPC/ISG. 
 
In some countries childcare credits are connected to the birth of the child rather than an 
absence from the labour market (e.g., DE, FR, IT) resulting in an increase in pension entitlements 
when a child is born. In Romania, childcare breaks are less well protected than in most other 
Member States. In the BE, IE, NL and UK the decline on the state pension side is marginal, and 
results depend more on whether private pension schemes award care credits or not. 
 
3.4  The effects of minimum pension provision on working longer 
When considering the role of minimum pension provision on the extension of working lives, 
however, it is important not to loose sight of the role of these pensions in maintaining adequate 
benefit levels and evading poverty in old age. Calculations showing the average increase in 
theoretical replacement rates for an extra year of work, indicate that incentives to work longer can 
be significantly lower for those more dependent on minimum pension provision incentives, 
therefore, the design of minimum pension need to be coherent incentive structures in standard 
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Figure 8 
Average Change in Net Theoretical Replacement for an Extra Year of Work 













Source: Calculations on Theoretical replacement rates carried out in the OECD APEX model. 
 
The theoretical replacement rates for low wage earners would typically include minimum 
pension provision for these groups. By taking an average of the annual change in replacement rates 
for each year of prolonged working lives for an average earner and a low wage earner it is possible 
to see if minimum pension systems give a comparative disincentive to longer working lives. Most 
Member States retain incentives to work longer for those with lower incomes and in some the 
incentives are even stronger than for an average worker (e.g., BE, CZ, EE, HU, IE, LV, HU) 
(Figure 8). In these cases it is important to keep in mind that experience shows that low wage 
earners are often more reluctant to extend working lives than average wage earners. At the same 
time it is important to consider that the minimum pension guarantees are enough to give financial 
security and avert poverty in old age. 
On the other hand, countries with a traditionally high level of minimum pension guarantee 
(e.g., SE, FI) or flat rate defined benefit pension with a lower number of contributory years than the 
40 years used in the exercise display lower incentives to work longer for those with lower incomes 
in comparison to average workers (e.g., SK, AT). It is important to consider balancing the 
adequacy of pension benefits and the disincentives to work longer that they innately provide. 
Most Member States perceive minimum income benefits as providing negative incentives 
towards longer working lives. This can depend on a number of issues. Firstly, if the eligibility 
criteria of the minimum pensions are set at a reasonably high fixed age, such pension cannot be 
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pensions are rarely, if ever, available before a fixed statutory retirement age. The qualifying period 
for a minimum pension has, for example, recently been extended in some Member States (e.g., CZ, 
CY, ES, and RO). If a minimum pension scheme guarantees the major part of pensioners’ income, 
and the contribution period is too short, it can act as a disincentive to stay in the labour market. 
Secondly, if the level of the minimum pension is low, this may provide an incentive to work 
longer, yet bringing the adequacy of the protection provided by these pensions into question. In 
contrast, too high a minimum level of pension could provide a disincentive to prolong working 
lives beyond the minimum eligibility age. This, especially in combination with other labour market 
early exit routes may provide disincentives to work longer for some low-wage groups with 
incomplete contribution records, as the added value of working for these individual’s pensions is in 
many cases minimal compared with spending the last few years before retirement on 
unemployment, sickness or disability benefits.. 
Thirdly, the means testing criteria can affect retirement behaviour. For example, if extra 
accruals of pension entitlements result in a one to one reduction of the minimum pension working 
longer may not be perceived as worthwhile. In some Member States, experience shows that 
disregarding work income in means tests gives possibilities to increase incentives to work longer. 
Ireland has introduced an income disregard of 100€ on earnings from work in the calculation of 
means tested pensions. Simultaneously cumulating minimum benefits and income from work is not 
possible in a few Member States (like in LT). Most Member States provide the possibility to 
cumulate at least a share of earnings from work and retain minimum benefits or pensions (e.g., DE, 
DK, NL, FI, SE). 
 
4  Obstacles to work incentives in pension systems: early exit routes 
The incentives to work longer incorporated in pension systems are often affected by other 
design features in the pension scheme or by other financial security systems. In the design of work 
incentives it is also important that complementary schemes and systems do not impediment the 
built-in incentives in the pension scheme. This, however, is often the case. 
As pension and social security systems become more complex, there are also more actors 
involved in the design of these systems. Statutory pension schemes have different components with 
different purposes; some might be of a social safety net nature whilst others aim to provide an 
income related benefit. Statutory pension schemes are more commonly being complemented or 
replaced by privately managed provision where the work incentives might differ. This also gives a 
bigger role to private actors, rather than policy makers in the cumulative work incentives in a 
multi-tier pension scheme. 
With increasing flexibility in the retirement decision, the role of other complementary social 
security systems, often under the jurisdiction of different policy makers, may end up affecting the 
incentives in the statutory pension schemes. In order to design efficient incentive structures it is 
vital that these are designed collectively with complementary systems. 
The average age of exit from the labour market is often lower than the average age at which 
an old-age pension is drawn (See Table 1 above). Experience shows that transitions from the labour 
market into retirement are not direct and only half of older workers leave their last job or business 
to take up an old age pension. Only 35 per cent of older workers leave their last job or business to 
take up a pension. 20 per cent take up an early retirement benefit, 13 per cent leave due to 
unemployment and 12 per cent for reasons of long-term sickness or disability. Furthermore, a slight 
decline in direct transition from the labour market into retirement can be observed in the EU 25 
Member States (Figure 9). An Ageing Europe at Work: Are the Incentives to Work Sufficient to Provide Adequate and Sustainable Pensions in the Future?  85 
 
Figure 9 
















Note: The variable is based on self assessment. Unemployed may include government training, persons waiting to start a job, etc. 
Source: 2006 ad hoc module LFS. 
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(Between 3% and 10%) 
High 
(≥10%) 
Take up as a share of population 55-59  DK, ES, FR, 
LT, PT, SE  BE, DE, HU, LU, RO, SK  PL 
Take up as a share of population 60-64  CY, FR, HU, 
PT, RO, SE  DE, ES, IE, SK  BE, LU, 
DK, PL 
 
Figures generally refer to 2006. 
These figures are generally taken from administrative sources are not necessarily completely comparable. Member States for which 
information is not provided do not have such information available. This table refers to specific early retirement schemes opened for all 
categories of the population. 
Source: National replies to a questionnaire submitted to Members of the Social Protection Committee. 
 
The main labour market exit pathways that have been identified are through invalidity or 
sickness benefits, early retirement schemes and unemployment benefits that have been specifically 
designed for older workers. Few workers may also leave the labour market through other systems 
such as with survivor’s pension, or due to specific tax concessions granted to older workers leaving 
the labour market, but the take up rates of these benefits are minimal. For example survivor’s 
benefits are often granted to those who have not been labour active in any case, whilst taxation 
rules show indications of curbing rather than promoting early exits in most member states. Whilst 
incentive structures in pension systems are being increased, complementary systems both with the 
social security systems and private schemes (often occupational) may affect negatively these 
incentives. 
 
4.1  Early exits through early retirement schemes 
Specific early retirement schemes creating exceptions from general rules for certain 
occupational groups are common in a number of member states. The proportion of early or indirect 
exits varies considerably from one Member State to another, but can be a main reason for early 
labour market exit in some Member States. Differences range from approximately 20 per cent of 
those aged 55-59 in receipt of early retirement benefits in Poland and close to none in Sweden. 
The type of early retirement scheme, the eligibility criteria and the groups to which it is 
directed are for great importance. Usually early retirement schemes are open to all categories of the 
population. Some countries with less flexible retirement options use such schemes to provide 
flexibility of working careers and a smoother transition to retirement (e.g., BE, RO, FI). In some 
countries, however, they are designed as a source of protection for professional groups that are 
identified as having arduous or hazardous occupations, a list that varies greatly between Member 
States. In a few Member States they are explicitly made available due to major economic 
restructuring (e.g., ES, FR, HU). In some cases the schemes were primarily expected or are still 
expected to contribute to reducing statistically recognized unemployment levels (e.g., BE, ES, IE, 
LU, PT). 
The possibility to retire early along with flexible transition from work to retirement is 
recognized as key to actually prolonging working lives. In some statutory old age pension schemes 
this flexibility has been incorporated. If the idea is to utilise special early retirement schemes to 
provide this flexibility it is important to create incentives for delaying the take up of early An Ageing Europe at Work: Are the Incentives to Work Sufficient to Provide Adequate and Sustainable Pensions in the Future?  87 
retirement benefit in these schemes as well. This also pertains to the flexibility in the transition to 
retirement for special occupational groups, often for those in so-called hazardous or arduous 
occupations. Most Member States allow certain categories of worker to take out early retirement 
benefits prior to the legislated statutory retirement or pension eligibility age. In some of these 
Member States this is also possible without actuarial reductions to old age pension benefits. 
However, the extent to which these schemes can be an impediment to work incentives also depends 
greatly on the earliest retirement age. In some member States this is as low as 50 years. 
The use of early retirement benefits in economically strained times to cope with labour 
market issues can on the other hand become a long term disincentive to longer working lives. This 
is primarily due to the fact that once these financial security systems have been put into place it can 
be politically difficult to dismantle them, thus having a serious long term impacts on the 
employment rates of older workers. Employers may also encourage early retirement possibilities in 
times of financial strain to ease necessary redundancy processes. This, however, would give a 
disproportionate affect on the labour market participation of older workers in times of economic 
strain. Ensuring that employers bear all or at least a significant share of these costs can reduce such 
behaviour (e.g., BG, DK, HU, SI). 
Nevertheless a number of Member States are adopting reforms to discourage the take-up of 
or close access to early retirement paths from the labour market, but not without difficulties. These 
reforms include increasing the age of entitlement to early retirement (e.g., BE, CZ, SK, UK), 
equalising the rules of access for both genders (e.g., DE, HU), plans to limit the number of 
professions entitled to benefits (e.g., PL), tightening the rules of access to recently introduced 
schemes that turned out to be unexpectedly popular (e.g., FR), or simply phasing out the schemes 
(e.g., IE). Other Member States strengthen the financial disincentives to retire early, by increasing 
the value of penalty factors (e.g., CZ, GR, PT, UK). Another solution adopted is suspension of 
early pension benefits for those who earn more than a minimum wage (e.g., HU). Since January 
2006 the Netherlands has tightened fiscal treatment of early retirement and pre-pension schemes, 
and a reform of unemployment benefits is aimed at preventing the use of the scheme as an early 
retirement path. 
Yet some Member States have delayed planned reforms (e.g., IT, AT, PL) decided to slow 
down the process of tightening the minimum requirements for early retirement. To what extent this 
is a result of the current economic recession or simply due to the political unpopularity of such 
decisions is difficult to determine. Also announcing restrictions on early retirement schemes can 
provoke early retirement choices as individuals feel pressured to take up such benefits before the 
restriction are imposed (e.g., FR, LT, PL, SK). However, shorter working lives and less hours 
worked implies lower economic growth and activity and through this lower and less sustainable 
pensions. 
 
4.2  Early exits through disability schemes 
In some member states, the take up of sickness benefits and disability schemes in older 
workers are quite high. The high take up rate and in countries with increasing life expectancy and 
healthy life years raises issues as to whether there is a issue of such benefits being used as a way to 
exit the labour market early or if there is genuinely a health issue that needs to be addressed. For 
example, invalidity and sickness benefits may have become a tool to manage labour market 
difficulties in the 1980s and 1990s. Recent work from the OECD
8 highlights that developments in 
————— 
8  M. F. Forster Sickness (2007), Disability and Reintegration strategies: A Comparative Overview, Santander, 16-20 July, available 




Take-up of Specific Invalidity Benefits in EU27 
 
Take-up of Invalidity Benefits as Share of Population 55-59 
Low (< 5%)  Medium (5-15%)  High (>15%) 
   BG, LV  EE, HU, LT, PL, RO, SK 
IE, PT  BE, DK, LU, SI  MT, UK 
ES  CY, DE, FR, NL  FI, SE 
Take-up of Invalidity Benefits as Share of Population 60-64 
Low (< 5%)  Medium (5-15%)  High (>15%) 
LV, SK  BG, EE, PL, RO  HU, LT 
PT  BE, IE, SI, UK  DK, LU, MT, NL 
CY, ES, FR  DE  FI, SE 
 
 
Source: National replies to questionnaire submitted to Members of the Social Protection Committee. Figures generally refer to 2006. 
Note: These figures are generally taken from administrative sources are not necessarily completely comparable. Member States for which 
information is not provided do not have such information available. 
 
sickness and disability benefits are not necessarily related to trends in objective or subjective health 
indicators but are influenced by policies and social phenomena. Namely, in some countries it can 
be socially less stigmatising to be out of work because of health reasons than unemployment. It can 
also be observed, that many people with health problems can work, and want to work. Having 
policies based around an assumption that they cannot work can be fundamentally flawed. Helping 
those people to work is potentially a “win-win” policy: it helps people avoid exclusion and have 
higher incomes, at the same time as raising the prospect of higher economic output in the long 
term.
9 
A number of member states have identified the above mentioned as a reason to reform their 
sickness and disability benefit schemes. Member States have sought to extend working lives by 
curbing exits through sickness and disability schemes (e.g., CZ, DK, ES, HU, MT, NL, PL, AT, 
SE). Measures generally involve rehabilitation efforts in connection with stricter eligibility rules 
and greater cooperation between institutions involved to allow for a quicker transition back into the 
labour market. 
Changing attitudes to the acceptance of being in receipt of sickness or disability benefits, 
changing eligibility criteria for different types of health conditions, and putting more financial 
responsibility on employer’s for the cost absences for ill health (both work and non-work related) 
are common approaches. 
Restricting the use of sickness and disability schemes as pathways for early exit should, 
however, not preclude the use of such schemes for the contingencies they were meant for. Member 
————— 
9  Sickness, Disability and Work: Breaking the Barriers (Vol. 1): Norway, Poland and Switzerland, published 7/11/2006, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3343,en_2649_37411_37600345_1_1_1_37411,00.html and Transforming Disability into 
Ability, published 27/02/2003, avaible at: http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,3343,en_2649_37411_35290126_1_1_1_37411,00.html An Ageing Europe at Work: Are the Incentives to Work Sufficient to Provide Adequate and Sustainable Pensions in the Future?  89 
States are looking for ways to integrate people into the labour market according to their capabilities 
and the dichotomy of “employable” versus “unemployable” persons with disabilities is being 
challenged. 
 
4.3  Private pension provision and the incentives to work longer 
Member states have identified that relative benefit levels in pension systems are bound to 
decline in the future given pension reforms that have been carried out. To avoid this projected 
decline whilst still sustaining financial stability in pension expenditure, Member States have been 
promoting the development of private pensions. 
Individually funded and pre-funded pension provision has often been viewed as providing a 
possibility where the costs of future pensions are shifted to the present as opposed to pay-as-you-go 
schemes and as being schemes where the returns on contributions are higher. 
In most Member States a combination of providing incentives to extend working lives and 
increasing privately managed pension provision is being implemented. Some Member States 
promote or mandate extra contributions for occupational and private pension provision (e.g., BE, 
DK, DE, IE, SE, UK). A number of Member States that have introduced mandatory funded 
schemes by allowing for a transfer of contributions from old pay-as-you-go systems to the funded 
schemes or by an increase of overall contribution rates to statutory pension schemes (e.g., BG, EE, 
HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK, SE). 
The interplay of the two strategies, providing work incentives in statutory defined benefit, 
pay-as-you-schemes and increasing privately managed pension provision, is vital to the success of 
providing adequate pensions in the future. 
Privately managed pension provision typically shifts a lot pension risk from the provider to 
the beneficiary. This is especially true for defined contribution funded (both pre-funded and 
individually funded) schemes, which are becoming more predominant. Privately managed pension 
provision in most countries involves that individuals make active choices regarding their pension. 
This type of an active choice instigates an interest at an earlier stage in a person’s contributory life 
in even other types of choices that can affect the pension of an individual, such as career choices, 
through a sort of spill-over effect. In many countries, however, most systems allow for a default 
choice when and active choice is not made which works adversely to this aim. 
On the other hand, supplementary pension schemes occupational or private, mandatory or 
voluntary can give a significant addition to the statutory pension. These pensions, historically, have 
also had elements that have reversed certain work incentives legislated in the statutory pension 
schemes contributing to earlier retirement. These impediments can include the possibility to 
withdraw an occupational pension earlier than the statutory retirement or pension eligibility age or 
the receipt of lump-sum payments facilitating earlier exits from the labour market. 
In a few Member States, early exits through supplementary private pensions used to be a 
common practice, though now diminishing (e.g., BE, UK). In Some Member States there are still 
specific private pension schemes designed to provide early retirement (e.g., FR, IE, NL, SI, SK, FI, 
SE), but in a growing number of Member States supplementary pensions cannot be used for 
bridging early exits from the labour market and old age retirement through statutory retirement 
schemes (e.g., DK, EE, PL, BG, CZ and CY). 
The early take-up of private pension benefits depends strongly on eligibility rules and age 
limits. In some cases, a lower age is fixed by law (e.g., BG, DK, PL, FI) or by wide extending 
agreement between labour market actors as in the case of Sweden. The eligibility age for private 
pension provision can be as low as 50 in some cases (e.g., UK, IE and CZ) In some Member States, 90  Asees Ahuja and Ruth Pasermann 
 
private pension benefits are, however, actuarially reduced in case of early withdrawal (e.g., IE, UK, 
SE) providing the same kind of incentives to work longer as in statutory schemes with the similar 
design. Some Member States consider the frequent use of private pensions to bridge between early 
exit and statutory retirement age attributable to low awareness of the consequences of such 
behaviour. For instance, in the UK, employees are often even unaware of actuarial reductions of 
their private pension in the case of early labour market exit. 
The effects of the current economic situation on privately managed pension schemes where 
the beneficiary bears much of the investment risk is an area that need to be monitored carefully in 
terms of longer working lives. Most existing funded schemes have experienced a fall in asset 
values during the recent financial turbulence. Low returns can lead to pension benefit levels that 
force the incapable to continue to work longer but it is important to note that the share of income 
from such schemes is quite limited for those in or close to retirement today. However, the 
experiences of the turbulence in financial markets can act as an early warning signal of the need to 
evaluate the situation as we move towards a higher amount of funded and prefunded pension 
provision. A lack of knowledge of the effects of investments on these systems can also lead to 
people making the wrong investment or retirement choices. For example, early withdrawal of a 
pension in a time of downturn can lead to unnecessary low benefits. 
In this sense, the importance of information and knowledge regarding one’s pension is 
crucial for incentives to be effective. This also has significance with regard to an individual’s 
choice to invest in individual private pension savings. An incomplete picture of one’s pension 
provision from different schemes affects the choices that individual’s make concerning their 
retirement decision, such as career choices, including breaks from gainful employment, saving 
levels for retirement and labour market exit and the extension of working lives. . Early exits 
through unemployment schemes 
Unemployment benefits are a key reason for early labour market exit in some Member 
States. As calculations for theoretical replacement rates show how results drop for unemployment 
breaks in an individual’s career (Figure 11). In many Member States unemployment breaks lead to 
a bigger drop in replacement rates than for instance childcare breaks (e.g., CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, IT, 
CY, LU, AT, PL, SK, FI, SE, UK).
10 In some Member States, the drop in replacement rates are six 
percentage points or more in after three years of unemployment (e.g., SK, RO, FI), bringing the 
adequacy of protection of pension entitlements during unemployment into question, which has to 
be balanced with the financial incentives for individuals to return to the labour market. 
At the same time, in a number of Member States specific unemployment schemes are 
opened, that do not count in the general unemployment level. This provides a form of hidden 
unemployment of older workers that may not be visible in the normally calculated unemployment 
figures. Specific schemes of this type may include, extended benefit disbursement periods (e.g., 
CZ, EL, FR, IT, LT, AT, PL, SI, FI) extra benefits paid after the expiration of standard 
unemployment benefits (e.g., BE), or relaxing of other eligibility criteria, for example with regards 
to job search. Whilst these types of special conditions or too generous benefits systems for periods 
of unemployment may protect older workers from a difficult labour market situation, they can also 
act as a disincentive to work longer, and become an old-age poverty trap. Therefore, while many 
Member States do not have any distinguishing rules for unemployment benefits for older workers, 
others are attempting to progressively phase out such rules (e.g., DK, DE, FI). 
————— 
10  In BE, this has to do with the nature of the calculation. Unemployment is assumed to take place at the end of the individual’s career. 
In BE this entails that the individual loses the entitlement to the pension bonus which is given to those who work beyond the age of 
62, as compared with a person who continues to work. If the unemployment is instead assumed to take place earlier in the career the 
results would be as those for the childcare case. An Ageing Europe at Work: Are the Incentives to Work Sufficient to Provide Adequate and Sustainable Pensions in the Future?  91 
 
Figure 11 
Difference in Net Theoretical Replacement Rates for an Average Earner 
Entering the Labour Market at 25 and Retiring at the Statutory Retirement Age 












* The unemployment break is assumed to take place in the years just prior to old age retirement which is assumed to take place at the 
legislated statutory old retirement age for men. 
Source: SPC/ISG. 
 
5  Information and the effectiveness of incentives 
With these increasingly complex structures it is also vital that collective information 
including all complementary schemes gives individuals a clear picture of their retirement options 
and their subsequent effects on benefit levels. In order to ensure effectiveness of the incentives to 
work longer it is important to ensure transparency and information regarding the design of these 
incentives and how they affect a person’s pension benefits ad entitlements. For example, the link 
between contributions paid in and benefits paid out has to be clear for the general public, since 
pension contributions, by and large, are viewed by the public as general taxation rather than as a 
build-up of individual pension rights. This can especially be the case if employers pay the 
contributions. Some Member States have clarified the link between benefits and contribution by 
imposing a part of the contributory burden on the individual (e.g., CZ, DE, EL, FR, IT, LV, LT, 
LU, HU, AT, PL, FI, SI, SE SK). 
Pension reforms have taken place in most Member States and have often become a 
continuous process. In this context, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the people concerned to 
understand how the changes introduced affect them and how they should respond. At the same time 
pension reforms are also demanding more choices of the individual that affect their pensions by 
increasing flexibility around retirement conditions and prolonging maximum and minimum 
contributory criteria. Therefore, without transparency and general knowledge of the systems the 
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Take-up of Specific Unemployment Schemes for Older Workers in EU27 
 
  Low (< 3%)  Medium (3-6%)  High (>6%) 
Take up as a share of population 55-59  UK, SE, SK, LU  EE, CZ, LT, MT  BE, CY, FR 
Take up as a share of population 60-64  CZ, BG, LT, PL, 
UK, SE, SK, LU  FR, CY, NL  BE, FI 
 
Note: These figures are generally taken from administrative sources and are not necessarily completely comparable. Member States for 
which information is not provided do not have such information available. In DE a special scheme for 58+ unemployed individuals could 
make up an estimated 5  per cent of the population aged 55-64. However, this scheme is about to phase out as of 2008. 
Source: National replies to questionnaire submitted to Members of the Social Protection Committee. Figures generally refer to 2006. 
 
There is widespread recognition in Member States that the level of financial literacy among 
the general public is inadequate for people to be able to make educated choices between the various 
options open to them. All the increased individual responsibilities and risks imply that information 
policy should play a more important role in pension policy. 
Additional to this there is also a recognised problem of short-sightedness suggesting that 
even knowing and understanding the significance of different choices may not ensure sound 
consumer choice simply due to a lack of interest in one’s pension, or interest arising too late. This 
is especially pertinent in systems where there is a life cycle approach to earning pension 
entitlements making decisions made in the early years of a person’s career important to the pension 
eventually paid out. 
In efforts to complement other types of pension formation a growing number of Member 
States are now also providing or developing calculations of how these pensions rights may translate 
into a pension income, based on projections given certain economic assumptions (e.g., BE, DE, 
DK, IE, ES, FR, LT, FI, SE, UK). In Finland, the projections are only provided for those closest to 
retirement, as projections for younger cohorts are considered too hypothetical. Yet with a move 
towards longer contributory periods it would seem important that individuals understand the effects 
of shorter careers early on. As the pros and cons of different approaches are weighed, even younger 
cohorts might appreciate forecasting tools which provide different scenarios depending on 
economic assumptions, contributory years and point of retrieving the pension. 
However, many countries have recognized that at the same time projections are usually 
provided for each scheme in isolation even though individuals ideally would need to know how 
their different entitlements combine into a full package of potential retirement income. But in a few 
of the Member States with widespread occupational and private pension provision, steps are being 
taken to develop web-based pension portals where people can check how their pension accruals 
from different schemes would come together in an overall amount of pension income (e.g., DK). 
This will help citizens to avoid making retirement decisions based on incomplete or fragmented 
information. 
 
6  Labour market conditions for older workers 
6.1 Developments  2001-08 
The European Union has identified a target under the growth and jobs strategy is to reach a An Ageing Europe at Work: Are the Incentives to Work Sufficient to Provide Adequate and Sustainable Pensions in the Future?  93 
 
Figure 12 




















Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, Annual averages. 
 
50 per cent employment rate for older workers by 2010. In 2007, the employment rate for older 
workers in the EU-25 was 45 per cent compared to 37 per cent in 2001, and 11 countries now 
exceed the 50 per cent target (Figure 12). This general increase in employment rates results from 
two main factors. Firstly, the relative share of people aged 55-59 – who have a higher employment 
rate – has grown due to the ageing of the baby-boom generation. In addition, most Member States 
experienced a higher increase in the employment rate for women than for men between 2001 and 
2007. 
Moreover, since 2000 the increase in the employment rate among 55-64 year olds has 
benefited all categories of workers, although it has been relatively slower for the less qualified 
within the EU25: it has been 5 points for the less qualified, compared to 6 or 7 points for medium 
or highly qualified (Figure 13). At the same time the evolution of employment rates for the less 
qualified was more favourable for the age bracket 25-54, probably reflecting targeted employment 
measures. 
The employment rates of older workers are often monitored as an indicator of the effect of 
pension reforms on the extension of working lives. It is, however, clear that incentives structures 
included in pension reforms have only a small role to play unless complemented by a labour market 
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Strategies show that there 
are two commonly used 
instruments to boost the 
labour market activity of 
older workers. First, 
Member States are 
actively adopting a 
culture of lifelong 
learning, offering more 
training designed to 
make older workers’ 
skills more adaptive and 
to help them keep their 
jobs (e.g., AT, BG, and 
CZ). This plays in line 
with the life-cycle 
approach to contributory 
periods in some pension 
schemes as well. Second, 
subsidies are offered to 
employers to boost 
financial incentives to 
employ older workers 
(e.g., AT, DK, ES, LT,   
 
HU, and SE). In Germany, financial incentives are also given to unemployed older workers to 
reenter the labour market by offering a compensation allowance to unemployed people aged 50 or 
more who accept a low-paid job. On a European level, the European Social Fund (ESF) contributes 
to the financial sustainability and adequacy of pension systems by encouraging activities related to 
life long learning, active ageing and prolonging working lives (e.g., AT, HU, SK). Some Member 
States are also using European anti-discrimination law in their promotion of better age management 
(e.g., DK, NL, UK). 
Additionally, European legislation on age-based discrimination (Council Directive 
2000/78/EC) states that less favourable treatment of employees on the grounds of age needs to be 
objectively justified. A recent court ruling has, however, confirmed that reaching the pension 
eligibility age or statutory retirement age could be a sufficient reason to terminate the employment 
without it being considered discriminatory.
11 
However there is still a need to fight age discrimination and to open up employment 
opportunities for older workers, including opportunities for training and retraining. 
 
 
6.2  The effect of the crisis on labour market conditions 
In May 2009, the European Commission revised its forecast with regard to the financial and 
economic downturn in the EU. The forecast predicts a contraction of GDP in the EU by 4 per cent 
in 2009 and to stagnate during 2010. In line with this, employment rates are expected to fall 
————— 
11  Case C-388/07 The Incorporated Trustees of the National Council for Ageing. 
Figure 13 
Employment Rates of Men 55-64 by Skill Levels, EU25 
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significantly and EU-wide unemployment rates are expected to reach almost 11 per cent in 2010 as 
compared with 7.0 per cent in 2008.
12 
The economic crisis has already had an impact on the labour market and employment growth 
has come to a standstill whilst unemployment rates have started to rise. The number of employed 
people will decline by 2.5 per cent in 2009 and by 1.5 per cent in 2010 or by about 8.5 million jobs. 
Some categories of workers are expected to be more affected by the stagnation on the labour 
market such as new and young workers, the low skilled, employees holding temporary contracts, 
EU mobile workers, migrants and the elderly.
13 
The current situation can cause further delay in the establishment of younger workers on the 
labour market. This can have a long term impact on the pension levels of these individuals, 
possibly causing pension benefit adequacy problems later as is displayed by the calculations in 
Figure 11. This can be especially pertinent in systems where contributory years have been 
extended. This problem is compounded by the increase in long term unemployment. 
The long-term unemployment share for older workers (percentage of unemployed for more 
than 12 months) is especially high, at 55 per cent. Sustaining a well-functioning labour market and 
a high activity rate among the population of working age can be especially difficult in times of 
economic downturn. Often groups that are extra vulnerable are more susceptible to unemployment 
and lay-offs, including older workers who can often be considered both a more expensive yet more 
ineffective source of labour. Such labour market behaviour can, however, lead to more significant 
problems later on in the sustainability of pension systems and other financial security systems. The 
reason for this is that often older workers are more difficult to reintegrate into the labour market. 
For example, if early retirement systems or specific unemployment’s schemes are used these may 
provide more long-term and generous benefits than those provided to other groups, as a way of 
enticing an easier redundancy. The individual incentives to reenter the labour market are then often 
smaller and the labour market demand for a person who has been absent for a longer period tends 
to diminish. 
In earlier economic crises, older workers tend to be amongst the majority of those affected 
by redundancies. It is important to implement proactive labour market policy strategies that keep 
older workers in the labour force and that help to curb such labour market distortions as the impact 
of the current labour market and economic situation such as redundancy packages, and early 
retirement. 
Most Member States have taken measures to preserve employment, support activation and 
promote reintegration in the labour market, and anticipate and manage the impact of restructuring. 
However, most of these measures build on existing labour market policies that have developed 
along the principles of flexicurity and active inclusion. It is important that all labour market actors 
work together in order to keep a balance in the age distribution of the labour market and those in 
unemployment considering that certain groups such as young and older workers are already 
proportionately underrepresented on the labour market.
14 
Integrated plans in Member States to cope with the current economic downturn indicate an 
understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the crisis.
15 A common approach is to cushion the 
impact of the crisis by giving support in the field of employment to both employers and workers 
————— 
12  European Commission Economic Forecast Spring 2009, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ 
publication_summary15046_en.htm 
13  Source: DG ECFIN. 
14  Source: National replies to questionnaire submitted to Members of the Social Protection Committee. 
15  Updated joint assessment by the Social Protection Committee and the European Commission of the social impact of the economic 
crisis and of policy responses, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/spc_opinions_en.htm 96  Asees Ahuja and Ruth Pasermann 
 
and by investing in the economy. Labour market measures that have been observed include flexible 
working-time arrangements (e.g., BE, DE, NL, SI); measures to raise the employability of workers, 
including the most vulnerable through enhanced training programs (e.g., DE, HU, NL, AT, PT); or 
public support to SMEs (e.g., BE, BG, AT, PT, FI, SE). Other examples of measures to preserve 
jobs entail cuts in non-wage labour costs (e.g., BE, BG, DE, PT, SI, FI, SE) and corporate income 
taxes (e.g., PT, SI). Specific measures are also targeted at older workers and aim at avoiding the 
use of early retirement schemes (e.g., PL, PT). 
Measures to support activation and promote reintegration in the labour market, especially of 
the most vulnerable include the strengthening of public employment services allowing in particular 
for more individualised support (e.g., BG, DK, DE, FR, SI); greater access to training (e.g., BG, 
DE, FR, FI, PT, UK) including training schemes targeted at specific groups of workers (e.g., PT), 
subsidised employment for those furthest away from the labour market (e.g., FR), and to child care 
(e.g., AT) and other enabling services. 
Preserving a close link to the labour market for those made redundant is an important 
measure. Although the current social costs of this may be high, it is important that a long-term 
thinking is maintained. 
 
6.3  The crisis and the take up of benefits 
In light of the current economic downturn, it is also important to monitor the effects on the 
situation of older workers in the labour market and on their path to full retirement.The direct 
impact of the recession is most apparent in the increase in the take up unemployment benefits in 
2008, and especially during the second part of the year. The impact of the crisis has also had a 
slight impact on the percentage of older workers claiming early retirement schemes (e.g., LV, LT, 
PL and SK).
16 The number and age and gender distributions of claimants of social assistance is not 
clear yet, however, most MS expect increased pressure on minimum income safety net schemes. 
Areas more frequently pointed out as deserving special attention when adopting recovery 
packages or specific measures in the current context are linked to unemployment, the adequacy of 
safety nets, funded pension schemes, and access to housing. Moreover a number of Member States 
have also delayed pension reforms or the activation of automatic mechanism which in the current 
climate would otherwise lead to lower pension benefits. 
Member States have taken action to reinforce the support to people’s income through 
measures that include increasing the level of minimum income or minimum wage, extending the 
coverage or duration of unemployment benefits, reinforcing other social benefits, introducing tax 
rebates or exemptions for specific groups. They have done so either by advancing measures that 
were already planned or by adopting new measures, either on a temporary or permanent basis. 
These measures build on the active inclusion strategies that many Member States have started 
implementing, and attention is paid to avoiding that the new measures compromise efforts to build 
integrated approaches that combine income support, access to services and reintegration incentives. 
 
7 Conclusions 
Pension reforms have to deal with demographic developments and in particular increased 
longevity, which is a key driver for increasing pension expenditure in the future. This increase in a 
financially balanced scheme would require either higher contributions by workers or lower benefits 
————— 
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for pensioners, if the increase in life expectancy were spent in retirement. However, increases in 
life expectancy can be shared between the years in employment and retirement, thereby resulting in 
a better balance between life-time contributions and benefits. 
The hesitation to maintain older workers, into the labour market can also depend on what is 
socially acceptable. There is, however, a growing recognition amongst policy makers and also 
amongst the general population for the need to extend working lives. The clearest example of this 
success is the recognition that has been given to the need to increase retirement ages. This is now 
becoming a politically legitimate and viable reform in some countries. 
Giving flexibility to retirement choices and putting more responsibility on the individual in 
determining the pension ultimately received, also allows for a social dimension in work incentives. 
Individuals are allowed to prolong working lives according to individual ability and choice. 
Creating incentives to work more and longer in pension systems is only part of the solution 
to extending working lives. The success of these incentives is dependent on their interaction with 
other benefit systems and on labour market conditions. If incentives in pension systems are 
counteracted in other social security systems, private or public, the incentives will not be as 
effective in attracting people to prolong their working lives. Moreover even the best designed 
incentive scheme will fail to take effect if the demand for older and younger workers is lacking on 
the labour market. This is clearly more of a problem in phases of employment destruction, but also 
in periods of employment growth it is important to ensure labour markets are open for younger and 
older workers. 




List of Abbreviations of EU Member States 
BE -  Belgium 
BG - Bulgaria 
CZ -  Czech  Republic 
DK - Denmark 
DE - Germany 
EE -  Estonia 
EL -  Ireland 
ES -  Greece 
FR -  Spain 
IE -  France 
IT -  Italy 
CY - Cyprus 
LV - Latvia 
LT -  Lithuania 
LU - Luxembourg 
HU - Hungary 
MT - Malta 
NL - The  Netherlands 
AT - Austria 
PL -  Poland 
PT -  Portugal 
RO - Romania 
SI -  Slovenia 
SK -  Slovakia 
FI -  Finland 
SE -  Sweden 
UK - United  Kingdom 
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ANNEX 2 
Recently Enacted Changes in Retirement Age in the EU Member States 
 
MS Measure  Decision  Implementation 
BE 
Equalisation of retirement age: 
gradual increase in retirement 
age up to 65 for women 
1996  Gradual increase to reach age of 65 in 
2009 
BG  Increase in retirement age up to 
60 for women and 63 for men  2000 
Since 2000 retirement age increase by 
6 months per year: age of 63 for men 
reached in 2005.Age of 60 for women 
in 2009 
CZ 
Increase in retirement age from 
60 to 65 for men and from 57 to 
65 for women (and to 62-64 for 




Since 1996 retirement age increased 
by 2 months per year for men and 4 
months per year for women 
DK 
Increase in retirement age from 
65 to 67 for both genders (and 
further possible increases) 
2006 
Between 2024 and 2027. A 
framework for further increases in the 
retirement age after 2030 (adjustment 
mechanism based on trends in the 
remaining life expectancy) 
DE  Increase in retirement age from 
65 to 67 for both genders  2006 
Gradual increase between 2012 and 
2029 (one month per year starting 
from 2012 and two months per year 
from 2024) 
EE  Increase and equalisation of 
retirement age (63 years)  1999-2000  Gradual equalisation till 2016 
GR 
Increase in retirement age for 
women insured before 1993 in 
IKA-ETAM
17 from 57 to 60. 
Increase in retirement age for 
women insured after 1992 to 65. 
1992 
Retirement age of 65 for those 
women insured since 1993 (to be 
achieved in 2058) 
IT  Increase in minimum retirement 
age from 58 to 61  2007 
Gradual increase between 2008 and 
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MS Measure  Decision  Implementation 
LT 
Increase in retirement age from 
60 years for women and 
62.5 years for men to 65 years 
for both genders 
 
Gradual equalisation between 2012 
and 2026. Yearly increases by 4 
months for women and by 2 months 
for men 
LV  Increase and gender equalisation 
of retirement age (62)  1996 
Increases in retirement age by 6 
months per year: men reached 
retirement age of 62 in 2003, and 
women in 2008 
HU 
Increase in retirement age from 
60 years for men and from 55 
for women to 62 for both 
genders 
1996 
Gradual increase by year every two 
years so that the retirement age of 62 
was reached in 2001 for men and in 
2009 for women 
MT 
Gender equalisation: increase in 
retirement age from 60 years for 
women and 61 years for men to 
68 years for both genders 
2006  Equalisation of the retirement age till 
2013 
MT  Increase in retirement age from 
62 to 65 for both genders  2006  Gradual increase between 2014 and 
2026 
AT 
Equalisation of retirement age: 





Increases by 6 month per year 
between 2024 and 2033 
RO 
Increase in retirement age from 
57 to 60 for women, and from 
62 to 65 for men 
2000  Gradual increase between 2001 and 
2014 
SK 
Equalisation of retirement age: 
increase from 60 years for men 
and 57 years for women to 62 
years for both genders (women 
with children lose their right to 
retire at the age of 53-56) 
 
Gradual increase for men between 
2004 and 2006, and for women 
between 2004 and 2010 (women with 
5 children and more till 2015) 
FI  Increase in retirement age from 
63 to 65 for both sexes  2009  Retirement age will be raised by two 
months per year starting in 2011 
UK 
Gender equalisation: increase in 
state pension retirement age for 
women from 60 to 65 
2007  Between 2010 and 2020 
UK 
Increase in state pension 
retirement age for both genders 
from 65 to 68 
2007 
increase to 66 between 2024 and 
2026, 67 between 2034 and 2036, and 
68 between 2044 and 2046 
UK 
Increase in age when private or 
occupational pension can be 
drawn from 50 to 55 
2008 From  2010 
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RETIREMENT BEHAVIOUR AND RETIREMENT INCENTIVES IN SPAIN 
Isabel Argimón,
* Marta Botella,
** Clara I. González
*** and Raquel Vegas
*** 
In this paper we analyse the role that Social Security wealth and incentives play in the 
transition to retirement in Spain. We use the labour records and other relevant information 
contained in a newly released database (Muestra Contínua de Vidas Laborales, 2006), to construct 
incentive measures stemming from the Social Security provisions in relation to retiring at old age 
and investigate the role played by such incentives and by other socio-economic variables on the 
retirement hazard. We compute the effects of the reform that took place in 2002, which made the 
requirements to access an old pension stricter in general. We carry out a dynamic reduced-form 
analysis of the retirement decision using a duration model. 
Our results show that both the pension wealth and substitution effects have a significant role 




The sustainability of pay-as-you-go systems is a matter of concern in ageing economies, 
such as Spain, as they were designed at a time when demographic structures were characterised by 
a much lower life expectancy and a much higher fecundity.
1 Therefore, both, the number of people 
and the number of years that these people were in a situation to receive a public pension was much 
lower when the system was launched than nowadays.
2 
On top of such demographic developments, in recent years we have also observed a decline 
in the labour force participation of older workers. While in the seventies, the participation rates of 
males over 55 were above 50 per cent, in 2008 they do not reach 30 per cent. The combination of 
both factors has lead to the prediction that the ratio between people in working age and people of 
70 or more years of age, which is nowadays around 5.5 in Spain, will be only 2.25 in 2055. So, a 
smaller proportion of people than what is currently the case will be providing the revenue that will 
be transferred to older people in the form of pensions. In this sense, the behaviour of older workers 
is reinforcing the negative impact that demographic factors have on the sustainability of the 
pension system. 
The role of pension benefits rules in relation to labour market participation of the elderly is 
regarded as central in many countries, as not only they may be too generous in providing income 
support, but they may also create incentives to retire early from work. In this sense, three issues are 
relevant here: the amount of the pension that the system provides, the pattern of benefits associated 
with each age of retirement and the entitlement rights that define the conditions to be met to be able 
to claim a pension at each age. Parametric changes for the Social Security system have been and 
are being discussed in Spain under the so-called Toledo Agreement while some countries have 
————— 
*  Financial Stability Department, Banco de España. 
**  Research Department, Banco de España. 
*** FEDEA. 
1  It is the decline in fecundity, more than the longevity increase, what explains the forecast that more than 30 per cent of total Spanish 
population will be older than 65 years of age in the middle of this century. 
2  In fact, the average number of years that a man aged 65 was expected to live from that age was around 12 in the middle of the 20th 
century, it has grown up to 15 now, and is forecasted to increase to 20 years in the middle of this century, according to the Spanish 
National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE). 104  Isabel Argimón, Marta Botella, Clara I. González and Raquel Vegas 
already implemented large reforms. Many changes have been directed to reducing incentives to 
early retirement embedded in the pension system and to increase incentives to leave the labour 
market at a later age. Governments have also promoted active labour force measures that should 
stimulate the demand for elderly workers, thus contributing to raising or maintaining labour market 
participation of the elderly. 
The goal of this paper is to study and quantify the role that Social Security provisions for 
old-age pensions are playing on the retirement decision of the elderly in Spain. We propose 
estimating a reduced form model for retirement to capture the effects of pension incentives on 
pension claiming, controlling for some socio-demographic characteristics. In particular, we analyse 
the probability of retiring at a given age, given that the person has not retired yet, as a function of 
individual variables. 
Boldrin et al. (1999, 2004) have carried out an analysis of similar characteristics, estimating 
the probability of retiring at a given date. The objective of the work that we are presenting here is 
to widen such study in three main directions. On the first place, we propose estimating a duration 
model and not a point in time estimation, so as to allow a consideration of the determinants of the 
retirement decision at different ages, and, particularly to assess the role of the SS incentives for 
early retirement and for retirement at each age.
3 Moreover, we use a new database, the Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL), which has recently been released to explore this issue 
further. The advantage of the MCVL for the analysis in relation to previous samples obtained from 
the same source, and used in empirical work,
4 is that the sample design is known and, therefore, it 
allows for a better and broader understanding of the results obtained. A duration approach seems to 
maximize the informative content of this database, as it allows to follow the workers’ decisions 
across time. Finally, we address the quantification of the impact of the change in pension rules 
whose full implementation took place in 2002. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly summarise the empirical 
results obtained so far on the determinants of retirement for old people in Spain. Section 3 contains 
a description of the dataset that we use in the analysis. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical model 
that we estimate and whose results are summarised in section 5. Section 6 contains the conclusions. 
A Data Appendix is included, as well as an Appendix containing the main features of the Spanish 
Social Security pension system. 
 
2  The empirical analysis of the role of social security on retirement decisions 
The vast majority of empirical analysis carried out to measure the role of Social Security on 
retirement decisions has been done for the USA, while evidence for other countries, and specially 
Spain, is more limited.
5 
One of the most revealing evidence of the dependency between withdrawal from labour 
force and pension regulations in Spain is the presence of spikes in the benefit claiming moment 
around the ages of 60, the earliest age a pension can be, in general, claimed, and 65, the ordinary 
retirement age. Such pattern is also observed in other western countries (Gruber and Wise, 1999 
————— 
3  Villagarcía (1995) and Muñoz (1995) apply the duration model approach to analyse the age of retirement, using the EPA database, 
which is cross sectional by construction. Because of the data source they cannot address the role played by SS incentives. 
4  A previous version of a similar database with information up to 1995 and whose description can be found in Martínez (1999), has 
been used in Boldrin et al. (1999 and 2004), Boldrin and Jiménez-Martín (2002), and Jimenez-Martín et al. (2000, 2006). The main 
drawbacks of such database are that the detailed sample design has not been disclosed and that it is not publicly available. 
5  This literature has been reviewed in detail in Diamond and Gruber (1999) and Coile and Gruber (2000). Evidence for other countries 
can be found in Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004), where also the case of Spain is addressed (Boldrin et al., 1999 and 2004).   Retirement Behaviour and Retirement Incentives in Spain  105 
and 2004), where eligibility ages prescribed in country-specific provisions also play a major role in 
defining the observed pattern of retirement by age. 
The microeconomic evidence that has been gathered so far shows that the Spanish early 
retirement provisions play an important role in the modal age of retirement and its pattern in 
different ages (Boldrin et al., 1999, 2004) and that, in general, labour force transitions of elderly 
men depend on Social Security regulations (Alba, 1997; García-Pérez and Sánchez- Martín, 2008a 
and 2008b)
6 and their interdependence with health considerations (Blanco, 2000; Prieto et al., 
2002). 
There are few papers that attempt at quantifying the impact of pension Social security 
incentives on labour force participation. In particular, Boldrin et al.,1999, 2004 and Jiménez, 2006 
do so through changes in the social security framework. These works follow a regression-based 
approach, being based on reduced-form behavioural equations, to model the effect on the decision 
to retire of pension wealth, the incentives embedded in the pension system and individual 
demographic characteristics. Estimating retirement hazard rates, using a probit model on a sample 
of individual work histories randomly drawn from the historical files of Social Security affiliates, 
they conclude that a substantial portion of the retirement behaviour cannot be explained by Social 
Security factors. On the other hand, García Pérez and Sánchez Martín (2008b) find evidence of the 
relevance of the social security incentives on the transitions from unemployment for older workers. 
Using a sample of individuals aged between 56 and 70 from tthe European Union Household Panel 
(PHOGUE), wave 7 (2000), Utrilla de la Hoz and Ubago (2005) find that a replacement rate 
(pension over total income) below 80 per cent reduces the probability of retiring. 
The effect of the successive pension reforms has been empirically addressed and point out, in 
general, to its effectiveness in lowering retirement. Jiménez (2006) carries out a simulation exercise 
that computes the effect of the Spanish old age pension reforms that took place in 1997 and 2002 
and concludes that they reduce the hazard rates. A similar qualitative result is found in Gutiérrez-
Domenech (2006), where, using a longitudinal survey of Catalan population, it is shown that the 
2002 reform contributed to the increase in the staying-on employed probabilities of the individuals 
older than 60. On the other hand, Sánchez Martin (2005), using a calibrated overlapping- 
generations model finds that the overall effect of the 2002 reform is a clear drop in the average 
retirement age, as younger cohorts of low income workers benefit from the opportunity of leaving 
the labour force early. 
As for the impact of truncations in the system, Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez (2000, 2006) 
show, through the estimation of the behavioural parameters of a structural model, that the existence 
of minimum pension’s regulations has an impact on early retirement decisions. They find that the 
combination of age penalties and minimum pensions generate large incentives to early retirement 
for those workers with low wages and short labour histories. Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez (2006) 
conclude that there is a threefold increase in retirement at 60 with respect to the economy without 
minimum pensions and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50 per cent larger. 
Finally, there is the line of research devoted to analysing the sustainability of the pension 
system which is usually formulated within the framework of an overlapping generations model. 
The evidence gathered on the effects of delaying the normal retirement age a number of given years 
(Sánchez-Martín, 2003; Boldrin and Jiménez-Martín, 2003; Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra, 
2008) shows that this strategy has an important impact on the system deficit. 
————— 
6  See García Pérez and Sánchez Martín (2008a and 2008b) for some results on the links between unemployment, retirement and their 
associated public insurance programmes calibrated with data from the MCVL. 106  Isabel Argimón, Marta Botella, Clara I. González and Raquel Vegas 
 
3 The  data 
3.1 The  MCVL 
The database Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL 2006) includes all the 
electronically recorded information that the Social Security administration keeps in relation to 
labour and contributory pension history for more than one million of individuals, whose anonymity 
is preserved. It is a 4 per cent random draw from a reference population, which is composed of all 
the people who at any time during 2006 had a registered record with the Social Security system, 
either because they were contributing or because they were receiving a pension. Therefore, it does 
include those that were unemployed for the whole 2006, either if they received a contributory 
pension or if they received unemployment benefits, as in the latter case, the National Employment 
Service pays their social contributions to the Social Security Funds. The sample does not contain 
any information relating to the scheme called the Regimen de Clases Pasivas that covers public 
sector employment, so that most civil servants cannot be included in the analysis. It must be 
pointed out that as a consequence of the definition of the reference population a large proportion of 
non-working females is also included, mostly as preceptors of a widowhood pension.
7 
Most of the labour, contributory and pension history of the over one million individuals has 
been recovered, so that their employment history can be reconstructed. The data contain, for each 
employment spell, information on covered earnings, which are the amount of the earnings that the 
Social Security regulations takes into account for the computation of pension rights. Covered 
earnings can be regarded as a good proxy for actual earnings, although they have both a ceiling and 
a floor: on the one hand, a minimum contribution must be paid over earnings, independently of the 
actual amount perceived, so that there is a minimum covered earning associated to it; on the other 
hand, earnings above a given ceiling do not pay contributions and therefore do not generate further 
rights. Covered earnings are used in the empirical analysis to proxy the wage variable. 
Moreover, for each employment spell we have also information on length and type of 
contract, the Social Security regime and contributive group that are associated with the job and that 
define the amount of the contributions and the conditions to access the pensions, as well as 
information about the firm, such as its activity sector and location (province).
8 Available data also 
include some personal characteristics such as sex, age, place and year of birth. We can also know 
the place where the worker first affiliated, which could be regarded as the place where the first job 
was taken. Data on people’s socio characteristics, such as marital status are poorly recorded in the 
sense that the available information corresponds to the situation when the affiliation took place, and 
in no case there is any reference to the spouse’s working status, so that it is not possible to take into 
account the joint decision to retire.
9 As far as social transfers are concerned, the database contains 
information on periods and amounts enjoyed for old-age and disability pensions or survivors’ 
pensions such as, orphanage, widowhood and family help. There is no data on other sources of 
individual wealth or other sources of income.
10 
————— 
7  A detailed description of the sample can be found in Seguridad Social (2006), La muestra contínua de vidas laborales. 2004, and an 
overview in Argimón and González (2006). 
8  Active policy measures to promote retaining or offering a job to old people cannot be taken into account as the dataset does not 
include enough information to do so. 
9  The MCVL has been matched with information coming from the Census. In the Census’ module “Co-inhabitants” there is 
information about the number of people living with the person in the MCVL dataset, their age and sex, but not their working status. 
10  The MCVL has also been matched to Personal Income Tax data corresponding to one fiscal year. In that sense, information on 
additional sources of income could be obtained, but not in a longitudinal dimension.   Retirement Behaviour and Retirement Incentives in Spain  107 
Born Not Retired Total
60 61 62 63 64 65
1936 205 199 152 295 892 189 1,932
1937 880 201 162 149 295 866 195 2,748
1938 817 136 159 153 285 819 170 2,539
1939 652 103 135 134 243 732 190 2,189
1940 948 168 225 232 401 1,225 314 3,513
1941 704 140 187 192 332 981 893 3,429
1942 607 186 170 188 350 1,956 3,457
1943 600 213 231 205 2,671 3,920
1944 554 200 220 2,963 3,937
1945 546 209 3,449 4,204
1946 388 3,597 3,985




Distribution by Year of Birth and Retirement Age. 
Sample of Men Born between 1936 and 1946 Having Worked in the General Regimen 













3.2 The  sub-sample 
Given that we are only interested in retirement decisions taken by the elderly, we restrict our 
initial sample from the 2006 wave to people that are aged between 60 and 70 in 2006 (i.e., those 
born between 1936 and 1946) and that have already become entitled to a pension benefit, defined 
in terms of being able to prove at least 15 contributory years. It means that we exclude those for 
which the Social Security system does not record any contributory life, those that have retired 
before their 60
th birthday
11 and those who started receiving an old age pension before 1997, when a 
large pension reform was introduced.
12 We have also excluded those that receive an old-age 
pension coming from incapacity, as the determinants to claim such kind of pension are most likely 
linked to health factors, which are not comparable with the rest of the determinants.
13 We 
additionally restrict the sample to men as the labour history of women is quite different from the 
one for males, so that the determinants of their decisions may be rather different. Finally, to ensure 
homogeneity in pension rules, the sample is limited to those whose longest recorded labour relation 
has taken place in the General Regime, the Social Security scheme that gathers the largest 
proportion of workers.
14 
Finally, we also exclude some individuals with incomplete recorded contributory 
information so that the sub-sample we use for the analysis is composed of 35853 men, whose 
distribution by year of birth and retirement age is reflected in Table 1. 
————— 
11  Early retirement before the age of 60 is only possible for dangerous and unhealthy jobs such as air pilots, some miners, railways 
workers, bullfighters and artists. 
12  Very few records relating to pensions awarded before 1997 are available. 
13  Moreover, the transition to the old-age retirement scheme is deterministic, so that disability pensions are converted into retirement 
pensions once the beneficiaries turn 65 years of age. These pensions receive a very favourable tax treatment. 
14  See Appendix 2 for a description of the regulatory framework. 108  Isabel Argimón, Marta Botella, Clara I. González and Raquel Vegas 
 
4 Empirical  framework 
The earliest empirical work in this area considered reduced-form models of the retirement 
decision as a function of Social Security wealth and pension level. While the estimation strategies 
employed differed, depending mainly on the nature of available data, the results consistently 
suggested a role for Social Security. The main limitation of this type of studies is that they consider 
Social Security effects at a point in time, but cannot account for the impact on retirement decisions 
arising from the time pattern of social security wealth accruals. In order to address this 
shortcoming, different approaches were followed in subsequent analysis. The accrual of Social 
Security or other more forward-looking incentive measures were developed and their effect was 
analysed with the estimation of reduced-form models.
15 Alternatively, a different approach was to 
consider structural models where workers were facing a budget constraint which was discontinuous 
or kinked.
16 Another line of research is the “option value” model of retirement where it is 
postulated that not only the level of pension wealth or its increment with one additional year of 
work is a determinant of the retirement decision, but that what is relevant is the evolution of future 
wealth and work. So retirement decisions are modelled as a function of the difference between the 
utility of retirement at the current date and at the date that maximizes one’s utility (Stock and Wise, 
1990). In its structural form this model is difficult to implement, so numerous authors (Samwick, 
1998; Gruber and Wise, 1999; Hakola, 2002; Blundell et al, 2002) have used the option value in 
reduced form models. More recently, applied general equilibrium models are also being used to 
explore the pensions issue (for instance, Imrohoroglu et al., 1999) so that they need to be calibrated 
to be able to produce numerical results.
17 
The paper follows the hazard model approach followed in Grubber and Wise (2004), and 
Blundell et al. (2002), among others, to capture the effects of changes in social security wealth and 
other variables on retirement. Although the option value model is the theoretically most intuitive 
model and the structural model should provide more insight into the issue, we choose the simplicity 
of this reduced form technique because of the computational complexity of the alternative 
approaches.
18 Moreover, it is partially forward looking, as it allows for continuous updating of 
information as individuals grow older. That is, for an individual who complies with the 
requirements to retire at age t, the probability of retiring at age t+1 is modelled in terms of the ratio 
of annual wage earnings over pension benefits, public pension accruals and labour situation at time 
t. The retirement decision is analysed in this paper following a duration model approach that treats 
it as a dynamic discrete choice.
19 
We define T (our duration variable) as the period between the age the person becomes 
entitled to receive a retirement pension until the age that person claims the benefit. We treat it as a 
discrete variable, defined in years, that changes as time goes by.
20 We let Ci be the maximum 
number of years that we could observe the individual in the sample, which only depends on his 
year of birth and the moment he became eligible, so that it is constant. So, that, for example, if a 
————— 
15  Spataro (2005) proposes a set of alternative measures that feature the forward-looking aspect and applies them to Italian data. 
16  The lifetime budget constraint is analogous to the standard labor-leisure budget constraint, with annual hours replaced by years of 
labour force participation, and annual earnings replaced by cumulative lifetime compensation. The kinks are produced by changes in 
the accrual rates (the rise in retirement income entitlement caused by continuing to work for one more year). See for instance 
(Burtless, 1986). 
17 See  Jimeno  et al. (2006) for a survey of the features of different approaches used in the literature to study the effects of population 
aging on Social Security expenditures. 
18  Moreover, Spataro (2002) finds that a reduced-form model is preferable to the structural option value model. 
19  We assume that individuals will choose to remain with the current situation if the utility of remaining exceeds the utility of retiring. 
20  We must remind that not all individuals in the sample are either working or have claimed an old-pension. Some of them are 
unemployed and receive benefits, some do not receive benefits, but are also contributing and some do not contribute. Moreover, 
some go through different labour situations before claiming the pension. (See Argimón, González and Vegas, 2007). The situation 
immediately preceding retirement is conditioned upon, but duration is defined independently of the situation.   Retirement Behaviour and Retirement Incentives in Spain  109 
person born in 1941, becomes eligible in 2001 (when he is 60), and only claims a pension benefit in 
2003 (when he is 62), will have in 2004, T=3 and C=5. In our estimation we restrict Ci to be at least 
1 and no greater than 6 as we assume that the decision to retire only takes place between 60 and 66, 
as only very few people retire after that age, or do not retire at all. The dataset contains some 
individuals that either can only be observed before they take the decision of interest (i.e. claim 
pension benefit) because we only observe the individuals up to the year 2006 or either did not 
claim a retirement pension before the age of 66. In both cases, data is right censored. For these 
individuals we can only observe that T>C, so that they remain in the current situation for a larger 
number of years than the ones that the sample allows us to observe them. That is, we observe 
claiming at T only if T=<C. Otherwise, we observe that T>C. We assume that T is independent of 
C.
21 
The intensity of transition to claiming or the hazard function (i.e. the probability of an 
individual retiring precisely at time t, given that he has not retired before t), is defined as: 
  () ( ) ( )() ) ( ) ( ) ( [ / | | 1 0 t x t t F t T prob t T prob t T t T prob t i i θ θ φ + = >= = = >= = = Χ ] 
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, some of which are age dependent and others are 
constant and independent of the age. It provides the probability of not claiming benefits for exactly 
t years relative to the group of individuals who have been not claiming for at least t years. In other 
words, it gives the probability of retiring T years after having become entitled to a pension, given 
that the person has not retired before. 
A discrete duration model can be regarded as a sequence of binary choice equations (with 
cross equation restrictions) defined on the survival population at each duration. 
We are, therefore, interested in the conditional distribution of T in relation to variables x: 
() i i x t F | . 
So the likelihood function could be expressed as: 
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where φ  is the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
The dependent variable in the model is the probability of retiring (claiming a retirement 
pension) at a specific age, given that the person has become eligible to do so
22 and has not retired 
the preceding years.
23 The explanatory variables that have been included in the specification (Xi) 
can be grouped in three main categories: social security framework, personal characteristics, and 
————— 
21  It must be reminded that for some cohorts we can only have observations of people retiring after a given age (60 for those born in 
1936) or before a given age (for instance, at most at 60 for those born in 1946), in the latter case, given that this is the age when the 
sample was extracted, as shown in Table 1. 
22  It could be the case that they withdrew the labour market much in advance and remained unemployed or were inactive for some 
time. In fact, in the case of Spain, early retirement regulation stipulates that in some cases, workers need to be unemployed to be 
able to claim retirement pensions before the age of 65, the ordinary retirement age. Moreover, up to 2002, pension regulations 
required total or substantial withdrawal from any form of employment requiring affiliation to the Social Security System to be able 
to perceive an old-age pension. In 2002, partial retirement was regulated, so that employment and old-age pensions could be 
simultaneously enjoyed, while the mandatory retirement age at 65 was effectively abolished. An alternative would be to study the 
transitions from employment to a non-employment status, as in Gutiérrez-Domènech (2006). 
23  So, for each person, the decision moment is different and is defined in relation to his birthday, assuming that they are yearly 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Values of Social Security Incentives and Working Status. 
Sample of Men Born between 1936 and 1946, Having Worked in the General Regimen 












N: Number of observations; n: people. 
(1) In thousands of euros. 
(2) In percentage. 
 
labour characteristics. A detailed description of the variables that have been used can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
We build up the traditional measures of the incentive mechanisms that are standard in this 
literature. In particular, we use the Replacement Rate (RRt), which is the ratio of the expected 
pension benefits over wages, the Social Security Wealth (SSWt), that is, the present discounted 
value of the future stream of pension benefits, the Accrual Rate (SSAt)
  which measures the 
discounted increase in SSW from postponing retirement one year and the Peak Value (PVt), that 
compares this year’s social security wealth to the maximum social security wealth that could be 
attained in the future. They are constructed under the assumptions that the age of death is certain, 
no changes in social security regulation are expected by individuals and it excludes any tax 
considerations. 
Table 2 provides information about the descriptive values of the incentive Social Security 
variables showing that, while the average stock of wealth was higher after the 2002 reform than 
before, the incentives linked to it were lower. On the other hand, the RR increased after the reform. 
It also contains information related to working status, distinguishing between those observations 
corresponding to a working situation (l) previous to the decision moment and those corresponding 
to an unemployment situation (u). The rest of the observations correspond to either an already 
retired situation or another situation where there is no work involved. Additional data concerning 
the rest of the variables can be found in Table 6 in Appendix 2. 
We make that both the level of social security wealth and the different incentive variables 
enter the equation. The level captures wealth effects: the larger the value of wealth, the larger the 
demand of all goods, including leisure, if leisure is a normal good. The incentive variables capture 
a substitution effect: the higher the price for leisure, the lower its demand, so that if there is a larger 
financial incentive to additional years of work, then individuals will retire later. The specification 
chosen also allows us to test whether the sole act of being entitled is a determinant for retirement, 
median mean s.d. median mean s.d. median mean s.d.
SSWt
(1) 199.30 222.50 96.83 195.83 211.84 87.02 201.35 228.17 101.21
SSAt
(1) 6.89 6.73 12.95 10.12 9.79 12.20 4.97 5.09 13.04
PVt
(1) 12.65 18.84 26.73 21.68 26.77 28.03 8.32 14.63 25.01
RRt
(2) 57.61 67.36 35.50 50.77 57.61 26.56 61.93 72.55 38.45
lt–1
(2) 57.49 62.67 54.74
ut–1
(2) 24.28 27.54 22.55
N 115,532 40,123 75,409
n 35,853 16,212 28,259
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in the sense that the individual leaves his current situation as soon as he is entitled to collect a 
pension benefit. Finally, the impact of the regulatory change introduced from 2002 is also analysed, 
both as it could have affected the average probability of retiring and through its effects on the 
incentive mechanisms. 
As for the labour characteristics, the control variables include the individual’s labour 
situation the year preceding the decision date, distinguishing between working and unemployed, 
the activity sector and some measures of labour mobility or precariousness. 
Finally, we also include some standard demographic controls such as age, education and 
health status. We also control for the collection of other benefits as they may interact with the old 
age pension. Finally, regional dummy variables and GDP growth are also included to control for 
the macro environment. 
The duration dependence of the hazard rate is captured in two ways. On the one hand, 
following Bover et al (2002) we do not impose a specific functional form for duration, so that we 
introduce additive dummy variables for each of the possible discrete values of the duration 
variable. Durations of more than 6 years (which would necessarily imply that the person is at least 
66) are treated as censored at 6 years, due to the relatively small number of observations under such 
circumstance. On the other hand, interaction of certain independent variables with the duration are 
included to see if the variable effects change with the number of years that a person takes to retire. 
Table 6 in Appendix 2 contains the summary of the variables used. 
 
5 Results 
The qualitative impacts of the variables on the hazards are discussed in terms of the sign and 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, which are reported in detail in Table A2 in 
Appendix 1. We present in that Table three different specifications with two different sets of Social 
Security incentive variables. So, under model A we present the estimated coefficients obtained for 
the basic specification, distinguishing between the Accrual Rate (SSA) as incentive variable, and 
the the Peak Value (PV). Model B tries to capture the impact of the 2002 reform through the 
inclusion of dummy variables that test for its relevance and effect on the response to the social 
security variables, while model C, also include dummy variables that capture the effect on the 
retirement hazard rate of being entitled to perceive the minimum or the maximum pension benefit 
at each age. 
The size of the impacts of the Social Security measures on the probability of retiring is 
reported in Table 3. In particular, they are measured as the predicted effect of a change in the 
Social Security variable on the hazard, computing it as an elasticity, for the variables that are 
continuous. For the qualitative ones, its impact is computed from the change from 0 to 1 in the 
variable, so that they can be interpreted as the direct effect of having such characteristics on the 
probability of retiring. The more detailed quantitative impact of a change in all the variables 
included in the specification distinguishing by age is reported in Table A3 of Appendix 1. 
 
5.1  Economic incentives and regulation 
As the results in Table A2 show, all the social security variables coefficients – for SSW, 
SSA and PV – are statistically significant with the expected sign. Increases in the total present 
value of the flow of pensions that a person will receive from the year she retires to the year she 
dies, i.e. an increase in SSW, increases the hazard. Increases in the difference of this amount  112  Isabel Argimón, Marta Botella, Clara I. González and Raquel Vegas 
 
Table 3 














 * Quantitative effects are computed as the discrete differences of the logistic function evaluated at a 10 per cent increase in the variables’ 
values with respect to the logistic function evaluated at the observed variables’ values. 
Results are obtained from the regressions presented in Table A2 where: 
• Model A represents the basic model, 
• Model B represents Model A including changes in 2002 regulation as control variables, 
• Model C includes Model B and income level as control variables. 
Median values are in italics. 
 
derived from postponing the retirement (either one or more years) reduce the hazard, whether SSA 
or PV are used to capture the substitution effecta. 
In order to provide an assessment of the explanatory power of the different variables, whose 
statistical significance has been tested, for the hazard rate, we propose using the Akaike (AIC) and 
the Bayesian Information criteria (BIC), as recorded in Table 4. By providing a criterion to choose 
among nested models, we can compare the relative explanatory power of the different variables to 
affect the probability of retiring. As shown, the pension wealth and the incentive measures are 
jointly significant (Table 4) for all specifications. On pure likelihood grounds, the specification that 
does include the peak value dominates the one with the more myopic incentive measure. 
In spite of these effects being statistically significant, their size is not very large. As the 
figures in Table 3 show, a 10 per cent rise in SSW, increases on average around 7 percentage points 
the probability of retiring between 60 and 65 years of age. Moreover, these probabilities show a 
U-shaped form with age (Table A3), reaching the highest impact at 65, so that the closer the 
personis to that age the more responsive to changes in SSW she is. 
As for the incentive variables, we find that increasing by 10 per cent the difference between 
what a worker would receive if she retired now and what she would receive if she retired one year 
later (increasing SSA) decreases the average probability of retiring between 60 and 65 by between 
0.3 and 0.7 pp and by a similar amount if the 10 per cent increase would be in PV. The effects on 
the retirement probability of the SSA and PV incentives are also U-shaped in relation to age 
(Table A3), so that they are large at 60, decline then and later start increasing again. 
On the other hand, the replacement rate, does show the positive expected sign for the whole 
sample, but it is not statistically significant, a finding which is confirmed by the results on the AIC 
SSA PV SSA PV SSA PV 
SSW t 0.60 0.60 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
0.29 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33
SSA t –0.07 –0.04 –0.06
–0.03 –0.02 –0.02
PV t –0.07 –0.04 –0.03
–0.03 –0.01 –0.01
RR t 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.06
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03
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Table 4 
Relative Incidence of Social Security Measures 


















* Results are obtained from regressions under Model C of Table A 2. Degrees of freedom in parenthesis. 
Number of observations: 115,532. 
 
 
and the BIC criteria shown in Table 4. 
From the calculations presented in Table 4 we could conclude that the wealth variable plays 
a larger role on the determination of the hazard rate than any of the incentive variables. That could 
imply that changing the quantity that is transferred through pensions is more relevant to retirement 
decisions than changing the built-in incentives in the regulation. 
The observed probability of retiring between 60 and 65 before 2002 is higher than after 2002 
and this relationship happens at every of the ages between 60 and 65 (Figure 1). The role of the 
2002 reform on this change is tested with both the introduction of a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 from 2002 onwards and which may capture changes in tastes or other factors that are not 
channelled through the Social Security variables, and with the inclusion of this dummy variable 
interacted with the Social Security incentive and pension wealth. 
If we use the sign and the t-ratios of both the dummy and the interacted variables to test for 
significance of the changes that were introduced in 2002,
24 we can conclude that the reform did not 
change the pattern of response to the wealth variable, but the response to the incentive variables, in 
general, reducing its impact on the timing of retirement (Table A2). That is: we need a larger value 
of SSA (or PV) from 2002 to reach the same impact on the hazard, as shown in Table A4, where a 
decomposition of the effects of the reform on the incidence of the different incentive variables is 
shown. This result could be explained as a consequence of the fact that one of the changes carried 
out under the reform improved the treatment for those that had more than 30 years of contribution, 
increasing for them the amount of the pension to be perceived at each age. The fact that most 
————— 
24 See  Norton  et al. (2004) for a discussion of such test. 
Contribution of AIC BIC AIC BIC
Overall Model C 65,659.72 66,210.18 –32,772.86 (57) 65,648.87 66,199.34 –32,767.44 (57)
SSW t 66,186.56 66,717.71 –33,038.28 (55) 66,164.28 66,695.43 –33,027.14 (55)
SSA t 65,694.62 66,225.77 –32,792.31 (55) 65,694.62 66,225.77 –32,792.31 (55)
RR t 65,659.82 66,190.97 –32,774.91 (55) 65,656.79 66,187.94 –32,773.39 (55)
SSW t  and SSA t 66,212.33 66,724.17 –33,053.17 (53) 66,212.33 66,724.17 –33,053.17 (53)
SSW t  and RR t 66,201.02 66,712.86 –33,047.51 (53) 66,188.33 66,700.17 –33,041.17 (53)
SSA t  and RR t 65,703.37 66,215.21 –32,798.69 (53) 65,703.37 66,215.21 –32,798.69 (53)
SSW t , SSA t and RR t 66,226.46 66,718.98 –33,062.23 (51) 66,226.46 66,718.98 –33,062.23 (51)
r2002 65,787.63 66,299.47 –32,840.81 (53) 65,792.13 66,303.96 –32,843.06 (53)
ln Likelihood ln Likelihood
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Figure 1 

















workers (64 per cent) already had at least 30 contributory years (in particular, nearly a third had 
more than 34 years of contributions), may explain the finding that the reform reduced the incidence 
of the incentive structure. Additionally, the replacement rate becomes statistically significant for 
this period, so that a more myopic approach seems to result. Therefore, the observed reduction in 
the hazard rate does not seem to stem from the new regulation, which has reduced its incidence, but 
from a collection of other factors that are captured by the dummy. 
The evidence gathered shows that those individuals that are being low topped in terms of the 
amount of their Social Security wealth have a higher retirement probability at 60 than those that are 
not (Table A4). It could be argued that the minimum pension mechanism blocks the effect of early 
retirement penalties so that it creates a strong incentive for low income earners to retire, that is 
specially strong at 60. From 61 onwards being low topped in wealth reduces the probability of 
retiring. In fact, the older the person, the higher is the reduction in the probability to retire. This 
result could be consistent with the idea that people might choose to carry on working in order to 
build up more pension rights, given the built-in incentives, arising from the higher dependency 
between the amount of the pension to be perceived and the latest wages that she receives compared 
to further in time wages, which, under the expectation that they increase with age could lead to a 
larger pension in the future. 
The results also show that high earners (those that have their pensions capped) have a lower 
probability of retiring both at 64 and 65
25 (Table A4), in line with the findings in Villagarcía 
(1995), Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez (1999), Blanco (2000) and Labeaga (2008) that show that 
————— 
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income plays a positive role on continuing in employment. This finding could result from the fact 
that, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from 
working, A lower potential wage rate for a mature age worker is likely to be associated with a 
lower probability of labour force participation, as other things equal, a lower wage rate represents a 
lower opportunity cost of leisure and a higher replacement rate for government pensions. 
 
5.2  Duration variables and cycle 
Given that individuals enter the sample as soon as they satisfy the requirements to claim a 
pension, we can interpret the significance of the dummy coefficient for duration 1 (g1) as a test for 
the relevance of becoming entitled to access the retirement benefits.
26 We could expect that if the 
preference for retiring is high enough, becoming eligible would be a main determinant of the 
decision to retire, and people will retire as soon as the regulation would entitle them to. The 
regression results report a non statistically significant coefficient for g1 (Table A2), so that it can 
be said that the fact of becoming eligible by itself is not a relevant ground for retirement. The 
results show also a non-monotonic duration dependence. 
We will comment on the interrelation between duration and the effect of some of the 
covariates when we present the results for the latter. 
Early-retirement may result from fluctuations in the economic cycle. Our results show that 
the propensity to retire is pro-cyclical, so that the hazard retirement rate is higher during 
macroeconomic expansions, feature that has been observed in other studies about retirement 
decisions (Montizaan, Cörvers and de Grip, 2007). A possible explanation of this result could be 
the fact that asset cycles are highly correlated with the evolution of the business cycle. If people 
rely on their investments to fund their consumption in retirement, besides what they can get from 
the retirement pension, they are particularly vulnerable to market downturns. That could be the 
reason why in periods of economic prosperity, prospective retirees are more optimistic about the 
evolution of their other sources of income and therefore decide to retire earlier. On the other hand, 




In our specification, we also include age dummies to account for differential effects arising 
from age itself. These dummies should capture the effect of growing older “per se”, and not 
through the different coefficients in the calculation of pension rights that are age dependent. The 
results show that, even when controlling for eligibility criteria and Social security variables, 65 is a 
prevailing retirement age. 
 
5.4  Working status, sector of activity and other labour history related variables 
The activity status prevailing during the year before the decision is taken could be relevant 
for the retirement hazard. In particular, the sample allows us to distinguish between four labour 
status: working, receiving unemployment benefits and thus also contributing to Social Security, 
contributing without working nor perceiving unemployment benefits (special agreement), and not 
contributing. 
————— 
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Figure 2 

















The results show that a person working at a particular year has a lower probability of retiring 
the following year than a person who was not working, even when we condition on social security 
incentives. They also show that being unemployed the preceding year increases the probability of 
retiring. Such findings may only reflect the predominance of special early retirement programs that 
exist for unemployed old people.
27 We also find that the size of these effects varies with age, as can 
be seen in Figure 2, showing a U-shaped form. 
We also include as a covariate the activity sector, which allows us to distinguish between 
those working in the service sector and those working in the industry sector. The estimated 
coefficient is, however, not statistically significant, in contrast to other works where the sector of 
activity is found to be playing a role (Conde-Ruiz and García, 2004; Blanco, 2000; Villagarcía, 
1995; Muñoz, 1995). 
The next pair of variables try to capture the quality of the labour relations, through the 
consideration of the number of contracts that have been recorded for a given work history up to the 
eligibility moment and the average length of these contracts. 
The results show that job rotation (proxied by the total number of labour relations that a 
person has had) has a negative impact on the retirement hazard, impact that fades away as duration 
increases. The sign of the coefficient suggests that the higher the labour rotation the lower the 
probability of retiring between 60 and 65. This result could be in consonance with the findings that 
workers with a firm-specific training history retire earlier than workers with a general training 
background (Montizaan, Cörvers and de Grip, 2007). 
————— 
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On the other hand, the average length of the contract seems to play a significant role in the 
decision to retire only as time unfolds. Although in general, the higher this average the more stable 
the individual’s working life has been, it is not a sophisticated measure of a precarious career as the 
same average may result from quite different job histories. 
 
5.5  Individual characteristics and other 
The results obtained for the negative role of higher education on the probability of retiring is 
in consonance with what is obtained in most empirical work (Villagarcía, 1995; 
Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2006).
28 One explanation of such finding may result from the theory that 
states that low-ability workers are induced to retire early because of the intra-generational 
redistribution built in early retirement provisions via the utility from leisure (Conde-Ruiz and 
Galasso, 2003). The effect of education is reinforced by duration, so that the lower probability of 
retiring of a higher educated worker is larger the more time it has elapsed since becoming eligible. 
As for the health status, the results show a lower hazard for those receiving disability 
benefits the year before. Such counterintuitive finding may just reflect the fact that those receiving 
disability benefits, besides having a poorer health, will probably be the ones receiving retirement 
disability pensions when they turn 65, the only age in which this type of pensions can be awarded 
and which we are not including in our analysis. 
Receiving public transfers other than unemployment or disability benefits reduces the 
retirement probability, which may be a consequence of liquidity constraints. 
Dummy variables for the region (Autonomous Community) where the worker initially 
registered are included in the specifications, as a way to capture other differences in the economic 
environment. Coefficients are not reported but are available under request. 
 
5.6  Counterfactual Regulation Schemes 
Finally, we have performed a counterfactual exercise with the aim of shedding more light on 
what these magnitudes are likely to mean in reality, by calculating the effect over estimated 
retirement probabilities of small changes in the economic incentive mechanisms underlying the 
Spanish public pension system. The reason for applying only tiny changes to the baseline is to 
avoid the Lucas’ critique, while providing a sensitivity analysis. 
So we have computed the pension wealth that a person would receive under three alternative 
regulatory schemes, which imply very small changes over the current regulatory situation.
29 We 
have computed for each individual in the sample the SSW and incentive measures that result from 
the assumed setting. We then have obtained counterfactual predicted retirement probabilities so 
that we can compare them with the one predicted under our estimates, which act as a benchmark.
30 
In particular, we compute the changes in relation to the population that in the sample are subject to 
the rules prevailing in 2002. In general terms, each of the three alternative regulatory schemes tries 
to change only one item in the pension rules. 
————— 
28  Muñoz (1995), on the other hand, finds evidence that the education has a quadratic effect, so that those individuals with little or with 
a lot of studies retire later than those with an intermediate level of education. 
29  In general terms the current system is characterised by requiring at least 15 years of contribution and with the pension being at least 
50 per cent of a proxy of gross average lifetime earnings (regulatory base), which raises to 100 per cent after 35 or more years of 
contribution See Appendix 2 on legislation for a detailed description of the system. 
30  The new probabilities are obtained using the specification in column 1 of Table A2. 118  Isabel Argimón, Marta Botella, Clara I. González and Raquel Vegas 
Benchmark Setting A Setting B Setting C
  Predicted retirement probability
(1) 77.08 76.33 76.82 76.95
  Predicted retirement age 62.92 62.93 62.93 62.92
  Change in number of retired people
(1) - –1.53 –1.58 –0.08
by age:
60 - –1.80 –1.63 0.00
61 - –2.45 –2.09 0.00
62 - –2.48 –2.10 0.00
63 - –2.59 –2.26 0.00
64 - –2.06 –1.90 0.00
65 - –0.60 –1.09 –0.20
 
Table 5 











(1) In percentage. 
* The effects are estimated for the period beginning in 2002. 
Setting A: Capping the pension to 96% of the Regulatory Base at 35 years of contribution and to 48% at 15 years of contribution. 
Setting B: 18 years of contribution to claim a pension. Retiring after 65 implies 3% increase. 
Setting C: Retiring after 65 implies 2% increase and 3% if 40 years of contribution. 
 
The first counterfactual scenario, setting A, would consist of an overall reduction in the 
amount of the pension perceived at all ages. It caps the pension to 96 per cent of the regulatory 
base, not allowing individuals to get the 100 per cent of it at any retirement age.
31 Even if no 
change in the number of people retiring is produced, such scenario implies a reduction of the 
pension burden in relation to the benchmark. 
Setting B affects mostly the incentive structure as it requires more years of contribution to 
claim a pension (18 years instead of 15), so that the increase ladder becomes stepper. Moreover, at 
the age of 66, if the person has more than 35 contributory years, an additional increase in the 
amount of the pension is added.
32 Under this scenario, it cannot be initially established whether or 
not the burden rises. 
Setting C proposes changes in the short-term incentives to stay beyond 65, in the sense that it 
only introduces higher retirement benefits for each additional year beyond 65 that an individual 
remains not retired.
33 If effective, it could raise the burden, not the implementation year but in the 
middle and long run. 
Table 5 shows the computed counterfactual predicted retirement probabilities for these three 
scenarios, the average predicted retirement age over the age interval 60-65 and the changes in the 
number of retirees in the same interval and its disaggregation by ages. All the changes analysed 
result in an extremely mild increase on the average retirement age and a reduction in the number of 
————— 
31  Under this scenario, with 15 contributory years the pension amount is only 48 per cent of the regulatory base. Moreover, up to 25 
years of contribution a 3 per cent increase each year would be added, and from 26, the increase would be 2 per cent per year up to 
96 per cent of the regulatory base at 35 or more years of contribution. 
32  Under this scenario, there is a 3 per cent increase up to 25 contributory years, while since then the increase is 3.22 per cent up to 35. 
At 66 with more than 35 years of contribution the increase is also 3.22 per cent. Only 2.6 per cent of people at 60 have a labour 
history shorter than 18 years. 
33  It reproduces part of the changes introduced by the “Acuerdo sobre Medidas en Materia de Seguridad Social”, of 13 July 2006, 
which were implemented two years later. In particular, at 66 with at least 35 years of contribution a 2 per cent increase in the 
pension is added, raising it to 3 per cent for those individuals with at least 40 years of contribution.   Retirement Behaviour and Retirement Incentives in Spain  119 
people who retire between 60 and 65, which goes from 0.08 per cent under setting C to 1.6 per cent 
under setting B. 
We obtain that under the first two scenarios, the retirement rates of all ages are affected by 
the proposed change and that the effects are increasing with age up to 63, when the largest impact 
is recorded. The smallest effect is at 65, reflecting, probably, how this age is regarded as normal 
retirement age. 
The fact that under setting C there is a null impact on the probability of retiring between 60 
and 64 with respect to the benchmark results from the specification chosen to compute the effects, 
that only reflects the impact of changes in SSA. However, the low incidence of the long term 
incentive (peak value) on the decision results in a very similar figure when the specification with 
the PV variable is chosen, instead. In any case, the decrease in the number of people that choose to 
retire at 65 so as to retire at a later age is rather small (0.20 per cent), as only the incentive changes, 




There is some agreement that generous early retirement provisions account for a large 
proportion of the drop in the labour force participation of elderly workers that had been observed in 
Spain in the nineties. This paper aims at quantifying the impact of these provisions under the 
Spanish Social Security System. 
We have gathered evidence that, in general, the economic incentives stemming from Social 
Security regulations on old age pensions in Spain seem to have the expected effect on retirement. 
We find that the present value of the future flow of pensions has a positive impact on the 
probability of retiring, with larger pensions shortening the span between becoming eligible for 
retirement and actually claiming the retirement pension. Therefore, all measures taken to reduce the 
present value of such flow at early ages may have the desired effect of reducing early retirement. 
Moreover, it seems that the built-in incentives in the system not to retire early have a non 
negligible effect on old-age retirement, so that they are effective in retaining people. The higher 
flow of pensions that workers receive for staying at work one additional year compensate both the 
loss of leisure that they experience for the additional year that they keep contributing and the wage 
and salary they perceive at work. The quantitative size of such effect is statistically significant so 
that small variations in the incentives measures have a sizeable effect on early retirement. 
Therefore, from a policy perspective, there is a need to reinforce such effects. 
We also found that the new scheme implemented since 2002 has reduced the probability of 
retiring at each age, in spite of the fact that the substitution effects captured through the incentives 
measures seem to have reduced their incidence on retirement decisions. We also found some 
evidence of a more myopic behaviour of workers as regards social security incentives. The changes 
in the regulation that have taken place may explain such results. 
Any new change in the incentive structure of pensions should take into account the longer 
work histories that younger people have, when becoming eligible. In fact, the counterfactual results 
show that a small change in the incentive structure has a small impact on the number of people 
retiring. It seems that to increase the number of people staying beyond 65 requires more than a tiny 
push. It is therefore necessary to combine economic incentives with other institutional constraints 
in order to effectively increase the retirement age. 
————— 
34  In fact, those whose entire contributory life is below 35 years experience a reduction in the amount they perceive at 65 in relation to 
the benchmark. 120  Isabel Argimón, Marta Botella, Clara I. González and Raquel Vegas 
There is a need to address the consequences of an ageing population on the Social Security 
accounts. Minor changes in the rules that define the amount to perceive at each age and in relation 
to the years effectively contributed may have a positive impact on the accounts, through its impact 
on the probability to retire at each age, but this is not enough. Prospective amendments in 
retirement rules should be oriented to link the possibility of retiring and the benefit rights not only 
to contributive efforts to, but also to life expectancy. 
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APPENDIX 1 
DATA 
This appendix contains the definition of the variables included in the different specifications. 
As it has already been mentioned in the text, the main data source is the Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales 2006 (MCVL-2006), a sample of administrative data gathered by the Social Security 
Department.  
The subsample used includes the available information on men who have contributed to 
social security at least once in their lifetime, have not collected an old age pension before 1997, and 
who were born between 1936 and 1946, so that in 2006 they were between 60 and 70 years old. 
Moreover, we restrict it to those men whose longest contributory relationship with the Social 
Security took place in the General Regime, the scheme that covers most workers and whose 
description can be found in the following appendix on legislation. We also drop those individuals 
who have collected an old pension after 1997, but whose eligibility to access a retirement pension, 
in terms of having at least fifteen contributory years, could not be proved with the available data, as 
a pension could not be estimated for them.
35 The final subsample is composed of 35853 
individuals. The main statistics for each variable is presented in Table 6. 
 
Economic Incentive Variables 
To calculate the Social Security benefits to which individuals in our sample are entitled, we 
make use of the Social Security covered earnings histories of individual in the MCVL2006. 
SSWit: Value of Social Security Wealth of individual i at time t, at 2006 prices: 
 











indicates Social Security Wealth at time t (at age t) if retiring at age r, L is the maximum life 
length, ) , ( r s Bi is the pension benefit in period s (at age s) if retiring at r, p(s|r) is the conditional 
probability of an individual at time t to be alive at time s where s>r,  i ρ  is the individual discount 
rate. 
To calculate the pension we make use of data on covered earnings and from it we have built 
the Regulatory Base which has been computed as the regulation establishes. The minimum base 
that has been used to complete job careers has been the one corresponding to contributory group 5, 
senior administrative (“oficial administrativo”), the group with the largest volume of population. 
On the other hand, the maximum base has been taken to be the one corresponding to group 1, 
Engineers and Graduates (“Ingenieros y Licenciados”), the group with the highest base for all the 
years. The maximum life length (T) has been taken to be 98 years; i ρ , the individual discount rate 
is assumed to be fixed at 3 per cent, p(s|r), the conditional probability of an individual aged r to be 
alive at age s, has been taken from the National Statistics Institute (INE) demographic projections 
scenario 2, based upon 2001 Census data and pensions are assumed to increase 2 per cent yearly 
from 2006. Minimum and maximum pensions are applied and the minimum one corresponds to a 
worker with a dependent spouse. 
In order to calculate the different incentive measures, we need to project SSW for the future. 
Two different situations arise, depending on the age of the individual and whether or not he has 
————— 
35  The administrative nature of the data source explains that a limited number of individuals had to be deleted from the sample as the 
available information for them did not seem consistent. 122  Isabel Argimón, Marta Botella, Clara I. González and Raquel Vegas 
retired. For those that are not 66 before 2006, we need to project their pension and their SSW 
beyond this year. To do so, we assume that their salary and, therefore, their contributory base will 
be increasing at a 2 per cent rate every year. For those that have retired before 2006, we project 
their salaries for the years before 2006 assuming that they keep the purchasing power of their last 
observed salary (or the following one), so that the contributory base increases by the same amount 
as the December over December CPI.
36 
SSAit: the Accrual Rate, 
  it it i it r SSW r SSW r SSA ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( 1 ) ( − + + = ρ
  
and we let: 
  ) 1 (
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A limitation of this index is that it does not take into account the comparison that the 
individual can make between pension benefits and the level of his/her income. It could be argued 
that the leisure preference is such that wages can fully compensate for the forgone leisure 
enjoyment from postponing retirement. 





We follow Coile and Gruber (2000) and restrict the peak value to be equal to the accrual 
rate, if the individual works beyond the highest value for his social security wealth
37 
RRit: Replacement rate,  ) (r RRi  is the ratio of the expected pension benefits ) (r Bi  at time t over 
wages  ) (r wi  perceived at time t–1 for individual i at age r, if the person retires at age r: 
)) ( / ) ( ( ) ( r w r B E r RR i i r i =  , where E is the expectation operator 
 
Other variables 
failurejubit: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the person retires at time t and 0 otherwise. It is 
the dependent variable 
disabit–1: Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was receiving any disability 
benefit while he was a year younger (at time t–1) and zero, otherwise 
univi: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the contributory group (“grupo de cotización”) of the 
longest contributory relationship with the Social Security system is the one with the highest 
academic qualifications (group 1: “Engineers and Graduates”), and zero otherwise 
————— 
36  Alternatively, we could have taken the average increase in observed national accounts data for compensation of employees per 
employee. 
37  They also normalize the peak value by the expected stream of wages over the period between the maximum year and the current 
year. Hence their actual index measures the benefits of continued work relative to the social security wealth earnings in the same 
period. They call this measure the tax/subsidy rate. This normalization can also be made for both the accrual and the option value. 
otherwise SSA
r SSW r r SSW r r r SSW r r SSW r PV
i
i i i i i
,
) ) 66 , ( ..., ) 3 , ( , ) 2 , ( , ) 1 , ( max( ) (
=
+ + + =
) ( ) 1 /( ) ( ) , ( r SSW j r SSW j r r SSW
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numreli: number of contributory labour relations that have been recorded by the Social Security 
before becoming entitled to an old age pension and that include those involving the perception of 
unemployment benefits 
Regional Government (Comunidad Autónoma) where the worker initially registered: Group of 
19 dummy variables, each one corresponding to a CA, plus one for Ceuta and one for Melilla, that 
records the initial worker’s registration (IIccaa-) 
servi: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the longest job a person has held has taken place in the 
following CNAE sector classifications: Trade (50 to 52), Restoration (Hostelería) (55), Transport 
(60 to 64), other services, including education y health (65 to 67, 70 to 74, 80, 85 and 90) 
uit–1: Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was receiving unemployment 
benefits,
38 either as a subsidy or a contributory transfer, while he was a year younger (at time t–1), 
and zero, otherwise 
lit–1: Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was working and contributing to 
Social Security while he was a year younger (at time t–1), and value zero, otherwise 
g_kit: Dummy variables that take value 1 if the person is at time t in the k
th period decision and zero 
otherwise, where k=[1,6]. That is, g_k takes value 1 if the value of the length of the spell from the 
year the person becomes entitled to a retirement pension is k 
age_kit: Dummy variables that take value 1 if the person is k years old at time t and zero otherwise, 
where k=[60,65] 
cyclet: Spanish GDP real growth rate (for years 1997 to 2006) 
r2002: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the year of the observation is greater than 2001 
otherbenit–1: Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was receiving any Social 
Security benefit other than disability, old age or unemployment while he was a year younger (at 
time t–1) and zero, otherwise 
meanlengthi: average number of years for the spells that the individual i has had before becoming 
entitled to a pension 
t: trend variable 
 
————— 
38  It corresponds to the people whose relationship with Social Security is coded as a TRL 751-756 in the administrative files. 124  Isabel Argimón, Marta Botella, Clara I. González and Raquel Vegas 
APPENDIX 2 
LEGISLATION 
The institutional framework 
The labour-market based social security is mandatory for workers in Spain. Old-age public 
pensions are mainly provided through three different schemes: General Social Security scheme 
(Régimen General de la Seguridad Social, RGSS), Special Social Security Regimes (Regímenes 
Especiales de la Seguridad Social, RESS) and government employees scheme (Régimen de Clases 
Pasivas, RCP).
39 Around 72 per cent of social security contributions are obtained from the RGSS. 
The pension regulations for RESS, within which the self-employed are assigned, and RCP do not, 
in general, allow for early retirement, so that the focus of the analysis will be on the RGSS. 
The main changes that have taken place in Social Security regulation in recent years that 
affect the period covered by the sample correspond to the reforms introduced in 1997 and 2002 in 
relation to the framework set in 1985.
40 
The normal retirement age in Spain, that is the age when a person becomes eligible for the 
full pension benefit, is 65. In fact, in some sectors retirement at sixty-five has been compulsory for 
some years. However, since 2002, incentives have been built in the regulation so as to promote 
retirement beyond the age of 65.
41 Early retirement is possible from the age of 60, under some strict 
conditions that are detailed below and that imply a reduction in the amount of the pension to be 
perceived that is defined by a reduction coefficient. 
 
Entitlement criteria for RGSS 
A payroll tax defined for both employers and employees and levied on earnings, with a 
minimum contribution and a maximum pensionable earning, finances the Social Security System. 
Up to 1997 only 8 contributory years were required to be entitled to a retirement pension. 
The change introduced in 1997 set a timetable to extend this period to fifteen years, one every year, 
so that in 2002, 15 years were required to be able to receive a pension at the age of 65, the ordinary 
retirement age. An additional requirement introduced in 1997 was that two of these contributed 
years had to have taken place during the last eight years. 
As for early retirement before the age of 65 there are three different cases:
42 
On the one hand, those who, before January 1, 1967, contributed to the labour mutual funds 
system that preceded the current Social Security system are entitled to retire from the age of 60 if 
the total contributory years are at least 15. 
————— 
39  The RGSS and RESS are administered and managed by the Social Security as a joint pay-as-you-go system. The RCP is 
administered and managed by the Central Government. 
40  In particular, up to 2002, pension regulations required total or substantial withdrawal from any form of employment requiring 
affiliation to the Social Security System to be able to perceive an old-age pension. In 2002, partial retirement was regulated, so that 
employment and old-age pensions could be simultaneously enjoyed, while the mandatory retirement age at 65 was effectively 
abolished. In 2006 a new agreement among government, trade unions and employers’ associations was reached, but with limited 
impact (Ley 40/2007, de 4 de diciembre, de medidas en materia de Seguridad Social). 
41  The regulation increased the amount of the pension to be received if the worker remained employed and payment of social 
contributions by employers and employees with indefinite-term contacts were waived. 
42  Regulation also allows for early retirement for special professions, especially those involving dangerous or unhealthy activities or 
some instances of those affected by industrial restructuring regulated by special legislation. Moreover, a new regulation came into 
force in 2002 allowing for partial retirement that can be simultaneously enjoyed with a part-time job. Workers can partially retire 
starting at the age of 60 if the firm replaces the retiree with another worker (relief contract) to compensate for the retiree’s reduction 
in work-time.   Retirement Behaviour and Retirement Incentives in Spain  125 
For those whose initial contribution year dates from after 1967 and only since the 2002 
amendment, the earliest retirement age is 61. For them, the minimum number of contributory years 
amounts to 30. Moreover, in order to be able to claim the pension, they have to have spent at least 
six months involuntarily unemployed and registered as job seekers in the Public Employment 
Service Offices, immediately preceding the claim. Years spent unemployed and receiving 
unemployment benefits add as contributory years towards an old-age pension.
43 
Retiring at the age of 64 is also possible and is subject to different rules: from 2002 no 
previous period of unemployment is required, but just the minimum 15 contributory years. 
However, in this case, the firm needs to hire another worker for a minimum period of a year 
(substitution contract) to replace the retiree, if full benefits (as at the age of 65) are to be 
guaranteed. 
The database does not provide information about contributions dating from before the 
seventies. On the other hand, all men born between 1936 and 1946 could potentially have been 
working by 1967, as the youngest would have started working at the age of 21. Therefore, the 
assumption in the empirical part is that all people in the sample contributed to the labour mutual 
funds system, so that they only require 15 years of contribution to be entitled to retire.
44 In fact, in 
our sample 34 per cent of those we observe retiring, do so at 60 years of age. 
 
The pension amount 
The actual level of the old age pension is defined by the interaction of different elements. On 
the one hand, the Regulatory Base (Base reguladora, BR) that defines the amount upon which to 
calculate the pension rights is directly related to wages perceived, but subject to lower and upper 
caps.
45 The minimum and maximum contributory periods to be included in its calculation and the 
inflation correction to obtain its present value are regulatory defined. Reduction coefficients for 
early retirement and for less than 35 years of contribution are also defined.
46 Minimum and 
maximum pensions are yearly defined and depend on marital status and number of dependents of 
the person receiving the benefit. Pensions are indexed by the Consumer Price Index. Up to 2002, 
any additional year contributed beyond 35 did not add to the amount of pension received. 
A person retiring between 1985 and 1996 with at least 15 contributory years at year t had a 



























where wt–j are covered earnings for the jth month before retiring at t and It–j is the price index for 
the jth month before retirement,
47 so that only eight years are taken into account to define BR. 
Since 2002, the contributory base is defined as: 
————— 
43  In fact, unemployed workers aged 52 and older can receive unemployment benefits that turn into subsidies until they are eligible for 
early or ordinary retirement. 
44  We also find that 40 per cent of people in the sample who retire do so with less than 30 registered years of contribution. 
45  Different caps have been in place for different types of workers depending on their group of contribution (grupo de cotización) 
associated with the type of job and education level. 
46  There is a special treatment for those that contributed to the system before 1967 (mutual funds contributors or “mutualistas”). 



























so that 15 years are taken into account. A transitory period was set from 1997 to 2002 so that a one 
year increase in the years considered in the indexed part of the weighted average was included per 
year, so that in 2002 the fifteen years were finally accounted for.
48 
The relation between the first monthly pension received at time t (Bt) and the regulatory base 
(BRt) calculated at t can be expressed as   t
T
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The reform introduced in 1997 modified the number of years to define the contributory base 
and the substitution rate (α
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The new scheme thus implies a more progressive approach to full benefits. 
For early retirement, regulation also sets a penalization system linked to age. Mutualistas 
that retire early are subject to a reduction coefficient equivalent to 8 per cent for each year in 
advance of 65 that he/she retires, so that   () 60 65 08 . 0 1 = > − − = r where r
a
t α . The 1997 
reform reduced the reduction coefficient to 7 per cent for those with more than 40 contributory 
years, when claiming the pension. This coefficient should be jointly applied with the one 
corresponding to contributory years. 
The 2002 reform changed the penalization mechanism, so as to make the age coefficient 
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where r is retirement age. 
————— 
48  As social contributions are paid 14 months a year, the effective number of years taken into account to compute the regulatory base is 
6.8 up to 1997 and 12.9 since then. The 2006 agreement proposes to rise the effective contributory years to 15, without taking into 
account the 14 monthly payments.   Retirement Behaviour and Retirement Incentives in Spain  127 
 
Table 6 
Descriptive Values. Sample of Men Born Between 1936 and 1946, 























(1) In thousands of euros. 
(2) In percentage. 
(3) In years. 
(4) In percentage variation of GDP. 
 
Moreover, it introduced a premium for late retirement, so that the pension was increased by 
2 per cent per additional year if the worker credited more than 35 years of contribution:
49 
  () 35     65      65 02 . 0 1 ≥ > − + = n and r if r
T
n α  
————— 
49  The 2006 agreement proposed raising the premium to 3 per cent for those with more than 40 contributory years. The partial 
retirement regulation introduced with the 2002 reform, established that no correction coefficient for age would be used for those 
claiming this type of pension. The reform agreed in 2006 aims at rationalizing this type of retirement, requiring six years of seniority 
in the firm before retiring, 30 contributory years (instead of the current 15), and changing the maximum and minimum labour day 
reduction to 75 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively from the current 85 per cent to 15 per cent. Full implementation will be in four 
years’ time. 
Median Mean s.d. Median Mean s.d. Median Mean s.d.
SSW t
(1) 199.30 222.50 96.83 195.83 211.84 87.02 201.35 228.17 101.21
SSA t
(1) 6.89 6.73 12.95 10.12 9.79 12.20 4.97 5.09 13.04
PV t
(1) 12.65 18.84 26.73 21.68 26.77 28.03 8.32 14.63 25.01
RR t
(2) 57.61 67.36 35.50 50.77 57.61 26.56 61.93 72.55 38.45
l t– 1
(2) 57.49 62.67 54.74
u t –1
(2) 24.28 27.54 22.55
numrel 10.770 25.866 9.547 19.763 11.420 28.565
meanlenght
(3) 7.237 7.243 7.763 7.436 6.957 7.122
time since eligible
(3) 2.677 1.565 2.275 1.390 2.892 1.609
univ 0.106 0.307 0.101 0.302 0.108 0.310
serv 0.364 0.481 0.356 0.479 0.367 0.482
disab 0.126 0.332 0.024 0.152 0.181 0.385
otherben 0.134 0.341 0.030 0.172 0.190 0.392
low60 0.086 0.281 0.101 0.302 0.078 0.268
low61 0.047 0.211 0.034 0.181 0.053 0.224
low62 0.029 0.168 0.015 0.123 0.036 0.187
low63 0.018 0.134 0.008 0.091 0.024 0.152
low64 0.011 0.104 0.005 0.067 0.014 0.120
low65 0.008 0.086 0.003 0.053 0.010 0.100
top64 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.025 0.002 0.042
top65 0.003 0.058 0.001 0.034 0.005 0.067
age61 0.219 0.413 0.236 0.425 0.209 0.407
age62 0.175 0.380 0.158 0.365 0.184 0.387
age63 0.135 0.342 0.110 0.313 0.148 0.355
age64 0.100 0.300 0.068 0.252 0.118 0.322
age65 0.065 0.246 0.027 0.162 0.085 0.278
cycle
(4) 3.667 0.679 4.262 0.688 3.350 0.406
r2002 0.653 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
After 2002
All Period Considered 
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Table 7 
Logit Estimates of the Effects of Pension Incentives on Retirement Behaviour 
between 60 and 65 Years of Age. Males Born between 1936 and 1946, Having Worked in the 





































ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE
LR chi2(45)=38014.62 LR chi2(49)=38187.03 LR chi2(56)=38597.09 LR chi2(45)=38030.83 LR chi2(49)=38213.54 LR chi2(56)=38607.93
Pseudo R2=0.365 Pseudo R2=0.367 Pseudo R2=0.371 Pseudo R2=0.365 Pseudo R2=0.367 Pseudo R2=0.371
Log likelihood =  –33064.09 Log likelihood = –32977.89 Log likelihood =  –32772.86 Log likelihood = –33055.97 Log likelihood = –32964.63 Log likelihood = –32767.44
SSW t 2.979 2.969 2.462 2.401 2.322 2.289
(23.08)*** (23.31)*** (11.69)*** (11.81)*** (10.78)*** (10.83)***
SSA t –7.993 –12.941 –10.510
(–7.07)*** (–7.78)*** (–5.69)***
PV t -4.284 -6.730 -5.363
(–8.11)*** (–9.26)*** (–6.92)***
RR t 0.046 0.043 –0.083 –0.144 –0.085 –0.139
(1.2) (1.14) (–1.25) (–2.14)* (–1.28) (–2.06)*
SSW t * r2002 1.109 1.166 1.272 1.252
(4.76)*** (5.16)*** (5.48)*** (5.53)***
SSA t * r2002 8.821 4.018
(4.50)*** (2.04)*
PV t * r2002 4.451 3.265
(4.94)*** (3.61)***
RR t * r2002 0.232 0.300 0.151 0.252
(3.04)** (3.89)*** (1.97)* (3.26)**
 r2002 –0.763 –0.843 –0.689 –0.787















l t–1 –1.577 –1.577 –1.551 –1.556 –1.575 –1.577
(–39.51)*** (–39.52)*** (–38.65)*** (–38.77)*** (–39.05)*** (–39.10)***
u t–1 0.942 0.934 0.965 0.952 0.954 0.947
(25.21)*** (24.98)*** (25.72)*** (25.33)*** (25.31)*** (25.09)***
numrel –0.022 –0.022 –0.021 –0.021 –0.023 –0.023
(–11.82)*** (–11.74)*** (–11.11)*** (–11.06)*** (–11.74)*** (–11.66)***
t x numrel 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(9.03)*** (8.97)*** (8.68)*** (8.65)*** (9.10)*** (9.04)***
meanlenght 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.75) (0.73) (0.96) (1.01) (1.57) (1.58)
t x meanlenght 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(3.85)*** (3.92)*** (3.43)*** (3.40)*** (2.56)* (2.61)**
serv –0.003 –0.001 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.024
(–0.07) (–0.02) (0.50) (0.54) (0.58) (0.60)
t x serv –0.020 –0.022 –0.024 –0.026 –0.027 –0.028
(–1.67) (–1.81)* (–2.01)* (–2.13)* (–2.22)* (–2.30)*
 MODEL A  MODEL B MODEL C
115.532 number of observations
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND REGULATION
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Table 7 (continued) 
Logit Estimates of the Effects of Pension Incentives on Retirement Behaviour 
between 60 and 65 Years of Age. Males Born between 1936 and 1946, Having Worked in the 




























Dependent variable is 1 if person retires and 0 otherwise, conditioned on not having retired before. Monetary values are in thousands of 
euros, prices 2006. Z-values are in parenthesis. 
Statistical significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
Coefficients of Autonomous Communities not resported. Prob > chi2=0. 
Model A represents the basic model. Model B includes Model A and changes in 2002 regulation as control variables. Model C includes 
Model B and income levels as control variables. 
 
 
ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE
LR chi2(45)=38014.62 LR chi2(49)=38187.03 LR chi2(56)=38597.09 LR chi2(45)=38030.83 LR chi2(49)=38213.54 LR chi2(56)=38607.93
Pseudo R2=0.365 Pseudo R2=0.367 Pseudo R2=0.371 Pseudo R2=0.365 Pseudo R2=0.367 Pseudo R2=0.371
Log likelihood =  –33064.09 Log likelihood = –32977.89 Log likelihood =  –32772.86 Log likelihood = –33055.97 Log likelihood = –32964.63 Log likelihood = –32767.44
univ –0.729 –0.751 –0.706 –0.716 –0.779 –0.794
(–10.46)*** (–10.82)*** (–10.10)*** (–10.28)*** (–10.95)*** (–11.18)***
t x univ –0.078 –0.068 –0.086 –0.079 –0.038 –0.029
(–4.02)*** (–3.57)*** (–4.39)*** (–4.15)*** (–1.89) (–1.49)
disab –1.578 –1.586 –1.468 –1.485 –1.484 –1.498
(–8.28)*** (–8.34)*** (–7.64)*** (–7.74)*** (–7.70)*** (–7.78)***
otherben –2.981 –2.970 –2.978 –2.972 –3.016 –3.015
(–17.55)*** (–17.54)*** (–17.39)*** (–17.41)*** (–17.54)*** (–17.55)***
age61 –0.015 –0.037 –0.069 –0.095 0.098 0.069
(–0.06) (–0.15) (-0.29) (-0.40) (0.40) (0.28)
age62 –1.047 –1.076 –1.055 –1.087 –0.767 –0.791
(–3.70)*** (–3.80)*** (–3.70)*** (3.81)*** (–2.48)* (–2.56)*
age63 –0.710 –0.739 –0.725 –0.759 –0.098 –0.134
(–2.50)* (–2.59)** (–2.54)* (–2.65)** (–0.32) (–0.44)
age64 –0.712 –0.759 –0.686 –0.739 0.247 0.213
(–2.46)* (–2.63)** (–2.36)* (–2.55)* (0.78) (0.67)
age65 2.813 2.788 2.865 2.834 3.271 3.272
(10.94)*** (10.84)*** (11.09)*** (10.96)*** (12.34)*** (12.33)***
cycle 0.241 0.246 0.111 0.119 0.125 0.131
(16.89)*** (17.18)*** (5.94)*** (6.42)*** (6.69)*** (7.03)***
g1 –0.514 –0.540 –0.591 –0.615 –0.331 –0.370
(–1.96) (–2.06)* (–2.24)* (–2.33)* (–1.23) (–1.37)
g2 –1.703 –1.733 –1.697 –1.723 –1.539 –1.572
(–6.76)*** (–6.88)*** (–6.74)*** (–64.85)*** (–6.02)*** (–6.15)***
g3 –0.522 –0.557 –0.538 –0.567 –0.442 –0.483
(–2.06)* (–2.20)* (–2.11)* (–2.22)* (–1.64) (–1.79)
g4 –0.858 –0.904 –0.856 –0.891 –1.094 –1.128
(–3.52)*** (–3.72)*** (–3.50)*** (–3.65)*** (–4.32)*** (–4.45)***
g5 0.054 0.027 0.028 0.016 –0.494 –0.519
(0.22) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (–1.95) (–2.05)*
cons –2.328 –2.264 –1.422 –1.306 –1.731 –1.635
(–3.82)*** (–3.71)*** (–2.30)* (–2.12)* (–2.76)** (–2,46)**
115.532 number of observations
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS & OTHERS
 MODEL A  MODEL B MODEL C
 DURATION VARIABLES 
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 ASSESSING THE SHORT-TERM IMPACT OF PENSION REFORMS ON OLDER 
WORKERS’ PARTICIPATION RATES IN THE EU: A DIFF-IN-DIFF APPROACH 
Alfonso Arpaia,
*, ** Kamil Dybczak
** and Fabiana Pierini
** 
1 Introduction 
The performance of the European labour markets improved significantly during the second 
half of the 1990s (AER 2003). After having reached a peak in 1994, the unemployment rate started 
gradually to decline while both the employment and the participation rates kept rising. With 
increases of more than 8 and 7 percentage points, respectively for the employment and the 
participation rates, the female and the older workers were the most dynamic components. These 
improvements reflect long-term changes in the socio-economic behaviour such as a different 
attitude toward female employment and participation, improved health and working conditions 
which induce to retire at older ages. Yet, they took place in response to the reforms implemented 
during the period (e.g., ECB, 2007). The last decade witnessed important changes in European 
pension systems. Up to 1995, only few countries implemented pension reforms. By 2006, almost 
every European country had enacted reforms of the pension system. This richness of reforms across 
countries and time of their occurrence can be used to conduct a “policy experiment” of the effects 
of pension reforms on the participation rates of people aged between 50 and 64 years. Each policy 
intervention is considered as a discrete event that occurred at a specific time for each country. The 
event-study compares the value of one variable of interest after a certain reform or legislation has 
taken place with its value before such change has occurred. To control for other determinants not 
related to specific policy interventions, the findings of before-after comparison are compared with a 
control group made of those countries which did not implement a reform at least in one year 
covered by the sample period. With the event-study approach we will verify whether after pension 
reforms the participation rate rises.
1 Thus, we analyse the impact of pension reforms on 
participation rates of different age/sex groups of elderly workers by contrasting changes in 
participation rates in reforming vs non-refroming countries. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the main stylised facts. Section 3 
briefly reviews the main theoretical explanations of the observed trends in participation, while 
section 4 discusses the effects of pension reforms on the average retirement age. Section 5 gives an 
overview of the reforms undertaken in the EU between 1997 and 2007. Section 6 presents the 
empirical finding of the effects of recently introduced pension reforms on the older workers’ 
activity rates. Section 7 discusses the policy implications and possible follow up. 
 
2  Stylised facts: main developments in older workers’ participation rates 
Life expectancy has significantly increased in developed countries, mainly thanks to 
improved living standards, working conditions and health care. In the early 1980s the average life 
————— 
* IZA. 
**  DG ECFIN, European Commission. 
  An early version of this paper was presented at the 11
th Banca d’Italia workshop on Public Finance Pension Reform, Fiscal Policy 
and Economic Performance, S.A.DI.B.A., Perugia, 26-28 March 2009. We have benefited from comments by conference 
participants, we would like to thank Lukas Reiss, in particular. The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do 
not indicate concurrence by other members of the European Commission. 
1  The event-study method has been applied to study market response to changes in the law, both as a result of court decisions and 
legislative reforms. 136  Alfonso Arpaia, Kamil Dybczak and Fabiana Pierini 
 
expectancy stood at around 75 years to reach 80 in 2006; for few new Member States it hovered 
around the EU average of 26 years earlier (Table 4). 
Work has become less physically demanding, population much healthier and long-lived. 
Even so, as documented, among others, by Palmer (1999), Samwick (2002), and Boeri et al. 
(2001), there has been a significant decline in the participation rate of elderly people, which 
reversed its negative trend only in recent years. The dramatic difference in the time pattern across 
men and women (Figure 1) often gets unnoticed. For several countries, the activity rate of men 
aged between 55 and 64 appears often U shaped, with decline in participation at least until the mid 
1990s. For the 50-54 age group, rates appear more stable and the decline relatively more limited; 
there are significant exceptions to this pattern such as. the participation rates of Belgian and Italian 
men aged 50-54, rapidly converging to the highest rates. Despite country specific labour force 
histories, the broad trend of a shrinking labour supply of male aged 50+ remains. Thus, even 
though men live longer than before, they leave the labour market earlier. 
Conversely, women, especially those aged less then 60, have a steadily rising participation, 
and it is not rare to find countries where female rates almost doubled in 10 years only. The change 
over time in the age profile of the participation rates confirms that the major modifications in the 
participation behaviour occurred in the case of women, at age below 59, and especially in their 
early 50s. Without these modifications, several countries would have had in 2007 activity rates 
hovering around the level of twenty years earlier. As a consequence of these differentiated patterns 
in the participation rates by sex, the average age at which people retire has changed only to a minor 
extent (Table 5). 
Figure 2 displays the age profile of the exit rate from the labour market for selected countries 
for the mid-80s, the early 1990s and the first half of 2000s. This rate is calculated as the conditional 
probability of an age cohort of not staying in the labour market at age h.
2 Spikes can be observed at 
about the statutory retirement age for all countries and, for some, at the age of early retirement. 
There is also a clear difference in the exit rates by sex which reflects different statutory retirement 
ages of men and women. Finally, there are recently significant changes in the age profile of the exit 
rates in the recent years. The probability of leaving the labour market at ages just below 60 falls for 
both sexes in several countries. Even so, at the age of 60 there is a significant increase in the 
probability of withdrawing from the labour market. Early exit from the labour market remains high 
in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. 
The patterns briefly described are the outcome of complex individual participation decisions 
which are influenced by a variety of factors, including social factors, such as longer schooling or 
change in the role of women in households; demographic factors, including the decline of fertility 
rates and modifications of the age structure; institutional factors, such as changes in the financial 
incentives to retire early, in the eligibility conditions or in the availability of alternative early 
retirement paths, (e.g., temporary access to disability and unemployment benefits before being 
granted retirement benefits, Van Ours, 2006 for the Netherlands). Early- or pre-retirement 
programmes were commonly used in the ‘70s and ‘80s to deal with industrial restructuring 
(Brugiavini, 2001), high unemployment of older workers, low employment of young workers, or as 
a labour cost saving strategies. Economic factors, such as the level of the unemployment rate, the 
average income by household, the share of part-time employment in total employment or the share 
of the services sector in the economy have also been invoked to explain the differences in the 
participation rates across countries and over time. 
————— 
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3  What explains the main trends 
Many economists have tried to solve the puzzle of higher life expectancy, less physically 
demanding work and lower retirement ages. Two major factors have caused declining participation 
rates of older workers (Diamond, 2005). 
First, due to positive trend in real earnings, both the fraction of lifetime spent working 
dropped. As the income effect from higher real earnings prevails on the substitution effect, higher 
real incomes allows more hours for leisure, higher consumption and savings despite falling 
working time. Thus, the increase in real wages has been the main determinant of the long-term 
decline in the retirement age in industrialised countries (Bloom, Canning and Moore, 2007). 
The increase in the lifespan has also produced a wealth effect because of the influence of 
compound interest and wage growth, which reduce the proportion of life devoted to work. Second, 
the rules establishing access to pension, public health and long-term care may have influenced the 
individual decision to retire. As life expectancy increases it would be optimal to postpone 
retirement age. However, the existence of social security programs translate into higher savings and 
earlier labour market exits (e.g., Bloom, Canning, Mansfield and Moore, 2006, for a life-cycle 
model of the labour supply with endogenous retirement age and the social security arrangement). 
Similarly, in a model with stochastic ageing among three age classes and accumulation of human 
capital with two skill levels, Ljiungqvist (2007) shows that the non-employment effect of taxation 
do not differ in complete and incomplete markets, with the tax and benefit system affecting 
non-employment of low and high skilled respectively in complete and incomplete markets.
3 Using 
a panel for 12 countries, Gruber and Wise (2002) demonstrate several disincentives for continued 
work for the elderly built in national social security schemes. Many have noticed high exit rates at 
the first age at which one can retire and at the statutory retirement age (e.g., Coile and Gruber, 
2000, or Samwick, 1998). More generally, individuals able to set aside enough funds are those that 
firstly retire, especially when they are allowed to use benefits to “top-off” their retirement wealth. 
Early retirement schemes can be characterised by several adverse mainly long-term effects 
(Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2004). They can influence negatively the accumulation of human capital 
of less-skilled workers, lower economic growth, and increase the dependency ratio and the risks of 
financial imbalances when population ages. Using an overlapping generation model with 
heterogeneous agents extended by voting, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso demonstrate why alternative 
policies had not been realised even though they would have had less distortive impact upon the 
economy. Their analysis provides a political economy explanation of the early retirement schemes. 
 
4  Pension reforms and average retirement age 
If expected income falls or life expectancy increases unexpectedly, a worker realises that 
his/her planning horizon is extended and previous plans concerning the rest of his/her life should be 
reassessed. Economic theory proposes three ways how to set up a new optimal plan. First, a worker 
could reduce consumption during pre-retirement age and accumulate savings for later stages of life. 
Second, a worker could reduce consumption spending during retirement age and deplete lifetime 
savings more slowly. Third, a worker could decide to work longer to reach the initial level of 
consumption. In addition, when there is only one earner in the family, the fall in his or her expected 
income during retirement may induce the second earner to enter into the labour market to keep 
————— 
3  With incomplete markets fiscal policy impacts employment outcomes via the optimal allocation of individual wealth. As tax rates 
increase, skilled people can put aside enough funds to finance early retirement. At successively high rates, the low skilled will start 
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unchanged the family consumption.
4 The final impact on the participation rate depends on how 
these effects influence the retirement decision. 
Within a life-cycle framework, the retirement decision is a function of the lifetime streams of 
earning, pensions and other sources of income (Mitchell and Fields 1981). Obviously rational 
agents chose their optimal consumption pattern jointly with the amount of work they wish to 
supply during their lifetime and the time at which they wish stop working. In a standard 
competitive model with social security, taxes and benefits have distortionary effects on individual 
consumption, savings and optimal retirement age (e.g., Seshinski, 1977). Thus, compared to an 
economy with no benefits, social security benefits imply in equilibrium lower consumption and 
lower retirement age. In the option value model (Stock and Wise, 1990), the work/retirement 
decision is associated to the option of continued work keeping the option to retire at a later stage. 
If the expected value of working is worth more than the expected value of retiring, the individual 
continues to work. If there are no expected gains from continued work, he would retire. In this 
framework, changes in the pension system such as changes in the coverage rate, in the accrual of 
retirement wealth attributable to continued work, more than the level of retirement wealth at a 
given point in time, are found to influence the average retirement age (Samwick, 1998). 
According to the simulations of Gruber and Wise (2002), a reform that delays benefit 
eligibility by three years would likely reduce the proportion of men aged between 56 to 65 out of 
the labour force between 23 to 36 per cent. 
Mitchell and Fields (1983) apply an ordered logit model to estimate the impact on the 
average retirement age of changes in the expected income. Not surprisingly they find a negative 
impact of a rise in social security streams on the average retirement age. The impact of a 
10 per cent increase in the social security benefits was estimated to reduce a retirement age by 
–0.07 years for all individuals without any restriction on age. In case of individuals at the age of 60 
the effect is more pronounced when reducing the average retirement age by –0.19 years. 
Bottazzi, Jappelli and Padula (2006) estimate – separately for males and females – the 
impact of the Italian pension reform on the expected retirement age, omitting the transitional 
1993-97 period of the reform. While their regressions indicate that the patterns found for women 
are the same as for men, still the effect on women is somewhat larger. The estimated impact on the 
expected retirement age is about 0.7 years for both male and female private sector worker. In case 
of public employee and self employed the effect is even higher reaching values over 1 and 2 years 
respectively. 
Some EU countries have switched from defined benefit to defined contribution pension 
systems or at least introduced one pension pillar based on this assumption. Such change may lead 
people to stay longer in the labour market and, therefore, is expected to increase the average 
retirement age. Friedberg and Webb (2005) support this hypothesis by estimating that employees 
with defined contribution plans usually retire one or two years later compared to employees with 
defined benefit plan. Furthermore, Diamond (2005) argues in favour of pension systems with low 
implicit tax on continued work after the age at which retirement benefits can first be claimed. 
Usually low implicit taxes are ensured with a defined contribution system. 
Palmer (1999) proposes a notional defined contribution pay-as-you-go system. As usual in 
prevailing pay-as-you-go systems, working people contribute to the system providing resources for 
contemporary pensioners. However, differently from the DB system, the more people contribute to 
system the higher is their future pension. Finally, the rate of return is not affected by the 
developments of the financial markets, but by the overall performance of the economy. So, the 
————— 
4  The so-called “added worker” effect implies an increase in the participation rates when the expected income of the family 
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system should stimulate people to postpone their exit from the labour market and, in passing, to its 
financial stability. 
Bloom, Canning and Moore (2007) show that the optimal response to dealing with the 
solvency problems that arise in social security when life expectancy increases is to reduce 
contributions and increase benefit rates, maintaining solvency exclusively by increasing the 
retirement age. This response can maintain solvency because raising wages over time and 
compound interest on accumulated savings mean that longer working lives tend to create more than 
proportional wealth at retirement. 
The retirement age has stabilised and recently partially reversed its declining trend. Again, 
several factors have to be taken into account. First, under the pressure of ageing and the medium- 
to long-term risks for the financial sustainability of social security systems, several member states 
have enacted reforms of the pension systems that have tightened the eligibility conditions for 
pension benefits (e.g., minimum years of contributions, retirement age) and reduced their 
generosity. Second, some reforms have shifted part of the financial risks from state to employers 
and employees. Thus, longer life expectancy and less generous pension benefits may have induced 
workers to work longer to accumulate precautionary savings for their old age (i.e., they have made 
the income effect prevail over the substitution effect). The next section reviews more in depth the 
pension reforms enacted in the member states in the last decade. 
 
5  Overview of early retirement and pension reforms undertaken in the EU over the 
1997-2007 period
5 
Reaching low levels of inactivity among older workers and promoting longer working lives 
are key factors to alleviate the negative impact of population ageing on employment and economic 
growth (European Commission-EPC 2009 Aging report). The 2001 Stockholm European Council 
stressed the importance of reforms encouraging higher employment and participation rates, 
especially among women and the elderly; it emphasised that pension reforms are needed to ensure 
both the long-term financial sustainability and a certain degree of intergenerational fairness. 
In response to pressures stemming from ageing populations and persisting low participation 
rates, all countries of the EU have reformed their pension systems. These reforms comprise a 
number of different measures (Table 6 and Table 7) that were meant to keep the sustainability of 
public finances mainly by transferring part of the demographic risk from the state to individuals 
and by giving strong incentives for working longer. 
A widely accepted distinction is between parametric and systemic reforms. Parametric are 
those reforms which involve adjustments to the parameters of defined benefit (DB) and 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension systems, without changing their financing mechanisms. 
Systemic reforms move away from the PAYG DB- system and adopt a DC-type personalised 
accounts system - thus linking more strictly pension contributions to pension benefits.
6 
————— 
5  This section briefly describes the main elements of the reform strategies adopted in the EU27 over the period 1997-2007. 
Information on pension reforms adopted in the EU27 in the years 2000 to 2007 is taken from the LABREF database 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8638_en.htm). For reforms enacted during the Nineties in the 
EU15, we used the Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti database, available at: http://www.frdb.org. Concerning Bulgaria and 
Romania, for the time being LABREF only covers the years 2003 to 2007. Missing information was mainly obtained from Disney, 
R. (2003), “Public Pension Reforms in Europe: Policies, Prospects and Evaluation”, a number of ILO and ISSA papers, as well as 
the Joint Reports on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, 2007 and 2008 editions, and the Synthesis report on adequate and 
sustainable pensions 2006, all available at: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/index_en.htm 
6  The distinction between parametric and systemic reforms is largely used by the international academic community, notably the IMF 
and the OECD (see, for instance, Pensions at glance, OECD, June 2007). The key parameters of DB pension schemes can be 
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The majority of pension reforms adopted in last ten years were parametric, mainly 
strengthening the links between contributions and benefits (notably by extending the period over 
which earnings are taken into account for benefits’ calculation) and stricter conditions for 
eligibility to first pillar defined-benefit pension schemes (notably through higher retirement ages). 
For example, the reference contribution period and wages used for the calculation of old-age 
pensions were extended in Finland in 2003; the annual pension accrual rates were also modified to 
discourage early exits from the labour market and to financially reward long working careers; it 
was also decided that starting from 2009 pensions would begin to reflect changes in average life 
expectancy.
7 In Finland and Sweden, greater flexibility was given to older workers to decide their 
retirement age (abolition of the general retirement age at 65). In Austria, the 2003 pension reform 
raised the retirement age to 65 for men (60 for women) starting from 2017, extended the 
assessment period for pension calculation gradually from 15 to 40 years and gradually reduced the 
accrual rate.
8 Finally, the reform of the public old age pension scheme introduced in Portugal in 
2000 increased to 40 years
 the contribution period for a full pension for the private sector.
9 Other 
measures included changes in the taxation of contributions and benefits, or in the pension coverage, 
as well as the setting-up and development of mandatory and/or voluntary second- and third-tier 
pension schemes. 
Almost all countries increased the statutory retirement age, the majority opting for a smooth 
transition towards higher retirement ages (Table 8). The age of eligibility to a state pension was 
progressively increased from 65 to 67 in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, in the latter with a very 
long phasing-in period. In the UK, the earliest age to take a pension was raised from 50 to 55 in 
2004 and a default retirement age was fixed at 65 in 2005, with unjustified retirement ages below 
65 years being prohibited. The retirement age was also progressively increased in the Czech 
Republic (2003) up to 63 years for men and childless women (women get one-year bonus per child 
varying between 59 and 62 years), in Hungary (1997) up to 62, Slovenia (1999) and Romania 
(2000). In Cyprus, the retirement age for civil servants was increased from 60 to 63, the same as in 
the private sector (where retirement ages range between 63 and 65). In Portugal it was raised from 
60 to 65. The age at which women can receive a first pillar pension was equalised with men’s age 
in most countries. 
Pension reforms involved a systemic change in the financing of the insurance system in few 
cases only, notably leading to the conversion of pre-existing DB first pillars into notional defined 
contribution (NDC) public pension schemes (e.g., PL, SE),
10 or to the introduction of statutory 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
grouped into: income measures (ceiling or other restrictions on pensionable earnings; number of past salaries included in the 
calculation of the pension; revalorization mechanism for past salaries); eligibility conditions (statutory retirement age, minimum 
retirement age (for early retirement), minimum vesting period, contribution rate); benefit formula; (accrual rate; “reduction factors” 
for retirement prior or after the statutory retirement age; maximum replacement rates and/or pensions; minimum replacement rates 
and/or pensions; indexation mechanism for pensions). The main difference between DB and DC pension schemes lies in the sharing 
of risks for longevity between the current generation and future ones – i.e., the shift to DC structure in systematic reforms implies 
greater risks for individuals. 
7  Germany, Finland and France introduced part-time work before the standard retirement age. In Sweden, individuals can continue 
working, taking a part-time pension and accrue additional unlimited pension rights. Gradual retirement was introduced in 
Luxembourg for the employees agreeing to switch from full-time to part-time work. 
8  One year later, the 2004 reform redesigned the calculation of pension benefits leading to a much stronger link between contributions 
and benefits, including a bonus/malus system for deferred/early retirement, and introduced a uniform pension law for all 
professions. 
9  In 2005, it was extended to employees in the public sector. The benefit formula was again significantly changed in 2007. 
10  In Poland, pre-existing defined-benefit PAYG pension scheme was replaced in 1999 by a three pillar system including a notional 
defined-contribution (NDC) first pillar linking contributions to future pensions, a second pillar that capitalises individual 
contributions and is mandatory for the younger generations, and a voluntary third pillar based on company plans or other savings 
vehicles. Following the shift of the public pension pillar from defined benefit to notional defined-contribution accounts, the pension 
benefits depend on contributions made, but the notional interest rate is set by government and the schemes remain 
pay-as-you-go-financed. Similar reforms were passed also in Sweden (1999), Latvia (1996) and Italy (1993, with very long 
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funded pension schemes (e.g., HU, EE, LV, SK). Some countries (HU, SE, PL, LV, EE, LT and 
SK) switched part of the public defined-benefit pension system into funded defined-contribution 
schemes, where the pension depends on contributions and interest earned on them. 
Systemic reforms were also introduced in countries that established state-supported second 
and third-pillar voluntary funded pension schemes, supplementing a gradual reduction of first-pillar 
pension levels (Germany in 2000) or promoted third pillar pension funds based on employees’ own 
savings (France in 2003). Several countries encouraged supplementary pension schemes either 
through tax incentives or adjusting contribution rates in the direction of private and occupational 
schemes (e.g., HU, DE, NL) so as to promote the development of privately-managed, fully-funded 
occupational pensions. Similarly, the automatic transfer of the end-of-service allowance to 
occupational pension funds was decided in Italy in 2004. 
The changes introduced In several countries were rather incremental building upon previous 
reforms dating in some cases from the early Nineties (e.g., Italy). Reforms generally involved the 
establishment of stronger actuarial links between benefits and contributions – mainly through 
longer contribution periods required for a full pension – and increased incentives for workers to 
retire later, notably by means of actuarial reductions for early pensions and increases in pension 
rights for deferred retirement. 
With few exceptions (e.g., Slovakia), the major reforms in the new Member States were 
legislated in the 1990s (for instance, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia). In some 
EU10 countries, recent reforms have increased the generosity of the system, for instance by 
introducing new early retirement schemes where they did not exist any more (e.g., in Lithuania, 
where the early retirement scheme was abolished in 1995 and re-introduced in 2004 for the long-
term unemployed, the Czech Republic, where a new early-retirement programme in the steel 
industry was introduced in 2000) or by reinforcing them (e.g., in Hungary), to help absorb the 
shocks of ongoing employment restructuring and economic change. 
To take better account of future demographic changes, a significant number of countries 
introduced a demographic adjustment in their first pillar pension formula linking pensions to 
changes in average life expectancy. This is a common feature of all countries having introduced 
systemic reforms, where pensions will in future automatically adjust to changes in life expectancy, 
but similar adjustment mechanisms have also been built into systems which have not undergone 
systemic reforms (e.g., with the reforms of 2003 and 2004 in France and Germany. Similar 
provisions have been introduced in DK, FR, AT, FI, LV, LT and, more recently, in PT (2007). 
 
5.1  Discouraging early retirement... 
Early retirement benefits, which vary by country and usually by professional group 
depending on the nature of work, is the main reason for early exits from the labour market. They 
are often used as an instrument of employment policy, to artificially lower the unemployment rate 
of the elderly. 
Reducing the generosity of early retirement pensions was a key component of all pension 
reform.  To discourage early exits from the labour force, Member States have abolished early 
retirement schemes, substantially reduced their generosity and introduced bonuses in case of 
postponement of retirement for those extending their working lives (Table 8). 
For example, as part of the 1999 pension reform, in Poland the “pre-retirement allowance” 
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were made more stringent in 2004.
11 A comprehensive reform of the pre-retirement pension system 
was approved in France in 2003.
12 In Finland (2003-2004), the qualifying age for early old age 
pension was raised to 62 and the individual early retirement, available to people with reduced 
working capacity aged 60 to 64, was phased out. The early retirement pension for older long-term 
unemployed will be abolished in 2009.
13 Some early retirement schemes were suspended and 
abrogated in Portugal in 2005
14 and the conditions for accessing early retirement tightened in 
Czech Republic and Spain (2006). Germany, Hungary, Slovakia (2006) and Portugal (2007) cut 
early retirement benefits, raised the minimum contributory period to be eligible for an old-age 
pension and tightened the access to schemes open to unemployed. In Latvia, the possibility to early 
retire was abolished in 2008. The early retirement age was gradually raised in Austria in 2003, and 
the possibilities for early retirement will be phased out by 2017. In Germany (2004), the minimum 
entry age for early retirement on account of unemployment was increased from 60 to 63. The 
earliest age at which a private or occupational pension can be taken was also raised in those 
countries where this has an impact on the effective labour market exit age (e.g., UK, IRL). In 
Sweden (2000), early retired people were allowed to return to work while the tax advantages for 
early retirement were abolished in the Netherlands. 
Working beyond the official retirement age was supported in many countries for instance 
with higher accrual factors – e.g., CZ, EE, LU, DE, EL, HU, PT, SI – or with the introduction of 
supplements for deferred public old-age pension (e.g., DK). Partial retirement was introduced in 
Germany (2001) and the UK (2004) and gradual retirement in France (2006). In this country, a new 
form of fixed-term contract for job seekers aged 57 or more was introduced in 2006, while the 
so-called “Deladande Contribution” – a tax to be paid by companies dismissing employees aged 
50 years and over – was gradually phased out to improve the employability of older workers.
15 
Incentive schemes for workers who decide to remain in the labour market after the official 
retirement age were decided in Italy, France, Spain and the UK. 
 
6  An empirical evaluation of the effect of pension reforms on the older workers’ 
participation rates in the short-term 
The OECD has conducted an extensive research on the impact of policies and institutions on 
employment and unemployment in the OECD countries.
16 This work showed that high implicit 
taxes on continued work deter older workers from remaining in the labour market, while high 
————— 
11  Both schemes had been introduced in 1994 to accompany employment restructuring in the waning branches and outdated sectors of 
national economy. 
12  The 2003 reform, which was embedded in the pension package known as the “Raffarin Act”, included limiting fiscal incentives for 
pre-retirement schemes to physically demanding jobs and restructuring firms in financial distress; eliminating progressive early 
retirement; increasing the cost of company early-retirement schemes, placing restrictions on state-financed early retirement. Even 
so, employers may still require employees who have the right to a full pension to retire between the ages of 60 and 65 if the worker 
is covered by an early retirement scheme put in place before the reform came into force or if an extended sector-level collective 
agreement, providing for compensatory measures for such retirement, was reached before 1 January 2008. A number of sectors have 
taken advantage of this option for maintaining retirement before the age of 65. 
13  If people become unemployed at the age of 57, they will be entitled to the income-related daily unemployment allowance until the 
age of 65 if they have worked for five years during the previous 15. Those born before 1950 will be entitled to a daily 
unemployment allowance from the age of 55 until the age of 60; thereafter, early retirement and then full retirement will be still 
possible. 
14  Previously, workers in Portugal could qualify for early retirement benefits either at age 55 with 30 years of contributions or at age 
58 if they were unemployed. 
15  The Deladande Contribution was introduced in 1987 to compensate for the removal of the administrative authorisation of 
redundancy but in practice obstructed the recruitment of people aged 50 years and older and transferred possible redundancies to 
employees who were soon to reach 50 years of age. The contribution will be phased out completely in 2010. 
16  Bassanini, A. and R. Duval (2006), “Employment Patterns in OECD Countries: Reassessing the Role of Policies and Institutions”, 
OECD, Economics Department, Working Paper, No. 486, OECD Publishing. Assessing the Short-term Impact of Pension Reforms on Older Workers’ Participation Rates in the EU: A Diff-in-Diff Approach  143 
 
statutory retirement ages have the opposite effect.
17 The characteristics of the old age-age public 
pension systems (e.g., standard retirement age, accrual rates) and other forms of income support 
(early retirement schemes) are found as the main determinants of the differences in the 55-64 
participation rates across countries and over time (Blondall and Scarpetta, 1998; Duval, 2003). 
In this section we verify the impact of pension reforms on the participation rates of specific 
groups of older workers with a difference-in-difference approach. This approach requires the 
identification of a specific policy intervention against which one should compare the difference in 
outcomes before and after intervention for a treatment and a control group. A source of spatial and 
temporal policy variation in the reforms carried out is necessary to estimate this effect. 
We exploit the information available from LABREF and other sources (e.g., FRDB, 
MISSOC, etc.) to identify a chronology of reforms.
18 Reforms are classified in three categories. 
First, fundamental reforms are those systemic reforms that imply a change from defined 
benefits to notional defined contribution first pillar pension schemes or that transfer public 
pension savings partly to private funded schemes. To this category belong parametric 
reforms that entail a change in the eligibility conditions (e.g., statutory retirement age, 
years of contributions). These reforms are usually gradually phased in and imply long 
implementation lags. Second, measures that do not modify financing or eligibility 
conditions are deemed as non fundamental, namely those modifying the tax regime of 
contributions and pension benefits, indexation rules, or introducing second and/or third 
pension pillar gradually and on a voluntary basis. The third group gathers all measures 
implying phasing-out of early retirement schemes. 
Figure 3 displays the cumulated number of fundamental, non-fundamental pension and early 
retirement reforms for the period 1990-2006. Three things emerge. First, an increasing number of 
countries introduced reforms that changed the philosophy of the system (fundamental reforms). As 
of 2006 nearly every European country, especially of the EMU (Table 6), had reformed its pension 
system. Second, starting from 2000, non-fundamental reforms are more frequent than fundamental 
or early retirement reforms. Third, early retirement reforms rare in the 1990s became more frequent 
in the early 2000s. 
This rich variation in policies across countries and over time can be exploited to assess their 
effect on the older workers’ participation rates. Each measure is considered a discrete event which 
occurred at a specific point time for each country. The value of a variable of interest after certain 
legislation has taken place is compared to its value before such a change occurred. To control for 
factors unrelated to specific policy intervention, the before-after comparison is evaluated against 
the average of a control group. 
In the period under consideration almost all countries undertook a pension reform. The 
quasi-natural experiment framework requires that pension reforms are a source of exogenous 
variation with respect to shocks to the participation rates. Consistently with the common belief 
————— 
17  A 10 percentage points cut in the implicit tax and a one-year increase in the standard retirement age are estimated to raise the 
employment rate of older workers by 1 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively. 
18  LABREF provides information on reforms enacted in various years by the 27 Member States. It is an inventory of labour market 
reforms jointly managed by DG ECFIN and the Economic Policy Committee. It is conceived as a tool to provide comprehensive 
description of qualitative features of the reform process, including the design of enacted reforms, their scope and durability. To date, 
the database covers the years 2000-2006 for the EU27. Information for the year 2007 will be made available to the public in April 
2008. The database can be freely accessed at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/labref_en.htm. For a 
description of LABREF see European Economy Research Letter Vol. 1, issue 3 November 2007. As regards pension reforms 
LABREF provides information distinguishing policy measures in the area of Disability benefits, Early retirement schemes, 
Contributions , Coverage, Eligibility conditions, Level and tax treatment of pension reforms. For the years 2000-2006, the 
chronology of pension reforms is taken from LABREF. For the previous years the information draws on different sources (e.g., 
EIRO, MISSOC, NATLEX). 144  Alfonso Arpaia, Kamil Dybczak and Fabiana Pierini 
 
(Lindbeck and Persson), we assume that the main motivation for governments to undertake a 
pension reform is to achieve financial sustainability of social security rather than to offset trends in 
participation rates and in the retirement age. 
Our sample covers 27 countries over the period 1990-2006.
19 To define our treatment group 
we identify as reform year the year in which a reform is enacted. When reforms of the same type 
are passed in two consecutive years we treat them as a single event; the average participation rate is 
taken as representative of the participation rate at the time of the reform. Similarly, if there are at 
most two years between two years of reforms we treat them also as one event. Our control group is 
made out of the remaining periods. Within both groups we compute the average change in the 
participation rate. Finally, the average change in the participation rate of the treatment group is 
compared with average participation rate for the control group. If a reform is successful, the 
difference between the participation rates of the two groups should differ from zero. 
One way to detect this is to compare the change in the participation rate 1, 2 and 3 years after 
a pension reform has been implemented with the change in the participation rate in all periods but 
those that followed a reform. The change in the participation is modelled as follows: 
t i t i t i v I PR , , , + = Δ α ; Iit equals 1 if country i enacts a reform in period t and zero otherwise. A 
similar expression holds for a country j with j≠i. The average change of the participation rate in 
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The reform in country i is successful if α is statistically different from zero. We evaluate the 
effect of pension reforms comparing the average change in the participation rate after a pension 
reform with the average change of the participation rate over the sample period excluding those 
years where a reform occurred.
20 
For each target group, the first two columns of Table 1 to Table 3 report the average change 
in the participation rate over reforms and non-reforms years; the statistical significance of their 
difference appears in column 3.
21 Table 1 suggests that compared to the non-reform years the 
participation rate of the 50-54 and 60-64 age groups rise significantly in the years near to the 
reform year. Conversely, no significant change is detected for the participation of those belonging 
to the 55-59 age group. While fundamental reforms do not have significant effect on the 
participation rates in the years just following the enactment of the reform, probably because of the 
gradual phasing-in (Table 2), parametric reforms entail a change in the participation rate of those 
with age between 55 and 59. 
Figure 4 shows the time pattern of the participation rate around the reform event for the three 
reforms’ types and the three age groups. We consider only those reforms that are followed at least 
by one year; hence, measures taken in 2006 are excluded from the sample. Next, in order to select 
the reform years we treat two consecutive periods of reform as a one reform year. The same rule 
————— 
19  Since data on participation rates from European LFS Statistics are not available for all years for all countries the panel is 
unbalanced. 
20  In contrast, we do not look at the effect on the participation rate of changes in one specific element of the system (i.e., contributions, 
eligibility conditions, retirement age, indexation formula, and the like). We leave this for future work. 
21  Since it may take some time for a pension reform to have visible effects on the participation rate, we calculated the average change 
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applies for years once there are at most two years between two years of reforms. Consequently, the 
participation rate in the selected years is calculated as a simple average in these years. 
The figure plots the average change in the participation rate compared with the year in which 
the reform occurred. Hence, each point represents the cumulated change up to and since the 
enactment of the reform. A successful reform implies a change in the slope in the years that follow. 
Before the pension reform, all groups have participation rates lower than or as big as the rate 
observed in the year when it is enacted. Then the participation rate increases, and after 3 years it is 
on average 5 percentage points higher than at the year of enactment. 
Figure 4 shows the cumulated change of the participation rates before and after the 
enactment of early retirement, fundamental and non-fundamental reforms.
22 The following points 
are noticeable: 
•  the increase in the participation rate is mainly due to the female component, with increases 
dominated by a long-term trend, 
•  after early retirement reforms, the participation rate of women aged 55-59 slightly accelerates, 
while the profile of the men rate is more muted, 
•  the change in the participation rates of the oldest group barely differ by gender, 
•  the 50-59 male participation rate changes after early retirement reforms, 
• non-fundamental  reforms  modifies the 55-59 participation rate, 
•  the profile of participation rates does not change when fundamental reforms are enacted, which 
is consistent with these reforms being usually gradually phased in, 
•  the profile of female participation rate does not change in response to any type of reform. Yet, 
we don’t consider this an evidence of their ineffectiveness as female participation is dominated 
by a long-term trend unrelated to reforms of social security. 
These findings are suggestive of a positive impact of early retirement reforms on the 
participation rate of specific groups of older workers. The different response for the male and 
female rates is consistent with differences in the elasticity of the labour supply to the implicit tax 
rates and in the length of working careers and years of contribution to social security. Thus, 
tightening the access to early retirement would induce women to postpone retirement. 
Of course, participation rates also change in response to the business cycle. In line with the 
cyclical ups and downs, those out of the labour force may be induced to starts searching actively 
for a job when they perceive that their employment chances have improved. Similarly, unemployed 
people may stop searching for a job when their employment prospects weaken and leave the labour 
force (the so-called discouraged worker effect). Thus, controlling for the state of the economy is 
necessary to identify the effects of pension reforms on the participation rate. Finally, the 
participation behaviour is influenced by changes in the socio-economic aptitudes towards work of 
the elderly, not necessarily related to governments’ interventions. The fact that participation rates 
can be influenced by other factors invites shifting to multivariate analysis. 
Before proceeding with the analysis an important caveat is needed. Short-term changes in the 
participation following a pension reform, as the one considered in this paper, tell nothing about the 
lags needed for a reform to fully influence the retirement decision and the participation rate. 
Pension reforms, especially fundamental, are gradually phased in and their impact may become 
visible only after some years, when an increasing number of cohorts born over successive years 
start to be under the new regime. Therefore, the expected gains of pension reforms cannot always 
————— 
22  We consider only those reforms that are followed at least by one year; hence, measures taken in 2006 are excluded from the sample. 
In addition, when one reform is followed within four years by another reform of the same type, we consider in the calculation only 
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be perceived immediately and their short-run effect is uncertain. Moreover, due to the gradual 
phase in, it is unlikely that the oldest generations would change their retirement behaviour because 
of the reform. In contrast, those aged between 50 and 54 are more likely to revise their inter-
temporal consumption/leisure allocation. In general, when a reform is announced, agents may 
respond with “imperfect” foresight when two dimensions of uncertainty, namely the timing and the 
measures adopted to reform the system, prevail (Butler, 1999). Finally, early retirement and 
non-fundamental reforms may have shorter implementation lags, and their effects can be more 
visible in the short-term. However, delay between announcement and enactment creates in general 
the possibility for agents to reassess how the reform will affect their incentive to retire prior to the 
effective implementation of the new regime (Santoro, 2006).
23 Thus, the effects of the reforms in 
the short-term are highly uncertain and depend on how different cohorts react to current or 
perspective changes in the rules of the social security system. For example, for those relatively far 
from the statutory retirement age, any change in their participation rate due to the reform would be 
induced by an announcement effect. 
 
6.1 Econometric  methodology 
To capture the effect of reforms we estimate a reduced form regression for the participation 
rate: 
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where PR it is the participation rate for different age groups in country i at time t; αi  and μt  are fixed 
effects for countries and years respectively, SEXi  is a dummy equal to 1 for women and 0 for men; 
ERit, FUNit and NONFUNit  are dummy variables taking the value 1 if a reform occurs in country s 
at time t and zero otherwise. γ, δ and η is the mean difference between countries that undertook a 
reform of one of the three types and those that didn’t. In practice we compare the participation rate 
in countries enacting a pension reform in a given year with the participation rate in countries that 
did not enact a pension reform controlling for other (non-reforms factors) that may influence 
participation. The unemployment rate ust captures the cyclical components of unemployment while 
long-term changes are represented by country/gender specific trends.
24 
The reference group in the equation is men. Thus αi represents the average (over time) 
activity rate of male in country i. Since a reform may imply different effects on the implicit tax rate 
and pension wealth of groups with different working histories, we expect a response that differs 
across age groups and gender. The interaction between SEX and the reforms dummies would 
capture this differential effect. Including interaction of this sort is also convenient when treated and 
control group are very similar and/or the treatment and the control group differ along other 
dimension of the data, in our case sex; it may also remove trends along these dimensions (Meyer, 
1995). To account for lagged effect of enacted reforms we introduced the reform dummies up to 
3 lags (i.e., 3 years). 
————— 
23  Santoro finds unintended announcements effect of the Italian pension reform of September 1992. Santoro, M.M. (2006), “Early 
Announcements of a Public Pension Reform in Italy”, CBO WP-1. 
24  We tried specifications with different combinations of common and country specific trends. In light of the strong institutional 
characteristics of European labour markets we preferred to include country and gender/ specific trends Results are available from 
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The use of fixed effects allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity possibly correlated 
with the policy dummies. This happens when the participation rates and the decision to undertake 
reforms of any type are correlated. Under these circumstances the fixed effect estimator is 
consistent and unbiased. In addition to a country specific unobserved component, there can be a 
common latent factor which influences both the participation rate and the reform dummy. This 
happens when exogenous trends in participation rates (e.g., increase in level of education or female 
participation) make a reform of the pension system more likely (for example, because there is 
stronger support for reforming the pension system when the participation rate is low rather than 
high). In this case the fixed effect estimator is inconsistent and inefficient (Coakley, Fuertes and 
Smith, 2004). Conversely, the two-way fixed effects provide consistent and efficient estimates. In 
our case, the inclusion of period dummies would absorb all the values of the coefficients of the 
reform dummy making them not significant. To avoid this we account for unobserved common 
factors with a time trend, which is equivalent to controlling for period effects when the coefficient 
of the trend variable is the same across countries. 
The introduction of lagged of the reform dummies control for possible correlation between 
these and the country specific effects. Finally, to control for the presence of common shocks hitting 
men and women in each country we correct standard errors using a robust covariance estimator 
according to the formula developed by Liang and Feger (1986)
25 across groups. We estimate the 




Before commenting the results, a note of caution is needed for the relatively limited number 
of observations and reforms events. Moreover, it is worth reminding that our analysis focuses only 
on the short-term impact of pension reforms, while in many countries these reforms are phased in 
only gradually. 
The results highlight a different response of the participation rate across gender, age and 
country groupings (Table 9). Columns 1 and 2 show, respectively for the EU27 and the EMU, the 
estimates of the effects of pension reforms pooling data over the age dimension. The results for the 
full sample show an increase in the EU27 participation rate following a fundamental reform, 
though the coefficients are not statistically significant. Similar results are obtained for the male rate 
when estimates are limited to EMU countries; conversely, the effect on women is negatively 
signed, though statistically insignificant. In the case of non-fundamental reforms we have similar 
results for the EU27, i.e., positive but insignificant. In contrast, the estimates for the EMU 
countries suggest that non-fundamental reforms increase the overall male rate, while the effect on 
female participation is ambiguous. Finally, reforms tightening the access to early retirement 
increase female participation, more in the EMU than in the non-EMU countries. Conversely, their 
effect on male participation is in EMU and non-EMU countries negative or insignificant. 
Columns 3 to 7 display the outcome for three age groups. For early retirement reforms, we 
find a consistent pattern across different age groups of women. Reforms tightening the generosity 
————— 
25  This is implemented in Stata with the cluster command. The clustering adjusts for correlations between the error terms over 
subgroups. In practice there are less independent observations standard errors should go up. If the error terms are not independent in 
a subgroup of observations (such as for the different time periods for a specific individual in a panel or, e.g., for observations that 
are spatially close) clustering avoids that common group errors generate too low standard errors (Moulton, 1990). 
26  Controlling for period fixed effects would imply that the estimated coefficients would capture all the effects of our reform dummies 
which are slowly time varying. Preliminary evidence based on ANOVA F-test suggests that for early retirement and non 
fundamental reforms there is more similarity in the number of reforms across time averages than across countries averages. The 
opposite occurs for the number of fundamental reforms with an average which is more similar across time than countries. This 
implies that the former types of reforms are enacted in a specific cluster of countries uniformly over time. Conversely the latter are 
enacted in specific years in a large set of member states. 148  Alfonso Arpaia, Kamil Dybczak and Fabiana Pierini 
 
of the early retirement schemes tend to increase the female participation rates, with statistically 
significant coefficients, especially for the ages close to the statutory retirement (55-59).
27 By 
contrast, the participation rate of men aged 50 to 59 is negatively affected by these reforms. Only in 
the case of men belonging to the 60-64 age bracket of the EMU sample, participation increases 
after early retirement reforms. In case of reforms that change the main financing characteristics of 
the pension system (fundamental reforms), we found a short-term negative impact on female 
participation rates in particular for the 55-59 and 60-64 age groups. In the case of men, the 
estimates suggest a positive response, in particular for those belonging to the 55-59 bracket. Those 
reforms that we have dubbed as non-fundamentals appear to be effective in raising the participation 
rate of men both in the EMU and non-EMU, though the coefficients are significant only for the 
EMU sample. On the contrary, women participation seems to fall in the short-term. However, the 
uncertainty associated to these results is higher probably due to “non-fundamental reforms” 
category being a residual gathering a range of diverse measures. Thus, the implicit assumption that 
these different measures have the same impact on the participation rate might not be valid. Finally, 
the impact of the early retirement reforms on women is in absolute terms always the largest. While 
for men, fundamental reforms seem to have the largest effect on the participation rate for the 
central age bracket. 
One problem with these estimates is that shocks to the participation rate might also hit the 
variable used to capture its cyclical component, i.e., the unemployment rate, implying that the 
coefficients measuring its impact on participation are biased downward – as the correlation 
between the shock and the unemployment rate is negative – and inconsistent. To correct for this 
endogeneity, the equation has been re-estimated with instrumental variables using the own lagged 
values of the unemployment rate as instruments (Table 10 and 11). As expected, the IV estimates 
of the coefficients of the unemployment rate are lower than the OLS estimates. Different 
specifications across countries and age groups suggest that the participation rate is broadly more 
sensitive to the unemployment in non-EMU countries. One exception is the participation rate of the 
group 50-54, which has a response to the difficulty of finding a job due to the cyclical conditions as 
big as in the rest of the EU. 
Turning to the role of reforms, the IV estimation suggests for both the EU27 and the EMU 
sample, a statistically significant and positive effect of fundamental reforms on the overall male 
and female participation rates (col. 1). When the focus is on specific age groups the effect on the 
male and female participation rates are respectively positive and negative. For the EU27 sample, 
non-fundamental reforms have usually a positive effect on participation rate, which is, however, 
precisely estimated only in the case of women. Conversely, for the EMU countries non-
fundamental reforms increase the male participation rate but decrease that of women of age 
between 55 and 59. Finally, reforms of early retirement reduce the participation rate of men, 
especially those aged between 50 and 54, but increase sizeably that of women. 
To account for persistent trends in participation rates unrelated to pension reforms, we 
include gender and country specific time trends in equation (1). Adding trends usually turns out in 
a lower impact of reforms, implying that in the specification without trend the impact of reforms is 
biased upward, as part of these trends get caught in the reform dummies. Moreover, the fact the 
standard error of the coefficients measuring the impact of reforms remained unchanged suggests 
that the introduction of specific trends does not introduce multicollinearity that reduces the 
precision of the estimates. 
Thus, when we control for gender and country specific trends, we find that: 
————— 
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•  fundamental reforms increase the participation rate of older men, respectively in the EU and the 
EMU sample, by about 2/3 of and ½ percentage point within 2 years. For both samples, the 
response of the male participation rate to fundamental reforms conditioned to age is hump-
shaped: low for the youngest and the oldest of the older workers age group and high for those 
with age at about the average retirement age; participation rates of men aged between 55 and 59 
raise by about 2 pp. Conversely, female participation declines in the short-term, more in EMU 
than in non-EMU countries, offsetting the overall effect of fundamental reforms; 
•  for the EU sample, non-fundamental increase the overall female participation rate (+0.7 pp in 
the year of reform), especially of women aged between 50 and 54, while the male rates remain 
mainly unaffected. The opposite is found when the estimates are restricted to the EU subsample. 
In this case, the male rate increase – again the 50-54 age group being the more reactive – while 
the female components remain mainly unchanged with the exception of women of age between 
55 and 59 whose participation rate drops by more than 2.5 pp; 
•  early retirement reforms have a positive effect on the female participation rate, especially for the 
55-59 age group of the EMU sample. Conversely, in respectively the EU and the EMU samples, 
the male participation rate drops or remains mainly unchanged. 
 
7  Conclusion and policy implication 
This paper investigates the short-term effects of pension reforms on the participation rates of 
specific age groups belonging to the 50-64 age class with a diff-in-diff approach. Variation across 
countries and time in pension reforms enacted in the member states provides the information 
needed to examine the effects of these reforms. 
The descriptive and preliminary econometric analysis conducted on a sample of 27 EU 
countries suggests a different short-term impact of pension reforms on the participation rate of men 
and women. Reforms tightening the access to early retirement have a short-term positive effect on 
the female participation rate, but reduce somewhat male participation. In our view, these findings 
reflect the different length of working life of men and women. A full pension is usually granted to 
anyone who has been working for a certain number of years. If someone does not reach the 
statutory number of working years, his or her pension is consequently reduced. When men enter the 
labour market, they tend to have more stable career path than women and to work continuously 
until retirement age (e.g., Hall, 1982). By the official retirement age, males have worked a 
sufficient numbers of years to get a full pension. As long as the pension reform reduces the 
expected lifetime income, it creates an incentive for those that have accumulated enough financial 
wealth to retire earlier. Thus, the optimal retirement age is defined as the upper threshold such that 
is never optimal to retire after that age as lifetime income is downward sloping (Heijdra and Romp, 
2007). Following the announcement of a reform that makes less generous the pension system, men 
just below the retirement age may find more convenient to anticipate the exit decision, not to miss a 
generous pension. These findings suggest the risk of a run on pension funds well before the 
changes take effect. This has been indeed the case following the announcements of restrictions of 
early retirement in some EU Member States, according to the 2009 Commission working document 
“Joint Report on Social Protection and Social inclusion”. 
Conversely, women have more career interruptions than men, especially because of 
maternity leave and family reasons, and the number of years spent working at the age of retirement 
is smaller than men. This difference may explain why the female participation rate raises in 
response to early retirement reforms. Compared to men, women have to reach a reasonable pension 
or accumulate a sufficient amount of precautionary savings before being able to retire with (not too 
large) drop in consumption. The effects are stronger in the EMU than in the non-EMU countries. 150  Alfonso Arpaia, Kamil Dybczak and Fabiana Pierini 
 
The results for non-fundamental reforms are more uncertain. The positive effect of non-
fundamental reforms for men is not surprising. These reforms usually adjust upwards the 
contribution rates, implying a lower net wage. If the substitution effect prevails, an individual 
prefers to work more. There is an additional motive for working more, which is related to the 
increasing life expectancy. Because of a longer life span an individual needs to work more in order 
to accumulate sufficient amount of wealth. As the real wage drops, he/she needs to work more to 
reach an intended level of consumption during the retirement age. 
In contrast, reforms that change the way of financing pensions or the eligibility conditions 
(fundamental reforms), usually with long phasing-in periods, may have unintended short-run effect 
on the female participation rate, especially of EMU countries. 
Our findings point at the importance of designing pension reforms and strategies to reform 
social security that reduce the risks of undesired effects on the decision to remain into the labour 
market. There is plenty of evidence that workers’ information about pension rules and uncertainties 
about long transition periods may influence in the short-term the retirement decision in a way 
which is not consistent with the intended effects of the reform. While transitory periods may be 
needed to gain the political support for the reforms, long and reiterated discussions on how to 
reform the social security system may add uncertainty and, if allowed by the rule in force, lead to 
anticipate the retirement decision even in cases where reforms involve future and not current older 
workers. Well-informed individuals are far more responsive to pension incentives, while 
ill-informed individuals seem to respond systematically to their misperceptions of pension 
incentives (Chan and Huff Stevens, 2008). 
To buttress these results, we plan to extend the empirical analysis in five directions. First, in 
the regression, we control for the determinants of participation unrelated to reforms with country 
fixed effects, period dummies or a common trend. The evidence found needs to be corroborated by 
enlarging the set of controls to observable variables, such as self-employed, age of entry into the 
labour market, per capita income, share of employee working in the public sector. Second, to get an 
indication of the short-term effect of pension reforms on the retirement decision our result should 
be validated by similar finding for probability of withdrawing from the labour market. Third, to 
better study labour force dynamics in response to pension reforms we need to combine the cross-
country policy variation with individual information on the labour market status. To use individual 
data from older workers’ self-reported satisfaction to investigate the effect of pension reforms on 
their retirement decisions. Finally, in the estimate we do not take into account that for the 
retirement decision what matters is not the individual income but the family income. There is 
evidence for the US of a differential response to policy changes of men from one earner vs two 
earner households (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2008). Extending the analysis to the participation 
rates of married men and women might provide some hindsight on the different, and sometime 
puzzling, response of the male and female participation rates to pension that found in our estimates. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1 
Average Annual Change of the Participation Rate 
after Early Retirement Reforms’ Years and Years where No Reforms Occur 
 
  No Reforms’ Years  Reforms’ Years  z-test: 
Same Mean Changes 
Participation rate 50-54  0.5  0.9  1.9 
Participation rate 55-59  0.7 0.9  0.6 
Participation rate 60-64  0.3 0.9  2.4 
 
Source: Authors calculations on LABREF database; the difference between the participation rates of the no-reforms and reforms years is 
statistically different from zero at 5 per cent of confidence when the value of the z-test is above 2. 
 
Table 2 
Average Annual Change of the Participation Rate 
after Fundamental Reforms’ Years and Years where No Reforms Occur 
 
  No Reforms’ Years  Reforms’ Years  z-test: 
Same Mean Changes 
Participation rate 50-54  0.8  0.5  –1.4 
Participation rate 55-59  0.7 0.9  0.4 
Participation rate 60-64  0.3 0.6  1.1 
 
Source: Authors calculations on LABREF database; the difference between the participation rates of the no-reforms and reforms years is 
statistically different from zero at 5 per cent of confidence when the value of the z-test is above 2. 
 
Table 3 
Average Annual Change of the Participation Rate 
after Non-fundamental Reforms’ Years and Years where No Reforms Occur 
 
  No Reforms’ Years  Reforms’ Years  z-test: 
Same Mean Changes 
Participation rate 50-54  0.6  0.5  –0.4 
Participation rate 55-59  0.4 1.1  2.1 
Participation rate 60-64  0.2 0.5  1.2 
 
Source: Authors calculations on LABREF database; the difference between the participation rates of the no-reforms and reforms years is 
statistically different from zero at 5 per cent of confidence when the value of the z-test is above 2. 




Life Expectancy at Birth 
 
Year Belgium  Bulgaria  Czech  Denmark  Germany  Estonia  Ireland  Greece  Spain 
1980  73.3 71.1 70.4  74.7 
1 73.1 70.6 
2 73.3
 3 75.3  75.4 
1990  76.2 71.2 71.5 74.9 75.4 69.9 74.8 77.1  77 
2006  79.5 72.7 76.8 78.4 79.9 73.1 79.7 79.5  : 
 
Year France  Italy  Cyprus  Latvia  Lithuania Luxembourg Hungary  Malta  Netherlands 
1980 :  75.6 
  : :  70.5  74.7 
4    69.1 70.4  76.5
 6 
1990 77  77.2 :  :  71.5  75.7  69.4  77
 5  77.1 
2006 81  81
5   80.6 70.9  71.1  79.4  73.5  79.5  80 
 
Year Austria  Poland  Portugal  Romania  Slovenia  Slovakia  Finland  Sweden  UK 
1980 72.7 : 71.5  69.2 :  70.4 74.5
 7 75.8  : 
1990 75.8 : 74.1  69.9  73.9  71.1 75.1  77.6 : 





4 1986 ; 
5 1994 ; 
6 1985,




Average Exit Age 
 
Country 1984-90  1991-99  2000-06 
Belgium 58.5  59.6  60.2 
Denmark 65.6  64.6  65.8 
Germany
1  61.5 60.8 62.7 
Greece 62.7  63.4  63.2 
Spain 63.2  62.3  63.3 
France 59.6  59.3  59.8 
Ireland 63.9  64.7  66.3 
Italy 60.7  59.8  61.1 
Luxembourg 62.3  58.9  60.8 
Netherlands 60.3  60.7  63.2 
Austria
 2   58.3  61.4 
Portugal 65.1  66.2  64.5 
Finland 
2   62.5  62.9 
Sweden 
2   65.4  65.7 
United Kingdom    62.3  64.3 
Cyprus     67.9 
Czech Republic 
3   59.4  61.2 
Estonia 
3   65.8  67.6 
Hungary 
4  58.1  61.1 
Lithuania 
5   65.2  63.8 
Latvia 
5   61.4  67.1 
Malta     60.1 
Poland 
3   59.6  58.7 
Slovakia
 5   57.4  59.1 
Slovenia 
4   61.1  62.7 
Bulgaria     63.5 
Romania 












Number of Pension Reforms by a Type of a Reform and by a Country Group 
 
 Fundamental  Non-fundamental  Early 
EU27 56  87  37 
EMU 36  55  26 
Non EMU  20  32  11 
 
Source: LABREF; FRDB Database. 
 
Table 7 











































































































































































































































































































































Belgium       x   x 
Denmark x      x    x 
Germany x      x  x x 
Greece           x 
Spain       x  x  x 
France x      x  x   
Ireland       x     
Italy   x    x  x  x 
Luxembourg            
Netherlands           x 
Austria x      x    x 
Portugal x      x  x  
Finland x      x    
Sweden x  x  x  x    
United Kingdom  x      x    x 
Bulgaria x         x 
Cyprus x           
Czech Republic  x      x    x 
Estonia     x       
Hungary x    x  x   x 
Lithuania x    x       
Latvia   x  x  x     
Malta           x 
Poland   x  x  x     
Romania x          x 
Slovenia x           
Slovakia x    x  x   x 
 
Source: LABREF; FRDB Database. 
  
 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Preferred specification takes into account both gender and country trends. 
(I) and (I EMU) represent results for all age groups in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
(II) and (II EMU) represent results for age group 50-54 in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
(III) and (III EMU) represent results for age group 55-59 in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
(IV) and (IV EMU) represent results for age group 60-64 in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
Variable (I) (I EMU) II (II EMU) III (III EMU) (IV) (IV EMU)
duf 0.1 0.1 –0.4 –0.0 1.0 1.3 0.2 –0.4
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
** *** ***
L.duf 0.3 0.2 –0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.7 –0.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6
*** ***
L2.duf 0.3 0.5 –0.0 0.7 –0.1 0.4 0.9 0.7
0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
** *** ***
L3.duf 0.2 0.2 –0.3 0.2 –0.2 –0.1 0.9 0.6
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
**
dunf 0.1 0.4 –0.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
** **
L.dunf 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.7 –0.1 –0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3
* * ** ** * *
L2.dunf 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 –0.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3
L3.dunf 0.1 –0.0 –0.3 –0.2 0.3 –0.0 0.4 0.1
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
**
duer –0.4 0.2 –0.5 –0.0 –0.0 –0.2 –0.7 0.9
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
** ** ** ***
L.duer –0.3 0.1 –0.4 –0.2 –0.5 –0.7 0.1 1.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
*** *** *** ***
L2.duer –0.2 0.0 –0.6 –0.4 –0.3 –0.7 0.3 1.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
** *** ***
L3.duer –0.3 –0.2 –0.6 –0.3 –0.5 –0.9 0.2 0.9
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4
** *** **
duf_Women 0.1 –0.2 0.6 0.5 –1.2 –1.7 –0.9 –0.0
0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6
*** ** ***
L.duf_Women 0.1 –0.4 0.1 –0.3 –0.5 –1.8 –1.4 –0.7
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.7
** **
L2.duf_Women 0.4 –0.1 –0.1 –0.4 0.3 –0.5 –1.1 –0.6
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8
L3.duf_Women 0.4 –0.1 0.1 –0.3 0.1 –0.2 –1.2 –0.5
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
**
dunf_Women 0.1 –0.3 0.3 –0.3 –0.4 –0.6 –0.6 0.0
0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
L.dunf_Women 0.1 –0.5 0.4 –0.2 –0.8 –1.6 –0.8 –0.6
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5
*** **
L2.dunf_Women 0.2 –0.4 0.5 –0.1 –0.3 –1.1 –0.6 –0.2
0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5
***
L3.dunf_Women 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.2 –0.1 –0.0
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
*** *** **
duer_Women 1.0 0.9 0.5 –0.4 1.3 2.1 1.6 0.4
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.4
*** *** ** *** ***
L.duer_Women 0.2 0.5 0.2 –0.4 0.7 1.5 0.8 0.5
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5
*** ***
L2.duer_Women 1.4 1.6 1.2 0.2 2.6 3.2 1.4 1.2
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.6
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
L3.duer_Women 1.3 1.5 0.8 –0.6 3.1 2.7 1.0 0.5
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.5 0.7
*** *** ** *** *** ***
u –0.4 –0.2 –0.2 0.0 –0.5 –0.3 –0.4 –0.3
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
_cons 50.4 43.5 68.3 59.0 50.7 44.1 27.0 21.7
0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 1.4 1.8 1.0 0.9
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
N u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a t . 9 3 7 95 9 2 93 7 5 62 3 7 62 5 0 41 5 8 43 1 1 91 9 6 9




Estimated Change in the Participation Rate of Older Workers Following a Reform 

















































Note: Preferred specification takes into account both gender and country trends. 
(I) and (I EMU) represent results for all age groups in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
(II) and (II EMU) represent results for age group 50-54 in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
(III) and (III EMU) represent results for age group 55-59 in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
(IV) and (IV EMU) represent results for age group 60-64 in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
 
Variable (I) (I EMU) (II) (II EMU) (III) (III EMU) (IV) (IV EMU)
duf 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.1 0.1 –0.5
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
** **
L.duf 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.3 –0.5
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
*
L2.duf 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.6 –0.0 0.5 0.7 0.4
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
** * *
L3.duf 0.1 0.2 –0.1 0.2 –0.2 –0.0 0.6 0.5
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
*
dunf 0.2 0.4 –0.0 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
** *
L.dunf 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.7 –0.1 –0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4
*
L2.dunf 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 –0.2 0.3 0.4 –0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4
L3.dunf 0.0 –0.0 –0.4 –0.1 –0.2 0.0 0.4 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
*
duer –0.4 0.2 –0.5 –0.0 –0.0 0.1 –0.8 0.8
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
** ** **
L.duer –0.4 –0.0 –0.4 –0.2 –0.5 –0.4 –0.2 0.9
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
* **
L2.duer –0.3 –0.0 –0.6 –0.4 –0.3 –0.5 0.2 1.2
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
** ***
L3.duer –0.3 –0.2 –0.4 –0.2 –0.4 –0.7 0.0 0.7
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
*
duf_Women –0.3 –0.1 0.0 0.3 –1.0 –1.7 –0.4 0.4
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.5
**
L.duf_Women –0.3 –0.4 –0.0 0.1 –0.3 –1.6 –0.4 0.3
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.6
**
L2.duf_Women –0.2 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 0.2 –0.9 –0.6 0.0
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.6
L3.duf_Women –0.0 –0.2 –0.0 –0.2 –0.0 –0.5 –0.7 –0.3
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.5
dunf_Women 0.1 –0.1 0.3 –0.4 0.2 –0.8 –0.6 –0.0
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
L.dunf_Women 0.1 –0.2 0.6 –0.2 –0.2 –1.7 –0.4 –0.3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5
** **
L2.dunf_Women 0.3 –0.1 0.6 –0.2 0.6 –1.1 –0.3 –0.0
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5
**
L3.dunf_Women 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.9 –0.0 0.2 0.2
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5
** *** *
duer_Women 0.6 0.2 0.4 –0.3 1.1 1.5 1.5 0.4
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6
** ** * * *
L.duer_Women 0.3 0.3 0.3 –0.1 0.7 1.7 1.0 0.8
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6
** *
L2.duer_Women 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.1 1.7 2.7 1.2 0.9
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6
** * ** *** **
L3.duer_Women 0.4 0.1 0.1 –0.6 1.6 2.3 1.0 0.6
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6
** ***
u –0.3 0.0 –0.2 0.0 –0.5 –0.4 –0.4 –0.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
*** *** *** *** *** ***
_cons 47.8 41.0 67.6 59.1 48.1 44.9 25.8 20.8
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.7
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Number of observat. 8992 5782 3600 2316 2400 1544 2992 1922
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Note: Preferred specification takes into account both gender and country trends. 
(I) and (I EMU) represent results for all age groups in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
(II) and (II EMU) represent results for age group 50-54 in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
(III) and (III EMU) represent results for age group 55-59 in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
(IV) and (IV EMU) represent results for age group 60-64 in case of all countries and EMU respectively. 
Variable (I) (I EMU) (II) (II EMU) (III) (III EMU) (IV) (IV EMU)
duf 0.4 0.2 0.0 –0.0 1.2 1.1 0.2 –0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
*** **
L.duf 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.4 –0.4
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
*** * **
L2.duf 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 –0.0 0.5 0.8 0.6
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
** **
L3.duf 0.2 0.2 0.0 –0.0 –0.3 –0.0 0.7 0.6
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
** *
dunf 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
*
L.dunf 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.1 –0.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
*
L2.dunf 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 –0.2 0.3 0.5 –0.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
L3.dunf 0.1 –0.1 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
duer –0.4 0.1 –0.6 –0.3 0.0 0.1 –0.7 0.8
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
** * ** *
L.duer –0.4 –0.2 –0.7 –0.6 –0.5 –0.4 –0.2 0.9
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
** *** * **
L2.duer –0.3 –0.3 –0.7 –0.6 –0.3 –0.4 –0.1 0.9
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
** * **
L3.duer –0.3 –0.3 –0.5 –0.2 –0.4 –0.6 –0.0 0.7
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
* *
duf_Women –0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 –1.4 –1.8 –0.5 0.1
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5
** **
L.duf_Women –0.1 –0.2 –0.3 –0.0 –0.5 –1.8 –0.6 0.1
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.5
**
L2.duf_Women 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.7 –0.1 –0.2 0.3
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.6
**
L3.duf_Women 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 –0.4 –0.8 –0.3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5
dunf_Women –0.2 –0.1 0.3 –0.2 0.1 –0.8 –0.6 –0.2
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
L.dunf_Women –0.2 –0.3 0.6 –0.1 –0.2 –1.6 –0.5 –0.4
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5
** **
L2.dunf_Women 0.2 –0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 –0.9 –0.2 0.0
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5
**
L3.dunf_Women 0.8 0.3 1.0 0.2 1.1 –0.1 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4
*** *** *
duer_Women 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.1 1.5 1.9 1.5 0.6
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5
*** * ** *** ***
L.duer_Women 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 1.0 2.1 1.1 0.9
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.5
** ** *** **
L2.duer_Women 1.8 1.1 1.0 0.7 2.5 3.6 1.7 1.6
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
L3.duer_Women 1.3 0.2 0.2 –0.5 1.7 2.4 1.0 0.6
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6
*** ** *** *
u –0.3 0.0 –0.2 0.0 –0.4 –0.5 –0.3 –0.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
*** *** *** *** *** ***
_cons 48.7 40.2 67.6 60.0 47.2 45.7 24.9 20.4
0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.7
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Number of observat. 8603 5633 3444 2256 2296 1504 2863 1873
Number of groups 810 480 324 192 216 128 270 160 
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Participation Rate Before and After Reforms of Early Retirement: EMU Countries 
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 VALUATION OF THE HUNGARIAN PENSION SYSTEM 
Erzsébet Kovács
* 
This paper takes a look at certain results of the modelling side of the Hungarian pension 
reform. Preparations are underway to implement actuarial modelling of pension liabilities for the 
government. The objective is to understand how the state might face challenges of the present 
pay-as-you-go pension system. Flat-rate pension, point system and notional defined contribution 
(NDC) as possible suggestions are reviewed in order to stop increase of public debt in the course of 
this century. Based on the investigations done in the last two years the sharpest problems for 
Hungary are the low activity ratios and the short working period. 
 
1 Introduction 
The Hungarian pension system underwent a structural reform in 1997, at present according 
to the World Bank terminology it has three pillars: 
•  Pillar I is the mandatory public pension system,
1 which is financed from the contributions paid 
by the employer and the employee; 
•  Pillar II is mandatory consisting of mutual private pension funds; and 
•  Pillar III covers voluntary mutual benefit funds. 
Pillar I is a publicly managed, pay-as-you-go financed, defined-benefit, social security 
pension scheme. It provides earnings-related old-age, disability and survivors benefits. Pillar II of 
the compulsory pension system is operated by fully-funded, defined contribution, private pension 
funds. The funds accumulate and invest contributions paid by their members onto their individual 
accounts. At retirement the accumulated sum increased by investment yield is converted into a life 
annuity,
2 which can be provided by either the fund itself or a life insurance company. 
Persons entering the labour market for the first time are automatically enrolled into the 
two-pillar system. Those who had already acquired pension rights before 1998 could voluntarily 
opt for the new system at the time of its inception. 
Pension and Old-age Round Table (POART) was set up in 2007 to analyse the future 
changes of the Hungarian pension system. Based on the projection results of POART’s report 
several important questions will be analysed. Besides the transformation of the pension system, and 
quantitative presentation of future contributions and benefits, impacts on labour supply in planned 
to be examined. 
 
2  Why don’t we comply with the rules of the pension system 
Qualifying conditions for a person to become eligible for the old-age pension in Hungary are 
as follows: 
————— 
*  Corvinus University of Budapest. E-mail: erzsebet.kovacs@uni-corvinus.hu 
  The author is member of the Hungarian Pension and Old Age Round Table. The views expressed here are mine. 
1  Our present social security system was introduced after the Second World War. The original version of the public pension was 
introduced in 1928. 

































Source: Author’s calculations based on Pension Statistics. 
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•  Reaching statutory retirement age 62 years for both males and females in 2009; and/or 
•  Completing the required number of years of service, 40 years for total pension amount; 
•  Completing at least 37 years of service until the age 60 to get reduced pension amount. 
In spite of the clear rules the effective retirement ages of both genders are significantly lower 
than the official retirement age. Figure 1 presents the age of newly retired old-age pensioners 
according to the calendar years. The discrepancy of numbers between legal and effective retirement 
ages is mainly the consequence of the political and economic transition after 1989. 
The best-known rule of our socialist system ended in 1989 was the full employment, which 
was associated with the so called in-door unemployment in the early 1960s. Figure 2 presents these 
artificially high rates of employment. 
As a result of these high ratios the average service period was higher than 40 years for men, 
and 36 years for women. Based on the long contribution period, the pay-as-you-go scheme worked 
smoothly until the late 1980s. 
After the political transition, the labour market shrank as a consequence of the privatisation 
of the Hungarian economy. Several companies were closed down or reorganised, and the 
agricultural cooperatives fell into individuals. The low demand for unskilled blue-collar workers 
caused serious difficulties. From 1990 to 1997 the unemployment rate increased suddenly. Early 
retirement and disability pension were the sidetracks for them because of their missing skills and 
low flexibility/mobility. 
To sum up the changes, by the late 1990s participation rate of active population decreased by 
20 per cent. The current level of employment is lower than it has been earlier.
3 Role of the informal 
sector is not analysed here because of the unpaid pension contribution. The maximum density of 
women’s employment (83 per cent) was measured in 2005 for those who were born in 1974. The 
parallel maximum numbers of men’s employment (71 per cent) was measured in 2005 for those 
who were born in 1974 and 1975. For more details see Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
In order to exit from the labour market around the age of 50, persons applied for disability 
pension. This process was supported by policymakers to avoid the further increase of the 
unemployment rate. As a result of this process total number of disability pensioners reaches 
22 per cent of pensioners in 2009. Number of disability pensioners below retirement age limit is 
around 10 per cent of the active population. These numbers are extremely high compared to he EU 
ratios, and are not underpinned by the health conditions of Hungarian people. 
 
3  What does the future hold for us? 
Theoretical arguments for strict retirement rules are reinforced by concerns about the 
implicit debt of the pension system. 
The implicit debt is defined as a difference between present value of benefits disbursed to 
pensioners and active members (i.e. future pensioners) and contributions paid by active members. It 
shows obligations of the state pension system at a given point of time towards the current 
members
4 (those who have already entered the system). 
————— 
3  According to the OECD Statistics change of the total labour force in 2004 compared to 1994 was –1.2 per cent for Hungary. The 
OECD average for this period equals to +9.6 per cent. Source: OECD in Figures, 2005. 


































Source: Author’s calculation based on Pension Statistics. 
 
Figure 4 
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The implicit debt is measured in percent of GDP. Projected amounts of implicit debt per 
active members in the given calendar years were discounted to 2007 values in order to be 
comparable and expressed in currency units of the same year. 5 per cent discount rate was applied 
per annum, which corresponds to the risk free rate. 
The government’s possible decisions on changing the pension parameters (such as 
contribution rate, age limit and indexation) are expected to reduce the implicit debt in the next 
15-20 years. The best scenario can be seen in Figure 5. The estimated minimum (2.45 per cent) will 
be reached in 2026. 
This wave in Figure 5 is a consequence of the special shape of the Hungarian demographic 
tree
5 (see in Figure 6). The baby boom generation will retire around 2016, but the second boom, 
children of this generation are expected to be active on the labour market until 2040. The 
Hungarian pension system is strongly influenced by the special shape of the demographic tree. 
Aging itself is not the most serious burden for the Hungarian pension system as it is for other 
highly developed countries. Life expectancy is expected to increase by 2 months per year. 
The old version is projected by lower (1.3) fertility ratio, the young version is assumed with 
higher (1.8) fertility ratio. Both fertility values are below the reproduction level, so we do not 
calculate with a stationary population. Based on this projection, there are political intentions to 
increase the pension age to 65 year gradually in the next decade. 
 
4  Increasing the contribution period 
Our focus is on a small open economy in which the pay-as-you-go pension system is 
characterized by: 
•  the size of the labour market (L), and wages per worker (w), 
•  the number of retired persons (P), 
•  the average pension (p), and 
•  the contribution rate (r). 
The balanced budget for this system can easily be calculated by multiplying the above 
quantities for a given year (t): 
 L (t) r(t) w(t) = P(t) p(t) 
While these factors (wage, pension and contribution rate) can be influenced by the 
government relatively easily, the labour force adapts to the changes rather slowly. 
One obvious way of increasing the contribution seems to be raising the legal retirement age. 
However there are objections to this strategy: as significant number of people chose the early 
retirement, the actual mean retirement age is lower by several years than the legal retirement age 
(As it was seen in Figure 1). 
PORT is analysing chances of paying contribution according to age and sex. Dividing the 
active population into six categories, we can calculate the pension contribution density for a given 
year. 
Employment statuses are mentioned
6 as follows: 
•  Person A works during the whole year, 
————— 
5  Data are for 2001. Projections were made by Laszlo Hablicsek in 2007. 




Implicit debt of the Hungarian State Pension System 



























Source: Deloitte projection (2008). 
 
Figure 6 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Pension Statistics. 
 
•  Person B1 works at least ¾ year, 
•  Person B2 works at least ½ year, 
•  Person B3 works only ¼- ½ part of the year, 
•  Person B4 works less than ¼ part of the year, 
•  Person G does not work in the given year at all. 
Looking at the transition matrix of men (aged 30-43, the most active members of the society) 
from 2004 to 2005 a straightforward conclusion is that further reduction of participation density 
should be prevented. Table 1 covers 960 thousand people 77 per cent of whom contributed to the 
PAYG system. 55 per cent of them were full workers, 22.4 per cent contributed in a certain part of 
the year, 19 per cent did not pay contribution in 2005. Based on the special early retirement 
conditions for certain professions 0.4 per cent of this young cohort retired. 
Weighing the total ratios by the contribution densities,
7 the overall contribution density 
(OCD) equals to 68.6 per cent. A bit less than 1/3 of the year remains uncovered by pension 
contribution. Analysing different age groups the ODC ratios remain lower. The females’ overall 
contribution ratios are a bit higher than the appropriate males’ results. 
Further research is needed to analyse the following possibilities: 
a)  How can we increase overall contribution density within a given service period for different age 
groups and for both genders?  
b) What kinds of incentives are encouraging people to extend service period without increasing 
legal retirement age? 




7  Overall contribution density: 55*1+10.5*0.875+4*0.625+3.6*0.375+4.3*0.125=68.6. 
A B1 B2 B3 B4 G Disabled Old-age Dead
A 86.8% 8.6% 1.4% 0.9% 0.6% 1.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1%
B1 44.5% 31.3% 8.7% 6.1% 4.6% 4.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2%
B2 27.2% 20.2% 14.2% 11.5% 10.8% 15.6% 0.4% 0.0% 0.2%
B3 19.1% 14.1% 13.3% 13.7% 14.3% 24.8% 0.4% 0.0% 0.3%
B4 9.8% 9.1% 9.9% 12.0% 21.0% 37.3% 0.5% 0.1% 0.4%
G 2.4% 3.4% 4.3% 5.2% 8.6% 74.9% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5%
Disabled 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 95.5% 0.0% 4.5%
Old-age 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 99.6% 0.4%
Total 55.0% 10.5% 4.0% 3.6% 4.3% 19.1% 2.8% 0.4% 0.3%
Density 100.0% 87.5% 62.5% 37.5% 12.5% 0.0%180 Erzsébet  Kovács 
 
5 Conclusions 
Finding practical solutions and implementing them should be the first step on the path 
towards the pension reform in Hungary. We now live in a society where significantly more 
emphasis is being placed on personal provision for retirement. People are encouraged to save 
individually in Pillar II by taxation. On the other hand state provision is not out of favour. The aim 
of social insurance is twofold: to alleviate poverty in old age, and provide a big pooling of risk not 
only for old age pensioners, who contributed to the pension system during their working period, but 
for disabled persons and survivors as well. 
Attitude of people to pension system and savings for retirement period should be changed 
before introducing new pension reform. Neither the NDC nor the point system can solve our 
problems originated in short contribution period and early retirement. 
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  COMMENTS ON SESSION 1 
PENSION REFORM AND THE LABOUR MARKET 
Johannes Clemens
* 
As agreed previously, I will focus my comments on the papers by Najat El-Mekkaoui De 
Freitas and Joaquim Oliveira Martins: “Consumption Structure, Welfare Goods and Retirement 
Income: Linking the Ageing Puzzles”, and by Paul Rodway: “Public Pensions and the Labour 
Market in New Zealand”. I found both papers very stimulating and well founded. 
 
1  Discussion of “Consumption Structure, Welfare Goods and Retirement Income: 
Linking the Ageing Puzzles” by Najat El-Mekkaoui De Freitas and Joaquim Oliveira 
Martins
1 
The paper by El-Mekkaoui De Freitas and Oliveira Martins is very ambitious, as it deals 
with no less than four pension puzzles. These are correlations economists would not usually expect 
because of their belief in the lifecycle theory: 
i)  People are not perfect consumption smoothers. Instead, they tend to consume less in old age; 
ii) People are net savers even in old age. In a lifecycle world they should rather dissave; 
iii)  Countries with more pension fund assets have lower private household saving rates. If PAYG 
contributions are regarded as substitutes for private savings, the opposite result could be 
expected; 
iv) Rising longevity seems to be correlated with lower savings, although a longer life needs more 
private provision for retirement. 
Puzzles (i) and (ii) can be illustrated by hump-shaped consumption age profiles. 
Consumption smoothing in reality obviously does not mean perfect equalisation of consumption 
potentials in all phases of our lives. It rather means consumption planning, and thereby taking into 
account all income sources as well as consumption necessities in old age. If rational consumers 
save in old age, this should be driven by bequest motives. Another explanation might be special 
purpose savings or consumption smoothing within the retirement period. The fear of needing (not 
fully subsidised) long-term care at the end of one’s life might drive the observed savings. 
The OLG model is very insightful. However, the longevity puzzle does not really seem to be 
solved. Perfect consumption smoothing might lead to higher consumption during the working years 
if the expected income in old age rises. But if it rises only in sum because of a longer retirement 
phase, it is very hard to follow the author’s argumentation. The saving-longevity puzzle remains 
striking. Maybe people not only take into account their increased longevity but also the necessity to 
work longer (hopefully in good health). Perhaps they have to adapt their bequest plans because they 
live longer and dissave more than envisaged during retirement. 
It remains difficult to explain the saving-capitalisation puzzle. There were very numerous 
attempts to find empirical evidence for the Feldstein thesis of a wealth substitution effect when 
introducing a PAYG pension scheme. Even Feldstein himself mentioned the countervailing 
retirement effect. According to this effect, people retire earlier purely because of the existence of a 
pension scheme. As a result, however, they have to save more and consume less. The 
—————— 
*
 Deutsche  Bundesbank. 
1  The discussion refers to the original version of the paper which has been revised in the aftermath. 184 Johannes  Clemens 
Barro-Feldstein controversy is well known. But all the empirical cross-section, time-series and 
cross-country studies have not yet brought absolute clarity to the saving-capitalisation debate. 
Finally, there is some good news in the findings; due to the hump-shaped consumption age 
profile, demographic ageing would be consistent with lower per capita growth rates, which is 
nevertheless to be expected because of the shrinking working force. If the elderly do not want/need 
to consume as much as younger people, less production is needed to keep the welfare status 
constant. Indeed, it might be misleading to place too much emphasis on the expected decrease in 
the per capita growth rates. 
 
2  Discussion of “Public Pensions and the Labour Market in New Zealand” by Paul 
Rodway 
The paper by Paul Rodway deals with the interaction of the New Zealand statutory pension 
scheme, called NZ Superannuation (NZS), and the labour market participation of the elderly. It is 
well known that the demographic change will put public finances under pressure. The post-war 
baby boom will (temporarily) cause strong increases in the number of pensioners. The more or less 
linear rise in further life expectancy will continuously worsen the ratio of tax payers to pensioners. 
And finally, the tax base will erode due to insufficient birth rates to stabilise the population. 
According to the brief but enlightening characterisation of the pension system, the NZS 
offers a flat pension at the age of 65 to every New Zealander, notwithstanding whether he/she is in 
paid employment. In contrast to Bismarckian pension schemes in central Europe, the NZS includes 
a substantial element of explicit income redistribution. On the one hand, this makes the system 
successful in fighting old age poverty. 66 per cent of the net average wage for a couple implies a 
100 per cent or more replacement rate for a household receiving less than two-thirds of the average 
gross wage. On the other, due to the absence of any equivalence between contributions and 
benefits, the taxes levied to finance the NZS cause distortions and lead to inefficiencies. 
Paul Rodway is right to emphasise that there is no implicit tax to be taken into account by a 
pensioner considering whether to participate in the labour force. He/she receives the pension at the 
age of 65 regardless of whether he/she remains in employment. However, it should be mentioned 
that the explicit tax on the optional additional labour income is partly used to finance the pension 
scheme without giving rise to any additional pension claim. This disincentive to labour supply is 
the result of income redistribution within the NZS. The tax burden is the same for every cohort, but 
only those aged 65 or more can avoid it by leaving the labour force. 
The figures on labour force participation are very instructive. They give us a hint of the 
importance of the retirement or, more precisely, the eligibility age. Obviously, the rise from 60 to 
65 by 2001 caused a significant increase in the participation rates of those aged 55 to 64. In 
Germany, there was a comparable development from 1997 onwards. Here, actuarial deductions 
were introduced in stages in the event of early retirement (especially after unemployment or old 
age part-time work). Since 2005, there has generally been no opportunity to retire early (i.e., before 
reaching the age of 65) without these deductions. The result (together with major labour market 
reforms) is a relatively strong increase in the labour force participation rate of the elderly in 
Germany (see Figure 2). 
Unsurprisingly, the willingness to work after 65 diminishes. Theoretically, the positive 
income effect in the form of the NZS pension must lead to a lower labour supply if the demand for 
leisure is characterised by a positive income elasticity. This matches with the finding of a sudden 
cut in full-time work at 65 and – for men – a steady increase in part-time work with advancing age.   Comments on Session 1: Pension Reform and the Labour Market  185 
The deeper analysis of special factors that influence retirement behaviour is very interesting. 
According to the findings presented by Paul Rodway, the probability for remaining in work rises if 
a person does not have a non-working spouse. This might be interpreted as good news because 
secular trends moving from families to single households indicate some fiscal relief. Regarding the 
findings on health status, which is stated here to be rather irrelevant to decisions on whether to 
work, I would be cautious. Disabled persons are, by definition, no longer able to work. If they are 
included in the sample, one should expect some influence from health status. Persons who are not 
disabled but less healthy probably do not have a choice on whether to leave the labour force – 
unless they can count on the support of a spouse. And finally, the general trend moving from 
physically demanding jobs (in the production sector) to mentally demanding jobs (in the service 
sector) might make it easier to stay in work even with a worsened health status. 
What could be done to ensure fiscal sustainability in the next 30 years and beyond? 
Weakening the indexation means lower replacement rates. This might be politically difficult to sell. 
Fortunately, however, New Zealand has a highly redistributive pension scheme. Therefore, smaller 
pensions would be less of a problem to low income groups than, for example, in the German 
pension scheme, with its high degree of equivalence of contributions and benefits. On the other 
hand, pension cuts would be less effective from a fiscal perspective, because there are no “big” 
pensioners, who would lose more than those at the lower end of the income distribution. 
The first choice, therefore, would seem to be an increase in the eligibility age, preferably 
automatically indexed to rising life expectancy. For example, it should be possible to argue that 
there is an obvious necessity to stabilise the ratio of time spent in retirement to the time spent in 
work. Longer working time – as Paul Rodway points out very clearly – is the key to dampening the 
fall in potential output growth and, consequently, to strengthening the economic basis of 
government finances and, not least, the social security system. 
Some doubts arise regarding the idea of diverting the NZS pensions to a capital funded 
private scheme (KiwiSaver account) while staying in work. Letting the KiwiSaver account run 
above the age of 65 and allowing people to put money aside on a voluntarily basis would be a good 
idea. However, if subsidies are involved in these private savings accounts, it should be kept in mind 
that extra expenditures are not consistent with fiscal sustainability. This is a general caveat of 
government sponsored private savings accounts because it contradicts the goal of fairer 
intergenerational burden-sharing. 
 
  COMMENTS ON SESSION 1 
PENSION REFORM AND THE LABOUR MARKET 
Tomasz Jędrzejowicz
* 
I would like to thank Daniele Franco and Banca d’Italia for the opportunity to participate and 
discuss two inspiring papers of this session. The first one, by R. Vegas et al., is an empirical study, 
dealing with retirement decisions in Spain, conducted using detailed data on labour and pension 
histories. The second one, by A. Ahuja and R. Paserman, is an overview paper, focused on pension 
policies in European Union countries from a macro perspective, which draws on policy exchange 
and coordination between EU Member States in the area of pensions and social protection 
conducted in the context of the Open Method of Coordination. The two papers are therefore quite 
different, but both deal with the key issue of determinants of retirement decisions, in particular in 
case of early retirement.  
Pension wealth is generally found in studies to be one of the key drivers of retirement 
decisions. This result is confirmed by the Vegas et al. paper, where social security wealth turns out 
to play a greater role in the retirement decision than variables representing the increase in pension 
an individual could obtain by working longer, which also turn out to be significant. A higher 
replacement rate in principle also encourages early retirement, but in practice OECD studies show 
it to be less relevant and Vegas et al. obtain a similar result, with the replacement rate turning out 
to be insignificant. Other public income support programmes available prior to pensionable age, 
such as disability, unemployment and special early retirement schemes, also play a role, as do the 
levels of health, education and income. 
An issue related to retirement decisions, which recently has been receiving some attention in 
the literature is that of involuntary retirement. The issue is potentially relevant for both papers. In 
case of the paper by Vegas et al., involuntary retirement may not be captured directly, because of 
the nature of the dataset used. The issue is to some extent addressed indirectly, as the authors use a 
GDP growth variable to proxy the macroeconomic environment, but the results obtained are 
counterintuitive. Perhaps it would be useful to explore different variables representing the overall 
labour market environment, such as the level of unemployment or the number of jobs lost in a 
given period.  
Another potentially important issue in the context of retirement decisions is the minimum 
pension guarantee which would generally promote early retirement among low-income workers. 
The significance of this effect is likely to increase with reforms lowering average replacement 
rates, less intra- and inter-generational redistribution and more common temporary employment. 
The level of minimum pension is susceptible to political pressures and therefore subject to frequent 
ad hoc adjustments, which lead to uncertainty about its future level. 
For the case of Spain, Vegas et al. find that the minimum pension guarantee increases the 
probability of retirement at 60, but the effect appears to be relatively small and is reversed for 
workers aged 61 to 65. Though not directly comparable, these results seem to be qualitatively 
different from those of Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez (2006), according to whom the minimum 
pension guarantee in Spain increases retirement at age of first entitlement and early retirement in 
general by almost 50 per cent. The importance of the minimum pension guarantee in the Spanish 
pension system is also referred to in Boldrin et al. (2008), as well as OECD reports. 
————— 
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The paper by Ahuja and Paserman states that indeed, most EU Member States perceive 
minimum income benefits as benefits as providing negative incentives towards longer working 
lives, a conclusion generally consistent with empirical literature. However, while looking through 
the publications produced in the framework of the Open Method of Coordination, I have found an 
earlier one devoted specifically to the issue of minimum income provisions for older people 
(SPC, 2006), which gives a rather different message, stating that there is “no real evidence to prove 
or disprove labour market or savings behaviour impacts of minimum income benefits for older 
people”. 
Another important and much debated issue raised by the Commission authors is that of a 
move to funded pension schemes. The paper points out that such a move was usually motivated by 
the desire to pre-fund the future pension burden, as well as obtain higher returns on contributions in 
the private pension pillar. While the second argument has been questioned in the literature, the first 
one is fully viable, especially as it also entails other advantages of a political nature. Firstly, a move 
to an individual defined contribution pension scheme implies making the implicit future cost of 
ageing of the populations explicit, thus supporting the recognition and acceptance of the need for 
pre-funding of the pension burden. Secondly, once a defined contribution system with individual 
pension accounts is set up, a reversal of the reform would entail very significant political costs. 
These would most likely be higher than in case when the government were to abort pre-funding 
conducted at the government level, via debt reduction or building government reserve funds. 
But as the authors rightly point out, the move to funding also entails some risks which may 
need to be addressed. Firstly, one needs to note the shifting of the pension risk from provider to the 
beneficiary. This may be viewed as an opportunity to get participants more involved in pension 
planning, but in order to make this happen, costs will have to be incurred in reach them. 
In addition, the current financial market turmoil has shown that pension accounts may be at 
risk due to financial market volatility. While swings in asset prices are normal, although “normal” 
depends on the magnitude of these swings, it is important to ensure that funds of persons close to 
retirement are invested in low-risk assets. 
Speaking of the current downturn, the Commission authors point to a number of challenges 
arising in connection with the financial turmoil and global economic downturn. These include first 
of all rising unemployment, resulting in delayed establishment of younger workers on the labour 
market and, consequently, lower accumulation of contributions in defined contribution pension 
schemes, both funded and notional. Older workers will also suffer by becoming more susceptible to 
layoffs, with increased take-up of early retirement being the likely consequence. Some Member 
States are also delaying pension reforms or the activation of automatic mechanism which in the 
current climate would otherwise lead to lower pension benefits. Funded pension schemes are facing 
increasing challenges with the recent fall in asset value and increased risk of pension adequacy 
problems. In addition, one general challenge, which is already evident, is related to the massive 
increase in deficit and debt levels in connection with the current downturn. This will have 
significant implications for the size of fiscal adjustment required to cope with the ageing 
challenges. 
Finally I would like to conclude by devoting some attention to Poland, which may serve as 
an example for many issues raised in the paper by Commission authors. Before the pension reform 
in 1999, Poland had a fairly generous defined benefit pension system, with a relatively flat pension 
levels, thanks to which the elderly were a group less prone to poverty than the remainder of the 
population. The system also featured very generous profession-specific early retirement provisions, 
which in many cases were not justified by medical considerations. In addition, during the early 
years of economic transformation, the social insurance system had been used to cushion the social 
cost of restructuring and layoffs, in particular through the use of early retirement, disability benefits   Comments on Session 1: Pension Reform and the Labour Market  189 
and special pre-retirement benefits. All in all, this provided for a very costly system with strong 
disincentives to long careers and low participation rates. In 1999 a comprehensive pension reform 
was introducing a notional defined contribution pillar, as well as a mandatory funded pillar and 
elimination of the vast majority of early retirement provisions (finally completed in 2008). As a 
result, according to EPC Ageing Working Group projections, Poland is in a very good position to 
cope with the ageing pressures. Nevertheless, a number of problems and risks remain. Women’s 
retirement age remains at a low level of 60 years, resulting in low future pensions from defined 
contributions pension schemes. The shift of responsibility and risk of pension provision to 
beneficiaries may also be problematic in the longer run, as they are not well equipped to deal with 
this risk. This is evidenced by the rush of workers to register as self-employed, which means 
paying lower social contributions, but ultimately will result in lower benefit levels. The minimum 
pension will also gain significance as under the new system many low-income workers, especially 
those with sizeable breaks in their careers, will likely not accumulate sufficient funds in their 
individual pension accounts and will therefore draw on the minimum pension. Given the risk of 
discretionary adjustments of the minimum pension as a results of political pressures, this may 
undermine the idea of the reform. 
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OECD countries, in particular the European countries within the OECD, will face major 
demographic challenges in the not-too-distant future: Age-related public expenditures will increase 
dramatically due to (a) the strong inflow into retirement when the large baby-boom cohorts reach 
pension age, (b) the steadily growing life expectancy, and (c) the well-documented decline in the 
age at which people exit from the labour force. Together with the observed trend towards delayed 
entry into the labour market, this implies a sharp decline in the length of working life and in its 
duration relative to the retirement period. Together with declining and now comparatively low 
fertility rates,
1 this leads to a shrinking active labour population (in absolute terms as well as 
relative to the number of retirees) which cannot be fully compensated by migration. 
The process of population ageing per se is the result of a great progress in human history – 
the so-called demographic transition. “Before the start of the demographic transition life was short, 
births were many, growth was slow and the population was young. During the transition, first 
mortality and then fertility declined, causing population growth rates first to accelerate and then to 
slow again, moving toward low fertility, long life and old population” (Lee, 2003). People not only 
live longer these days, they also stay in relatively good health until later in their lives. However, the 
combination of declining fertility rates, longer life expectancies, low effective retirement ages and 
the large inflows into retirement of the large baby-boom cohorts transforms the benefits of 
demographic transition for individuals into a challenge both for the sustainability of public finances 
and for labour market policy. In many countries, the numbers of workers retiring each year will 
increase sharply and will eventually exceed the number of new labour market entrants. Without 
changes in the participation patterns and in productivity, this will result in declining 
GDP-per-capita growth and thus in lower living standards. 
According to the most recent report of the Ageing Working Group of the European 
Commission’s Economic Policy Committee, the reduction in the population aged 15-64 and the 
increase in persons aged 65+ will cause the old-age dependency ratio in the EU to almost double 
from 28 to 53 per cent over the next 50 years; at the same time, the total dependency ratio will 
increase on average by 30 percentage points to nearly 80 per cent.
2 According to the OECD (2006), 
the ratio of older inactive persons per worker in the OECD area will almost double from around 
38 per cent at the beginning of this decade to just over 70 per cent in 2050, if work and retirement 
patterns remain unchanged.
3 
Given these prospects, raising labour force participation will be one of the most critical 
measures, since changes in the ratio of retirees will be driven both by changes in the size of older 
relative to younger groups and by the proportion of older people who participate in the labour 
market. Thus, increasing participation and employment rates of older workers or – more generally 
– extending working life is essential for ensuring sustainable public pay-as-you-go pension systems 
————— 
* Österreichische  Nationalbank. 
  The views expressed in this comment are those of the author and not necessarily those of the OeNB. 
1  Fertility rates have decreased over the last decades and remain substantially below the demographic reproduction rate of 2.1. See 
Stiglbauer (2006). 
2  See European Commission (2009). 
3  In Europe, this ratio could rise to almost one older inactive person for every worker over the same period. See OECD, 2006, p. 9. 192 Walpurga  Köhler-Töglhofer 
and for safeguarding high living standards. Moreover, this would also be a logical step in the light 
of increasing life expectancy. As part of the Lisbon Agenda, the European Union aims at increasing 
the employment rate of older workers to 50 per cent by 2010 (“Stockholm target”). A 
complementary target is raising the average exit age into retirement by five years (“Barcelona 
target”).
4 
Over the last decade, Europe in fact already witnessed a significant rise in the overall 
participation and employment rates, with women and older workers being the most dynamic 
components.
5 However, labour force statistics show that there are significant cross-country 
differences in the labour force participation of older workers that range from about 30 per cent to 
more than 70 per cent. Hungary, for example, to which one paper of this session was devoted, 
exhibits a comparatively low participation rate of about 35 per cent and rather problematic 
prospects with respect to the development of the old age dependency ratio (an increase of 
34 percentage points compared to 28 percentage points for the EU-27) and the total dependency 
ratio (an increase of 35 percentage points to 80 per cent). 
A higher labour force participation of older workers would mean a better mobilisation of the 
labour supply of older people; this would yield a triple dividend (OECD, 2006). Firstly, it would 
boost labour force growth and help offset the negative impact of population ageing on economic 
growth; secondly, it would improve public finances (comparatively fewer expenditures but more 
contributions) and finally it would help employers by smoothing the pace at which they have to 
replace retiring workers with new entrants. 
 
2  Decline in the labour force participation of older workers was mirrored by a steady 
reduction of average retirement age 
Labour force withdrawal of older workers was one of the most dramatic demographic trends 
in the post-war period. In the early 1960s, the participation rate of people aged 60+ was above 
70 per cent in most European countries, in some it was around 80 per cent. By the mid-1990s, this 
rate had fallen to below 20 per cent in many countries, such as BE, IT, NL, FR or AT; in addition, 
cross-national differences in participation had widened. The downward trend in the labour force 
participation of older workers lasted until the mid-1990s, when it was eventually reversed in many 
countries. Despite this trend reversal, the labour force participation of males aged 55+ is still lower 
now than it was just a few decades ago. Female labour participation has been on the rise in general, 
as has been the participation of the group aged 55+; however, their respective participation levels 
are still much lower than those of men. 
The trend of falling labour participation of older workers was mirrored by a decrease in the 
average effective retirement age of workers. In the 1960s and early 1970s, men retired from the 
labour market when they reached the age of 65. Since then, the average age of retirement has 
declined dramatically. The average age of female retirement, while historically lower than that of 
men, has followed a similar pattern from the 1960s. 
Gruber and Wise (2002) point out that, to understand these trends, we have to consider the 
social security systems and their evolution over time, among other things. Pension policies are an 
important determinant of labour force participation. The extent to which social security systems 
————— 
4  Over and above these goals, it is reasonable to think of ways to shorten education periods and years of study, since otherwise rising 
numbers of labour markets entrants with tertiary education (which are another explicit goal of economic policy) will tend to shorten 
working lives further. 
5  Between 2000 and 2008, the employment rates of female and older workers increased by about 5.5 and 9 percentage points 
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affect the pattern of labour force participation depends on the generosity of the system, such as 
replacement and coverage ratios. These two ratios were on the rise in European countries until the 
mid-1990s. 
However, economic incentives built into the social security system were not the only reason 
why more and more people retired early. Above all, this development was caused by deliberate 
policy measures to reduce labour supply. Especially at the end of the 1970s and in the mid-1980s, 
governments, firms and trade unions often created “incentive schemes” for older workers to leave 
the labour market. Economic policymakers took action to “relieve” the labour market in times of 
low demand (recessions) or high supply (immigration) or in the face of structural unemployment 
problems caused by declining sectors – also in Austria. Various “soft landing” plans were 
implemented to reduce the labour supply (early retirement schemes, specific long-term 
unemployment benefits for older workers in declining sectors or a generous handling of invalidity 
pensions); these measures were characterised by less stringent eligibility rules. which were later 
even extended to all employees. Such bridging pensions were introduced also in FI, IT, DE and 
NL.
6 Most of these soft landing plans have become permanent institutions which have come to 
shape people’s attitude towards retirement and thus to influence individual retirement decisions. 
When investigating, inter alia, the reasons for cross-country differences in the labour force 
participation of older workers, Börsch-Supan et al. (2008) find, not surprisingly, that early 
retirement regulations in particular are an important determinant of labour force participation 
decisions in older age. In addition, they find that over and above the general institutional or other 
differences specific to a country, it is the generosity of the pension systems itself that matters a 
great deal in making individuals retire or keep on working. 
Apart from the retirement rules and the monetary incentives built into the social security 
systems, also other aspects determine the labour force participation of older people, such as the 
trend of increasing real earnings, the existence of non-pension alternatives for old age (availability 
of different sources of income in old age), health-related factors, within-household decision-
making (retirement decisions of couples) and care responsibilities, labour demand factors and 
social norms and traditions.
7 
 
3  Reversing the falling labour participation trend – an important target of pension 
reforms… 
Labour force participation as well as employment rates of older workers have been raised 
significantly in several European countries in recent years. Pension reforms introduced since the 
1990s primarily aimed at improving the sustainability of the public pay-as-you-go pension systems; 
they did so inter alia with the help of measures that intended to increase the labour force 
participation of older workers and to delay their exit from the labour market. The paper by Arpaia, 
Dybczak and Pierini, which was presented in this session, focuses on whether pension reforms 
enacted in the EU-27 over the past two decades have been successful in raising the labour force 
participation of those aged 50+ in the short term. It points to a difference in the short-term impact 
of pension reforms on the participation rate of men and women. The policy conclusion that can be 
————— 
6  The political intention behind these measures was to replace ageing high-wage workers by young low-wage workers or to encourage 
older workers to retire in order to give their jobs to younger, possibly unemployed, workers. However, this hypothesis could not be 
verified empirically for the past decades. Still, in the face of the strong rise in unemployment of young male workers in the wake of 
the global economic crisis, this argument has again become politically attractive. 
7  The importance of the latter should not be underestimated, in particular in those countries where people tend to retire at the first 
opportunity offered, even if their pensions are low and would be higher if they delayed retirement. Longer retirement becomes an 
acceptable, even a highly desired part of a typical worker’s life. 194 Walpurga  Köhler-Töglhofer 
drawn from their study is that at least reforms of early-retirement options seem to have had a 
significant positive impact on the labour force participation of older women.
8 However, we have to 
bear in mind that this reform category, as defined in the study, includes very heterogeneous reform 
measures. Thus, from a policy perspective it would be of greater interest to check for the labour 
supply impact of specific measures or elements. The authors do not find any clear-cut short-term 
impact from fundamental or non-fundamental reforms. However, people make plans and do not 
change them quickly when a system changes – and this is particularly true for older people. 
Therefore, asking about the short-term impact of different pension reforms may just not be the most 
relevant question. With respect to reforms aimed at enhancing the long-term sustainability of the 
pension systems, the medium- to long-term effects on participation are probably more important. 
Above all fundamental reforms – but also early-retirement reforms – may have long phasing-in 
periods. For instance, Austrian’s early-retirement schemes will be phased out slowly until 2017. 
Moreover, the breakdown of reforms into “early retirement”, “fundamental” and 
“non-fundamental” reforms does not allow any statement or inference about the time horizon, i.e. 
whether the political intentions were geared primarily towards the long term or also to the short 
term. Finally, as labour supply and labour force participation of older workers are not independent 
from the cycle, adequately controlling for the economic conditions is indispensable. 
 
4  … but efforts to increase labour force participation have to be transformed into 
successful structural reforms 
If the labour supply of older workers could be more fully mobilised, this would reduce 
economic dependency ratios and would improve public finances as well as increase potential 
growth (both in the short and long term). However, in order to transform pension reform-related 
efforts to increase labour force participation into successful structural reforms, they will have to be 
complemented with measures improving the employability of older workers in the future; the latter 
is far from assured. Increasing the employment rates of older workers has to be part of a more 
comprehensive strategy to cope with population ageing. This requires a broader reform perspective: 
Attention needs to be given to strengthening the skills and improving the training of individuals to 
reduce the gap between marginal productivity and total compensation of older people; to 
combating discrimination against older workers and people with disabilities; and to fostering 
changes in employer behaviour that inhibits employment of older workers (and people with family 




8  As mentioned by the authors, the increase in female labour force participation following pension reforms might be related to the fact 
that women tend to have shorter working lives due to career interruptions (maternity leaves and other family reasons).   Comments on Session 1: Pension Reform and the Labour Market  195 
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 PRIVATIZING PENSIONS: MORE THAN AN INTERESTING THOUGHT? 
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* and Ed Westerhout
* 
Privatization of public pension schemes, partial or complete, is on the political agenda in 
many countries. In the Netherlands, the discussion focuses on second-pillar pension schemes. 
Although these schemes are funded, they feature intergenerational risk sharing. This paper 
documents the consumption, labour supply and welfare effects of a privatization of these 
second-pillar schemes. It adopts a stochastic model of life-cycle planning that includes endogenous 
saving, investment and labour supply behaviour. The analysis offers a decomposition of the welfare 




A large literature has developed that assesses the welfare aspects of pension schemes. An 
important result is that defined-benefit (DB) pension schemes feature different types of 
intergenerational risk sharing that the market for whatever reason cannot provide. By this 
argument, DB pension schemes add to social welfare. Another result is that pension schemes 
generally aggravate already existing distortions on labour and capital markets, an aspect that 
decreases welfare. Some studies find that the risk sharing effects dominate (Nishiyama and 
Smetters, 2007; Fehr and Habermann, 2008), while others conclude that the distortions are 
dominant (Krueger and Kubler, 2006; Fuster et al., 2007). 
Almost without exception, the literature focuses on the case of PAYG-financed pension 
schemes. For the Netherlands, the case of funded schemes is more interesting. Moreover, the case 
of funded schemes differs from the PAYG case for two reasons. First, to the extent that the 
introduction of a funded scheme substitutes pension saving for private saving, the effect on 
aggregate saving may be minor. The case of the introduction of an unfunded scheme is known to be 
entirely different. Second, a funded scheme generally features a tight link between benefits and 
contributions. In contrast, in a PAYG scheme such a link either is weak or does not exist.
1 
This paper explores the effects of the privatization of a funded pension scheme. It therefore 
constructs an OLG model in which the rate of return on equity is stochastic and labour supply is 
endogenous. Unlike Teulings and de Vries (2006) and Bovenberg et al. (2007), households decide 
on the size and the portfolio composition of their private saving accounts. The idea that households 
do not save otherwise than through a pension fund is not only unrealistic, but would also in our 
case be misleading as households would be constrained from adjusting their private savings in 
order to compensate for a reduction of pension savings. 
————— 
*  CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. 
  Thanks are due to Bram Edens, who contributed to an earlier version of this paper, to the participants of the FPB/CEPS workshop 
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1  Lindbeck and Persson (2003) stress the usefulness of distinguishing carefully the concept of actuarial fairness from the financing 
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Our model has a relation with a few models in the literature that combine capital income risk 
with aggregate labour income risk (Bodie et al., 1985, Viceira, 2001, Cocco et al., 2005 and Gomes 
et al., 2008). Although our paper takes labour productivity and thus gross labour income as 
non-stochastic, labour income net of pension contributions is stochastic, as the rate of pension 
contributions in our model reflects shocks in the rate of return on equity. The paper that comes 
closest to our paper is that of Bodie et al. (1992) which includes labour income shocks that are 
perfectly correlated with stock price shocks. 
Unlike Bodie et al. (1992) and Gomes et al. (2008), we adopt a specification in which labour 
supply is not driven by a wealth effect. Our motivation is that empirically, wealth effects are 
usually found to be small when compared with substitution effects (Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 
1999). The implication is that labour supply is unresponsive to changes in financial wealth. Hence, 
labour flexibility cannot play a role in absorbing capital market shocks and the impact that the two 
above-mentioned studies find of labour flexibility on portfolio composition does not arise in our 
model. 
Our approach is to analyze a hypothetical DB scheme. This allows us to give clear-cut 
answers on the question what is the role of typical elements of DB schemes, like the insurance 
against capital market uncertainty or lifetime uncertainty. The disadvantage is that real-world 
schemes are different, because of factors neglected in the simulation approach. See Samwick and 
Skinner (2004) and Poterba et al. (2007) for a comparison of the actual performance of DB and DC 
schemes. 
Our analysis highlights four elements. The probably most well-known effect of DB schemes 
is intergenerational risk sharing. While the market does not allow trade with the unborn, DB 
schemes can. This type of risk sharing will be lost when the scheme is abandoned (Gordon and 
Varian, 1988; Bovenberg et al., 2007; Gollier, 2008). 
The second element is labour market distortions due to contingent transfers. If transfers 
among generations relate to labour income, they act as a wedge on labour supply. Hence, 
intergenerational risk sharing can result in effectively taxing or subsidizing labour supply. Both 
factors decrease social welfare and it is this welfare loss that will vanish when a DB scheme is 
abandoned.
2 
The third element also relates to labour market distortions, but now due to the fact that the 
contribution rate and the pension accumulation rate are uniform across generations. This element is 
common to DB plans (Bodie et al., 1985) and is even legally prescribed in the Netherlands.
3 As the 
terminal value of a pension contribution is lower, the older the household, pension contributions are 
larger than the rights accumulated for young workers, whereas beyond a certain age (typically, 
about 45 years old) the opposite holds true. The uniformity of the pension contribution rate thus 
works as an incentive for young workers to take up leisure, whereas beyond a certain age, 
households are induced to increase their labour supply. The distortion of the labour supply decision 
of both groups of workers creates an additional welfare loss. 
The fourth element is annuity markets. Pension schemes automatically convert the wealth 
upon retirement into an annuity, thereby insuring participants against lifetime uncertainty. This 
insurance could be achieved on the market as well, provided that annuity markets are perfect. In 
reality, annuity markets show large imperfections (Poterba, 2001). Our analysis takes this to the 
extreme and simply assumes (in the benchmark at least) that annuity markets do not exist. 
————— 
2  Taxes are levied also for other (non-pension) reasons, which increases the role of labour market distortions. Future work will take 
this into account. 
3  Aarssen and Kuipers (2007) and Bonenkamp (2007) calculated the transfers between different age cohorts for the Netherlands that 
are due to the uniformity of the contribution rate and the build-up rate and found them to be quite large.   Privatizing Pensions: More than an Interesting Thought?  201 
 
This paper will focus on the steady-state implications of the privatization of pension 
schemes. We will present four types of simulations: 1) privatization of the funded DB scheme 
(benchmark simulation); 2) the same as 1), but now assuming that perfect annuity markets exist; 
3) a simulation that explores the role of labour supply endogeneity and 4) a simulation that explores 
the role of the uniform contribution rate. Together, these simulations indicate the overall 
contribution of the funded DB pension scheme to welfare and the contributions of various 
elements, among which insurance against lifetime uncertainty, uniform pricing and labour supply 
endogeneity. 
Our analysis is not exhaustive. DB schemes offer additional advantages that our analysis 
does not capture. The obligatory nature of pensions prevents myopic households from saving too 
little. Moreover, pension funds may be better investors than individual households, able to achieve 
higher rates of return on average, less volatile rates of return or both. In addition, pension funds 
will be less subject to capital market constraints (e.g. borrowing constraints and short-selling 
constraints) than individual households.
4 These and other elements do not reduce the value of our 
results, but help to put them more in perspective. 
The structure of our paper is as follows. The next section sets up our model. Then, we 
describe various aspects of the life-cycle behaviour of households in the baseline. Subsequently, we 
report the effects of the four simulations described above. We focus on the effects on consumption, 
labour supply and welfare. We end with some concluding remarks. 
 
2  An OLG model with pensions 
The model describes a small open economy for which factor prices are given. It consists of 
overlapping generations of households and a pension fund. 
Households have a finite life with uncertain length. They enter the economy at the age of 20 
and may work up to the age of 65. From that age onwards, they receive a pension until they die. 
The time of death is uncertain, but occurs at the age of 100 or before with certainty. We work with 
periods of five years, so we define the working phase of the life-cycle to consist of 9 periods, the 
retirement phase to consist of 7 periods and the life-cycle to consist of 16 periods. Households 
maximize a utility function by choosing their savings and their investment in risky assets at 
different ages in their lives. In the working phase of their life-cycle, they also choose optimally 
their consumption of leisure. 
The pension fund in the model receives contributions from working generations and pays 
pensions to retired generations. Households are obliged to participate in this pension fund. This 
corresponds to the Dutch situation in which workers are obliged to participate in a pension scheme 
if they decide to sign a labour contract. The pension scheme is of the DB type: pension benefits 
relate to the individual’s labour history, but are unrelated to both capital market rates of return and 
to the length of life. Shocks to pension wealth are absorbed by the contributions that the pension 
fund levies upon working cohorts. 
This section develops the model that we use for our analysis. It starts by specifying the 
nature of the stochastic variables in the model. Subsequently, it specifies the model for households 
and that for the pension fund. 
————— 
4  See also Bovenberg et al. (2007) for an overview. 202  Nick Draper and Ed Westerhout 
 
 
2.1 Stochastic  assumptions 
We focus on one major form of macroeconomic risks: equity return risk. The gross rate of 
return on equity follows a lognormal white noise process. The second asset in the economy is a 
bond, the return of which is riskless. The excess return on the risky asset is defined as:
5 
  () () s sb et Rt R =−    (1) 
In equation (1), index b  points to bonds and  s to equity. The expected value of the excess 
return on equity is denoted as  s μ , whereas its variance is denoted as 
2
s σ . 
Our model distinguishes the case with and without a perfect life insurance market. In the 
former case, households receive an annuity return on their private savings that reflects their 
mortality risk (Yaari, 1965). As mortality rates are allowed to differ by age, the annuity return will 
be age-dependent. We abstract from macroeconomic longevity risk, so population growth at the 
level of generations is non-stochastic. 
More precisely, in the simulations in which annuity markets are assumed to exist, the wealth 
of those who die at time t  with age i , is transferred to the people of the same cohort who survive. 
This makes the effective rate of return on the two assets equal to  () ( ) () mm Rt i Rt t i ζ ,= / ,    mb s =,, 
where  () ti ζ ,  reflects the survival rate of cohort i in period t. Similarly,  () ( ) () ss et i et t i ζ ,= / ,  . Hence, 
it is  b R  and  s R  (and  s e ) that drive private savings if annuity markets are assumed perfect, rather 
than their equivalents  b R  ,  s R   (and  s e  ). 
The literature offers a simple approach to price assets in complete markets in case of partial 
equilibrium modelling. Partial equilibrium models of small open economies assume exogenous 
given capital market developments. Equity income is the only source of uncertainty. Given these 
assumptions there is a unique stochastic discount factor which can be used to calculate the value of 
all assets and their derivatives. This unique stochastic discount factor reads as follows (see 
Cochrane, 2005, page 73): 











=− −    (2) 
given the stochastic assumption made. This discount factor implies that non-stochastic income 
flows are discounted by the bond rate, because the last term disappears after taking expectations. 
However, stochastic income flows are discounted with a correction which depends on the 
covariance with the excess return. 
Two examples may illustrate the working of the stochastic discount factor. Assume a bond 
price  b p  that gives a pay out  (1 ) b d +  and a rest value  (1 ) b p +  in next year. According to asset 
valuation theory, it holds that: 
  () ( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) bb b pt E m t dt pt =+ + + +   (3) 
This implies for the rate of return  () (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) bb b b Rt dt pt pt += ++ + /   
  1( 1 ) ( 1 ) b Em t R t =+ +    (4) 
————— 
5  In this document we use suffixes as indicators for variables that refer to specific time periods or ages. For individual variables we 
use only the age suffix j , for intergenerational variables we use both the age suffix j  and the time suffix t , for aggregated 
(macro) variables we use only time suffix t . At the individual level time and age are related on a one-to-one basis, so using the age 
indicator  j  is sufficient.   Privatizing Pensions: More than an Interesting Thought?  203 
 
The same argument leads to: 
  1( 1 ) ( 1 ) s Em t R t =+ +    (5) 
for the rate of return on shares. Subtract both equations to obtain for the excess return on shares: 
  0( 1 ) ( 1 ) s Em t e t =++   (6) 
Equation (4) and (6) are easy to verify after substitution of the expression for the stochastic 
discount factor (equation (2)), taking expectations and using the definitions of the expected value 
and variance of the excess return on shares. All derivative assets can be valued using this stochastic 
discount factor, too. For instance, our model is characterized by stochastic net wages, due to 
stochastic pension premiums. This implies that human wealth, the discounted value of net wages, 
can be considered as a derivative asset of bonds and shares. The pay-out of human wealth (net 
wages) has to be valued with the stochastic discount factor m  . In the household model we will use 
() ()( ) mti timt ζ ,= , . 
 
2.2  The household decision problem 
An individual of age  j  maximizes his expected intertemporal utility, U , which is defined 
over his remaining lifetime:  




Uj E u i di
=












Here,  e j  (= 100 years) denotes the maximum attainable age.
6 The discount factor is defined 
as  () () ll δδ ζ =/   with δ   the time preference factor and  () j ζ  the conditional (upon being alive at 
the start of year  j ) probability of living through the next period.  j E  is the expectations operator, 
used to account for the uncertainty of utility derived from consumption.
7 
The felicity function, u , has as arguments the consumption of commodities, c, and the 
consumption of leisure, v: 
 
1 1 1( )









=+  −− 
 (8) 
  01 0 cv αα βγ ,> ,> , >  
1 γ /  denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and 1 β /  the price elasticity of leisure 
demand. We assume  1 β > , ensuring that commodity consumption is always positive.  c α  and  v α  
are utility weights of respectively the consumption of commodities and leisure. 
The asset accumulation equation describes the development of household financial wealth, 
()
h
f wi , through time: 
————— 
6  The consumption of children is attributed to their parents. 
7  Note, we use as convention 
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  () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) () () () ( 1 ) ()
hh h
fb f s s wi Ri wi y i c i ei wi += + + − + +  (9) 
Equation (9) signals that households receive non-capital income  () yi,  consume  () ci and 
invest their savings in bonds and equity. Riskless bonds earn a yearly gross return  b R  and equity 
earns an annual gross return  s R  (with an excess return  s e ). As explained in the previous section, 
the effective rates of return on the two assets depend on the household’s mortality rate in case 
annuity markets are present. Hence, the effective rates of return are age-dependent.  ()
h
s wi denotes 
the household’s investment in risky equity. Regarding the timing of transactions, we assume that all 
variables (transactions, demographic changes, stocks) are measured at the start of a period. 
Non-capital income equals labour income  () w yi  in the working ages,  r ij < , where 
r j  (= 65 years) denotes the maximum age in the working phase. Labour income depends on the 
working time, the wage rate  () l pi and the pension premium rate  p τ : 
  () () () ( 1 () )1 () () f o r wp l r y iy i i v i p i i j τ == − − <  (10) 
Working time is expressed as 1( ) vi − , indicating that we have normalized the time 
endowment to unity. Non-capital income equals pension income  () p yi  in the retirement period 
( r ij ≥ ). The pension level (replacement rate) at the start of the retirement period depends on the 
work effort over the past in an average-wage defined benefit (DB) system: 
  () ( 1 ) () 1 () () f o r 1 a n d ( 5 ) 0 pp l r p yi yi a v ip i i j y += + − <− = (11) 
with a the accrual rate. Pension income is constant over time: 
  () () ( 1 ) f o r p pr yi y i y i i j == − ≥  (12) 
The household’s problem is to maximize expected intertemporal utility (7), subject to the 
asset accumulation equation (9), his initial amount of financial wealth,  ()
h
f wi , and a Kuhn-Tucker 
condition that ensures that leisure does not exceed the time endowment of the household. 
 
2.3 Household  behaviour 
In our model, households decide on their savings, on their investment in equity and on their 















  (13) 
where the shadow price of leisure,  v p  , is defined as the maximum of the actual price of leisure,  v p , 
and the ratio  vc αα / . This ensures that leisure time does not exceed the time endowment of the 
household. In case the time constraint is binding,  vv c p αα =/  ; alternatively,  v p   equals  v p . 










  (14) 
Two aspects of leisure demand deserve discussion. First, due to our felicity function, leisure 
demand does not depend on the household’s financial or total wealth position. This accords with 
empirical evidence (Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999). Second, a Kuhn-Tucker condition ensures that   Privatizing Pensions: More than an Interesting Thought?  205 
 
leisure demand does not exceed unity. This holds true for retired workers, who will be assumed 
below to have zero labour productivity. It also applies to non-retired workers whose productivity 
falls below a certain level.
8 Our model thus captures the labour supply decision both at the 
intensive and the extensive margin. 
The price of leisure consists of three components: 
  () ( 1 () ) () () vp l r pi ipi pi τ =− +  (15) 
The first is the age-specific wage rate and the second the pension contributions which are 
proportional to the wage rate. The third component measures the discounted value of future 
pension income that can be attributed to the marginal hour of work,  () r pi: 
 
1












=+  ∏  (16) 
This component is also proportional to the wage rate. 
Our specification of the felicity function implies that the consumption of commodities has a 

















Equation (17) demonstrates that this minimum amount of consumption is age-dependent and 
decreasing in leisure time. Because it relates to leisure time, we call this labour-induced 
consumption and denote it as  l c . This minimum amount of consumption plays an important role in 




















h w  denotes total household wealth, which we will define below. 
h
l w , the wealth that relates 















=+  ∏  (19) 
The second term at the RHS of equation (18) reflects the basic feature of the standard life-
cycle model, consumption being proportional with total household wealth. The first and third term 
however indicate that the life-cycle pattern of commodities consumption deviates from the pattern 
of this standard model, due to the interaction with leisure demand. In particular, the first and third 
term taken together establish that the household consumes more (fewer) commodities than 
prescribed by the standard model in years in which his labour supply is relatively high (low). Our 
————— 
8  Actually, as long as labour productivity is below  vc αα / , our model predicts zero labour supply. This indicates that retirement 
occurs in our model not only when labour productivity becomes sufficiently low, but also when the preference for leisure becomes 
sufficiently high. 
9 Except  if  v  would be zero, a case that we will not consider. 
10  Note, households have expectations conditional on the state of the economy. These expectations depend on the state of the economy 
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felicity specification thus brings about a positive correlation between consumption and labour 
supply and, given that labour supply is increasing with the wage rate, between consumption and 
current labour income. Hence, consumption and current income are more strongly correlated than 
in the standard life-cycle model, which may help to solve part of the excess sensitivity of 
consumption that is found in empirical research (Flavin, 1981). 
Total wealth is defined as the sum of explicit assets (here, financial wealth) and implicit 
assets (here, human wealth, denoted 
h
h w , and pension rights, denoted 
h
p w ): 
  () () () ()
hhh h
fhp wi wi wi wi =++ (20) 















  ∏  (21) 
Pension wealth is the accumulation of pension rights minus the pension benefits that have 
already been paid out, where 
r j j δ ≥  equals one for the retirement years and is zero otherwise. 
  (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( 1( ) ) ( ) ( )
r
hh
pb p r j j p wj Rj wj v jpj yj δ >   += + +− −   (22) 
The price index of total wealth: 
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 ++   =  ++ +   
 ∏  (23) 
is a composite of the constant utility weight  c α . As in the standard life-cycle model, the weighting 
factors refer to two effects. A rate of return higher than the rate of time preference increases 
savings on account of the substitution effect. The second element of the weighting factor describes 
the income effect of returns on investments. A high rate of return also adds to consumption 
possibilities, the income effect. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below unity 
(11 γ /< ), the income effect dominates the substitution effect. 
Different from the standard life-cycle model is the rate of return  b R φ . This variable measures 
the certainty-equivalent rate of return. It differs from the risk-free rate of interest because the rates 
of return on equity and human wealth are stochastic and different from the risk-free rate of interest. 
The certainty-equivalent rate of return is age-specific. Indeed, pensioners do not own human capital 
and are therefore not subject to stochastic fluctuations in the rate of return on human wealth. In 
addition, workers of different age have different amounts of human capital and are therefore 
differentially affected by shocks in the rate of return on human wealth. The equation for the 
certainty-equivalent rate of return can be derived as follows: 
  ()
1
1 1 (1 ) 1( ) ( 1 )( ) ( 1 ) i nn ss lE al el al el
γ γ φ
− −  += ++ ++   (24) 
Here,  n e  and  s e  are the excess rates of return on human capital and equity respectively.  n a  
and  s a  measure the share of human wealth and equity in total household wealth respectively. 
The third dimension of the household’s decision problem is the allocation of wealth over 
bonds and equity. An age-dependent fraction of total wealth net of consumption,  () s ai ,  is invested 
————— 
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in the risky asset (where both total wealth and consumption are corrected for labour-induced 
consumption): 
  () () () () ( 1 ) () () () ()
hh h
ss b l l wi ai Ri wi wi c i ci   =+− − −   (25) 
The investment share in the risky asset,  s a  is implicitly defined by the following two 
equations: 
  () 0( 1 ) a n d 1( ) ( 1 )( ) ( 1 ) il nn ss Ee i l { n s } ai ei ai ei
γ − =+ ∈ , ++ ++  (26) 
with  n a  the implicit portfolio share of human wealth and:
12 
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in which  b y  is net broad labour income, i.e. labour income net of pension contributions but 
including pension rights and excluding labour-induced consumption:  (1 ) bv l yv p c ≡− −. 
The RHS of equation (26) can be approximated by a second-order Taylor expansion around 
zero. This leads to the following expression for the fraction of total household wealth that is 
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  /−  is the tangency portfolio and 
22 (( ) ( ) ) nn s ss ai i σσ μ
 
    /− is the income hedge 
portfolio.  () ns i σ  denotes the covariance between the excess return on equity and that on human 
capital. This covariance term is age-specific. It is positive for all working generations. The implicit 


















The value function is defined as 
 
1 1 1
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1
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 (30) 
 
2.4  The behaviour of retirees 
Retirees have zero labour productivity so that  vv c p αα =/ and  1 v = . Pre-commitment 
consumption equals  ( ) () 1 lv c c αα β =// −  and the equation for consumption adjusts correspondingly. 
Importantly,  0 n e =  for retirees, since they are not subject to labour income shocks. Hence, the 
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which is comparable with Viceira (2001). This implies that  () i φ  is age-independent for retired 
people. 
 
2.5  The behaviour of workers 
The leisure of workers is given by equation (13) and their consumption by equation (18). 
The investment in equity as a fraction of their total wealth is given in equation (28). A feature of 
the life-cycle model we employ is that human wealth as a fraction of total household wealth drops 
to zero at the age of 65. It can be derived that  n a  displays a similar pattern. Labour income net of 
pension premiums is positively correlated with equity return shocks. Consequently,  s a  increases 
over the life-cycle. As the hedging role of human capital diminishes over the life-cycle, households 
decide to invest an increasing fraction of their total wealth in equity. Although equation (28) is 
similar to that of Viceira (2001), the hedging demand for equity does not increase with age in that 
paper. The reason is that all workers in Viceira (2001) face the same probability to become retired, 
so that human wealth is actually independent of age. We consider our approach more realistic. 
 
2.6 Pension  sector 
Pension funds start each period with a given amount of financial wealth 
p
f w . They receive 
premium income  p wg y τ  from workers ( r jj < ) and pay benefits  p y  to retirees. The remainder is 
invested in bonds or equity. Assets have a return which is received at the start of next period. 
Assets evolve according to:
13 
  ( 1 ) ( 1 ) () () () () ( 1 ) ()
pp p
fb f p w g p s s wt Rt wt t y t yt et wt τ  += + + − + + 
   (32) 
in which the macro variables are obtained by aggregation over the age cohorts (for instance 
( ) ()() pp j yt n t j yt j =, ,  ). In this equation  p τ  is the pension premium rate and  wg y  is gross wage 
income, i.e. income before premiums are paid ( () ( ) ( 1 ( ) () wg l j yt n t j v j p j =, −  ). 
p
s w  denotes the 
amount that the pension scheme has invested in equity. 
The pension benefits for ( r jj ≥ ) are given in pure DB: shocks are absorbed in the premium 
rate, while the built up remains time-independent. The representative pension fund uses a simple 
premium rule. It fixes the premium at a rate that gradually reduces deviations of financial wealth 
from the pension rights 
  () () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) () ()
ph p h
pt f p f p t Ewt wt wt wt τμ :Δ + = Δ + − −  (33) 
The partial adjustment specification in equation (33) implies a gradual adjustment of 
financial wealth of the pension fund to its liabilities or, alternatively, a gradual convergence of the 
coverage ratio towards the level of unity. Hence, a deviation of the coverage ratio from one will 
generally not be eliminated in one period. This is essential, as it means that the pension scheme 
organizes risk sharing between non-overlapping generations of households, something that the 
private market is unable to organize. Unlike households, we do not let the pension fund optimize 
over the portfolio allocation of its financial wealth. We rather fix this portfolio allocation to the 
level that coincides with the portfolio allocation (for the case without pension funds) of the average 
household. 
————— 
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2.7  Alternative model settings 
The benchmark version of our model abstracts from annuity markets, so private savings 
cannot be insured against longevity risk. An alternative model version assumes that annuity 
markets exist, so that there is full insurance against longevity risk at actuarially fair prices. As 
mortality rates are age-dependent, effective rates of return are also age-dependent in this case. 
Another model version assumes exogenous labour supply. In this model version, labour supply is 
not an instrument of the household optimization problem. A third alternative version assumes fair 
pension pricing. In this model version, the equation for the uniform pension contribution rate does 
not apply. Instead, each cohort faces a cohort-specific pension contribution rate, equal to the 
present value of the marginal pension right. 
As the modifications that arise when implementing one of these alternative versions are 
pretty straightforward, we omit a detailed description with model equations. 
 
3  Calibration and the numerical solution of the base run 
The intertemporal substitution elasticity takes a value of 0.5 ( 2 γ = ). The rate of time 
preference,  1 δ −  , takes a value of 1.25 percent. The net risk-free rate,  1 b R −  , equals 2 percent. The 
mean and the standard deviation of the excess rate of return on equity,  s μ  and  s σ , are chosen to 
equal 1 and 10 percent respectively.
14 
Total available time a year is scaled to one and the annual gross wage rate to 2. The price 
elasticity of leisure equals –1/3 ( 3 β = ). The parameters  v α  and  c α  are chosen such that annual 
leisure time and annual working time during working ages equal 0.5. This is achieved by taking 
values for  v α  and  c α  of 0.25 and 1 respectively. 
The pattern of mortality rates is such that cohorts up to the age of 75 have a size of 10 and 
older cohorts have size equal to that of their predecessor minus 2, so that the last cohort in the 
model, aged 95-99, has size 2. In the simulations with a pension fund we assume an adjustment 
parameter  05 μ =. and an accrual rate  0 0125 a =. a year. 
We start in a world without pension funds and without insurance against longevity risk. 
These assumptions imply as only source of uncertainty equity income of households. 
Figures 1 and 2 give more insight into the life-cycle behaviour of households in the model 
version without pension funds and without annuity markets. For convenience, we focus on the 
median case, i.e. we present results for the case in which the rate of return on equity equals its 
mean in all years:  () s s et μ =  . 
The left panel of Figure 1 portrays the development of financial wealth, human wealth and 
their sum, total household wealth, as a function of the age of the household. The household 
accumulates financial wealth during the working phase in order to finance consumption during 
retirement. Human wealth is highest when households enter the labour market and falls gradually 
to zero over the working phase. 
The right panel of Figure 1 displays average consumption and income as a function of age. 
Consumption increases during the working ages due to the fact that the return on savings is larger 
————— 
14  The values taken for the mean and the standard deviation of the rate of return on equity are much lower than in the data. This is not 
so much of a problem, as this paper only explores the effects of pension reform. For a more thorough assessment of the issue, 
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than the rate of time preference. At retirement, consumption drops. This may look as a violation of 
the Euler condition that characterizes optimal consumption behaviour. It is not however. 
Retirement implies that the household is forced to reduce its labour supply to zero and to start 
consuming leisure at the maximum rate. In order to achieve marginal utility smoothing, the 
household then has to reduce the consumption of commodities upon retirement. 
After the age of 65, consumption starts increasing again. The increase turns into a decline at 
later ages. This occurs in the years with a positive death probability. Without annuity markets 
households prefer to frontload consumption, i.e. the time preference increases relative to the return 
of savings in this period. 
There are three sources of income: labour income, capital income and income from bequests. 
Labour income is generated during the working ages. Capital income develops in line with 
financial wealth. Bequests are constant over the life cycle. This is based on our assumption that in 
the absence of annuity markets aggregate wealth of those who die is distributed equally over all 
living households by the government. 
The left panel of Figure 2 displays the fraction of households’ total wealth invested in equity. 
Equity investment as a fraction of total household wealth is constant over the life-cycle, a 
well-known property of the CRRA function (Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969). Since financial 
wealth as a share of total wealth increases over the life-cycle, the ratio of equity investment over 
financial household wealth falls over the life cycle. Note that we have assumed perfect capital 
markets in which there are no short-selling constraints. Indeed, young cohorts start to invest about 
4 times their stock of private savings into equity. Only at the age of 40, the share of financial 
wealth drops below unity and the household no longer needs to go short in riskless bonds. 
 
4 Stochastic  Simulations 
4.1 Privatising  pensions 
We draw 100 different stochastic paths. For convenience, we only present the means. This 
section compares the case with pension funds (left panels) with that without pension funds (right 
panels). 
The accumulation of private financial wealth is slower in the model with a pension fund for 
the obvious reason that pension savings and private savings are substitutes. It is not that obvious 
that the sum of private and pension savings in the model with a pension fund is also smaller than 
private savings in the model without a pension fund. The reason is that the insurance that the 
pension scheme provides against equity return and lifetime uncertainty reduces the need for 
precautionary saving, thereby decreasing the accumulation of financial wealth. Figure 4 shows the 
counterpart of this: the smaller savings in the model with a pension fund imply higher consumption 
during working ages, but lower consumption at higher ages. 
Privatization is calculated to imply a negative welfare effect. Although the pension scheme 
in our model distorts the labour market in two ways, the insurance that the pension scheme 
provides to the household against capital income risk and longevity risk obviously dominates. In 
particular, the welfare loss of privatization equals 13.3 per cent. To see how this effect can be 
decomposed, the next sections will calculate the effects of the same reform with alternative model 

























4.2  The contribution of annuity markets 
The previous section showed a welfare decline of 13.3 per cent for the steady state 
generations in case pensions are privatised. The absence of annuity markets in the model without a 
pension fund explains about 8 per cent of this overall welfare decrease. The reason is that without 
annuity markets, the household needs to hold additional savings to protect himself against 
under-consumption in case he lives longer as expected. Hence, with annuity markets, he can 
consume at a higher rate at more advanced ages (compare the right panels of Figure 4 and 5). In 
order to finance the higher consumption, consumption at lower ages is somewhat reduced. 
 
4.3  The contribution of diminished intergenerational risk sharing 
Coverage deficits are reflected in catching-up premiums, levied upon labour income. 
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translate into negative premiums on labour. The two cases have in common that they distort the 
labour supply decision of individual households. Privatization of the pension schemes removes this 
effect. This amounts to a 08 .  per cent welfare gain. 
 
4.4  The influence of uniform premiums 
The impact of uniform pension pricing when compared with actuarially fair pricing on 
welfare is about25 .  per cent. Like catching-up premiums, uniform pension pricing leads to 
distortions on the labour market. Unlike catching-up premiums which in an average simulation will 
be close to zero, the implicit premiums that are due to uniform pension pricing are non-zero on an 
average simulation. They are positive for young workers and negative for old workers. This may 
help to explain our finding that the welfare gain that stems from the removal of the distortion due to 
uniform pricing is an order of magnitude larger than the welfare gain attached to the removal of 
catching-up premiums. Should we include taxes in our model, this conclusion may again be 
modified. This is beyond the scope of this paper, however. 
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
Our analysis has shown that privatising a funded DB pension scheme is on net 
welfare-decreasing. The steady-state loss from privatization is 13.3 per cent. Of this, 8.4 per cent 
can be attributed to valuable intergenerational risk sharing between non-overlapping generations. 
This is lost when the scheme is privatized. Another 8 per cent is due to insurance against lifetime 
uncertainty. This is also lost upon privatization if annuity markets are assumed to be absent. Should 
we assume that well-functioning annuity markets exist, this part of the welfare loss can be avoided 
as households can switch to annuity markets to insure against lifetime uncertainty. 
Pension schemes like the ones studied here are also known to distort labour markets. The 
fact that pension contributions are levied on labour income implies that the part of contributions 
that is used by the pension fund to restore the coverage rate acts as wedge on labour supply, similar 
to a labour income tax. The elimination of the labour market distortion that is due to the levying of 
(positive and negative) catching-up premiums produces a welfare gain, albeit quite meagre: 
0.8 per cent. 
Pension schemes distort the labour market for another reason as well. That is that the 
accumulation of pension rights and the pension contribution rate do not distinguish between 
generations. Since, the terminal value of pension contributions decreases with age, this means that 
young working generations pay more than what is actuarially fair; for older working generations, 
the opposite holds true. The labour market is distorted along two dimensions. Young generations 
supply too little labour and older generations too much. Privatization eliminates this inefficiency. 
The contribution to welfare is calculated to be another 2.5 per cent. 
Overall, the welfare implications of labour market distortions are non-negligible, but small 
when compared to the welfare effects that are due to intergenerational risk sharing. This confirms 
earlier calculations, like those in Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) and Fehr and Habermann (2008). 
Although these findings are interesting, our paper cannot be considered finalized. Future 
research will add a sensitivity analysis. It will also increase the number of stochastic simulations in 
order to get a more accurate estimation of the distributions of variables. It will also focus on the 




Aarssen, K. and B. Kuipers (2007), Costs and Benefits of Collective Pension Systems, chapter 
“Everyone Gains, but Some More than Others”, pp. 137-56, Berlin, Springer-Verlag. 
Bodie, Z., A.J. Marcus and R.C. Merton (1985), “Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution 
Pension Plans: What Are the Real Trade-offs?”, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper, No. 1719. 
Bodie, Z., R.C. Merton and W.F. Samuelson (1992), “Labor Supply Flexibility and Portfolio 
Choice in a Life Cycle Model”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, No. 16, 
pp. 427-49. 
Bonenkamp, J. (2007), “Measuring Lifetime Redistribution in Dutch Occupational Pensions”, 
CPB, Discussion Paper, No. 81. 
Bovenberg, L., R. Koijen, T. Nijman and C. Teulings (2007), “Saving and Investing over the Life 
Cycle and the Role of Collective Pension Funds”, De Economist, No. 155, pp. 347-415. 
Cocco, J.F., F.J. Gomes and P.J. Maenhout (2005), “Consumption and Portfolio Choice over the 
Life Cycle”, Review of Financial Studies, No. 2, pp. 491-533. 
Cochrane, J.H. (2005), Asset Pricing, Princeton University Press. 
Fehr, H. and C. Habermann (2008), “Risk Sharing and Efficiency Implications of Progressive 
Pension Arrangements”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, No. 110, pp. 419-43. 
Flavin, M.A. (1981), “The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations about Future 
Income”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89. No. 5, pp. 974-1009. 
Fuster, L., A. Imrohoroglu and S. Imrohoroglu (2007), “Elimination of Social Security in a 
Dynastic Framework”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 113-46. 
Gollier, C. (2008), “Intergenerational Risk-sharing and Risk-taking of a Pension Fund”, Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 92, No. 5-6, pp. 1463-85. 
Gomes, F., L.J. Kotlikoff and L.M. Viceira (2008), “Optimal Life-cycle Investing with Flexible 
Labor Supply: A Welfare Analysis of Life-cycle Funds”, American Economic Review, 
No. 98, pp. 297-303. 
Gordon, R.H. and H.R. Varian (1988), “Intergenerational Risk Sharing”, Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 185-202. 
Hansen, L.P. and R. Jagannathan (1991), “Implications of Security Market Data for Models of 
Dynamic Economies”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, No. 2, pp. 225-62, April. 
Heer, B. and A. Maussner (2005), Dynamic General Equilibrium Modelling, Berlin, 
Springer-Verlag. 
Krueger, D. and F. Kubler (2006), “Pareto-improving Social Security Reform when Financial 
Markets are Incomplete!?”, American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 3, pp. 737-55, June. 
Lindbeck, A. and M. Persson (2003), “The Gains from Pension Reform”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 74-112. 
Lumsdaine, R. and O. Mitchell (1999), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, chapter “New 
Developments in the Economic Analysis of Retirement”, Elsevier Science. 
Merton, R.C. (1969), “Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-time Case”, 
The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 247-57.   Privatizing Pensions: More than an Interesting Thought?  215 
 
Nishiyama, S. and K. Smetters (2007), “Does Social Security Privatization Produce Efficiency 
Gains?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122, No. 4, pp. 1677-720. 
Poterba, J., J. Rauh, S. Venti and D. Wise (2007), “Defined Contribution Plans, Defined Benefit 
Plans, and the Accumulation of Retirement Wealth”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 91, 
No. 10, pp. 2062-86. 
Poterba, J.M. (2001), “Annuity Markets and Retirement Security”, Fiscal Studies, No. 22, 
pp. 249-70. 
Samuelson, P.A. (1969), “Lifetime Portfolio Selection by Dynamic Stochastic Programming”, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 239-46. 
Samwick, A.A. and J. Skinner (2004), “How Will 401(k) Pension Plans Affect Retirement 
Income?”, American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 1, pp. 329-43. 
Teulings, C. and C. de Vries (2006), “Generational Accounting, Solidarity and Pension Losses”, 
De Economist, No. 146, pp. 63-83. 
Viceira, L.M. (2001), “Optimal Portfolio Choice for Long-horizon Investors with Non-tradable 
Labor Income”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 433-70. 
Yaari, M.E. (1965), “Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer”, 
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 137-50. 
 
   
 
THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON FUNDED PENSION SAVING 
Robert Gillingham,
* Adam Leive
* and Anita Tuladhar
* 
A key fiscal risk presented by the current financial crisis is its effect on retirement saving. A 
broad array of retirement plans – public and private, collective and individual – have accumulated 
a large stock of financial and real assets in recent years that will be used to finance future pension 
benefits (Figure 1). The level of funding has increased not only in nominal terms, but also as a 
share of aggregate GDP, with the increase stemming from earnings on existing retirement saving 
as well as net deposits (contributions less benefits). Deviations from this trend since 1995 occurred 
in 2000 and 2002. In each of these cases, equity markets were also in decline, more than offsetting 
the positive returns on some other assets and net contributions (contributions less distributions). 
The reduction in equity prices that started in 2007 accelerated during 2008. Figure 2 presents 
indexes of total returns on two broad-based U.S. equity indexes. The indexes equal the value of a 
$100 investment in each of the portfolios at the end of October 2007, when each portfolio reached 
its end-month peak. The value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by roughly one-third, and 
the value of the more broadly based S & P 500 portfolio (and other broad-based portfolios) fell by 
more than two-fifths. In U.S. dollar terms, European and emerging market equities have fared even 
worse, although that is likely an exchange-rate artifact (they fared much better in dollar terms 
before the decline began). 
 
1  Impact of the recent stock market decline on pension fund assets 
1.1  Distribution of assets, end-2007 
The impact of the stock market on the assets of a pension fund depends on (1) the share of 
equities in the fund’s portfolio and (2) the performance of the particular equities held by the fund. 
Figure 3 displays pension fund assets at the end of 2007 for those G20 countries for which data are 
available, as well as several other countries for which data are available. Six countries – the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, and Switzerland – accounted for 
roughly 90 per cent of total pension fund assets. In each of these countries, pension assets equaled 
at least 90 per cent of GDP, and equities comprised at least 40 per cent of aggregate fund assets. 
For all countries combined, direct investments in equities comprised almost 45 per cent of total 
assets, and investments in mutual funds, in which equities play a predominant role, accounted for 
another 19 per cent. 
Figure 3 demonstrates how important equities have been to pension saving, both in the 
aggregate and for the countries with the largest stock of pension assets. The impact of the stock 
market declines on a particular country will also depend on how steeply stock prices have fallen in 
that country (assuming a significant home country bias) and how significant total pension saving is 
relative to the size of the economy. Figure 4 categorizes countries according to these two variables, 
as well as the share of equities in pension saving. The domestic stock markets of almost all of the 
countries have declined by more than one-third. However, only 15 of the 41 countries for which 
data are available have either more than 50 per cent equities in their pension portfolios or pension 
assets greater than 50 per cent of GDP. Only four have all three of these characteristics, but these  
————— 
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Note: Totals include both public and private plans. 
Source: OECD Global Pension Database; and staff estimates. 
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four countries account 
for over 80  per cent of 
pension saving. 
 
1.2 Estimated equity 
losses 
Applying the 
domestic stock market 
decline through 
November 2008 to the 
equity and mutual fund 
holdings for each country 
as of end-2007 yields a 
rough estimate of the 
impact of the stock 
market declines on global 
pension assets. The 
aggregate loss from the 
fall in domestic equity 
markets was roughly 
 
36 per cent (Appendix, Table 1). In addition, however, European and emerging-market countries 
have had additional losses in dollar terms due to an exchange rate depreciation of 15 per cent. The 
total estimated reduction in the aggregate dollar value of equities and mutual funds is 43 per cent or 
$6.7 trillion. In absolute terms, these losses are concentrated in the countries with the largest 
holdings. Losses in the United States are roughly $3.5 trillion, representing more than one-half of 
the total (Figure 5). Other countries with large aggregate losses include the United Kingdom 
($0.8 trillion), Australia and Canada (both at roughly $0.6 trillion). 
Another important consideration is what the distributional incidence of these losses is likely 
to be. Among people over age 65 in the United States, for instance, funded pensions and annuities 
account for 21 per cent of income of the richest income quintile, but just 3 per cent for the poorest 
(Burtless, 2008). In the U.K., occupational pensions comprise over 30 per cent of income for the 
richest quintile of pensioners and only 1 per cent for the poorest. Most European countries rely 
almost entirely on pay-as-you-go, defined-benefit pension schemes. In a few countries, however, 
funded plans cover a  larger share of the retirement income of lower-income pensioners. For 
instance, all participants in the Chilean pension system invest in individual accounts, although the 
government does guarantee a minimum pension level. Where pay-as-you-go systems are (partially) 
funded or augmented with defined-contribution plans, the benefits from these defined-contribution 
plans are often guaranteed by the government. Consequently, lower-income households will be 
relying primarily on faith and credit of their governments either to honor their pay-as-you-go 
promises (see below for a discussion of the difficulties with this option) or compensate them for 
losses on their defined-contribution schemes that reduce benefits below a specified minimum. 
Absent significant cuts in government-provided or government-guaranteed benefits, the 
distributional incidence is likely to be – for the most part – benign.
1 
————— 
1  A separate risk is pension fund exposure to potentially “toxic” assets, such as mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps. 
The OECD has estimated average holdings of 3 per cent of such assets in the portfolios of pension funds that member countries 
have (OECD, 2008). Structured products – the class of assets within which toxic assets fall – represent about 8 per cent of pension 
fund assets worldwide. The risk is concentrated in the U.S., Sweden, and Japan. 
Figure 5 




United States, 52.7 Other countries, 13.2
United Kingdom, 11.7
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2  Short- and medium-term responses 
An array of economic agents will have to respond to the decrease in pension saving. These 
responses will depend on how persistent the fall in stock prices is. For this reason, it is useful to 
distinguish short- and medium-term responses for longer-term responses. These responses can be 
distinguished depending on whether the plan is defined-contribution or defined-benefit, what entity 
sponsors the plan, and whether a more broad-reaching government response – with attendant fiscal 
implications – is appropriate. (In all cases, individuals have the option of adjusting their rate of 
retirement saving to offset the effects of financial markets on the assets of the official pension plans 
in which they participate). 
 
2.1  Unprotected defined-contribution plans 
For unprotected defined-contribution plans (representing roughly three-quarters of defined-
contribution assets), neither the pension plan itself nor the plan sponsor provides any guarantee 
with respect to the rate of return or the size of benefits. Consequently, the impact of the recent fall 
in the stock market will fall directly on the individual participant. Of the reported $9.4 trillion 
invested in unprotected defined-contribution plans as of the end of 2007, $8.0 trillion were in U.S. 
funds. Roughly $6.8 trillion were, in turn, held in personal accounts, with the remainder in 
employer-sponsored 401k and similar type accounts. As noted above, these accounts are held 
primarily by higher-income households, and their responses will likely depend on their age. 
Younger workers have the luxury of waiting to see if the market recovers. These workers suffered 
similar losses between 1999 and 2002, but the market had recovered almost completely prior to the 
recent relapse. Older workers, on the other hand, have less time to recover and are likely to suffer 
more severe cuts in retirement income. This is especially true if workers would like to purchase 
annuity with at least some of their retirement saving. The depressed value in their accounts, 
combined with low interest rates, will make the purchase of annuities far less attractive. 
To evaluate the impact of a financial crises on individual retirement saving in the form of 
equities, we simulate the performance of individual accounts over the past 45 years. We assumed 
that workers made regular investments in an S&P 500 indexed fund over a 40-year working life. 
Two profiles of real deposits were simulated, one in which a constant $1,000 is invested each year 
and one in which the deposits grows smoothly from $667 in the first year to $1,333 in the last year. 
The only variable within these two profiles is the S&P rate of return, which is allowed to follow its 
historical path. The results of the simulation are displayed in Figure 6, where the horizontal axis 
displays the year in which the worker retires. 
As Figure 6 demostrates, there is a huge amount of inter-cohort variation. The value of the 
accounts vary from $123 thousand to $400 thousand for the level deposit profile. The variation is 
comparable for the growing deposit profile ($103 thousand to $347 thousand), although the levels 
are slightly lower because the a larger share of the deposits occurs later in a worker’s career. The 
real internal rates of return (IRRs) earned on the deposits (the single rate that yields the same 
account total) show similar variation, ranging from 4.9 to 9.4 per cent for the level deposit profile 
(4.6 to 9.5 per cent for the growing deposit profile). It is interesting to note, however, that the 
minimum IRR is over 4.5 per cent in both cases. Moreover, despite the meltdown in the S&P 500 
over the past 1½ years, workers retiring at the end of 2008 did not have the worst 
individual-account performance. In other words, even though the individual accounts produce 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2  Private-sector defined-benefit and protected defined-contribution plans 
For these plans, the benefit risk is shared in a variety of ways, depending upon how the plan 
is structured (OECD 2005): 
•  “Traditional” DB plan: a DB plan where benefits are linked through a formula to the members’ 
wages or salaries, length of employment, or other factors. In this case, the plan sponsor bears 
the “rate-of-return risk” – that is, the risk that contributions plus investment returns will be 
insufficient to cover benefits – but the participant bears the risk that the sponsor will default if it 
cannot afford the benefits. 
•   “Hybrid” DB plan or protected DC plan: a DB plan where benefits depend on a rate of return 
credited to contributions, where this rate of return is either specified in the plan rules, 
independently of the actual return on any supporting assets (e.g. fixed, indexed to a market 
benchmark, tied to salary or profit growth, etc.), or is calculated with reference to the actual 
return of any supporting assets and a minimum return guarantee specified in the plan rules. In 
this case, the plan sponsor and participant share the rate-of-return risk when it is tied to a market 
rate or the guarantee applies to benefits, and, again, the participant bears the default risk. 
•  “Mixed” DB plans: a DB plan that has two separate DB and DC components but which are 
treated as part of the same plan. 
For defined-benefit plans sponsored by private employers, funding rules determine the 
response, which typically comprises the extent and timing of increase in contributions by 
sponsoring employers and the degree to which benefits can be reduced or are conditional: 
•  Rules for Underfunding: Typically, the strength of the guarantee from the sponsoring agency is 
correlated with the extent of financing provided. The responsibility for closing the funding gap 
rests largely with the sponsoring agency if the benefits are underwritten by them (Austria, 
Canada, Ireland, Japan, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States). In countries where the 
plans are not as strongly tied with the employer and usually underwritten by insurance 
companies, the burden sharing is generally more flexible (Denmark, Germany, Iceland, 
Netherlands, Sweden). Nonetheless, even in the former group of countries, the risk can be 
shared with the members through, for instance, cuts in non-accrued benefits (United States) or 
accrued benefits with agreement with labor support (Japan).  
•  Rules for Plan Termination by Solvent Employer: In more severe case of underfunding, with the 
approval of the pensions regulator, the plans may be terminated by solvent employers. In such a 
case, detailed rules specify actions such as transfer of the accounts (Austria, Finland, Iceland), 
purchase of annuities (Canada, the UK, the US), “freeze” of the plan (US), and allocation of 
assets to members and beneficiaries. 
To avert the wind-up of plans, there are increasing demands for temporarily amending the 
funding rules. Since the requirements for increasing contributions comes precisely at the time of a 
liquidity crunch faced by companies, several countries are already considering relaxing the time 
required for making up shortfalls (Canada, USA), valuation methodology, and preventing a freeze 
of plans. Concerns remain, however, that such a relaxation would affect the long-term health of the 
plans adversely affecting members and the government in the future. 
 
2.3  Defined-benefit and protected defined-contribution plans for government employees 
Pension plans sponsored by governments for their employees represent a sort of “halfway 
house” between private employer-sponsored plans and national social insurance. This is especially 
true for pension plans sponsored by subnational governments, where the distinction between social 
insurance and an employer-sponsored pension plan is typically more sharply drawn. Government 224  Robert Gillingham, Adam Leive and Anita Tuladhar 
sponsors have a broader menu of possible responses since they can draw on the future taxing power 
of the government in response to financial market developments. The government options for 
reform are also different, since they will typically depend on specific legislation rather than a 
generally applicable regulatory structure. 
These plans are important. For instance, as of the end of 2007, almost $4 trillion were held 
by federal, state, and local government defined-benefit pension plans in the United States (almost 
one-third of the assets held by occupational pension plans worldwide and more than one-fifth of 
total U.S. pension assets). The value of these assets had fallen by roughly $1 trillion dollars by 
October 2008 (Munnell, et al. 2008). Three-quarters of these assets are held by state and local 
pension plans, which are typically subject to stringent funding requirements. The recent drop in 
equity prices will trigger requirements to close the resulting funding gap (on a mark-to-market 
basis, the estimated aggregate funding ratio fell to 65 per cent in October 2008). 
 
3 Central  government  responses 
The responses of the central government fall into four categories: 
1) Plan sponsor for national social insurance programs – National social insurance pension plans 
hold significant assets (Table 2). In some cases, these assets are specialized and largely 
impervious to financial market movements. (In the United States, the social security system 
holds $2 trillion in “Treasury specials,” which are non-marketable government bonds that can 
be redeemed at par at any time, that offset a small portion of the present value of future cash 
flows.) However, in other countries, such as Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and 
Norway, the national pension system holds a substantial quantity of marketable securities, 
including equities. The recent decline in financial markets will present these countries with the 
same challenges faced by private- and public-sector employers. Since national pension systems 
are not typically fully funded (Norway is a notable exception), the percentage impact on the 
pension systems will be smaller. This fact provides scant relief, however, since most national 
pension schemes face significant pay-as-you-go funding shortfalls absent reform. 
  Chile is a special case, in which the national social insurance program has been transformed into 
a system of funded individual accounts. The government guards against risk by providing 
holders of individual retirement accounts with a choice of portfolios, with one portfolio 
specifically designed to shield risk for workers near retirement. This “E portfolio” had losses of 
only 1 per cent over 2008. 
2)  Pension plan guarantor – A number of countries have pension fund guarantee schemes that offer 
insurance against the loss of assets in private defined-benefit plans due to employer insolvency. 
Implemented in 1961, Sweden’s guarantee scheme is the oldest and has been followed by the 
United States (1974), Germany (1974), Ontario, Canada (1980), Switzerland (1986), Japan 
(1989), and most recently, the United Kingdom (2005). Premiums collected from employers are 
based on some combination of a flat rate per member, the size of unfunded liabilities, and, in 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, the risk of sponsor default. The schemes also collect income 
from investments, which are mostly in fixed-income securities. Equities generally represent less 
than a third of investment assets across countries. In case of employer insolvency, benefits 
range across countries, with the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany offering 
relatively higher amounts. 
  Partly due to low pricing of premiums, weak funding rules, and limited adjustment for plan 
sponsor risk, guarantee schemes in the United States, United Kingdom, and Ontario, Canada 
were in deficit in 2008. The U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which covers 
44 million workers, currently has a projected deficit of $11.1 billion in net present value terms.   The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Funded Pension Saving  225 
 
The smaller Ontario Pension Benefit Guarantee Fund (PBGF), which covers 1 million workers, 
currently has a deficit exceeding $CAD 100 million. Just three years since its inception, the 
deficit in the United Kingdom Pension Protection Fund (PPF) stands at 500 million pounds.  
  The current financial crisis has yet to lead to widespread claims on the guarantee schemes; 
however, it is possible that the current systemic shock may overwhelm those already in deficit 
and require government intervention. As a federal corporation, the PBGC represents a sizeable 
contingent liability to the federal government. Already, the U.S. Congress on December 11, 
2008, rolled back part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which increased the funding 
requirements of underfunded plans. (In the United States, however, PBGC benefits are limited 
to the income and assets of the guarantor agency. Consequently, a surge in defaults would 
trigger reduced benefits and place additional pressure on the government to allocate additional 
resources to the agency.) While Ontario’s PBGF is not explicitly backed by government, the 
fund has borrowed money on two occasions: in 1988, it received a $CAD 22 million loan when 
an automaker failed and in 2001, it received a $CAD 330 million loan when a large steel 
company did. The United Kingdom’s PPF is not explicitly backed by taxpayers. However, 
should the balance on these schemes substantially deteriorate further, it appears likely that 
government financial support may be forthcoming. 
  In addition to creating pension plan guaranty agencies, some governments also guarantee 
minimum benefits or minimum rates of return to defined-contribution pension plans 
(Whitehouse, 2007). The recent fall in financial markets significantly increases the option value 
of these guarantees, increasing the contingent liabilities of the government directly. 
3) Pension plan regulator – The national government typically regulates the operation of 
private-sector pension plans, in particular with respect to funding requirements. The recent fall 
in pension-plan assets would typically trigger action under these regulations. One option is to 
adjust funding requirements and, especially, the time within which pension plans have to restore 
adequate funding levels. Such action could forestall plan defaults. 
4) Political pressure – Arguably the largest risk faced by governments with respect to pension 
funding is the possibility that the government – and, in turn, the taxpayer – will be forced to 
compensate pension plans for at least a portion of the reductions in asset value they have 
suffered. This type of contingent liability is more open-ended. As recent calls for government 
action to compensate homeowners for the loss in house values demonstrate, the call on 
government resources could approach a significant portion of the recently suffered losses.
2 
 
4 Longer-term  concerns 
4.1  Short- and medium-term responses should not compromise fiscal sustainability 
The immediate long-term concern with respect to the fiscal impact of the financial crisis is 
that any short- or medium-term response be consistent with long-term fiscal sustainability. With 
fiscal responses to the financial crisis and the economic recession threatening to exceed several 
percentage points of GDP for possibly several years, it is important that any budgetary resources 
allocated to assist pension funds be carefully circumscribed. As the recovery from the financial 
crisis in the early years of this decade demonstrated, equity markets can recover quickly. Any 
assistance to pension plans should be targeted only on those lower-income households for whom  
————— 
2  In the United States, pension plans of S&P 1500 companies lost nearly half a trillion dollars in 2008, nearly 80 per cent of which 
occurred in the last quarter (Mercer, 2009). 226  Robert Gillingham, Adam Leive and Anita Tuladhar 
 
Figure 7 













Source: Haver Analytics. 
 
current retirement income is likely to be seriously reduced. Assistance to higher-income 
households will either trigger tax increases that these households would be likely to bear or cuts in 
other, higher-priority spending programs. 
 
4.2  How persistent is the current financial crisis likely to be? 
The key long-term concern is whether the current financial crisis is part of a structural break 
in the dynamics of economic growth and financial-market returns. A relatively short drop in 
financial markets would have limited and specific effects, primarily for households that are either 
in or near retirement. On the other hand, a longer structural break similar to that experienced from 
the end-1968 to end-1983 would have serious consequences for the size and adequacy of retirement 
saving that go beyond the impact on pension funding levels. Figure 7 presents market return 
indexes similar to those in Figure 2 for three periods during which equity markets were stagnant for 
relatively long periods in the United States. During the Great Depression, the value of an 
investment in the S & P 500 portfolio fell by almost 60 per cent in three years. It recovered in year 
8 only to fluctuate above and below its initial value until well into World War II. A similar 
investment at the end of 1968 never reached a similar low point, but it remained below its original 
value for 13 of the next 14 years. More recently, an investment at the end of 1999 has yet to 
recover to its original value after nine years. Moreover, its value at this point is below the value of 
the investments in the earlier periods after the same number of years. 
The more important correlate with the financial market during the 1970s and early 1980s 
was the structural break in labor productivity growth. Over this period, productivity grew at an 
annual rate of 1.4 per cent, significantly below the postwar average (through 2008 QIV) of 
2.1  per  cent. Fortunately, labor productivity growth during the current market slowdown has 
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financial crisis were to persist and be accompanied by a global productivity or growth slowdown, it 
would seriously impact the ability of countries to address their long-term fiscal challenges, most 
notable population aging. The impact on the finances of pay-as-you-go pension schemes, where 
productivity growth is a major determinant of the sustainable steady-state rate of return to pension 
contributions, would threaten the fiscal sustainability in a broad range of industrial countries, with 
indirect and serious implications for growth in developing economies. 
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PENSION SYSTEMS IN EMES: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CAPITAL FLOWS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Ramón Moreno
* and Marjorie Santos
* 
1  Introduction and summary 
Pension systems can influence capital flows by affecting saving and investment. At the same 
time, the growth of pension fund assets has implications for the depth of financial markets. This 
paper seeks to shed light on these effects, by highlighting three relevant aspects: 
•  first, the stage in the demographic transition. Since around the mid-1960s, lower emerging 
market economy (EME) fertility rates have meant lower dependency ratios, which has tended to 
boost saving, and also a rise in the working-age population, which has tended to boost 
investment. The transition has worked out as predicted in some countries but not in others. In 
particular, in the aftermath of crises (e.g., Asia in the late 1990s), saving and investment have 
tended to fall, and current account balances to rise. Nevertheless, current account surpluses are 
expected to fall or turn to deficits as populations age in coming decades. In some countries, this 
process has already begun. 
•  second, pension system design. National saving could be affected by how pension benefits are 
financed. Recent reforms have favoured plans based on defined contribution and prefunding, 
moving away from defined benefit and pay-as-you-go plans. However, with a few exceptions, it 
is not clear that such pension system reforms have helped increase saving. This could be due to 
lower precautionary saving, transitional fiscal costs associated with pension reforms, problems 
with low or declining pension fund coverage, and high costs. 
•  third, pension fund asset accumulation and financial deepening. Rapid growth in pension fund 
assets appears to be associated with deeper financial markets in a number of EMEs. This could 
also influence capital flows by affecting saving and current account balances, as well as the 
pattern of gross capital flows. 
 
2  Stages in the demographic transition 
The demographic transition in EMEs over the past 40 years may be described as follows. In 
a first stage, which began around the mid-1960s, declining fertility rates
1 resulted in an increase in 
the working-age population and a decline in the share of the dependent young, with only a gradual 
increase in the share of the elderly population (Table 1).
2 The result has been declines in overall 
dependency ratios (the ratio of dependent young plus elderly to the working-age population) from 
around the mid-1960s to the present. (Annex, Figure 8). However, this stage of the demographic  
————— 
*  Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the BIS. The authors thank, without implicating, Már Gudmundsson, Philip Turner and William White for valuable 
comments. Contributions by Pablo García-Luna and Jimmy Shek to this paper are also gratefully acknowledged. This paper first 
appeared in BIS (2008) and covers the period to about 2007, before the full impact of the crisis was felt in EMEs. A final section has 
been added to highlight some issues associated with the implications of the global financial crisis. 
1  Lee (2003), Figure 2, observes that fertility rates in developing countries began to fall in the 1960s. This reflects factors that raise 
the opportunity costs of bearing children. Such factors include increased productivity of labour, which raises the value of time for 
parents, increased investment in children because of higher incomes and higher returns on education (due to longer life spans and 
greater demand for more skilled workers) and higher rates of urbanisation. Certain developments reduce the value of children, such 
as government provision of a safety net or the availability of pensions. 
2  The population forecasts are taken from the United Nations World Population Prospects, the most widely used source for 









































































































China 6.6  –6.1  –0.5  –20.6  15.0  5.5  –4.3  –14.3  18.6 
India 4.0  –3.9  –0.1  –10.8  8.1  2.7  –12.5  0.2  12.3 
Other Asia
(5) 2.7  –1.9  –0.8  –17.5  12.6  5.0  –9.1  –7.4  16.4 
Latin America
(6) 2.8  –3.4  0.6 –16.5  12.2  4.3 –9.6  –5.6  15.3 
CEE
(7) 0.9  –2.6  1.8  –14.6  7.2  7.5  –0.5  –15.1  15.6 
Other EMEs
(8) 2.9  –3.1  0.2  –13.8  12.1  1.8  –9.4  –2.7  12.1 
Memo:               
United States  3.3  –4.3  1.0  –10.2  5.6  4.6  –2.9  –5.9  8.8 
Japan   –9.5  7.6  1.9  –12.6  –8.1  20.7  –2.1  –11.6  13.7 
Western Europe
(9) 1.0  –3.6  2.6  –7.8  1.8  6.0  –0.9 –8.5  9.3 
 
Aggregates are weighted averages based on total population data for 2000. 
(1)    Population in each age group as a share of total population.   
(2)    Population aged 14 or less.   
(3)  Population  aged  15–59.   
(4)  Population aged 60 and above.   
(5)  Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.   
(6)  Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.   
(7)  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia.  
(8)   Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa and Turkey.   
(9)  France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects. 
 
transition is over or will end in the next couple of decades in some EMEs. Many countries are 
entering a second stage in which child dependency ratios are falling more gradually or have 
stabilised while elderly dependency ratios are rising more steeply (three right-hand columns in 
Table 1). As a result, projections up to 2050 indicate that overall dependency ratios will generally 
tend to rise. The implications of these trends for rates of investment and saving are discussed 
below. 
 
2.1  Implications for saving, investment and capital flows 
To see how the demographic transition would affect capital flows, it is worth recalling that a 
country’s net capital flows, or net financing requirements, depend on the current account balance 
CABt, which in turn reflects the behaviour of saving (Savt) and investment (Invt). That is:
3 
  CABt = Savt – Invt (1) 
The implications of demographic changes for saving and investment would depend on the 
stage in the demographic transition. When populations are relatively young, increases in the labour  
————— 






Saving, Investment and Current Account
(1) 
 
Change from 1980-2006 (percent)
(2) Level  in  2006  (percent) 
Country 
Saving Investment  Current 
Account  Saving Investment  Current 
Account 
China  19.5 10.1  9.4  54.1 44.6  9.4 
India  15.0 14.8  0.2  33.8 34.9  –1.1 
Other Asia
(3)  3.5 –5.3  8.8  30.8 25.6  5.2 
Latin America
(4)  0.9 –4.1  5.0  21.9 20.1  1.8 
CEE
(5)  2.2 –2.6  4.8  25.9 21.1  4.8 
Other EMEs
(6)  –11.4 –2.5  –9.0  25.8 21.2  4.7 
Memo:           
United States  –7.0 –0.7  –6.2  13.9 20.0  –6.2 
Japan  –3.8 –8.7  4.9  28.0 24.1  3.9 
Western Europe
(7)  –1.8 –3.8  2.0  20.3 19.0  1.3 
 
(1)  As a percentage of GDP.    
(2)  For CEE, change from 1992–2006.    
(3)  Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. For this group, saving and investment increased by about 7 percentage points from 1980–96.    
(4)  Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
(5)  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia.    
(6)  Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa and Turkey.    
(7)  France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
 
force would tend to raise the marginal product of capital, supporting higher rates of investment 
spending. At the same time, the falling overall dependency ratios resulting from lower fertility and 
child dependency would allow households to increase their rates of saving. (This is sometimes 
described in the literature as the first demographic dividend).
4 Conversely, when populations are 
relatively old, the declining labour force would tend to lower rates of investment while the 
increases in overall dependency associated with ageing populations would tend to lower saving. 
To shed some light on these demographic effects, Table 2 summarises trends in saving and 
investment over the past quarter century, with more details in Annex, Figure 9. 
Table 2 covers the period 1981-2006, for which data on saving and investment in EMEs are 
more readily available. As working-age populations tended to increase during this period, 
investment would have been expected to rise. At the same time, declining overall dependency 
ratios would tend to increase saving rates. However, Table 2 gives a much more mixed impression. 
In line with expectations, both saving and investment in China and India increased sharply over the 
period as overall dependency ratios fell, while declining in Japan where (reflecting a rapidly ageing 
population) dependency ratios have risen for some time now. However, contrary to expectations, 
increases in saving in the remaining EMEs have generally been modest, and investment ratios have 
generally declined. One reason is the effect of crises which appear to have persistent effects in 
————— 
4  The ultimate effects on national saving would depend on a variety of other factors. For example, the growth in output associated 
with higher investment and embedded total factor productivity growth could further increase household saving, corporate and 
government saving. However, household saving would tend to fall at higher levels of wealth. In line with this, empirical studies find 
that growth is associated with higher household saving, but higher real per capita income is associated lower household saving. (see, 




dampening national saving and investment. In particular, the Asian crisis of 1997-98 obscures the 
very large increases in investment and saving that occurred in the region until 1996 (see footnote 3 
in Table 2). Indeed, Bloom and Williamson (1998) find that increases in investment and saving 
rates (with the former exceeding the latter) were apparent in East Asia up to the first half of the 
1990s as overall dependency ratios fell (Annex, Figure 9). They conclude that the increase in 
working-age relative to dependent population contributed to East Asia’s so-called economic 
miracle. The effects of earlier crises also appear to have dampened saving and investment growth in 
Latin America. In the case of the United States, the sharp decline in saving appears in part to reflect 
perceived increases in wealth associated with rising asset prices, and the emergence of a financing 
technology (home equity financing) that increased the liquidity of the wealth held by households. 
The ambiguity of the results in Table 2 highlights the extent to which factors other than 
demographics can play an important role in influencing national saving and investment. 
As for current accounts, there appears to have been an extended cycle in which a number of 
EMEs started with current account deficits but more recently – often in the aftermath of crises – 
have experienced current account surpluses.
5 Demographics would predict that over time, EME 
current account surpluses would turn to deficits again. For example, a recent study (IMF, 2004) 
covering 115 countries found that investment tended to exceed saving on average over the sample 
period. However, a rise in the share of the working-age population tended to increase the saving to 
GDP ratio more than it increased the investment ratio (by 0.72 and 0.31 respectively).
6 A rise in the 
share of the elderly population tended to reduce the saving ratio more than it reduced the 
investment ratio (by –0.35 and –0.14 respectively). This implies that the current account balance 
would tend to rise with a larger share of the working-age population, and fall in response to ageing 
in the population.
7 
Looking ahead, a question of interest is to what extent ageing is already affecting saving and 
investment or might do so in the near future. Table 1 (three right-hand columns) indicates that 
particularly sharp declines in the shares of working-age population and increases in the shares of 
the elderly are projected for CEE and China. The declines in shares of working-age population and 
increases in elderly population are roughly comparable to those already observed in Japan. In CEE 
and China, and some other countries, the projected rise in elderly dependency is comparatively 
steep (Annex, Figure 8). 
This implies that saving and investment might be expected to fall and current accounts tend 
to deficit in CEE and China sooner than in other countries. However, as discussed earlier, there is 
considerable uncertainty about the timing of these effects because of the influence of other factors 
on saving and investment. For example, Singapore’s population has been ageing for some time 
now, and elderly and overall dependency ratios are projected to rise more steeply than in other 
countries (Annex, Figures 8 and 9). However, while saving and investment ratios have fallen, 
Singapore’s saving remains well above the average for EMEs, while investment ratios are 
somewhat above average. 
————— 
5  In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, these surpluses reflected declines in investment that exceeded declines in national saving. See 
Moreno (2007). 
6  IMF (2004), Table 3.1, page 143, estimates that in a panel of 115 countries over the period 1960-2000 a rise in the share of the 
working-age population was associated with an increase in real GDP per capita, while a rise in the share of the elderly population 
was associated with a decline. 
7  Additional perspective is provided by a study by Bulíř and Swiston (2006), Table 2, who estimate the effects of changes in overall 
dependency ratios on private saving in a cross-section analysis of 44 developed and emerging market economies. They find that in 
this decade, a 1 point increase in the overall dependency ratio is associated with a 0.3 percentage point decline in the ratio of private 
saving to GDP. The association is higher (0.63) in industrial countries, and has risen compared to the 1990s (see also Loayza et al., 
2000). Furthermore, Asian economies are found to save more than is predicted in the model, and until the end of the 1990s, Latin 
American countries tended to save less than predicted. These regressions explain between two thirds and three fourths of the 






Saving, Investment, Current Account and Years to Trough in Dependency Ratios 



































AR=Argentina; BR=Brazil; CL=Chile; CN=China; CO=Colombia; CZ=Czech Republic; HK=Hong Kong SAR; HU=Hungary; 
ID=Indonesia; IN=India; KR=Korea; MX=Mexico; MY=Malaysia; PE=Peru; PH=Philippines; PL=Poland; RU=Russia; SA=Saudi 
Arabia; SG=Singapore (not included in the regression, but the data points are shown in the figure); TH=Thailand; TR=Turkey; 
VE=Venezuela; ZA=South Africa. 
(a) Where 2008=year 0. Overall dependency ratio is defined as the population less than 15 years of age plus population 80 years or older 
divided by the population of 15-59 years-olds. 
Source: IMF and United Nations. 
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Additional perspective can be gained from Figure 1, which relates saving, investment and 
current account balances to the years to trough in overall dependency in a small cross-section of 
EMEs. In each Figure, countries on the right side of the x-axis are younger, implying higher overall 
dependency ratios (because of high child dependency). Moving left on the x-axis towards zero, 
overall dependency ratios are low (reflecting higher working-age populations and lower child 
dependency ratios). Dependency ratios then rise again in response to a rising share of elderly 
population and lower share of working-age populations. Focusing first on saving (left-hand panel), 
we would expect a non-linear relationship in which saving is low in countries where the population 
is young (right side of the axis), tends to rise towards the middle of the Figure and then declines 
when approaching the zero point of the x-axis or past it. A quadratic regression line broadly reveals 
such a relationship in saving and in the current account. (The regression line for investment turns 
out to be linear). Again, caution is needed in interpreting these results because of wide dispersion in 




3  Pension system design 
A key challenge faced by pension authorities is to generate enough resources to meet 
pension liabilities given a desired level of coverage and replacement income while minimising the 
burden on the working-age population. In this connection, there has been much discussion of how 
to fund pension benefits, and specifically on the extent to which countries should rely on income 
transfers or (alternatively) accumulated assets to finance retirement spending. National practices 
appear to vary considerably. Drawing on research by the National Transfers Account project, Lee 
and Mason (2007) estimate that reliance on assets has been comparatively high in Thailand and the 
United States, and comparatively low in Japan and Taiwan, China (Figure 2).
9 
Some of these differences could reflect different institutional arrangements for financing 
old-age consumption, including differences in pension design and coverage. Traditionally. pension 
systems have relied on defined benefit (ie guaranteed incomes) pay-as-you-go systems, in which 
taxes on workers fund the pension incomes of the elderly. However, these systems tended to create 
very large implicit pension debts that, since they were not fully funded, raised concerns about the 
adequacy of replacement incomes and potential fiscal burdens. In particular, unfunded systems in 
which payments have to be implemented via transfers from the working-age population (e.g., 
traditional pay-as-you-go systems) raised concerns about increasing burdens on a declining pool of 
workers. Projected declines in the share of workers and increases in the share of elderly dependents 
in the population (Table 1, three right-hand columns) imply increases in elderly and overall 
dependency ratios. The issue is of particular interest in countries where populations are ageing 
more rapidly (e.g., CEE, Korea and China). 
The potential financing problems that can arise in more traditional pension systems are 
illustrated by the experience of Korea, where the pension system is a partially funded defined 
benefit system managed by the government.
10 Holzmann et al. (2004) note that reserves 
accumulated through the public pension system were low compared to the estimated implicit 
pension debt (IPD), respectively 10 and 47 per cent of GDP, 10 years after the scheme was 
introduced. It was estimated that the fund would be completely exhausted within the first half of 
————— 
8  Singapore is such an outlier that it was not included in the regression analysis. However, all other countries shown in the figure were 
included in the regression. 
9  At the same time, however, there appears to be significant reliance on familial transfers in Thailand and Taiwan. 
10  However, in 2007, the National Pension Service (NPS) mandated several investment banks (Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse) to 
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We thank Ronald Lee for permission to use this figure. 
Source: Lee and Mason (2007). 
 
the 21st century.
11 One difficulty is that payment promises in a defined benefit plan do not depend 
on a pension system’s performance or ability to accumulate assets. Another difficulty pertains to 
incentives to save under these arrangements discussed below. 
Recent pension legislation (e.g., in Latin America) has instead sought to encourage wealth 
accumulation via personal saving to fund retirement consumption. In particular, there has been 
more emphasis on defined contribution, rather than defined benefit, which reduces the implicit 
pension debt. For example, Chile’s pension system (introduced in 1981) is a fully funded defined 
contribution system of mandatory individual accounts managed by private pension fund 
administrators (AFPs). In the 1990s, eight emerging market economies implemented pension 
reforms similar to Chile’s.
12 
In assessing the extent to which pension reforms of this latter type could reduce the burden 
on the working-age population, it is worth noting that in a closed economy, consumption by the old 
would always involve some transfer of resources away from the young. In a pay-as-you-go system, 
the transfer would involve the payment of taxes (e.g., for social security, as in the United States). In 
————— 
11  The precise estimated dates vary: by 2031 according to Moon (2002) and by 2047 according to the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(Bateman, 2007). 
12  These are Peru (1993), Argentina and Colombia (1994), Uruguay (1995), Mexico and Bolivia (1997), El Salvador (1998) and 
Poland (1999). In contrast, Brazil has not adopted individual accounts and recently introduced a notional defined contribution 
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a fully funded system with private accounts (e.g., as in Latin America) the transfer would involve 
the payment of rent, interest income or dividends to, or purchases of assets from, retirees. 
Nevertheless, a fully funded defined contribution system can still reduce the burden on the 
working-age population if over time it increases saving and the stock of capital of the economy. 
Higher capital/labour ratios would raise worker productivity, making it easier to sustain any given 
level of elderly consumption out of current income. In an open economy, burdens on the 
working-age population could also be reduced via the accumulation of foreign assets, which can 
result from additional saving, or the diversification of pension fund portfolios (see below). This 
would reduce claims on domestically produced goods and services at the time of retirement 
(compared to the case of pay-as-you-go financing or domestic investment only). 
Reformed pension systems could increase the incentive to save and reduce evasion because 
pension contributions are not transfers to others but are savings explicitly accruing to the 
individual.
13 However, the impact on saving rates of pension reforms similar to those adopted in 
Chile does not appear to be large.
14 Saving ratios in countries listed earlier as having adopted these 
reforms have generally not increased markedly over time (Annex, Figure 9). In Poland, for 
example, sharp increases in saving rates pre-date the 1999 pension reforms, and national saving 
rates have by and large drifted downwards since the reforms were adopted. In Latin America, 
saving rates are still comparatively low, and increases in some cases have only offset earlier 
declines.
15 An exception is Chile, where national saving rates have risen since the adoption of 
pension reforms in the 1980s. 
Several factors may have limited the impact of pension reforms on national saving: 
•  lack of financial literacy. Pension reforms will not increase saving if contributors are not aware 
of the possible returns from saving. Some recent survey data from Chile suggests that many 
pension contributors (up to around 60 per cent) probably lack such awareness as they cannot 
provide estimates of the balances on their pension accounts. It also appears that contributors 
with lower awareness have smaller balances (Arenas de Mesa et al., 2008); 
•  reduced precautionary saving. Precautionary household saving outside the pension system may 
have been reduced to the extent to which fully funded defined contribution plans are seen as 
more credible than defined benefit plans that are not fully funded. This effect may be 
accentuated if pension funds also contribute to financial deepening (see below). The impact on 
overall saving would then be small and could even be negative. In a number of countries, there 
has also been a decline in private saving offsetting increases in government saving. Indeed, 
Bulíř and Swiston (2006) find that the private saving offset to public saving has increased 
considerably in this decade; a 1 point rise in the ratio of public saving to GDP is offset by a 
0.9 point decline in private saving (up from 0.4 to 0.6 in the 1990s). This may reflect lower 
precautionary saving, due not only to pension reforms but also to more credible macroeconomic 
policies; 
• transitional  costs. While pension reforms have increased assets to cover implicit pension debts, 
explicit recognition of such debts has resulted in larger fiscal deficits over a relatively extended 
transition period. Roldos (2007) notes that “the loss of contributions to individual accounts and 
————— 
13  Indeed, in Korea, the contributions tend to be low due to a relatively large self-employed sector, where plan participants tend to 
underreport their income. A less developed infrastructure for enforcement and collection also plays a role. Reforms adopted in 2007 
seek to improve the sustainability of the system by gradually reducing the income replacement rate from 60 to 50 per cent in 2008 
and then to 40 per cent by 2028. 
14  The same could be said for current accounts. In Figure 1, the largest surpluses appear to be in countries that are export-oriented (i.e., 
Singapore and Malaysia) or are commodity exporters (e.g., Venezuela). The extent to which mandatory contributions to provident 
funds might help explain the large current account surpluses in Singapore and Malaysia remains to be determined. 
15  OECD (2007) reaches a similar conclusion. It also notes that empirical work on the impact of pension reforms on national saving is 




the payment of recognition bonds to those who moved to the new partially or fully funded 
systems added in some cases more than 10 percentage points of GDP to public debt ratios”. It 
may also be noted that in some cases, such as Peru, reforms were implemented in such a way 
that workers had an incentive to stay with the traditional pay-as-you-go system, although this 
was later modified (Carranza and Morón, 2008); 
•  declining pension coverage of workers. OECD (2007, Box 2.1, pp 69-70) estimates that the 
weighted average of coverage for the Latin American region fell from 63 per cent before the 
pension reforms to 26 per cent in 2006 (however, the initial coverage could be an overestimate). 
In particular, while membership in pension funds has increased as a proportion of the registered 
workforce, the share of members who actually contribute has fallen in every country.
16 Research 
is needed to uncover the reasons, but an important factor appears to be whether a pension plan is 
mandatory, or the default is set to automatic enrolment (Beshears et al.,  2008). Given that 
pension plan contributions are mandatory in a number of EMEs, a large informal sector may 
also play a role. High administrative costs of pension systems (see next item) may also be partly 
responsible;
17 
•  high administrative costs. Reforms that have forced workers to channel savings to fund their 
own retirement through private financial institutions have resulted in high fees.
18 Costs in these 
systems average 1 to 2 per cent in the long run, which can have the effect of lowering future 
pensions 20-30 per cent. Against this it has been argued that that high operating costs largely 
reflect marketing expenditures in retail-oriented pension fund systems and institutional reforms 
could reduce them (James et al., 2001). It is also argued that government-run pension systems 
deliver much lower returns than private systems.
19 
 
4  Asset accumulation and financial deepening 
4.1  Pension funds: asset growth and composition 
Experience suggests that pension funds can contribute to financial sector deepening. As 
pension fund assets grow, they can help diversify the investor base and provide stable demand for 
fixed income securities as well as for new financial instruments (e.g., high-yield bonds, 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives). The 
process is potentially symbiotic, as this in turn supports pension fund growth by increasing the 
availability of longer-maturity assets for pension fund investments. 
Since 2000, pension fund assets have grown rapidly in a number of EMEs. As shown in 
Figure 3, as a percentage of GDP these assets have risen by more than 8 percentage points in Chile, 
Colombia, Peru and Poland. (In contrast, partly reflecting their initially greater size, pension fund 
assets have grown only moderately in Singapore and declined in Malaysia over the same period). 
However, there is still ample scope for further growth, as pension fund assets are generally still 
small in EMEs. In 2006, eight out of 13 EMEs shown in Figure 7 had assets of less than 20 per cent 
of GDP. Among EMEs, only in Chile, Singapore and Malaysia did pension fund assets exceed 
50 per cent of GDP. Although this is comparable in size to some developed economies, it is still 
small compared to the 100 per cent of GDP recorded in the United States. 
————— 
16  The percentage of registered workers who contribute ranges from 11 per cent in Peru to 31 per cent in Mexico and 58 per cent in 
Chile. 
17  In line with some of these developments, the success of recent (three-pillar) pension systems in achieving their social goals is being 
questioned, notably in Chile (Kay and Sinha, 2008). Efforts to address this could have effects on saving and investment as well. 
18  For a more severe critique, see Kotlikoff (2006). 






Pension Fund Assets 














AR=Argentina; BR=Brazil; CL=Chile; CN=China; CO=Colombia; CZ=Czech Republic; GB=United Kingdom; HU=Hungary; 
JP=Japan; KR=Korea; MX=Mexico; MY=Malaysia; PE=Peru; PL=Poland; SG=Singapore; US=United States. 
(a) Or latest available. 
Source: OECD, Association of Pension Fund Administrators; national data. 
 
4.2  Composition of pension fund portfolios 
The impact of pension fund accumulation on the domestic financial sector depends in part on 
the composition of pension fund portfolios. The following aspects may be highlighted. 
First, the share of assets held in financial institutions has tended to decline in a number of 
EMEs (see Chan et al., 2006 for Latin America). This may reflect less reliance on bank deposits as 
investments, which could enhance demand for other financial instruments and financial deepening. 
However, in some countries, bank deposits remain significant. According to OECD statistics, in 
2005 the share of cash and deposits in total pension fund assets in Thailand, Brazil and Indonesia 
was 40, 44 and 71 per cent respectively. 
Second, the portfolio composition of pension fund assets in some EMEs, Latin America in 
particular, is highly weighted towards government bonds. Indeed, as reported by Chan et al., (2006), 
in the majority of Latin American countries they sampled pension funds held more than half of their 
portfolios in government debt (in Mexico and El Salvador it was more than four fifths). Of particular 
interest is that in five Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay) 
pension fund assets became more concentrated in government debt between 1999 and 2005. By 
way of comparison, the share of pension fund assets invested in bonds (both public and private) in 
the United States and Japan tended to fall (between 1995 and 2005, from 26 to 19 per cent and 
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Restrictions on Portfolio Composition and Actual Asset Composition 
(percent of total assets, 2006 or 2007) 
 
Domestic Equities  Foreign Assets 








India      
Korea 12  11  20  9 
Singapore PPR  0  PPR  … 
Argentina 50  13  20  10 
Chile 39  17  30  32 
Colombia 30 15  20  14 
Mexico 15  0.4  20  8 
Peru 35  42  10.5  8 
Hungary 50  8  30  5 
Poland 40  32  5  2 
Memo:        
United States  PPR  41  PPR   
United Kingdom  PPR  40  PPR   
Japan 30    30   
 
PPR = “prudent person rule”. 
Source: Poirson (2007); OECD, Global Pension Statistics; OECD (2008), Latin American Economic Outlook; Korea National Pension 
Service. 
 
Third, some pension funds (e.g., Korea or Mexico, Table 3) tend to allocate a relatively 
small amount of their portfolios to equities, even if relatively young populations (e.g., in India) 
suggest that there is scope for increasing allocation to equities.
20 By way of comparison, in the 
United States, 41 and 24 per cent of pension fund assets are invested in equities and mutual funds, 
respectively. Fourth, with some exceptions (e.g., Chile), the allocation to foreign assets by EME 
pension funds also tends to be small. 
The lack of diversification in pension fund portfolios is in a number of cases the result of 
restrictions on pension fund investments in equities and foreign assets (Table 3). A major reason 
for these restrictions is that expanding pension fund portfolios to include assets with returns 
exhibiting very high volatility (domestic equities and foreign assets) is believed to create an 
unacceptable risk of losses that could impoverish pension fund participants. 
There are two arguments for liberalising restrictions on pension fund investments, both of 
which have to do with the gains from diversification. First, liberalisation can reduce concentration 
in a portfolio and consequently lower the risk of very large losses. This can be particularly 
————— 
20  Some research suggests that it would be optimal to have portfolios that are more heavily skewed towards equities in economies 
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The line represents the efficient portfolio frontier. EM= Emerging Markets; EMBI=Emerging Markets Bond Index; GBI= Government 
Bond Index; MSCI=Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
(a)  Standard deviation of returns, calculated using daily percentage changes in the return index. 
Source: JPMorgan Chase; Merrill Lynch; Datastream. 
 
important in emerging market economies which, in the past, have been vulnerable to sharp 
downturns or even financial crises. For example, a pension fund investing in domestic bank 
deposits avoids market and liquidity risk but retains counterparty risk to the domestic banking 
system. This risk can be reduced (at the cost of assuming some exchange rate risk) by adding 
foreign assets to its portfolio. 
Second, liberalisation increases the set of investable instruments and potential gains from 
diversification. The recent performance of a variety of financial instruments suggests that these gains 
can be very large. For example, in this decade domestic Latin American government securities 
(GBI-Latin America) earned a shade over 10 per cent annualised return (in US dollars) with an 
annualised volatility of 10 per cent (Figure 4). However, roughly triple those returns could have 
been earned by investing in Latin American equities, at the cost of more than doubling volatility. 
Returns can be improved not only by diversifying into equities (at home or abroad), but also 
by diversifying into foreign bonds. For example, adding domestic bonds from other regions to an 
investment portfolio could be associated with increased returns with less than proportional 
increases in volatility; indeed, the GBI-EM index has higher returns and lower volatility than the 
GBI-Latin America index. This reflects diversification benefits resulting from combining assets in 
a portfolio whose returns have low or negative correlations (see below). 
Berstein and Chumacero (2005) provide more precise estimates of the gains from easing 
specific restrictions on pension fund asset allocations in Chile. Their analysis suggests that by 
mid-2002, in the absence of the specific pension fund restrictions applied in Chile, pension fund 
assets could have been higher by between 10 per cent (for a quadratic preference or an efficient 
value-at-risk portfolio) and 30 per cent (for a minimum variance portfolio) without increasing the 
volatility of returns (see their Figure 3). Put differently, for a minimum variance portfolio, with the 
same volatility of returns, returns to the unrestricted portfolio averaged 0.85 per cent a month, 
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compared to 0.67 per cent per month for the restricted portfolio.
21 This is because the unrestricted 
optimal portfolio implied a larger allocation to foreign bonds and equities (about a ⅓ share for the 
minimum variance model) than would have been the case for the restricted portfolio. Thus, for the 
minimum variance model, the probability of hitting the investment limit for foreign fixed income 
and equity instruments was estimated at about 62 and 90 per cent, respectively. 
 
4.2.1  How much would pension funds invest abroad? 
While steps are being taken to liberalise pension fund investments abroad in a number of 
EMEs, it is not clear how much pension funds will increase their investments abroad in response. 
On the one hand, in the case of Chile, or other EMEs, the returns from moving to an optimum share 
of foreign assets (and corresponding gross outflows channelled via pension funds) could be even 
higher than suggested by Berstein and Chumacero’s (2005) estimates. In their analysis, they only 
consider developed country fixed and variable income instruments as alternatives to domestic 
assets,
22 while recent experience suggests that EME pension funds could earn even higher-risk 
adjusted returns by investing in assets issued in other EMEs. As can be seen in Figure 4, a number 
of regional (EMBI, GBI and MSCI) indices dominate their developed country counterparts in terms 
of risk-adjusted returns. Against these advantages is the possibility that EMEs might be more 
vulnerable to crises, so that a pension fund that is very concerned about the risk of large losses 
might be less inclined to invest in EME instruments. 
Much depends on the diversification benefits provided by EME instruments on average and 
during episodes of financial stress. As can be seen in Figure 5, equities are not fully correlated 
across regions over a longer period (2001-07). This highlights the opportunities for diversification 
benefits from EME pension fund investments in both developed market and other emerging market 
equities. However, an important concern is that correlations in cross-country equity returns tend to 
rise during episodes of financial stress. Nevertheless, EM pension funds may be in a better position 
to manage the risks of diversification (than, say, EM banks) because pension fund liabilities tend to 
be longer-term. Also, bond investments do not appear to raise such concerns, as correlations in 
some cases have actually fallen during episodes of financial stress. 
On the other hand, diversification could be limited by a number of factors.
23 Even in the 
absence of restrictions, there is evidence that investors prefer to invest in their own domestic 
markets (home bias). This is reflected in the fact that pension fund investment abroad is below the 
ceiling in a number of countries (Table 3).
24 An important reason is that developing monitoring and 
management capacity to invest abroad is costly, particularly for pension funds in EMEs having 
————— 
21  The authors estimate the restricted portfolio by (where applicable) calibrating parameters in the objective function so as to replicate 
the ex post pension fund portfolio returns and volatilities. The unrestricted portfolio is selected so that in each period it is exposed to 
the same volatility as the restricted portfolio. The return corresponding to that volatility is then estimated. These results vary 
somewhat with differing assumptions about transaction costs, but the basic conclusions hold; see Berstein and Chumacero (2005), 
Table 3. 
22  They assume that there are four types of assets: domestic fixed, domestic variable, foreign fixed and foreign variable income (as 
proxied for, respectively, by promissory notes of the Central Bank of Chile of eight-year maturity, an index of all Chilean variable 
return instruments, an index based on all US indices, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average). 
23  Limited diversification of pension portfolios has also been observed in countries with higher incomes per capita. Gudmundsson 
(2001) describes stages in which pension funds in Iceland first invested in domestic bonds, lending directly to members (for 
housing), and then increased the share of foreign assets and equity in their portfolios over a short period of time (from low single 
digits to 19-26 per cent between the mid-1990s and 2000), resulting in large increases in returns on assets. In part, this reflected 
liberalisation, but also awareness by pension fund managers of the need to increase returns. 
24  Actual limits could also turn out to be below the ceiling because the ceiling applies to each fund individually and there are significant 
penalties for breaching the ceiling (e.g., forced sales). Under those conditions, fund managers would want to stay well below the ceiling 
to avoid breaches because fluctuations in market prices and mark to market accounting can push restricted asset holdings above the 




World-EM World-Asia World-LatAm World-Europe Asia-LatAm Asia-Europe LatAm-Europe
2001-07 May-Oct 2002 May-Jun 2006 Feb-Mar 2007 Aug-Dec 2007
 
Figure 5 
Correlations in Asset Markets
 






























































(a) Period of increased global market volatility. 






















little experience with investments in global financial markets. For example, as pension fund 
liabilities are denominated in domestic currency pension funds need to develop the capacity to 
manage currency risks;
25 There is also limited availability of instruments to hedge risks, including 
those arising from currency or interest rate fluctuations.
26 
There is growing awareness of the need to provide such hedging instruments. For example, 
in India market participants are now allowed to use foreign exchange forwards, swaps and options. 
While this is usually only against “crystallised foreign currency exposures”, the range of hedging 
tools available is now to be expanded (Mohan, 2007). However, it is still not clear to what extent 
pension funds would engage in hedging even were the appropriate instruments to be made 
available, because hedging would be costly. An additional concern is whether pension funds could 
contribute to increased volatility of capital flows (Vargas and Varela, 2008), which could reduce 
risk-adjusted returns or raise broader risk management concerns. 
 
4.3  Deeper financial markets 
As pension fund assets have grown, emerging securities markets have deepened in recent 
years. Domestic debt markets, which are largest in Asia, South Africa and Turkey, have generally 
grown in this decade. However, they have not grown in central Europe (Figure 6 and Annex, 
Figure 10). There has also been a tendency for stock market capitalisation to rise in EMEs in this 
decade, reflecting steep increases in equity prices. 
However, financial markets in EMEs are still not as deep as in developed countries. This is 
broadly reflected in (i) still low ratios of market capitalisation in securities to GDP; (ii) high ratios 
of bank deposits to GDP; (iii) lack of liquidity in securities markets; and (iv) low reliance on 
securities markets for financing. 
Low ratio of securities to GDP. As illustrated in Figure 6, the ratio of debt securities to GDP 
ranged from less than 30 per cent for CEE to 60 per cent or higher in Asia and Latin America. 
(Annex, Figure 10 provides country details). However, this ratio was around 200 per cent in the 
United States and Japan (Annex, Figure 11). With the recent run-up in EME equity prices, stock 
market capitalisation ratios are more comparable with the 100 and 150 per cent observed in Japan 
and the United States respectively, although they remain at a comparatively low 50 per cent in 
Latin America. 
Relatively high bank deposits. M2/GDP has recently averaged around 140 per cent in Asian 
EMEs and 45-60 per cent in other EMEs. Bank deposits are thus relatively more important in 
EMEs than in the US, where the M2/GDP ratio averaged 50 per cent. However, M2/GDP ratios are 
about as high in Japan (nearly 150 per cent) as they are in Asian EMEs.
27 
————— 
25  With regard to monitoring investments abroad, pension funds could draw on the risk management capacity of global financial 
institutions by investing in vehicles such as mutual funds. 
26  See Moreno (2006), Table A6 and Mohan (2007). 
27  One implication is that in countries where pension funds hold a significant proportion of bank assets, bank interest rate liberalisation 
could significantly increase pension fund returns, particularly where rising inflation is a concern. Bank interest rates have been 
liberalised in many EMEs, although restrictions are still relevant in certain countries, like China or India. See Mohanty and Turner 
(2008, Tables 11 and 12) for information on the liberalisation of bank interest rates between 1997 and 2006. In some cases, pension 
funds could help promote interest rate liberalisation. In the case of India, pension funds could help eliminate distortions in interest 
rates caused by existing arrangements to support small savers (Mohan, 2007). To compensate for the lack of a social security 
system, the government gives small savers access to saving instruments (administered through post offices and commercial banks) 
that benefit from tax incentives and favourable interest rates set by the government. However, to attract deposits, banks competing 
with these small saving schemes tend to set rates on long-term deposits at levels higher than those which would have been obtained 
under competitive market conditions. This has been seen as contributing to downward stickiness of lending rates (with implications 
for the effectiveness of monetary policy). Improvements in the social safety net (including pensions) could address this issue. (A 
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(a) Covers domestic (lower portion of bars) and international (upper portion of bars) debt securities.  
(b) China, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.  
(c) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
and Venezuela.  
(d) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia.  
(e) South Africa and Turkey. 
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Low liquidity. The rate of turnover in financial instruments tends to be lower in EMEs than 
in developed markets. This can present problems for risk management (and eventual wealth 
accumulation), by making it difficult for investors to change their positions. As can be seen in 
Figure 7, debt trading volume as a percentage of GDP ranged from a low of around 10 per cent of 
GDP in Asia to a high of around 150 per cent in Latin America. By way of comparison, the 
corresponding ratios for Japan and the US were respectively about 500 per cent and nearly 
2000  per cent. As for equity markets, turnover tends to be lower in Latin America (around 
10 per cent of GDP) and around 80 per cent in Asia and “other”. By way of comparison, the 
corresponding turnover ratios for Japan and the United States are 150 and 280 per cent respectively 
(Annex, Figure 12). 
Limited reliance on equities for financing. To illustrate, in China stock market capitalisation 
as a percentage of GDP is quite high (90 per cent), but flow of funds data indicate that between 
2003 and 2005 equities accounted for only about 4 per cent of total increases in liabilities, with 
bank loans and bond financing accounting for much larger shares (61 and 35 per cent respectively). 
The reasons why higher share prices do not lead to more share issuance warrant further 
examination. 
 
4.4  Role of pension funds in financial deepening 
The developments highlighted above suggest that further pension fund development could 
contribute to the deepening of financial markets. One indication is that the correlation between 
financial deepening and pension fund growth is comparatively strong in a number of EMEs. As 
shown in Table 4, stock market capitalisation is positively correlated with pension fund asset 
growth in Korea, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Poland. In contrast, the correlation is 
negative in Malaysia and Singapore. As for domestic debt securities, the correlation is positive (in 
either levels or changes) in most EMEs listed. 
The results in Table 4 are broadly in line with Roldos (2007) and OECD (2007), who note 
that institutional investment (including by pension funds) has been associated with increases in 
market capitalisation of stocks and bonds. This relationship is particularly apparent in Chile. In line 
with this, the share of pension funds in government debt markets in a set of Latin American 
countries rose from 18 per cent in 1998 to 29 per cent in 2005 (Roldos, 2007, Table 4). Pension 
fund demand is also believed to have helped stimulate the development of new financial 
instruments. There is also evidence of lengthening maturities in fixed income markets in Chile and 
Mexico, and institutional investors, including pension funds, are believed to have played an 
important role in this. Research also suggests that the growth of institutional investors such as 
pension funds can lower the cost of capital and encourage the creation of new financial instruments 
(Walker and Lefort, 2002). A pension fund portfolio reallocation to equities could thus boost 
investment and growth as well as returns for pension fund investors. The importance of this effect 
would depend in part on the extent to which firms rely on equity for their financing (which as noted 
earlier, can be relatively little in some EMEs).
28 
 
4.5  Implications for saving and capital flows 
The implications of greater financial depth for capital flows are uncertain, but some research 
suggests it could affect capital flows by lowering precautionary saving and current account 
————— 
28  On the other hand, some commentary suggests that the relationship between pension asset growth and market capitalisation has been 
weak in some countries over certain periods. Possible explanations include inadequate regulatory and financial infrastructure and a 













Country Time  Period 
Ratio  Change 
in Ratio  Ratio  Change 
in Ratio 
China 2000  2006  0.27  0.04  0.81  –0.60 
Korea  1990  2006  0.76 0.41 0.92 0.40 
Malaysia 2000  2006  –0.38  –0.09  –0.28  0.65 
Singapore 2000  2006  –0.20  –0.65  0.82  0.61 
Argentina  1995  2006  0.48 0.34 0.94 0.85 
Brazil      n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Chile  1982  2006  0.68 0.79 0.30 0.71 
Colombia  1995  2006  0.72 0.38 0.98 0.74 
Mexico 1998  2006  0.39  –0.23  0.96  0.54 
Peru  1994  2006  0.72 0.44 0.90 0.20 
Czech  Republic     n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hungary      n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Poland  2000  2006  0.86 0.33 0.96 0.91 
United  States  2001  2006  0.96 0.94 0.59 0.11 
Japan 2001  2006  0.98  0.86  0.64  –0.58 
 
(a)  Based on annual data covering the time period shown. 
Source: OECD; FIAP; S&P Emerging Markets Database; national data; BIS. 
 
balances. A recent study by Chinn and Ito (2007) finds that a larger financial sector could lower 
current account balances under certain conditions.
29 This is an issue of interest in a number of 
EMEs, notably China. 
The effects of pension fund portfolio liberalisation on net or gross capital flows are also 
uncertain. However, the experience of Chile since 1998, reported by Desormeaux et al. (2008), 
suggests that pension fund investments abroad can have a large impact on gross outflows. This 
impression is reinforced by evidence they cite that an increase of 10 per cent in foreign investment 
limits on Chilean pension funds is associated with an accumulated depreciation of 2 per cent of the 
Chilean peso against the US dollar (see Cowan et al., 2008). To illustrate orders of magnitude, at 
the limit of 30 per cent that prevailed until recently, Chilean pension fund assets invested abroad 
would be equivalent to nearly 20 per cent of Chilean GDP. Pending legislation contemplates 
significant easing of these limits which could mean large cumulative gross outflows over time in 
the pension fund sector. By way of comparison, foreign reserves to GDP in Latin America 
averaged about 10 per cent in 2006 (13 per cent in Chile) and 35 per cent in Asia. 
————— 
29  The conditions are that the economy be less open (ie restrictions on capital flows) and the legal system be less developed (not in the 




An issue of interest is whether outflows channelled via pension funds could help offset large 
gross capital inflows, thus reducing the incentives for foreign exchange market intervention and 
reserve accumulation in some countries. While they are not perfect substitutes for foreign reserves, 
pension fund accumulation of foreign assets could provide a channel for intermediating capital 
inflows abroad, thus providing some of the benefits that have been sought from foreign exchange 
market intervention and foreign reserve accumulation without the associated disadvantages. In 
particular, as pension fund foreign asset accumulation would be financed by domestic saving, it 
does not raise the issues typically associated with the financing of foreign reserve accumulation, 
such as the possible loss of monetary control or the carrying costs associated with sterilisation of 
intervention in foreign exchange markets. 
 
5  Postscript: The impact of the global financial crisis 
As noted earlier, some research suggests that it would be optimal to have portfolios that are 
more heavily skewed towards equities in economies where populations are younger. One reason is 
that returns on equity investments tend to outperform returns on fixed income investments over the 
medium to long-term. However, this proposition is being tested by the sharp deterioration in the 
performance of equity investments resulting from the crisis that broke out in the second half of 
2007. Annualised returns on equities fell from a range of around 5 to 35 per cent (depending on the 
index) for 2002-07 (shown earlier in Figure 4) to about –1 to 20 per cent for 2002-09 (not shown),
30 
while volatility over these periods increased from about 10-25 per cent to around 20-30 per cent. 
By comparison, the decline in the range of annualised returns for bonds was much more moderate; 
falling from around 5-20 per cent to 5-15 per cent, with volatility rising from 3-10 per cent to 
5-15 per cent. These differences are reflected in pension fund performance of some EMEs. For 
example, returns in pension funds holding a large proportion of equities in both Chile and Hong 
Kong experienced large losses. Looking ahead, a question of interest is how long it will take for 
returns on equity investments to recover as the global financial system emerges from this crisis. At 
this writing, equity returns had improved significantly in 2009, reducing very large losses on equity 




30  This reflects the fact that for 2008-09 (negative) returns on various equity indices shown in Figure 4 ranged from –20 to 





















































(a) Population less than 15 years of age / population 15-59 years old.  
(b) Population 60 years or older / population 15-59 years old.  
(c) Population less than 15 years of age plus population 60 years or older / population 15-59 years old. 
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(a) Covers domestic and international debt securities. 
Source: IMF; World Federation of Exchanges; BIS. 
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Estimates of the annual value of secondary transactions in equities and bonds. 
Source: National data. 
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REFORMING THE PENSION REFORMS: THE RECENT INITIATIVES 
AND ACTIONS ON PENSIONS IN ARGENTINA AND CHILE 
Rafael Rofman,
* Eduardo Fajnzylber
** and German Herrera
*** 
This paper describes the recent reforms of pension policies adopted by Argentina and Chile. 
The structural reforms in the 1980s and 90s were targeted on improving the long term fiscal 
sustainability of the system and their institutional design, while transferring part of the economic 
and social risks from the State to participants. However, in recent years authorities in both 
countries coincided on identifying insufficient coverage among the elderly and adequacy of benefits 
as the most critical problems. As a result of differences in political economy and institutional 
constraints, responses were different. In Chile, a long and participatory process resulted in a large 
reform that focuses on impacts on the medium term, through a carefully calibrated adjustment. In 
Argentina, instead, reforms were adopted through a large number of successive normative 
corrections, with little public debate about their implications, and immediate impacts on coverage 
and fiscal demands. 
 
1 Introduction 
Argentina and Chile, two of the pioneering countries in Latin American pension reform 
trends of the 1980s and 1990s, have recently embarked in a new wave of revisions and adjustments 
of their pension systems. The motivation, process and results of these reforms are not similar, 
although they share some characteristics. This paper describes the most relevant components of 
these reforms, explaining why and how they were introduced, discussing their likely impacts and 
remaining challenges. 
While the systems in both countries as of the early 2000s were not identical, they shared a 
number of characteristics. Chile was the first country in the region to introduce a structural reform 
to its pension system, creating a fully funded, privately managed scheme in the early 1980s. This 
system covered salaried workers on a compulsory basis, and independent workers could voluntarily 
join. While the system was designed as a defined contribution scheme, retirees had the right to 
receive a minimum benefit as long as they had contributed at least 20 years to the system. The 
minimum was financed with general revenue funds, and had a clear redistributive effect. 
In Argentina, the 1993 reform introduced a similar funded scheme, although it did not fully 
eliminated the pay-as-you-go, defined benefit component. All workers (including independent 
workers) were required to participate, and their contributions would finance a multipilar scheme. 
At retirement, the benefit would include a defined contribution component, but also a defined 
benefit flat amount, that would act as a universal basic transfer received by all retirees with at least 
30 years of contributions. Furthermore, Argentine workers were given the choice to opt out of the 
funded scheme, and continue to participate in a fully PAYG scheme. In a sense, the Argentina 
reform was considered at the time to be an improvement over Chile’s experience. The design and 
————— 
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approval process (Argentina’s reforms went through a long debate in Congress, with many reforms 
introduced by Senators and Deputies, while in Chile it was introduced through a “Decree Law” 
approved by General Pinochet), and several aspects of the new system were thought to be better 
designed and more sustainable.
1 
Sharing some design characteristics, the systems in Argentina and Chile also had some basic 
problems in common. Lower than expected coverage, administrative costs that were considered too 
high by some analysts and authorities, too much uncertainty for participants, and equity issues were 
perceived as the main problems of pension systems on both sides of the Andes. Some of these 
problems originated in the macroeconomic and labor market performance of both countries, others 
from design aspects. 
Many authors, analysts, and policy makers wrote and discussed about these problems in the 
last decade or so. While some remedial actions and small reforms were taken, deep changes were 
postponed, mostly due to macroeconomic and political restrictions. However, the stronger fiscal 
situation of both countries in recent years, and a changing political climate that brought up 
concerns about the effectiveness of these programs to provide adequate income security for the 
elderly created conditions for a new wave or reforms. 
The reforms enacted in Argentina and Chile in the last couple of years recognize similar 
origins (the concerns about coverage, equity, and efficiency of the systems, as well as a renew 
interest in defining the role of the State in the system) but measures and processes were very 
different. These differences seem to originate mostly on political and institutional disparities. In 
Chile, there was a strong consensus about the adequacy of the basic design of the pension system, 
and efforts were focused on improving it through a process that could guarantee political 
sustainability and fiscal predictability. In Argentina, on the other hand, the basic design of the 
pension system introduced in the 1990s was under strong criticism, and many of the existing 
problems were blamed on it. Also, the reform processes were different, possibly reflecting these 
differences in approach. While in Chile there was a wide public debate, with ample participation, 
lengthy analyses, and a slow construction of an almost universal consensus, in Argentina reforms 
were enacted through decrees or through laws that were briefly analyzed by Congress with little or 
no dissent about its contents and goals. 
As a consequence of these differences, the expected results of recent reforms are also 
different. The paper discusses the impacts that these reforms are expected to have on coverage, 
benefits, fiscal accounts, and the operational and financial operation of the systems. 
Interestingly, the reform processes in both countries were conducted in a relatively isolated 
manner from other social policy and fiscal debates. While there are many differences between the 
two countries, as discussed in this paper, both reforms share two clear aspects: they increased the 
coverage of pension systems among the elderly, at a fiscal cost. Discussions on whether increasing 
old age coverage was a priority for the social policies (as opposed, for example, to larger spending 
in education, health, or children’s benefits) were mostly absent. Similarly, there was little if any 
debate regarding the implicit costs of these reforms in terms of requiring additional fiscal resources 
(that will eventually come from new taxes or reallocation of current expenditures). While these 
debates exceed the context of this paper, they are evidently relevant and should be considered 
within a wider analysis. 
This paper presents a short description of the pension systems in each country as of the early 
2000s, to then describe the stated motivations for reform and the main changes introduced in the 
————— 
1  For example, Arenas de Mesa and Bertranou (1996) indicated that the Argentinean model has “(a)… more inter- and 
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systems since 2005, to finally identify some pending challenges. The fourth section discusses in 
more detail the political process, considering how and why differences in the political process 
between these two neighboring countries may result in important differences in outcomes. Finally, 
section five presents the conclusions. 
 
2  The reforms in Argentina 
Argentina’s pension system is one of the oldest in the world, as it started to develop in the 
early years of the twentieth century. While the first programs providing income to elderly and 
retirees originated in colonial times, it was only in 1905 when a large program, covering railroad 
workers, was created. A slow process followed this, as new occupational pension systems, usually 
designed as funded schemes, were introduced. In the late 1940s a strong push by the new Peronist 
government resulted in a quick expansion of coverage, and a few years later nearly all workers in 
Argentina, including salaried and self employed, were covered by relatively generous, partially 
funded schemes. 
An important reform in the late 1960s consolidated the different schemes into three 
programs, and gave the National Government authority to manage them. The financial scheme was 
explicitly defined as a pay-as-you-go scheme, and most parameters, including contribution rates, 
vesting period, minimum retirement age, and replacement rates were unified. This scheme ran into 
financial problems as its parameters became unsustainable in a context of growing unemployment 
and informality, and by the late 1980s it was clear that a new reform would be necessary. 
In 1993, amidst serious concerns about the medium term fiscal sustainability of the system, 
looking for tools to energize the local capital markets and expecting that private management 
would make the system more transparent and efficient, a structural reform was introduced. 
In this chapter, we discuss the situation of the system as of the mid-2000s, considering the 
design of the system, its performance, and the social and political context. We then describe the 
main reforms introduced in recent times, discuss their expected impacts, and identify some of the 
pending challenges that authorities will confront in the future. 
 
2.1  The situation as of 2005 
2.1.1  Quick description of the system 
After the 1993 reform, Argentina’s pension system became a multipilar scheme, with funded 
and unfunded components, private and public participation in its management, and a combination 
of defined benefit and defined contribution model to determine the benefits paid to retirees. 
The changes introduced almost 15 years ago were, by no means, a “definitive” reform. Since 
the original law was passed in October 1993, nearly eight hundred fifty new regulations about the 
pension system were approved, including thirty four laws and one hundred and thirty five decrees. 
While many of these norms were adopted to implement or supplement the system, there was a clear 
tendency to introduce short term corrections to the system. 
As designed in 1993, the pension system in Argentina includes two basic pillars. First, 
contributions from employers (at 16 per cent of salaries) would be used to finance a flat benefit of 
approximately 28 per cent of average salaries to all retirees that satisfy the minimum age and 
vesting requirements. The second pillar would consist on a defined contribution scheme, where 
workers make personal contributions of 11 per cent of their salaries and receive benefits after 
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The law established that there were two options for the second pillar. By default, workers 
would be enrolled in a funded scheme, managed by privately owned, commercial companies. 
Contributions (net of fees and insurance costs) would accumulate until retirement, when workers 
could get their benefit in the form of an annuity or as a scheduled withdrawal from their individual 
accounts. The second option was a smaller PAYG scheme, where workers would get a benefit 
proportional to their pre-retirement wage and the number of contributions to the new scheme. This 
benefit would be entirely managed by the Government’ Social Security agency. Workers could 
chose to join this scheme when entering the labor force, and were free to switch to the funded 
scheme at any time, but it was not possible to move from the funded to the PAYG scheme. 
In addition, a transitional benefit was established to compensate workers who had 
contributed to the system before the reform but would retire later. This benefit was also 
proportional to the pre-retirement salary and the number of years with contributions to the old 
system, and was subject to the same indexation rules as the other PAYG benefits. 
A minimum retirement age of 65 years (60 for women) was established. Also, at least 30 
years of contributions were required to receive any of the government financed benefits. These 
requirements meant increases of five years in minimum age and ten years in contributions, as 
compared to the previous law. To avoid sharp impacts on individuals close to retirement, the new 
minimums were to be implemented progressively, in a period of nearly 15 years after the reform. 
Nearly all formal workers in Argentina were expected to participate in this new system. The 
three national pension schemes created in the 1960s were merged and all private workers, civil 
servants, and self employed would become part of this new system. Furthermore, a number of 
“special” regimes, designed over the year to provide a more favorable treatment to groups of 
workers that were supposed to be in a disadvantageous situation, were eliminated. The list of this 
regimes included school teachers, academic researchers, diplomats, railroad workers, judiciary 
employees,  etc. Only one exception was maintained at the national level: the military and security 
forces, who continued to have their own, independent schemes. Also, provinces continued to 
manage independent systems covering provincial and municipal civil servants, and had the right to 
authorize the operation of occupational funds to cover some professional activities, such as 
lawyers, engineers, accountants, etc. Between 1994 and 1997 almost half the provinces transferred 
their systems to the national scheme, but others have continued to run their own programs to this 
date. 
Finally, a non-contributory pension system provides basic income to poor elderly. The 
program, originally introduced in the 1940s, offers a flat monthly transfer to individuals aged 70 
and more with no other income sources. This benefit is part of a set of seven non-contributory 
pension schemes, which also cover some poor disabled individuals, mothers with seven or more 
children, veterans of the Malvinas war, relatives of victims of the military dictatorship of 1976-83, 
and other groups. After the 1993 reform, these programs were formally transferred to the Social 
Development Secretariat, although payments continued to be managed by ANSES. The number of 
beneficiaries of these pensions has been limited, at around 40 thousand for old age in the late 
1990s, and benefits were approximately 66 per cent of the minimum pension.
2 
On the institutional design, the PAYG components would continue to be managed by the 
National Social Security Administration (“ANSES”), while the funded scheme would be managed 
by commercial firms, mostly owned by banks and insurance companies. One managing company 
was fully owned by the “Banco Nación”, a state owned bank, but still operated as a profit business. 
These companies would compete for affiliates, under a strictly regulated marketing system. They 
————— 
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were supervised by an 
autonomous Superinten-
dency, which operated 
under the control of the 
Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security. 
 
2.1.2 Recent  trends 
After the 1993 
reform, the pension 
system’s performance in 
Argentina was closely 
linked to macro trends. 
On coverage, 
contributors slightly 
grew in the early years, 
but the declining 
situation in the labor 
market had a strong 
negative impact. Benefit 
levels for retirees were 
slowly growing during 
the 1990s, when there 
was no indexation of 
existing benefits but 
 
new beneficiaries received higher transfers, to then suffer a sharp loss in real values with the 
2001-02 crisis and start a recovery afterwards. The fiscal situation reflected the benefit trends, since 
the average benefit is the strongest determinant of the financial balance of the public system. 
Finally, the evolution of the financial situation and performance of the funded scheme evolved 
unevenly, with sharp changes due to the crisis and normative adjustments. 
Argentina has been one of the countries in the region with highest pension coverage 
throughout its history. This situation began to decline as unemployment and informality grew since 
the 1980s. Figure 1 shows that the percentage of the labor force covered by the system declined 
from over 45 per cent in the early 1990s to below 40 per cent by the year 2000 and then to nearly 
30 per cent with the crisis.
3 Part of this decline was caused by rising unemployment, but the impact 
of the weakening economic situation on compliance was also important. By considering the 
coverage of workers occupied (either as salaried or self employed), it becomes clear that the trend 
was important among them as well, since coverage declined nearly 10 percentage points during the 
decade. The effect was significant among those salaried (that is, excluding the self employed), 
showing that it affected all sectors of the economy. 
Coverage began to improve after the worst of the crisis and, by 2006, the levels have 
recovered to those of the late1990s. However, these trends did not impact all social groups in the 
same way. Figure 2 shows the evolution of coverage among occupied workers in the first quintile 
of income per capita and that of workers in the highest quintile. It is clear that the decline in the 
1990s and even the crisis had little effect on the richest groups of the population, while, on 
————— 
3  Coverage of active workers in Figure 1 and other parts of this paper refer to the ratio of contributors to the pension system in a given 
month and the labor force, occupied workers or salaried workers at the same time, as measured by a household survey. 
Figure 1 
Argentina: Pension Coverage of Active Workers, 1992-2006 
Note: Household surveys in Argentina inquire about pension coverage of salaried workers 
only. Thus, the coverage rate of occupied workers is somehow underestimated, as all 
self-employed workers appear as uncovered. 
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the other hand, it was 
catastrophic for the poor 
and most vulnerable. 
This group showed a 
dramatic drop of 40 
percentage points in 
coverage between 1992 
and 2003, and the 
recovery since them 
amounted to barely five 
points.  
Part of the sharp 
decline in 2002 was 
caused by the 
introduction of the 
workfare program 
“Heads of households”, 
which provided income 
transfers to nearly 2 
million individuals that 
were previously 
unemployed, informal or 
inactive. This produced a 
quick growth on the 
labor force participation 
rates of the poorest 
groups, but did not 
necessarily increased 
their pension coverage, 
as the workfare 
participants do not 
contribute to the pension 
system.  
While coverage of 
active workers fell during 
the 1990s due to 
unemployment and 
informality, this drop had 
a limited impact on 
coverage among the 
elderly. Due the basic 
design of any 
contributory pension 
scheme, changes in 
participation of active 
workers have very little 
effect on old age 
coverage in the short 
term, as most 
beneficiaries have been 
Figure 2 
Argentina: Pension Coverage of Occupied Workers, 
by Income Quintile, 1992-2006 
Source: Rofman and Lucchetti (2007). 
Figure 3 
Argentina: Distribution of Contribution Densities 
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retired for years and 
many new retirees 
completed their vesting 
period long before the 
reforms or economic 
conditions changes. 
As relevant as coverage 
in any given month, 
contributions densities of 
full career workers 
determine whether they 
will be able to retire once 
they reach the minimum 
age or not. Datasets on 
density are more difficult 
to build and analyze, as 
records of contributions 
for long periods are 
necessary but not always 
available. An analysis for 
Argentina was prepared 
by a team at the Social 
Security Secretariat in 
2002, considering the 
contribution densities in 
the previous decade 
 
for workers with at least one contribution. Analyzing that data, the team showed that there is a wide 
dispersion in densities. While some workers present an almost full compliance record, many others 
have incomplete contribution histories, which might eventually result in their exclusion from 
pension benefits. 
On the other hand, short term changes in coverage among the elderly were linked to the 
legislation reforms. By increasing the vesting period to 30 years, in a context of declining labor 
markets, the reform excluded many workers from the social security system. Administrative data 
from ANSES shows that the flow of new beneficiaries dramatically dropped after the reform: while 
in 1992-93 ANSES was granting an average of 8900 new benefits per month, five years later this 
figure had dropped to around 3600 cases. This decline had an impact on the total number of 
beneficiaries. Retirees under the national system went from 2.1 million in late 1992 to 1.6 million 
in 2005. 
The decline in total number of retirees can be seen when considering the coverage rates of 
the population aged 65 and more. In 1992, there were nearly 80 beneficiaries per 100 individuals in 
Argentina. This figure slowly declined to 68 per cent by 2003. The decline was not similarly 
distributed across the income distribution: while retirees of the first quintile maintained coverage 
rates of more than 80 per cent during the full period, those of the poorest group lost significant 
ground, going from 63 per cent in 1992 to twenty percentage points less by 2003. A small recovery 
since 2003 was probably caused by a flexibilization in access restrictions to the non-contributory 
pensions program. Between 2003 and 2006 the number of beneficiaries of this program grew from 




4  Data from the website of Comisión Nacional de Pensiones Asistenciales. 
Figure 4 
Argentina: Pension Coverage among the Elderly (65+) 
Total and by Income Quintile, 1992-2006 























Total fifth quintile first quintile268  Rafael Rofman, Eduardo Fajnzylber and German Herrera 
 
While coverage of the elderly slowly declined during most of the 1990s, the value of benefits 
in real terms grew by more than 3.5 per cent per year between 1994 and the end of 2001. 
Interestingly, no general increases of benefits were granted during this period, but the combination 
of ad-hoc adjustments of individual benefits (caused by judicial decisions) and the higher level of 
new benefits had an important impact. On the other hand, the minimum benefit for retirees, 
established at $150 in the early years of the decade, was not modified. As a result, the minimum 
benefit went from representing nearly 60 per cent of the average in 1994 to below 50 per cent in 
early 2002, and the proportion of beneficiaries receiving the minimum benefit went from nearly 
40 per cent in 1994 to approximately 16 per cent in 2001.
5 
Beginning in 2002, the Government implemented an aggressive policy to increase the 
minimum benefit, to compensate for inflation and also to increase its real value. After a sharp drop 
in 2002 due to the inflationary impact of the crisis and the peso devaluation, the minimum had 
recovered its previous real value by mid 2003 and, by late 2005, the real value of the minimum 
benefit was 60 per cent higher than four years before. Meanwhile corrections for other benefits 
were very limited. As a consequence, by late 2005 the minimum represented 85 per cent of the 
average benefit. This trend continued in 2006 and 2007 and, by June 2007, the ratio of the 
minimum to the average benefit had reached 90 per cent. 
The rapid increase in minimum benefits after 2002 increased the average, but many retirees 
have not recovered their benefits purchasing power of the 1990s. The core problem behind this has 
been the absence of an automatic indexation system for benefits, as all corrections are made on a 
discretionary basis. While Argentina’s constitution indicates that pensions must be adjustable, the 
legislation in place since 1995 established that there would be no automatic indexation of any 
variable or parameter in the system. This restriction only applied to benefits from the PAYG 
scheme (including those of beneficiaries retired before the reform), as benefits from the funded 
scheme were adjusted through the returns of invested assets. The lack of indexation not only 
affected benefits of those already retired, but it also impacted benefits at retirement. The multipilar 
system established in 1993-94 granted benefits from several components. First, the basic, flat 
benefit known as “PBU” was designed to represent approximately 28 per cent of current average 
wages. Since this benefit was not revised after 1995, its value has declined, especially in recent 
years as salaries increased. As of late 2007, PBU represented less than 15 per cent of the average 
wages. On the other hand, benefits from the second pillar PAYG scheme (known as “PAP”) and 
from the transitional component (known as “PC”) were defined as a proportion of the “base 
income”, the average wages of the last ten years of work before retirement. Since these wages were 
not indexed, an inflationary process might have an impact on them. In the early years of the new 
system, workers saw their base income affected by the inflation registered in 1989-1991, but these 
effect declined as time passed. However, the new inflationary process that began in 2002 had again 
an impact on these components. 
Figure 5 shows the trend in pension spending since the early 1980s. As these data come from 
budget accounts, it includes all pension expenditures, including non-contributory, special regimes 
(such as the military), etc. The sustained growth between the mid 1980s and early 1990s explains 
the government efforts to introduce a reform, which had a clear impact as total spending stopped 
growing in 1993, and became stable at 7.5-8 per cent of GDP during most of the decade. This 
stability was the combined result of a growing average benefit, shown in Figure 4, and a declining 
coverage, shown in Figure 3. 
————— 
5  Beginning in 1992, additional transfers were granted to older beneficiaries earning the minimum benefit to bring its value to $200. 
The number of beneficiaries included in this provision grew during the nineties, reaching 750,000, or nearly all beneficiaries at the 





Argentina: Average and Minimum Benefits, in Real Terms, 

















Source: Moreno (2008). 
 
The figure also shows the sharp decline in spending produced by the 2002 crisis. As average 
benefits suffered a drop of nearly 40 per cent in that year, the slow recovery in real terms (together 
with the rapid growth of GDP since 2003) explain that, by 2006, total spending in pensions was 
still 20 per cent less than before the crisis. However, expenditures at the national level presented a 
sharp increase in 2007, as a consequence of the recent reforms. 
 
2.1.3  The political environment: Motivations for the reform 
Argentina’ successive governments have been aware of the need to review its pension 
system for nearly a decade now. After the 1993 reform, authorities were not fully satisfied with the 
new model and pushed forward for new revisions, first through a law called “Pension solidarity 
law”, that eliminated indexation in the system, and then through other legislation to review aspects 
of the funded scheme. 
In 2000 a report published by the Ministry of Social Development (Secretaria de la Tercera 
Edad, 2000) indicated that the most critical problem of the pension system in Argentina was the 
declining coverage among active workers and the elderly. Later that year, a system reform that 
would provide coverage to elderly with less than the minimum vesting period was enacted through 
a decree, but never implemented. 
In 2002, the Social Security Secretary organized, through a consultative process with 




























































Argentina: Pension Expenditures by Government Level, 1980-2006 

























Source: MECON (2007) and Goldschmit (2008). 
 
book” (SSS, 2002), that would define the medium term strategy for the pension policy. More public 
and private debates followed these efforts, and legislators introduced several pieces of draft 
legislation to Congress, but no action was taken. 
The recent reforms in Argentina appear to have been the result of a closed-door process, 
where a few policymakers defined the path to follow in successive and not always coordinated 
steps, and little if any participation of sector authorities. At the normative level, there were five 
main actions taken since 2005 that resulted in the system design and performance as of the end of 
2008. 
First, authorities decided to reinstate the special pension scheme for teachers, which had 
been eliminated (although this had been, in turn, successfully challenged in court). This decision 
was important regarding this particular group (which comprised approximately 5 per cent of 
contributors to the system) but also as a precedent. The decree issued by the government 
established that the old special system for teachers, diplomats, members of the judiciary and other 
small groups that had been eliminated in 1994 were valid and, consequently all contributions to the 
funded scheme by these workers had to be transferred back to the public system. 
The second, and most important, reform was enacted through a series of laws and decrees, as 
it resulted in a massive increase in the number of beneficiaries of the system. The legal system in 
Argentina allowed independent workers, since 1995, to pay contributions owed before the 1993 
reform in installments, through a scheme known as “moratoria”. A new law, passed in December 
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generous financial terms. Later on, as part of a law passed in December 2004 to allow some 
workers to apply for an early retirement scheme, it was established that independent workers 
applying to the “moratoria” could retire immediately, and pay the debt while receiving pension 
benefits. In other words, this law enacted, implicitly, a scheme to pay reduced benefits to 
individuals who had not contributed enough in the past.
6 
The institutional process that resulted in this major reform was also interesting; as the last 
law was a project originated in Congress, and was discussed and approved within one day, in 
December 16, 2004. The new law did not catch the attention of the press, or even authorities, as no 
public announcement of the new system was made. Only a year later, after a decree enacted in 
November 2005
7 regulated the process the program began to operate. 
A third step was taken by the end of January 2007, when the government announced its 
intention to reform the pension system. On February 1
st a draft law was sent by the President to 
Congress and, after short discussions, it was approved on February 27
th. The focus of this reform 
was to revise the balance between the funded and unfunded schemes in the multipilar model. The 
message of the Executive Branch to Congress made explicit eight goals in this reform, as an 
indirect way to explain its motivation. These were: 
i)  to improve coverage, 
ii)  to guarantee citizen’ freedom of choice between the funded and unfunded schemes, 
iii)  to improve the equity and transparency of the system, 
iv)  to increase the replacement rate of the system, 
v)  to ensure a genuine financing of the system, 
vi)  to reduce the administrative costs of the privately managed pension funds, 
vii)  to deepen the role of the State, 
viii)  to guarantee a minimum benefit to all beneficiaries, without distinction between the two 
schemes. 
The fourth measure was taken in July 2008, when authorities submitted draft legislation to 
Congress to introduce an automatic indexation rule for benefits in the PAYG scheme. This law, 
approved and enacted in October 2008, established that all benefits in the PAYG scheme would be 
adjusted following a combined index, that includes wages and earmarked taxes growth. 
Finally, a fifth measure was announced in late October 2008, and enacted as law in early 
December 2008. This law eliminated the funded scheme, transferring all contributors, beneficiaries, 
and assets to the PAYG program. The debate in Congress was short, as the law received support 
from different political sectors, and became effective as of December 1
st, 2008. 
 
2.2 The  reforms 
If considered as a group, the reforms enacted in the pension system in Argentina in the last 
few years aimed at changing the system coverage and adequacy of benefits, its fiscal parameters, 
the role of the State and the private sector in its management and some regulations of the 
operational and investment regimes of the funded scheme. This section describes in more detail 
each of them, and indicates, when possible, the expected impacts they might have in the short and 
medium term. Table 1 summarizes the main reforms, and the following subsections discuss some 
of their most relevant aspects. 
————— 
6  The three laws referred in this paragraph are 24476, 25865 and 25994. 
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Table 1 
Main Aspects of the 2005-07 Argentina Pension Reforms 
 
Topic Reform  Description 
Special retirement 
schemes were reinstated 
Teachers, diplomats, researchers and judiciary employees 
can retire with 82 per cent of reference wages, and different 
age or vesting periods. Their current and accumulated past 
contributions are compulsory directed to the PAYG scheme 
Affiliates to funded 
scheme allowed to 
switch back to PAYG 
Workers with less than 10 years to retirement and low 
balances in their accounts switched by default back to the 
PAYG scheme 






Default scheme choice 
to PAYG 
New workers are enrolled by default into the PAYG 
scheme, unless they explicitly join a pension fund. 
Access to Non-contribut. 
Pensions 
Quotas limiting the number of Non-contributory pensions 
were eliminated. 
Moratoria 
Individuals with minimum retirement age allowed to 
recognized debt for past contributions as self-employed to 




Individuals with less than five years to retirement age and 
complete vesting period can retire with reduced benefits 
(50 per cent of penalty, until the statutory age of retirement) 
No indexation scheme  Benefits in the PAYG scheme continue to have no 
automatic indexation scheme. 
Discretional increases 
with focus on the 
minimum 
Authorities continued the policy initiated in 2003 to 
increase the minimum benefit, and smaller increases were 
given to other beneficiaries 
Benefits from new 
PAYG scheme 
increased 
Retiring workers with contributions to the new PAYG 
scheme will receive higher benefits 
(from 0.85 per cent of base salary per year to 1.5 per cent) 
Benefit 
level/adequacy 
Benefit indexation  Benefits from the PAYG scheme will be adjusted twice a 
year, considering wage and earmarked taxes evolution 
Change in cost 
definition and 
maximum 
Pension Fund managers no longer responsible for cost of 
disability and survivors insurance 








Consolidation of system, 
pooling all risks  
Elimination of insurance companies’ role. 
New scheme based on collective self-insurance of all 





New regulation establishes that pension fund assets can be 
invested on this new type of asset. A minimum investment 
of 5 per cent of total assets is required, departing from 
previous practice when no minimums were used 
Multi-pillar 
scheme  Funded scheme closed 
The funded scheme will be closed as of January 1
st, 2009, 
and all contributors, beneficiaries, and assets, will be 
transferred to the PAYG pillar 
 
Note: Reforms in bold are part of Law 26222. Reforms in italics are part of Law 26417. Reforms in italics bold are part of Law 26425. 




2.2.1.1  Enrollment reforms for active workers 
Two aspects of the system were modified in recent times with regards to coverage. First, 
active workers were moved from the second pillar funded scheme to the PAYG scheme, through 
both voluntary and compulsory procedures. At the same time, changes in requirements to obtain a 
retirement benefits had an immediate impact on the number of beneficiaries, although these were 
temporary. On the adequacy aspect, actions (and inactions) regarding benefit levels also had an 
important impact. 
The first element of the trend to switch contributors from the funded to the PAYG schemes 
was the reinstatement of special schemes for teachers, researchers, diplomats, and judiciary 
employees. These schemes had been eliminated by a decree in 1994, and it had been repeatedly 
(and successfully) challenged in court. Beginning in 2001 with the diplomats’ scheme, the 
authorities progressively reinstated the schemes, and by March 2005 the four programs were active. 
In May 2007 it was decided that all workers of these schemes would have to direct their 
contributions to the public system. Approximately 174,000 contributors,
8 1.5 per cent of the total 
number participating in the funded scheme, were transferred to the PAYG through this process in 
May 2007.
9 
A second group of active workers transferred to the PAYG scheme was composed by those 
aged more than 50 years (women) or 55 (men) with less than AR$20,000 in their individual 
accounts. Law 26222 established that these workers would be switched to the PAYG scheme 
unless they make an explicit request to remain in a pension fund. Nearly 1.1 million affiliates were 
transferred through this process between July 2007 and March 2008, approximately 10 per cent of 
the total number of affiliates (unfortunately, there is no official data available indicating how many 
of these were regular contributors). This same law allowed all workers to switch between the 
schemes once every five years, opening the first period until December 2007. In those months, 
almost 1.3 million affiliates switched from the funded to the PAYG schemes. 
These three measures implied that nearly 2.5 million affiliates, or 21 per cent of the affiliates 
to pension funds by the end of 2006, were switched to the PAYG scheme by early 2008. Many of 
them may have had highly irregular contribution histories, but unfortunately there is no official 
data to verify how many were regular contributors. 
An additional reform implemented through law 26222 was about enrolment of new workers. 
The original 1993 law established that new workers had to enroll in a pension fund or explicitly 
join the PAYG, with a default option for the funded scheme. Most workers (between 80 and 
90 per cent) were assigned to pension funds through this mechanism. The new law reversed the 
default option, and established that, unless an explicit choice is made, new workers will now be 
enrolled in the PAYG scheme. 
A final reform in this area was introduced by Law 26425, in December 2008. This law 
eliminated the funded scheme, forcing all contributors to switch back to the PAYG as of 
January 1
st, 2009. The switch included beneficiaries, unless they were receiving benefits through an 
annuity, and accumulated assets were also transferred to the public system, which will manage 
them in the future. 
————— 
8 SAFJP  (2007). 
9  While 174,000 workers were transferred in May 2007, the actual number of contributors to these programs was apparently lower, 
but many were transferred by mistake. The final number of workers enrolled in these special programs has not been officially 
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2.2.1.2  Coverage reforms for the elderly 
Interestingly, none of the reforms that directly affect coverage of the elderly were part of the 
three main reform laws, approved between February 2007 and December 2008. On the other hand, 
it could be easily argued that this group includes the most important changes to the system. Three 
major reforms were implemented in recent years: (i) a relaxation of restrictions to access 
non-contributory benefits, (ii) the “moratoria” program, that allowed many elderly with insufficient 
or no contributions to retire immediately, and (iii) an early retirement program. 
Argentina has had non-contributory benefits for many years, as part of its old age income 
security scheme. During most of the 1990s, these benefits were limited both in terms of access (as 
they were rationed and qualified applicants had to join a waiting list to receive the benefit) and 
adequacy. As coverage of the formal pension system among the elderly declined, the pressure to 
review this scheme and make it more accessible increased. 
In March 2003 the National Government created the “Plan Mayores” (“Elderly Plan”), a 
program that, as part of the workfare scheme “Heads of Households” that was providing basic 
income to nearly 2 million households, would provide a basic income to individuals older than 
70 years old and no other sources of income. This program began to slowly enroll beneficiaries in 
the poorest provinces of the country. 
A few months later, in August 2003, the restriction in the number of non-contributory 
pensions was eliminated, and new beneficiaries were admitted to the program. This resulted in a 
sustained increase in the number of beneficiaries, which had more than doubled by 2006. Monthly 
benefits were also adjusted, by 2003 they had recovered to the pre-crisis levels and, three years 
later, they were approximately twice the real value of 2001. 
The second, in chronological order, but most important change was the introduction of the 
“moratoria” program. This program allowed all individuals with the minimum retirement age to 
apply for a benefit, after recognizing a past debt to the system. As discussed in the previous section, 
this program was created by a combination of successive laws and decrees, but was never formally 
launched or announced. While the core law of this scheme was approved in December 2004, there 
were barely any new benefits under this scheme until May 2007, when the number of new 
beneficiaries reached 50,000. After that, a rapid acceleration of the application and processing 
trends resulted in a total of nearly 1.7 million new beneficiaries by late 2007, a dramatic change in 
the long term trends. Figure 7 shows how the number of beneficiaries of pension and survivors 
benefits had a rising trend since the early 1970s until the early 1990s, when the reform broke the 
tendency and the number began to decline. This declining trend continued until the early 2000s 
(with an exception in 1996-97, when beneficiaries from 10 provincial schemes were incorporated 
into the national scheme), but then had a sharp increase as the moratoria was implemented in 
2006-07. 
While data to assess the impact of this increase on overall old age income support coverage 
is not available, it is reasonable to expect that the immediate effect must have been a sharp increase 
in coverage. Estimating this figure is difficult, since there was no provision in the moratoria 
program precluding individuals already receiving a benefit (especially in the case of survivors’ 
benefits) to apply, and an important number of duplication of benefits may have resulted from this. 
Citing administrative data and authors’ estimations, Bodou et al. (2007) indicated that total 
coverage of the elderly in 2007 was around 85 per cent, up from 69 per cent observed in 2006. 
The third reform affecting coverage of the elderly was the introduction of an early retirement 
scheme, in December 2004. This program allowed workers who had reached the minimum vesting 
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with a reduced benefit. 
The program was 
designed to target 
individuals with long 
working careers that lost 
their jobs during the 
2001-02 crisis and were 
having problems to 
return to the labor force. 
While there is no official 
data available on the 
number of new 
beneficiaries under this 
program, an indirect 
estimation indicates that 
there should be no more 
than 15,000 beneficiaries 
under this program. 
 
2.2.2 Benefit level and 
adequacy 
With regards to 
benefit levels and 
adequacy, authorities 
implemented actions 
in three areas in recent 
years. The first area 
refers to the decisions 
taken to increase the 
minimum and other 
benefits, the second is 
about changes in the 
expected benefits for 
affiliates to the PAYG 
scheme, and the third is 
the introduction, after 
13 years, of an automatic 
indexation system for 
benefits paid by the 
PAYG scheme. 
The main policy 
regarding benefit levels 
in recent years was the 
sustained increase of the 
minimum benefits and, 
more recently, some 
discretionary adjustments 
in other benefits. 
Figure 4  showed  how 
Figure 7 
Argentina: Non-contributory Pensions: 
Beneficiaries and Real Value, 2001-07 
Source: ANSES, 2007. 
Figure 8 
Argentina: National Pension System: 
Number of Beneficiaries of Pensions, 
Survivors Benefits and Moratoria Program, 1971-2007 
(millions) 
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minimum benefits continued to grow, in real terms, through 2006 and 2007. By the end of this year, 
this benefit was four times the value corresponding to six years before, in nominal terms. Meanwhile, 
inflation between 2001 and 2007 was slightly over 100 per cent, resulting in a real increase of 
almost 100 per cent. Other benefits were also increased, but at a much lower rate, resulting in a 
rapid compression of the benefits pyramid, weakening the contributory nature of the system. 
Several provisions in Law 26222 should result in changes of benefit levels in the future. 
First, the new law changed the benefits to be paid to those who in the PAYG second pillar scheme 
– known as “PAP” for its Spanish acronym – increasing the benefits of this component by 
76 per cent.
10 While this change has limited effect in the short term (the PAP component of new 
pensioners will be small for most individuals), it could be more important in the future. Second, as 
workers with less than 10 years to retirement age and low balances were transferred, their expected 
benefits will also change. Had they stayed at the funded scheme, they would probably receive no 
benefit from the PAYG system, as they would never reach the minimum 30 years of contributions, 
and would get back, in the form of a scheduled withdrawn, their individual account balances once 
they reach the retirement age. As they move to the PAYG scheme, they would still not qualify for 
the standard benefits, nor would they get their account balances, and they will probably have to 
wait until they are seventy years old to apply for an old age pension (a benefit they could request 
without switching to the PAYG scheme). 
Finally, and regarding indexation, after years of political and legal controversy the 
Government introduced an automatic scheme in 2008. As Argentina’s Constitution establishes that 
pensions should be “mobile”, thousands of lawsuit have been won by beneficiaries in the last 
thirteen years, after a 1995 reform eliminated the automatic indexation scheme. As a result of one 
of these lawsuits, in August 2006 the Supreme Court, in an uncommon departure from its tradition 
of considering each case individually, unanimously ruled that the National Government (including 
the Executive Branch and Congress) should define an automatic indexation system for pension 
benefits within a “reasonable” time. Unexpectedly, the draft law send by the Government to 
Congress in February 2007 (which then became Law 26.222) did not include any reference to this 
topic. On the other hand, the 2008 National Budget Law, approved on December 2007 established 
that the Executive Branch should prepare new legislation regarding the indexation of benefits. 
Unexpectedly, in July 2008 authorities announced that they were submitting draft legislation 
to congress to introduce a new indexation system. This new system established two semi-annual 
adjustments, where all benefits of the PAYG scheme will be increased following changes in a 
combined index, which considers both wages and social security collection. The formula to be used 
was included in Law 26417, and while it has some technical problems,
11 it is supposed to combine 
changes in wages (including formal and informal workers) and in taxes earmarked for social 
security, in equal proportions, provided that this index cannot grow more than 3 per cent faster than 
total social security collection. It will be first applied in March 2009, using data from the second 
semester of 2008, and then every six months. The law indicates that, in the future, the same index 
will be used to adjust reference wages to calculate the initial benefit of retiring workers. 
 
2.2.3  Administrative costs and insurance in the funded scheme: 
Law 26222 defined two important changes in the way the costs of the system are accounted, 
————— 
10  According to the law approved in 1993 and applied until 2008, retiring workers received 0.85 per cent of their base salary (the 
average of the last 10 years), per year of contributions to the new PAYG scheme. The new law increased this percentage to 
1.5 per cent. 
11  These problems include a confusion between annual and semi annual periods. If applied literally, the law indicates that the 
semi-annual increase in benefits will be calculated considering annual increases in tax collection.   Reforming the Pension Reforms: The Recent Initiatives and Actions on Pensions in Argentina and Chile  277 
 
financed, and charged. On one hand, the law eliminated the original 1993 provision that made 
pension fund managing companies responsible of paying disability and survivors’ benefits, and 
required them to buy an insurance to cover these costs. Under the new scheme, a special reserve 
will be build with contributions from the pension funds (thus reducing the individual account 
balances) and benefits will be paid from these reserves. Hence, managing companies will not 
longer be responsible of financing them. On the other hand, a maximum administrative fee was 
established, at 1 per cent of taxable wages. This level was slightly lower than the average registered 
before the reform, when the fees, net of insurance costs, were around 1.2 per cent of taxable wages. 
The reform in the insurance model eliminated the role of external insurance companies in 
financing survivors’ and disability benefits, as the funded scheme will now self insure. The new 
system does not accumulate reserves. Instead, beneficiaries of disability and survivors benefits will 
receive a lump sum payment (which will have to be converted into an annuity or a scheduled 
withdrawal) from the pension fund, and adjustments across the different funds will be done on a 
regular basis to ensure that costs are equally supported by all participants. Benefits will continued 
to be paid in the form of annuities, provided by a separate set of insurance companies, or through 
scheduled withdrawals, paid directly by the pension funds. 
These reforms were short-lived, as Lay 26425 eliminated the funded scheme, and, 
consequently, made these regulations redundant. 
 
2.2.4  Investment of pension funds assets: 
The final area or reforms included in this discussion is the regulation of the pension fund 
investment portfolios. Law 26222 created a new category of investments, called “productive and 
infrastructure projects”. The new regulation requires a minimum investment of 5 per cent of the 
fund in this category (a departure from previous and international practice, where there are no 
minimum investments) and a maximum of 20 per cent. While this seems to be a minor reform, its 
implications could be significant in the future, depending on what type of instruments are 
considered as part of this new category. 
On the other hand, the implementation of laws 26222 (which transferred assets of a number 
of contributors to the funded scheme to ANSES) and 26425 (which transferred all contributors and 
their assets to ANSES) created a large portfolio of financial assets to be managed by the public 
social security agency. A decree approved in mid 2007 had created a “Sustainability guarantee 
fund”, where ANSES would deposit all surplus assets not used to pay benefits. This fund would be 
managed by ANSES, with support from the Ministry of Finance. Law 26425 established that all 
transferred assets would be added to this fund as well, and created some additional regulations, 
including a new overseeing congressional committee, and a council with representatives from the 
government, workers associations, retirees associations, and business associations. Regulations 
regarding investment policies were not fully detailed in the law. 
 
2.3  Expected fiscal impacts 
As a consequence of the policy making process adopted for these reforms, there have been 
no formal assessments of their fiscal impacts, either in the short or medium term. None of these 
policies was adopted citing fiscal concerns or need, nor were these concerns present in public 
debates or presentations. As of late 2008, no public institution has published a document discussing 
the potential fiscal implications of these reforms, and public statements made by officials and 
policy makers have been very broad and unspecific regarding the fiscal impacts. 278  Rafael Rofman, Eduardo Fajnzylber and German Herrera 
 
Among the different policies, the changes of affiliation from the funded scheme to the 
PAYG and the moratoria seem to be the two most relevant in fiscal terms. The changes in 
affiliation had an immediate impact on revenues for the public system, in the case of the workers 
from the special schemes and those close to retirement, as the balances of their individual accounts 
were transferred. This one time transfer of funds to the public system amounted to AR$8.35 billion, 
nearly 20 per cent of the annual expenditures in benefits by the public system, in 2007 and early 
2008, and a second transfer of approximately AR$85 billion, by the end of 2008. Additionally, the 
future flow of contributions of these workers and those who chose to switch should represent 
additional revenue for the public system, for approximately AR$15 to AR$20 billion per year. 
On the other hand, the cost of the moratoria program should be close to AR$11 billion in the 
short term, although this figure should decline in the future as access to the program was closed for 
most workers.
12 The national government spent, in 2007, nearly 1.75 percentage points of GDP 
more than one year before, an increase that can be attributed mostly to the moratoria. For 2008, the 
national budget estimates that pension expenditures will be nearly twice those of 2006, in a context 
were prices have grown at 10-20 per cent and GDP at 8 per cent per year. As a result of these 
increases, expenditures in social security in Argentina will probably reach historical record levels 
in 2008, at over 9 per cent of GDP. 
Building a model to project medium and long term fiscal trends for the pension system in 
Argentina is a difficult task, mostly because several variables, such as the real value of average and 
minimum benefits are unknown and will be defined in a discretional way. The fiscal impact of 
moratoria should decline over time, as beneficiaries die, and unless new opportunities to join the 
program are offered in the future, its effect should tend to disappear in 15-20 years. On the other 
hand, the positive effect of the switch of workers should be more stable, as new workers joining the 
labor force will be enrolled in the PAYG scheme. However, benefits paid to these workers might 
be actuarially unbalanced, which could eventually result in negative impacts. 
 
2.4 Pending  challenges 
The most critical pending challenge that the pension system has in Argentina after the recent 
reforms is, by far, its predictability. This problem arises from some specific issues, (such as the 
implementation challenges of the recently approved laws, or the uncertainty about investment 
policies for the new publicly managed pension fund), but also from an evident weakness on the 
institutional processes related to the design and regulation of the system. A second core challenge 
is about coverage. While the “moratoria” program included most elderly in the pension system, this 
was supposed to be an exceptional measure, and no long term solution to the question of 
informality has been implemented. A third problem is the still existing fragmentation between the 
national system and provincial or professional schemes, and the inequities, inefficiencies and fiscal 
problems created by this situation. 
The lack of a transparent and reliable indexation scheme to adjust all variables in the system 
(including all PAYG benefits, minimum benefits, maximum taxable wages, reference wages, etc.) 
resulted in countless lawsuits and case-by-case responses in the last two decades. The new 
legislation might solve this for the future, but since it did not include any provisions regarding past 
indexation of benefits or reference wages, there is a significant space for further legal disputes. 
Furthermore, the compulsory switch of all workers contributing to the funded scheme to the PAYG 
system might result in additional lawsuits, if some of them consider their property rights affected 
by this decision. 
————— 
12  The program remains open only for workers that can claim contributions made before 1994.   Reforming the Pension Reforms: The Recent Initiatives and Actions on Pensions in Argentina and Chile  279 
 
The institutional problem is equally relevant. Formally, pension policy in Argentina is 
designed by the Social Security Secretariat, at the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social 
Security. However, the role of the Secretariat has been diminished by the high level of autonomy of 
the Social Security Administration (supposedly, an executing agency) and, until recently, the 
Superintendency of Pension Funds. Furthermore, the roles of all these institutions have been 
weakened by an increased centralization of the decision making process, with little inputs from the 
technical sectors. 
The second challenge is about coverage. While no definite data is available, it was estimated 
that the moratoria program resulted in an increase of coverage among the elderly, which might 
have reached 85 per cent. This improvement appears to have been achieved at a high cost, as many 
of the new benefits granted under the new program went to those who were already receiving a 
pension benefit. Still, two important questions remain. First, if this figure is correct, it is not clear 
whether the remaining 15 per cent represent those who are relatively better off and thus decided not 
to apply for benefits, or, on the contrary, they are so excluded from the system that weren’t able to 
apply for this program. If that were the case for most of them, then it would be important to find 
ways to reach these individuals and include them in the system.
13 Second, the prevalence of high 
informality rates among current workers indicate that, in the future, retiring cohorts will find the 
same problem that those who obtained a benefit thanks to the moratoria. However, since access to 
this program is now limited to those who can claim contributions made before 1994, many of those 
currently working as informal workers will not be able to obtain a benefit in the future. 
The response to this problem in the future could be to introduce new moratoria laws 
(although this approach would generate negative incentives for those who contribute to the pension 
system); to adopt a more structural approach, defining and integrated model that includes 
non-contributory benefits for those with no contribution histories, proportional benefits for those 
with some contributions and full benefits for those with complete contribution records; or to simply 
ignore it, forcing individuals and families to find alternative income sources on their own. 
The third challenge mentioned in this section is the question of fragmentation. As defined by 
the Constitution, provinces have the right to set up their own pension schemes for civil servants, 
and to authorize the operation of occupational pension funds. While legal, the existence of multiple 
pension schemes in Argentina creates problems of inequities (as some provincial schemes are much 
more generous than the national system), and efficiency (as there are multiple problems of 
coordination between the different schemes). This fragmentation also has fiscal implications, 
because some schemes are unsustainable and require continues subsidies from provincial or 
national funds. 
After the 1993 reform, national and provincial authorities began a process to consolidate the 
pension systems. Between 1994 and 1997, ten provinces transferred their schemes to the national 
system, thus reducing the fragmentation. However, this process was stopped at that point due to 
fiscal restrictions and, since then, new occupational schemes have been created throughout the 
country, increasing the number of independent agencies in charge of managing the programs. In 
this context, it is apparent that efforts to integrate the programs, either by consolidating them or 
introducing reforms to make the parameters of the programs consistent across jurisdictions are 
necessary. Also, most occupational funds are run with little or no supervision, exposing their 
participants (and, ultimately, the provincial and national governments) to serious financial risks. 
————— 
13  Traditionally, non-contributory pensions in Argentina have been rationed and access was limited to some of those who applied for 
them. Thus, there is little experience in launching public effort to reach those excluded from the system. 280  Rafael Rofman, Eduardo Fajnzylber and German Herrera 
 
 
3  The reforms in Chile 
Twenty eight years after the pioneering pension reform that replaced a traditional PAYG 
system by one based on individual accounts, market capitalization and private management, the 
Chilean Congress approved in January 2008 the second largest comprehensive reform to its 
pension system. 
In this chapter, we describe the social and political context that gave rise to this second 
generation reform, we provide a detailed overview of its main contents and we identify some of the 
pending challenges. 
 
3.1  The situation as of 2005 
3.1.1  Quick description of the system 
The current Chilean pension system can be decomposed into three main pillars: a poverty 
prevention pillar, a contributory pillar and a voluntary pillar. 
The poverty prevention pillar, before the 2008 reform, was based on two components: a 
means-tested assistance pension (the PASIS) and the Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG) for 
individuals who contributed for at least 20 years to the individual capitalization scheme, but that 
were not able to finance a minimum amount for their retirement. Together, these two programs 
corresponded to the main government programs aimed at avoiding old age poverty, and were 
financed by general revenue.
14 
The contributory pillar was drastically reformed in 1980. The previous system was based on 
a number of PAYG schemes, that provided defined benefits calculated as a proportion of the wages 
received during the last period of working life. Theses schemes were running increasing deficits, 
caused by large imbalances between the benefits that were promised and the contributions that 
were made into the system. In 1980, the military government created a unique national scheme that 
was based on individual accounts where each worker’s savings are deposited and invested in 
financial instruments by professionals firms, the Pension Fund Administrators (the AFP system).
15 
These firms can freely set an administrative fee in exchange for the different services they provide 
(collection, record-keeping, investment, benefit calculation and payment, and customer service) 
and individuals can switch at any time between AFPs. 
Individuals are not allowed to withdraw funds from their individual accounts until they 
retire, which can happen at any point after the legal retirement age (65 years for men and 60 for 
women) or before that (early retirement) if they have accumulated enough funds in their account 
and they receive a minimum replacement rate. When the individual retires, he or she can choose 
between buying an annuity from an insurance company or receiving a programmed withdrawal 
stream from the AFP. In both cases, benefits are actuarially calculated as a function of the 




14  One could argue that there is another important component of the old-age social protection network: free and guaranteed access to 
the public health system. However, this is not discussed in this paper as it concentrates on the pension system. 
15  Only the armed forces, military and police, remained in their previous PAYG schemes. 
16  A detailed description of the current AFP system can be found in Berstein (2007), available in the English section of www.safp.cl. A 
number of articles have been written about the impact the 1980 Chilean pension reform may have had on social security coverage, 
financial development, national savings and economic performance. For instance, see Corbo & Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), World Bank 






savings made into the 
contributory scheme, tax 
incentives are provided 
for individuals who make 
additional voluntary 
savings in a special set of 
financial products: 
voluntary savings 
accounts managed by the 
AFPs, mutual funds 
offered by banks, 
insurance-plus-savings 
products provided by 
insurance companies, etc. 
The scheme is set so that 
the part of the 
individual’s income that 
is allocated into these 
special products is 
exempt from income 
taxes during the years the 
deposits were made. 
Interest income from 
 
these savings is also tax-exempt, but pensions financed by these savings pay regular income taxes 
when they are received by the worker. Individuals are allowed to withdraw funds before retirement, 
but with a penalty, and in addition to the income taxes that ought to be paid at the time of this 
withdrawal. 
 
3.1.2  Recent trends in pension coverage  
As the Chilean pension system has been largely based on contributions from formal salaried 
workers, contributory coverage is one of the most important determinants of pension coverage. 
Since the early system of the 1930, between 60 and 70 per cent of the labor force has been enrolled 
in the pension systems in Chile (Arenas de Mesa, 2000). The indicator shows some variance, 
depending on the economic cycles and labor markets conditions. After the 1981 reform, available 
data provides information about actual contributors, and not just enrolled workers. The ratio of 
contributors to labor force, as shown in Figure 9, has slowly increased in the last two decades. 
It has been argued, however, that more important than contributory coverage is the density of 
contributions of workers, i.e., the fraction of working life during which a person makes 
contributions to social security. Figure 10 presents the distribution of this measure for Chilean men 
and women, making evident the high degree of heterogeneity in contribution histories: from 
individuals who contribute all of their available time to individuals who barely contribute during 
their lifetime and all the possibilities in between. This heterogeneity is particularly strong among 
women, who show a strongly bimodal distribution, with significant mass in the two extremes 




17  The estimation of contribution densities was prepared considering actual data for 24,000 workers, active between ages 16 and 59.  
Figure 9 
Historic Contributory Coverage in Chile 
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Figure 10 
Density of Contributions to the Pension System 























Source: Figure 2, Berstein, Larrain and Pino (2006). 
 
Figure 11 
























































































Individuals with and without a 
Contributory Pension 



















































































































































Pension always higher than minimum pension (MPG) level
Pension with State Guarantee and pension that eventually falls below MPG level
Pension lower than MPG level and without State Guarantee
 
Finally, Figure 11 shows the distribution of old age coverage in the Chilean population. 
Approximately half of the population over 70 receives a benefit from a contributory scheme 
(currently, most of this coverage is provided by pensions from the PAYG regimes but their 
importance is decreasing every year as the AFP system matures). The bottom graph shows the 
different sources of income for those individuals who do not receive a direct benefit from a 
contributory scheme: assistance pensions, widow pensions and disability payments provide some 
form of coverage for close to 60 per cent of this group. 
 
3.1.3  The political environment: Motivations for the reform 
A number of factors may have contributed to the adoption by presidential candidate Michelle 
Bachelet, of pension reform as one of the main campaign promises for the 2005 election. Since 
Chile’s return to democracy, a center-left coalition had won three consecutives elections taking in 
each case, at least one important reform to the policies or institutions created during Pinochet’s 
17 year ruling period: President Aylwin’s period (1990-1994) was centered on creating a stable 
political environment for a successful return to democracy; President Frei’s period (1994-2000) 
concentrated its efforts on education and infrastructure reforms and President Lagos’ (2000-06) 
main achievements were a reform to the private health insurance system created by Pinochet and 
the creation of a privately run unemployment insurance scheme based on individual accounts. 
Pension reform, especially a reform to the non-contributory component was clearly one of the 
pending debts of the governing coalition. This demand for a coverage enhancing reform was partly 
justified by the first coverage studies that were published in 2005 and 2006, suggesting that large 
 
fractions of the 
population were not 
going to be able to 
finance a minimum 
pension and would not 
qualify for the minimum 
pension guarantee (that 
required 20 years of 
contributions).
18 Figure 12 
shows the results of one 
of these projections, in 
terms of the projected 
level of coverage for the 
affiliates to the Chilean 
pension system (before 
the current reform). 
A second 
important factor that 
must have been 
considered in the 
decision to undergo 
a concentrated and 
the combination of 
extraordinary profits over  
————— 
18  See Berstein, Larrain and Pino (2005) and Arenas de Mesa et al. (2006). 
Figure 12 
Pension Projections for the Chilean Pensions System 
(before the reform) 




Pension-related Fiscal Expenditure in Chile 

























Source: ECLAC (2006). 
 
strong pension reform is the fiscal space that was being created by the gradual reduction in the 
transition costs generated by the original pension reform of 1980. As Figure 13 shows, both the 
operational deficit associated with the phased-out PAYG system and the recognition bond 
obligations made to workers who switched to the new system were, by 2005, starting to decline. 
This represented an opportunity to introduce a broad social safety net for old age. 
Finally, a certain consensus was reached that the AFP industry was becoming increasingly 
assets with lack of entry over a long period were symptoms that price competition was not working 
properly in this particular market. These were certainly some of the factors in President Bachelet’s 
decision to take pension reform as her main contribution to the social and economic development 
of the country. 
 
3.2  The 2008 Chilean Pension Reform 
In March 2006, newly elected President Michelle Bachelet appointed a presidential 
committee of 15 professionals, experts in the different areas related to the pension system, to draw 
a report with reform recommendations for the pension system.
19 Two years later, a comprehensive 
bill was approved by Congress, representing the most significant reorganization since the original 
1980 reform that created the AFP pension scheme. The scheme was essentially maintained in its 
original form but significant improvements are introduced to increase the coverage of the poverty 
prevention pillar, to improve gender equality in the pension system, to intensify the scope of 
competition in the AFP industry, and to introduce a more flexible investment regime for the AFPs. 
————— 
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In this section, we review the main elements of the reform (summarized in Table 2), its 
expected impacts and fiscal sustainability. We conclude the section with some of the expected 
challenges to be addressed in the future. 
 
3.2.1  Description of the reforms 
3.2.1.1  Measures to increase extension and quality of coverage in the pension system 
The individual nature of the AFP system creates a direct link between the frequency, timing 
and amount of the contributions made by an individual and the benefits he/she obtains. Pensions 
tend to be smaller when individuals face long periods without contributions, caused by 
occupational choices or informality, make a late entry into the formal labor market or make 
contributions that are not proportional to their actual income. Furthermore, actuarial calculations 
imply that life expectancy increases require higher savings to allow for reasonable replacement 
rates, either in the form of higher voluntary savings, extended working lives or reduced pension 
periods. The Chilean 2008 reform addresses these concerns in a number of ways: replacing the 
poverty prevention pillar with a strong New Solidarity Pillar, making participation compulsory for 
a large group of self employed workers, facilitating the creation of employer-sponsored voluntary 
savings plans, creating direct incentives for voluntary savings from low and middle income 
workers, and a number of measures that improve gender equality in the system, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
The New Solidarity Pillar (NSP) 
Previous to the reform, poverty in old age was partially addressed by two main programs: the 
minimum pension guarantee, that provided a floor for pensions for individuals who contributed for 
at least 20 years, and the Assistance Pensions program (PASIS) for poor individuals with no 
pension entitlements.
20 
The 2008 reform replaces these programs with a unique scheme that guarantees that all 
individuals in the 60 per cent less affluent fraction of the population will have a guaranteed basic 
pension, regardless of their contribution history.
21 This new program provides old age and 
disability subsidies, financed by general revenues of the State. 
Individuals with no contributions are entitled to an old-age Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS), 
once they reach 65 years of age, and fulfill the affluence and residence requirements.
22 Individuals 
who made contributions but will receive a pension below a certain threshold are entitled to a 
————— 
20  As of March 2008, the minimum pension guarantee is equivalent to US$222 (US$242 after age 70 and $257 after age 75) and the 
PASIS program provides old age, disability or mental deficiency benefits equivalent to US$110 before age 70, US$117 after age 70 
and US$128 after age 75 (all US$ figures based on an exchange rate of 435.10 pesos per dollar, existing as of March 12, 2008, the 
day the reform was officially promulgated). For an analysis of this poverty prevention pillar and alternative designs, see Fajnzylber 
(2006). 
21  The scheme will be introduced gradually: in the first year, beginning in July 2008, the Basic Solidarity Pension will be equivalent to 
US$137 and restricted to the 40 per cent less affluent population. This benefit will increase to approximately US$172 in July 2009, 
and cover up to the 45 per cent poorest individuals. The final schedule of benefits will be in place in July 2012, covering up to the 
60 per cent poorest individuals. 
22  The affluence test is a form of means-testing applied to determine that a person does not belong to the 40 per cent richest fraction of 
the population (60 per cent in the first year). Initial implementation (2 years) will be based on the Ficha de Protección Social, a 
means-testing instrument that calculates the vulnerability of the members belonging to a household, based on information about 
their capacity to generate income, self-reported earnings, administrative data on pensions and need adjustments based on age and 
disability status. More information about the instrument can be found in www.fichaproteccionsocial.cl. The residence test requires 
that individuals must have resided in Chile for at least 20 years since the age of 20, and at least 3 in the 5 years prior to requesting 




Main Aspects of the 2008 Chilean Pension Reform 
 




Creation of a New 
Solidarity Pillar 
* Provides a Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS) to individuals 
with no pension earnings, belonging to the 60 per cent 
poorest individuals in the population 
* Provides a Pension Solidarity Complement (APS) to 





* After a transition period, self employed workers in 
certain tax categories will be required to make 
contributions into the AFP system, through their annual 
income tax statement 
Subsidy to 
contributions from 
low income young 
workers 
* The first 24 contributions of low income workers aged 
between 18 and 35 will be partly subsidized by the State 





* Women and men will be charged the same fee for the 
disability and survivorship insurance but men have higher 





Additional tools for 
the supervision of 
contribution payment 
* Circumstances where employers stop making 
contributions without formal reporting will be 
automatically considered as “declared but not paid” 
* Employers who will be allowed 3 additional days if they 
file contributions electronically 
Legal framework for 
Collective Voluntary 
Savings Plans 
* Provides tax incentives for firms to set up collective 
plans where workers contributions are matched, to some 
extent, by the employer, subject to a minimum vesting 
period  Coverage/adequacy 
through voluntary 
pillar  Tax incentives for 
middle income 
workers 
* Allow for tax exemptions either at the time of 
contribution or at the time of withdrawal 
* There is a bonus set by the State to low-income 
individuals who make voluntary contributions on an 
individual or collective basis 
Bonus for every live 
birth 
* The State will either deposit a bonus in the woman’ 
account or increase the amount of the PBS in the 
annuity-equivalent for every live birth or adopted child. 
The amount of the bonus is equivalent to 18 months of 
contributions at the minimum wage rate, plus the average 
rate of return of the pension system between the birth of 
the child and the moment the woman turns 65 
Savings 
redistribution in case 
of divorce or 
annulment 
* The judge can order, as a means of economic 
compensation, to redistribute savings between the two 
accounts, up to 50 per cent of the funds that were 
accumulated during the period they were married 
Gender equity in 
the pension system 
Symmetric treatment 
of men and women 
in the pension system 
* Women can now leave, in case of death, pensions to their 
surviving spouse 
* Separate contracts for men and women are set for the 
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Topic Reform  Description 
Competitive bidding 
for new members 
The Superintendency of Pensions will set, every 2 years, a 
bidding process: The AFP who offers the lowest fee will 
automatically receive all new participants in the system for a 
period of 24 months. This fee applies to all members of AFP 
Incentives for 
separation of AFP 
functions though 
outsourcing 
* AFPs are now allowed to outsource most of their functions 





All AFPs must set up, together, a bidding process to obtain 
disability and survivorship insurance. Today, each AFP hires 
its own policy 
Simplification of fee 
structure 
Facilitates cost comparison by allowing only one type of fee 
(as a fixed percentage of taxable income) 
Increase price 
competition in 
the AFP industry 
New actors in the 
industry 
* Insurance companies are allowed to create an AFP 
subsidiary but maintaining the sole purpose nature of the 
regulation 
More flexible 
investment limits  
* Only structural limits are fixed by law: other limits are set 
by secondary regulation, with advice from an Investment 
Technical Committee 
* This increased flexibility is accompanied by greater 
responsibility from the AFP, who must now set up special 
Board Committees for investments and conflicts of interest 
and explicit investment policies 
* Eventually, investment limits may be replaced by risk 
measurement and control 
Investment 
regime 
Higher limit for 
foreign investment 
The maximum investment limit can be increased to up to 
80 per cent of the value of the Pension Fund. The Central 
Bank will set it within a 30-80 per cent range 
Creation of an AFP 
Users’ Committee 
* Representatives of workers, retirees and administrators will 
make evaluations and propose improvements 
Creation of Pension 
Education Fund 
* Financed by State transfers and private donations 
* Funds will be invested in promotion or education 




Creation of Pension 
Advisors 
* Individuals who offer independent advice on the different 
choices faced by workers, and that are paid from the 




Creation of new 
institutions 
* The Social Security Institute is created to manage the New 
Solidarity Pillar (NSP), as well as remaining participants in 
old regime 
* Integral Pension Assistance Centers (CAPRIs) are created 
throughout the country to receive applications to the NSP 
* Superintendency of Pensions replaces the current 
Superintendency of AFPs, with a broad oversight over 
private and public participants 
* The Pension Advice Committee is created to assist the 















Pension Solidarity Complement (APS), with the same affluence and residence requirements.
23 The 
disability program provides benefits under similar conditions, but for individuals between the ages 
of 18 and 64. Once disabled individuals reach the age of 65, they are eligible for old-age solidarity 
benefits. 
The schedule of subsidies is best described in Figure 14, which presents solidarity subsidies 
and total pensions, as a function of self-financed entitlements. 
It is worth noticing two particular elements of this design: the strong integration between the 
contributory system and the solidarity pillar and the concern for contributory incentives that this 
integration raises. Integration allows guaranteeing that everybody in the first three quintiles will 
receive a pension equivalent to, at least, the PBS. If the benefit had been established with a cap (as 
in the disability case), there would be strong disincentives to contribute for low income individuals, 
as their retirement income would not increase with the number or amount of contributions. With 
the chosen design, old-age total pensions are monotonically increasing with self financed savings, 
i.e. every dollar saved always increases retirement income, but not by a full dollar. 
This is certainly the most important component of the 2008 reform, both in terms of 
extension of coverage and assurance that every old person in Chile will have access to some form 
of protection. Current projections show that this program alone will drastically reduce income 
inequality in the years to come. The main challenge is, of course, the ability to develop sound fiscal 
policy to be able to finance the additional cost of the reform over the next decades, during which 
the country will be exposed to a significant increase in its demographic dependency ratio. This 
challenge will be partially compensated by the gradual reduction in the fiscal pressure generated by 
the transition from the PAYG system to the AFP scheme. Since the 1980 reform, the government 
————— 
23  The Pension Solidarity Complement will be first paid to those whose contribution financed benefits are below US$161 and belong 
to the poorest 40 per cent of the population in July 2008, to progressively grow until 2012, when the benefit will reach those 
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has been financing the fiscal deficits generated by the previous regime (deprived of most of its 
contribution revenue) and the obligations contracted with the workers who switched to the new 
system. These obligations are now starting to phase-out leaving fiscal space to finance the new 
pillar. 
 
Compulsory contributions from self-employed workers 
Benefits from the New Solidarity Pillar will be paid to eligible individuals, regardless of the 
reason that originated the lack of contributions. In particular, self-employed workers are not 
required to make social security contributions for their old age. Consistent with the extension of 
coverage brought by the introduction of the NSP, the reform requires all self employed workers 
who receive income subject to income tax to make social security contributions on their annual 
earnings.
24 The introduction of this requirement will be gradual, starting with an information period 
of 3 years, followed by a period of 3 years during which workers will be required to make 
contribution unless explicit manifestation not to do so (the default option will be to participate in 
the system). During this interim period, the fraction of taxable earnings subject to this requirement 
will be increased, from 40 per cent during the first year, to 70 per cent during the second and to 
100  per cent during the third year. Starting in 2015, compulsory participation will be fully 
implemented. 
The main challenge involved in this reform will be the ability of authorities to enforce its 
application. Experience in other countries in the region has shown that self employed workers tend 
to have much lower level of compliance than wage earners. While the situation in Chile seems to 
be better than in neighboring countries (as shown by the high levels of compliance with income tax 
regulations), this will still be a difficult process. On the other side, this component of the reform is 
only targeted to self-employed workers subject to regular income tax regulations, leaving outside 
most informal sectors of the economy: agricultural workers and fishermen, small-scale producers 
and retailers, etc. 
 
Collective Voluntary Savings Plans (APVC) and incentives for low and middle income workers 
As in many other countries, voluntary savings for old age can benefit from tax exemptions in 
Chile. This type of savings is known as a Voluntary Pension Savings plan (in Spanish, an APV 
plan). This type of savings can be done through a special account in one of the AFP, through 
special mutual funds offered by banks or other financial institutions and through life 
insurance-plus-savings contracts. By construction, this type of exemption mostly attracts voluntary 
savings from high income individuals, as these are subject to the highest marginal income tax rates. 
For most low and middle income workers, who are not even subject to income tax, regular tax 
exemptions provide no incentive to participate. 
The reform makes two attempts to increase voluntary savings from dependent workers in 
general, but especially for those who do not benefit from regular tax exemptions. On the one hand, 
it creates the figure of Collective Voluntary Savings Plans (known is Spanish as APVC plans), a 
scheme that provides tax incentives for firms who provide matching-contributions plans for their 
————— 
24  More precisely, these workers will have to contribute approximately 12.5 per cent (10 per cent savings plus 2.5 per cent 
corresponding to administrative fees and the disability and insurance premium) of their annual taxable earnings. Taxable earnings 
for self employed workers are equivalent to 80 per cent of the annual earnings received under that status. There is a minimum 
contribution amount equivalent to the contribution rate applied to one minimum salary, and a maximum level, equivalent to the 
contribution rate applied to the maximum taxable earnings for social security that applies to dependent workers. This new 
requirement also includes making contributions to a public or private health insurance program. 290  Rafael Rofman, Eduardo Fajnzylber and German Herrera 
 
workers.
25 On the other hand, the reform provides two additional incentives for individual 
voluntary savings: i) workers can choose between tax exemptions when contributions are made or 
tax exemptions when they are withdrawn, and ii) workers can benefit from a State-financed 
15 per cent bonus on voluntary contributions (individual or collective) that are used to increase 
retirement benefits or apply for early retirement, with an annual maximum. 
Following the experience of developed countries, there is enormous growth potential in the 
amount of old age wealth that can be accumulated through voluntary savings schemes. The creation 
of APVC plans is particularly interesting as a new form of non-pecuniary compensation that can be 
used by employers to attract and retain good workers, increasing the incentives for on-the-job 
training, while at the same time improving the amount of old age savings from middle income 
workers. It remains to be seen if tax incentives are enough to induce firms to create these plans and 
seize the opportunity to move towards this modern form of compensation. 
 
Subsidized social security contributions for young workers 
One particular aspect of defined contribution systems is that, due to the effect of compound 
interest over a long period, early contributions can have a great impact on final pensions. For this 
reason, and the interest to decrease youth unemployment, a special subsidy is created to pay for 
part of the social security bill of employers who hire workers between the ages of 18 and 35. More 
specifically, employers will be subsidized in an amount equivalent to 50 per cent of the pension 
cost (contribution included commission) of a minimum wage worker, for the first 24 contributions 
of young workers earning less than 1.5 minimum wages. 
Additionally, a State-financed bonus equivalent to the hiring subsidy will be directly 
deposited in the worker’s individual account, for the first 24 contributions between the ages of 
18 and 35 that were made for a covered wage below 1.5 minimum wages. 
 
Additional tools for the supervision of contribution payment 
A key role for increasing contributory coverage is placed on the tools available to enforce 
employer’s obligations to make contributions on behalf of their workers. Before the reform, when 
an employer stopped making contributions for a particular worker, it was difficult to verify whether 
the employment relationship had stopped or whether the employer was no complying with the law. 
The Reform introduces a legal change under which circumstances where employers stop 
making contributions without formal reporting will be automatically considered as “declared but 
not paid”. The AFPs will then be responsible for verify compliance and pursue all legal resources 
to make the employer pay for the absent contributions, if necessary. 
Another recurrent source of verification problems is the use of paper declarations from the 
part of employers. These are often associated with collection mistakes and delays in accreditation 
of the contributions. It also makes difficult to prosecute faulty employers. The reform introduced an 
incentive to the use of more efficient filing mechanisms by allowing employers 3 additional days 
for fulfilling the legal requirement if they file contributions electronically.
26 
————— 
25  APVC follow the same principle of 401K plans in the United Status or other defined contribution occupational plans in other 
countries. Employers can establish savings contracts with any institution that provides APV individual plans (AFP, banks, mutual 
funds, and insurance companies), make matching contributions as a function of worker’s contributions, and establish vesting 
periods. Conditions must be the same for all workers and, under no circumstances, can employers restrict benefits to certain groups. 
26  Obligation will remain on the 10th of every month for contributions not filed electronically.   Reforming the Pension Reforms: The Recent Initiatives and Actions on Pensions in Argentina and Chile  291 
 
 
3.2.1.2  Measures to improve gender equality in the pension system 
Special attention was given in the reform to introduce measures that could increase gender 
equality between men and women. In general, women tend to i) have long periods without 
contributions, usually associated with caring duties over children or other dependent relatives, 
ii) be hired in low remunerated occupations (relative to men with similar educational background), 
iii) retire earlier and iv) live longer.
27 All these elements, combined in a pension system that 
provides no gender redistribution during the retirement phase, create significant differences in the 
benefit distributions of men and women. 
On the other hand, retirement and disability benefits under the AFP scheme inherited many 
of the asymmetric design elements of previous regimes: women cannot provide survivorship 
benefits to their husbands (or the fathers of their children), unless they are disabled. This means 
that they are entitled to lower benefits from the workers´ disability and survivorship insurance 
program while paying the same premium. At the same time, pension formulas do not have to 
reserve funds for husbands in case they outlive their wives, a regulation that increases women’s 
benefits. In addition, mortality tables used to calculate benefits under a programmed withdrawal 
schedule are gender specific (which is consistent with this self-insured option) and insurance 
companies are allowed to make differentiated offers to men and women. 
 
Introduction of the New Solidarity Pillar 
To address these differences, the reform considers a number of measures. The main one is 
certainly the introduction of the New Solidarity Pillar, which, by design, will be more beneficial for 
women, as they are more likely to never have contributed or done so with less frequency than men. 
In addition, benefits are gender neutral, therefore benefiting women because their higher longevity. 
 
State financed Bonus to mothers for every child born or adopted 
The reform introduces a subsidized bonus to mothers, for every child born or adopted. The 
subsidy is equivalent to the contribution of a full time minimum wage worker for 18 months, and 
receives an annual rate of return (equivalent to the net average return of AFP’s Fund C) from the 
day of birth until the mother reaches the age of 65. This benefit is subject to the residency 
requirement but is not means tested. 
Since Chile is among the countries with the longest maternity leave regulations in the region 
(18 weeks) and at the same time with one of the lowest female labor force participation rates, the 
introduction of this bonus is extremely important to achieve decent retirement income, particularly 
among low income workers. But beyond the financial benefit, the measure is extremely valued by 
the population, as a form of social recognition to the (non-remunerated) activity of giving birth and 
taking care of children during their first months of life. 
 
Economic compensation in case of divorce or annulment 
In addition, the reform introduces the legal concept of pension related economic 
compensation in case of divorce or annulment. Under this figure, a judge can instruct, if required, 
the transference of retirement funds between individual accounts, as a form of economic 
compensation to the part that presents a loss during the period they were married. This transference 
————— 
27  Minimum retirement age is 60 for women and 65 for men. The report from the Presidential Committee for Pension Reform 
suggested increasing female retirement age to 65 but this recommendation was not included in the reform bill sent to Congress. 292  Rafael Rofman, Eduardo Fajnzylber and German Herrera 
 
cannot exceed 50 per cent of the resources accumulated in the account of the contributing part, 
during the period the two persons were married. 
 
Separation of disability and survivorship insurance contracts between men and women and 
transference of the difference in premia to the low-cost group individual accounts 
The premium that is charged to participants in the AFP system for the disability and 
survivorship insurance (SIS) was, before the reform, the same for men and women, despite the fact 
that these are less likely to become disabled and do not generate survivorship benefits to their 
spouses, unless they are disabled. To avoid this cross-subsidy, the reform requires AFPs to obtain 
separate insurance contracts for men and women, to charge affiliates for the higher of the new 
premia (most likely the men’s contract) and deposit the difference for the other group in the savings 
account of the less risky group (most likely, women). As a result, women’s final contribution to 
their pension funds will be slightly higher than the 10 per cent prescribed in the law. This can be 
seen as a way to maintain a unique insurance cost for all participants, while increasing the amount 
of savings available to women at the time of retirement. 
 
Widower pensions 
As mentioned earlier, one of the main gender asymmetries prevailing in the pension system 
is the impossibility of generating survivorship pensions to widowers, unless they are disabled. As 
part of the reform, the requirement of reserving part of the accumulated funds at retirement for 
paying survivorship pensions and the coverage under the survivorship insurance are now applicable 
to both men and women. In the first case – retirement calculation – the inclusion of widowers will 
actuarially decrease the pension of the retiring woman in exchange for the additional benefit. In the 
second case, the additional coverage will be financed by a unique insurance premium 
corresponding to all women in the system, therefore eliminating the current cross-subsidies from 
insured women to insured men. 
The measures described in this subsection account for most of what can be done to improve 
pension equality between men and women through pension system design.
28 Clearly, however, 
most of the pension inequality is associated with cultural factors governing the distribution of labor 
at the household level and the labor market distortions that occur through occupation or wage 
discrimination. These factors cannot be appropriately addressed through pension reforms. 
 
3.2.1.3  Measures to increase competition in the AFP industry
29 
One of the main pillars of the reform introduced in 1980, was the introduction of competition 
between AFPs, as the central disciplining mechanism to ensure good performance, good quality of 
service, at a low cost. As participants could freely move between pension managers, expensive or 
underperforming AFPs would be punished by market forces. Reality has shown that competition in 
an industry where the service provided is compulsory and extremely complex for the average 
consumer and where benefits are only perceived in the long term, does not always take the form 
that was intended. In fact, during the 1990s, competition was strong, but based on an expensive 
system of sales personnel and presents for transferring from one AFP to another. This inefficient 
————— 
28  Some have argued that one further measure that could greatly improve women’s pensions was not included in the reform: the 
equalization of retirement age at 65. In a defined contribution context, however, it is not clear whether this is a significant 
improvement in women’s welfare, as the increase in retirement income is directly compensated by the delayed retirement age, with 
no additional wealth being saved or transferred to women.  
29  For a comprehensive analysis of these measures, see Reyes (2008).   Reforming the Pension Reforms: The Recent Initiatives and Actions on Pensions in Argentina and Chile  293 
 
period of high cost marketing competition was replaced by a short period of mergers and 
acquisitions that resulted in the current state of affairs, characterized by a concentrated industry 
(6 firms manage funds equivalent to 60 per cent of GDP), high returns on assets and no entry in the 
last 9 years.
30 
The interpretation of this phenomenon is both related to demand considerations (the low 
elasticity of demand caused by the characteristics of the product and the limited product or price 
differentiation between providers) and supply considerations associated with a number of 
regulations that affect the industrial structure of the market. AFPs are required to provide a number 
of services: collection of contributions, record keeping, investment, customer service, as well as 
benefits calculation and payment. This creates in practice a multiple barrier to entry. This problem 
is exacerbated by regulations that limit the scope and benefits of outsourcing some of these 
activities: AFPs are not allowed to outsource record keeping or customer service and they are not 
allowed to provide services other than those stipulated by law. In addition, they do not collect value 
added tax (VAT) from the fees they charge to participants but they must pay VAT on the services 
contracted from outside providers, therefore generating a significant cost to outsourcing. 
 
Competitive bidding process for new members 
The reform addresses these issues affecting both the demand and supply side.
31 On the 
demand side, elasticity is substantially increased by the introduction of competitive bidding process 
for new members. All new participants in the pension system will be automatically enrolled in the 
AFP that offered the lowest commission during the last bidding process. These affiliates will be 
required to stay in that AFP for a minimum period.
32 The winning AFP will therefore receive a 
constant inflow of participants for a period of two years, without having to incur in marketing or 
sales force costs. This measure creates an attractive starting point for potential new entrants, as 
incumbent firms cannot charge a different commission to different groups of participants (current 
affiliates or new workers). 
 
Fee structure 
Another explanation for the low sensitivity of demand, especially to the fees charged, is the 
complexity of comparison between firms that can charge multiple fees (some are constant in 
absolute terms and some are a fixed fraction of covered earnings). In an attempt to facilitate price 
comparison between AFPs, the commission structure was simplified by the reform to the point 
where AFPs can only charge a unique commission, expressed as a fixed proportion of covered 
earnings. 
 
Requiring or facilitating the outsourcing of certain functions of the AFP 
On the supply side, a number of measures tend to facilitate outsourcing of certain functions 
of the AFP. The range of services that can be outsourced is extensively broadened, and the AFPs 
receive a tax credit for the VAT paid to subcontractors. 
————— 
30  See Valdes and Marinovic (2005) for a detailed accounting procedure of the return on assets exhibited by AFPs. 
31  The reform bill sent to congress included a measure to allow local banks to enter the AFP industry by creating subsidiary firms. This 
measure was not approved by opposition parties, arguably to avoid the creation of a public AFP, as a subsidiary of the Banco del 
Estado de Chile. 
32  The affiliate can transfer to another manager if the winning AFP does not comply with the regulation or is consistently 
underperforming other administrators in a way that cannot be compensated by the difference in commissions. 294  Rafael Rofman, Eduardo Fajnzylber and German Herrera 
 
One of these services, the disability and survivorship insurance (SIS) is now required to be 
contracted by the AFP system as a whole, instead of the previous situation under which each AFP 
had to take its own insurance and these contracts were designed in a way that most of the risk was 
born by the AFP itself.
33 This created a strong incentive to compete in the ability to attract low risk 
individuals only, in detriment of good portfolio investment, cost reductions or quality of service. 
By requiring a system-wide insurance contract, the risk is effectively born by insurance companies 
and the incentive to out-select riskier individuals is eliminated. The design of the insurance bidding 
process will be subject to detailed regulation issued by the Superintendency of Pensions and the 
Superintendency of Insurance and Securities. By law, insurance coverage will have to be auctioned 
separately for men and women, and randomly assigned groups could be created and assigned to 
different firms to avoid excessive concentration of risks. 
This measure implies an important change in the way the disability and survivorship 
insurance system is managed. While its mandatory separation will greatly reduce barriers to entry 
into the AFP industry, some have argued that it will greatly reduce their incentive to contain fraud, 
potentially causing an important increase in the insurance cost of the service. This is not a minor 
issue, considering that this component accounts for about 1 per cent of covered earnings in the 
economy and careful consideration should be taken to maintain appropriate controls in the system. 
 
Permission for Insurance Companies to create AFP subsidiaries 
Looking to increase contestability in the AFP industry, insurance companies are now 
allowed to create subsidiaries as Pension Fund Administrators, subject to the regulation established 
in the Decree Law 3.500. These subsidiaries must strictly follow the sole purpose requirement for 
any AFP, i.e., it can only offer the services and products stipulated by law. Furthermore, the 
insurance company cannot its subordinate services or products to joining or staying in the AFP 
subsidiary or offer improved conditions for individuals in such circumstances. 
 
3.2.1.4  Flexibilization of the AFP investment regime 
To limit the absolute exposure of investment portfolios, the original regulation included a 
complex set of quantitative limits: limits by issuer, by emission, by asset class (including limits to 
variable income), by source of funds (domestic or foreign), etc. Most of these limits were written in 
the law that regulated the system, with little scope for interpretation or flexibility. The reform 
transferred most of these limits from the law into secondary regulations and a created a special 
investment council (the Investment Technical Council) whose function is to make 
recommendations regarding the investment policies and regulations of the Pension Funds.
34 
Increased flexibility will be accompanied by increased transparency requirements in terms of 
explicit investment policies, as well as public policies to deal with conflicts of interests. The 
reformed law includes the possibility to establish limits based on portfolio risk measures instead of 
quantitative limits by assets classes. 
————— 
33  Insurance contracts included ex-post adjustments that were equivalent to a risk transfer between the insurance company and the 
AFP, leaving insurance coverage only for extreme events.  
34  Only the main structural limits remained in the law, subject to a general upper bound, under which the Central Bank has the 
authority to set the actual limitation: A variable income limit for each type of fund; An overall foreign investment limit (which could 
reach up to 80 per cent of the funds) which can substituted by specific limits for each type of fund; fund specific limitations to the 
amount of uncovered investment made in foreign currency; and finally, a limit to investment in financial instruments issued by 
institutions with less than 3 years of operation.   Reforming the Pension Reforms: The Recent Initiatives and Actions on Pensions in Argentina and Chile  295 
 
 
3.2.2 Expected  impacts 
The reform described in this section is certainly one of the most comprehensive efforts 
undertaken in the region to both complement the contributive pillar with a strong 
poverty-prevention component and introduce a number of innovative solutions to improve, after 
27 years, a second pillar based on individual capitalization accounts and market provision. 
The introduction of the New Solidarity Pillar will greatly reduce income uncertainty in old 
age, by providing minimum coverage for everybody who does not have other means of financing. 
This will also reduce income inequality both among adults and in the population as a whole. In 
fact, it is not uncommon to see older individuals living in the same household with relatives. The 
new benefits will therefore improve the situation of the individuals, together with the families they 
live with. 
The extension of coverage provided by the poverty-prevention pillar should be 
complemented by the increased contributions made by young and self-employed workers, as well 
as the additional voluntary savings that should be raised through collective voluntary savings 
arrangements. The experience in other countries, particularly developed ones, show the great 
potential that this type of firm related coverage can imply for a large segment of the population. 
It is also expected that the measures taken to improve the industrial organization of the 
industry should reduce costs and facilitate entry of new competitors, by providing new firms access 
to a large critical mass of new workers without having to incur in marketing costs and by providing 
incentives for the external provision of certain activities. The separation of the disability and 
survivorship insurances will greatly reduce the uncertainty associated with having to provide this 
service for a firm that is just entering the market. 
 
3.2.3  Fiscal sustainability of the reform 
As the benefits from the New Solidarity Pillar were designed as entitlements to the 
population, the reform implies a significant commitment from the State to future generations of 
pensioners. While detailed information about the medium and long term impacts of the reform is 
limited, available data indicates that they might be relevant. The reform bill was accompanied by a 
financial statement, including estimations of fiscal costs from 2008 until 2025 (Table 3). This table 
presents the expected impacts of all provisions incorporated in the reform law, including some that 
might not be considered part of the pension reform in strict sense. In any case, the projections 
indicate that the fiscal cost of the reform should be below 0.5 per cent of GDP in the first few 
years, to reach almost one per cent of GDP by 2025. 
Financing of the reform was designed to maintain fiscal discipline and a rigorous application 
of fiscal policy based on structural surpluses. The main sources of financing are the following: 
•  the Pension Reserve Fund (created in 2006, and funded with fiscal surpluses), 
•  reduction of fiscal liabilities originated in the transition from the PAYG to the fully funded 
system: reduction of the operational deficit of the National Pension Institute
35 and the interest 
accrued from recognition bonds issued by the State to workers from the previous system who 
switched to the new one, 
•  resources originated in reallocations, expenditure efficiency and economic growth, 
 
————— 
35  The INP is the institution in charge of administering the PAYG regimes that are still in place for workers who decided to stay in 
their previous schemes. With the reform, pension related activities of the INP are transferred to a new institution, the Instituto de 
Previsión Social, responsible for the administration of benefits under the New Solidarity Pillar.  
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•  during the first few years (the transition period), part of the interest earned on financial assets 
owned by the State. 
 
3.3 Pending  challenges 
The most important aspect of the reform described in this section is that, rather than 
replacing the AFP system created in 1980, it improves it by integrating a State-financed poverty 
prevention pillar, extending the voluntary pillar to middle income workers and introducing a 
number of measures to increase coverage and competition in the AFP industry. It is the result of a 
two year long participatory process, preceded by extensive research and evaluation efforts. 
A number of challenges remain to be addressed in the years to come, both regarding the 
implementation of this reform and longer term aspects. In the first group, the progressive 
implementation of the new solidarity pillar will probably face risks. On one hand, the actual 
number of potential beneficiaries is not clearly known, as it partially depends on future trends of 
wages, compliance, and pension fund returns. Also, organizing the new institutions, setting up the 
conditions to fully integrate the self employed workers into the system, and organizing the systems 
to identify beneficiaries of the new solidarity benefits and make the payments will demand a 
serious commitment by the government. 
On longer term challenges, not necessarily addressed by recent reforms, the most important 
seems to be shared by most middle and high income countries in the planet: the uncertain increase 
in life expectancy and medical costs in old age. With the technological progress of the last decades 
came dramatic increases in life expectancy, based on ever more sophisticated medications and 
equipment. We currently have a reasonable idea of how long the current pensioners are going to 
live but little is known about life expectancy of the individuals who are just entering the labor 
market. It is quite possible that the current 10 per cent contribution rate will be insufficient to fund 
adequate benefits for this increased life expectancy and it is not clear that generational differences 
will allow workers to remain on the labor market long enough to compensate. Most of the burden 
will be put in the ability of individuals to foresee these shortcomings and increase their voluntary 
savings but, if pension systems were created to avoid myopia, it is not obvious that this reaction 
will have the adequate timing and strength. More efforts must be put in place to improve 
predictions over this uncertain future and the necessary – often unpopular – measures must be 
taken to increase contribution rates or retirement age. 
 
4  Institutions and policy making processes 
4.1  Motivations for focusing on the policy-making processes 
Up to this point this paper has described the design and performance of the pension system 
in Argentina and Chile, and it has examined with some detail the reforms recently adopted by both 
countries. This section will no longer concentrate on the specific content of these reforms, but 
rather it will introduce a discussion on the institutional and political patterns under which those 
policy changes have been accomplished. In this sense, this section focuses on the importance of 
policy-making processes and their influence on the features of policies and, more specifically, on 
pension policy. 
Why is it relevant to discuss this in a paper regarding pension reform? To state it briefly, it is 
because the workings of the political institutions and the characteristics of policy-making processes 
play a role in pensions as they do in other areas of complex public policy. In general terms, looking 
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public policies; in other words, public policies require policy-making capacity to be effective. More 
specifically, several significant features of public policies depend on the ability to strike and 
enforce intertemporal political and social agreements. The dissimilar capability of achieving these 
agreements will affect some critical attributes of policies, such as their stability, adaptability, 
sustained credibility, and coordination and coherence. In this manner, whether the workings of the 
policy-making process tend to facilitate or discourage cooperative outcomes in the political 
transactions game becomes a central question (Spiller, Stein and Tommasi, 2003). 
As will be discussed afterward, there are some particulars of pension policy which seem to 
aggravate the possible consequences stemming from the lack of adequate policy-making capacity 
and cooperative political environments. In the context of the market-oriented reforms in Latin 
America, the discussion concerning pension policy was frequently articulated around the “public 
vs. private” controversy, as if that choice on its own could solve all the complexity involved in this 
policy. Focusing on the institutional determinants behind pension policy highlights the potential 
influence of some permanent characteristics of the policy-making process that are beyond the “big 
title” of public system or private system.
36 
As stated previously, the different characteristics of the policy-making processes play a 
significant role in the performance of public policies. However, while measuring social outcomes 
from public policies is relatively simple, measuring institutional features is much more difficult. 
More over, in the case of pension policy, even if these institutional indicators were readily 
available, showing a clear causal effect between them and the policy outcomes would still be very 
complex, partly because many of these outcomes can be fully observed over several decades after 
the adoption of policies, and partly because other primary determinants – such as a long term 
economic growth, labor market performance, or overall fiscal development – may have stronger 
short term impacts.
37 
Section 4.2 advances with an exploratory approach, analyzing in what way political 
institutions and policy-making processes could matter for pension policy performance. After that, 
in Section 4.3, some general attributes of the policies and the policy-making process of Argentina 
and Chile are explored; even if it is a very limited account, it will illustrate some key features of the 
institutional and political patterns in both countries. Section 4.4 presents some aspects of the recent 
pension policy-making processes in Argentina and Chile. But before moving on, we will briefly 
attempt to make two concepts more clear: intertemporal political cooperation and the 
characteristics of policy-making process. 
Policies (at least complex policies, such as pensions) can be visualized as dynamic processes 
that involve multiple actors through their life cycle. This concept of policy (and consequently of 
policy reform) goes up against the more stereotypical one-shot policy implementation account, 
which implicitly assumes some kind of magical moment of special politics in order to produce 
effective policy results (Tommasi, 2004). In a dynamic approach to the concept of policy, the 
recurring specific responses required from political, social, and economic agents have to be 
considered. Therefore one must contemplate the various forms of regular interaction required 
among them. Only if this interaction is supported by positive beliefs in the workings of the 
————— 
36  In the context of the shift toward pension private administration that took place in Latin America during the ’90s, it was frequently 
argued that “privatization” would eliminate political risk (defined as the risk of any type of wrong use of funds or inadequate 
interference in pension system by the government). However, with the reforms in place, it was quite evident that things were more 
complicated (see Kay 2003) for an analysis of Argentine case). As in other areas of policy reform, the weakness of oversimplified 
messages dealing with problems of high institutional and political complexity came out into the light; these problems inevitably 
require political cooperation on a regular basis. In other terms, it seems to be clear that it is not possible to get the government out of 
the pension system (Barr 2002). 
37  For simplicity, since this is a paper concerning pensions and not political or institutional theory, we mention here the role of central 
economic concepts, such as growth and labor market performance, as if they were totally free from any institutional or political 
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policy-making game as well as some attributes of the policy itself (such as its credibility and 
expected durability), can it become a “cooperative” interaction. At the same time, the 
policy-making game is conditioned by the workings of a set of political institutions (such as 
Congress, the party system, and the judiciary). These institutions, in turn, rely on some more basic 
institutional features of historical nature (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003, broader develop this causality). 
Concentrating on the characteristics of policy-making process leads to scrutinizing the 
connection between the kind of transactions that political actors are able to undertake and the 
possibilities provided by the institutional environment. The dynamic behavior of political actors (in 
accordance with the dynamic approach to policies that was emphasized before) will primarily 
depend on the actors’ preferences. But, at the same time, their behavior will depend on their 
incentives, the constraints they face, and on the expectations they have regarding the actions of 
other players. Therefore, to delineate some characteristics of the different policy-making scenes, it 
is important to analyze who the key actors are that participate in the process, their powers, their 
preferences and incentives, their time horizons, the arenas in which they interact, and the nature of 
the transactions they undertake. 
In political environments that encourage intertemporal agreements, public policies will tend 
to be more consistent, less sensitive to political shocks, and more adaptable to changing economic 
and social conditions. In contrast, in settings that hinder cooperation, policies will be either too 
unstable (subject to political swings) or too inflexible (unable to adapt to socioeconomic shocks) 
and they will tend to be poorly coordinated (IDB, 2006). 
 
4.2  The specifics of pension policy and its political implications 
Pension policy has some particular characteristics that make the process of designing and 
implementing it prone to trouble – and much more so in countries with limited institutional 
capacity for credible commitment. 
Measured by the proportion of public expenditure it usually represents, pension policy is 
now the largest component of social policy in most developed economies. By the year 2000, 
pensions represented an average of 12.5 per cent of the EU members’ GDP (Eurostat, 2002). That 
same year, the U.S. spending on pensions explained a third of the whole federal government 
expenditure (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). Even if they do not reach the magnitude of the more 
developed world, pension expenditures in several Latin American countries are very substantial as 
well, and they have shown persistent growth during the last few decades. As it is well-known, there 
is a demographic determinant behind these expenditure patterns. As populations age, the elderly 
represent a growing proportion of the population, creating heavier demands on the working-age 
population, and so, pension policy becomes a more complex subject to deal with. 
Secondly, pension policy has been characterized by a multiplicity of goals, which exhibit 
some inherent degree of trade-off. Policymakers who design pension systems have to 
simultaneously provide the best possible benefits to the largest possible number of beneficiaries at 
the lowest possible cost (Rofman, 2003). In more theoretical terms, even the proper definition of 
pension policy seems to be a frequent subject of disagreement. Nobody denies that it is in itself an 
explicit distributive policy; however, there is no such consensus concerning what constitutes the 
main matter of redistribution, in which way this redistribution has to be accomplished, and among 
whom the policy is supposed to redistribute. In practice, the distributive function that most pension 
schemes usually perform is multifaceted, meaning it operates simultaneously on different levels. 
Probably, the most recognized of these levels is the redistribution of monetary income, which in 
turn works through multiple stages: intertemporally from an individual point of view, between 
generations and, most often, intra-generationally. But the design of the pension system also 300  Rafael Rofman, Eduardo Fajnzylber and German Herrera 
 
determines the distribution of rights (access to the system) and a set of risks (demographic, 
economic, financial, labor market). It has been suggested that pension systems also play a key role 
in the redistribution of jobs; in an overview of some empirical facts released by 89 pension systems 
in the mid ‘90s, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martín (1999) found that three-fourths of them explicitly 
encouraged retirement in order to be eligible for a pension benefit (including compulsory clauses in 
half of the cases). 
Finally, there is an aspect of pension policy that is unique. It should be taken into account 
that any pension system, in being a mechanism for distributing rights over the future social output, 
is inevitably based on some kind of promise (Barr, 2002). The temporal compromise that underlies 
this promise is absolutely exceptional. From an individual perspective, we are facing the longest 
time-cycle a single public policy can possibly run. Novice formal workers in their twenties are 
having money taken from them, in exchange for the promise that the money will be returned in 
around 40 years. As it is easy to visualize, this cycle fits perfectly with our previous reference to 
the set of risks pension policy has to manage; there are so many things that could go wrong along 
those 40 years, that it is no wonder that pension systems are such hot political problems in almost 
any country. 
In short, we are dealing with a policy that i) handles huge relative amounts of money, 
wherein ii) implicitly resides a sort of “agreement” of outstanding durability, and that iii) must 
arbitrate several distributive dilemmas of an atypical degree of complexity. In this sense, pension 
policy (much more than any spot-transactional policy) seems to be particularly suitable in 
reflecting the significance of having good capacity to perform intertemporal agreements. 
But it should be highlighted that the political challenge behind pension policy goes beyond 
the fulfillment of some specific and well-defined long-term promise. In being such a complex 
distributional issue, the concrete form adopted by the pension arrangement needs to be politically 
and socially reshaped over time. Thus, the real challenges reside in having appropriate political 
configurations to articulate, channel, and control that dynamic process. These political 
configurations can exhibit a broader or more restricted “institutional density”: they can display a 
different degree of inclusion of relevant actors; they can offer dissimilar time-horizons for these 
actors (longer time horizons make it easier to enter into the intertemporal agreements necessary to 
sustain effective policies); they can exhibit either more adequate or more deficient political arenas 
for interaction; they can assume or exclude more representative and democratic mechanisms of 
articulating interests; and they can contemplate more or less credible enforcement technologies 
(such as an independent judiciary, or a strong bureaucracy to which certain public policies can be 
delegated). 
 
4.3  A general picture of the main political characteristics in Argentina and Chile 
This sub-section introduces some generic characteristics of policies in Argentina and Chile 
and presents some aspects of their policy-making processes that are significant to pension policy. 
The purpose here is not to demonstrate but simply to illustrate a fact widely accepted in literature – 
that both countries show different characteristics in their policy-making processes as well as 
dissimilar abilities to generate and sustain cooperative political games. 
What probably constitutes the most notable aspect in differentiating public policy in 
Argentina and Chile is its degree of stability, reflected both in particular policy areas as well as in 
the core of their economic strategies. Both from international data sets and from comparative 
studies, it is quite visible that in the last decades their economic models have exhibited a different 
degree of constancy. After a comparable pro-market turn realized in the mid-’70s, Chile continued 
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The unpredictability of economic policy in Argentina has been found to produce high uncertainty 
costs from economic agents. The greater the volatility of the most important variables, the greater 
the propensity of the economy to create systematic disequilibria. An economy with such 
characteristics induces some microeconomic behaviors that would otherwise be absent and, as a 
result, the harmful influence of macro determinants on micro-structure will be much more 
permanent and visible (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1994). 
At times, volatility in Argentina has impeded the enforcement of policies the country had 
enacted and has led to self-imposed rigid routines as a means to achieve a little political credibility. 
An example of this mechanism is the management of inflation. By the late ‘80s, this problem spun 
out of control driving the economy toward hyper-inflation episodes – episodes with huge social and 
political consequences. The new administration, after a couple of failed attempts to control 
inflation, established the so-called Convertibility regime. The Convertibility was an extremely 
strict monetary rule that kept the domestic currency tied to the dollar, taking money supply totally 
out of the policymaker control (with the obvious purpose of positively influencing people’s 
expectations about monetary policy). After some years of apparent success, the rigidity and 
limitations of this regime became evident and the Convertibility plan blew up in late 2001 in the 
middle of another huge crisis, with another government leaving office prematurely. In this way, 
extreme rigidity ended up being a (very high) price to pay for extreme volatility.
38 
Stability is not the only aspect that differentiates policies in both countries. For instance, 
Stein and Tommasi (2005) have categorized eighteen Latin American countries in accordance to 
several other features of public policies such as their adaptability, quality of implementation, 
coordination, public-regardness and efficiency. In that research, as well as in several studies 
dealing with the measurement of the characteristics of policies in Latin America, Chile consistently 
ranks at the top of the scale, while Argentina is at the lowest third of the ranking. 
Even if it is not possible to achieve a full understanding of any country’s political process 
choosing single “pieces” from its institutional map, we will briefly comment on certain aspects of 
the policy-making in Argentina and Chile. 
The anatomy of political parties, the role of Congress, and the actual influence of governors 
compose an intricate triangle, which differs profoundly in both countries. Chile has two 
well-defined major coalitions, the Concertación (in office since 1990) and the Alianza. The 
electoral rules highly enforce intra-coalition discipline by reducing the incentive of single parties to 
leave them, which in turn reduces the number of relevant political actors. In a recent study on the 
policy-making in Chile, its political party system (and its links with the rest of the political game) 
was identified as the essential foundation for political cooperation (Aninat et al., 2006).
39 On the 
other hand, Argentina has also presented two major parties in recent decades. However, the real 
workings of its political party scene are much more intricate. This is related to the fact that 
Argentina (unlike Chile) is a federal country made up of 24 provinces with substantial 
constitutional powers. This difference is far from representing just a formality since the workings 
of Argentine federalism are extremely complex and constitute a central part of its political scenario. 
————— 
38  As stated, inflation is a recurring source of trouble in Argentina. In 2007, in the context of rising prices, the government carried out 
a controversial “intervention” in the National Bureau of Statistics (INDEC) with the aim of changing the way inflation was being 
measured. Every top and middle official in charge of the price indexes and other related surveys was replaced and the 
methodological changes have not been clarified to this day by the government. This episode suffered high repercussions in the 
media and the credibility of INDEC data notably decreased.  
39  The authors sustain: “Repeated interaction between the parties not only makes it possible for them to make (and keep) policy deals, 
but it more importantly creates an incentive for the parties to maintain their ideological “brand names” with the voters – thus 
constraining the sort of policy changes they align themselves with”. (ibid., p. 40). In Argentina, in contrast, ideological brand names 
of parties have been much more confusing and ambiguous. Perhaps, the most notable image of this was the “switch” performed by 
President Menem (who belonged to the Peronista Party) in the early ’90s when, once in office, surprised everybody – particularly 
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Provincial governors have proved to be key political actors, not just in their local territories but in 
the national political game. 
The political weight of Congress is also unequal in both countries. Argentine legislators face 
high rotation, resulting in a lower level of experience and specialization, and little incentives to 
become more professional (Jones et al., 2002 and 2003). In consequence, Congress in Argentina 
has not worked as a crucial arena in policy-making process. The Chilean Congress, in contrast, has 
been described as unusually professional and competent by Latin American standards, becoming a 
place in which the relatively prolonged trajectory and expertise of legislators turn into institutional 
competence (Montecinos, 2003; Santiso, 2006; Aninat et al., 2006). A strong Congress, besides 
being a reservoir of technical skills, clearly becomes a privileged arena where intertemporal 
cooperative practices can be developed to make public policies more effective and reliable. 
The workings of civil service and the judiciary could be seen as another two major 
institutional nodes in which both countries have shown disparities. A qualified bureaucracy can be 
important both in its role of implementing public policies and as an additional channel for the 
intertemporal enforcement of political agreements. Argentina, however, in part due to past political 
instability, but also to the current incentives of key political players, has not achieved such a 
professional bureaucracy. Civil service policies in Argentina during the last few decades have been 
considered erratic; the political views regarding the employment regulation regime have largely 
fluctuated. In contrast, since the turn to democracy, Chile has carried out civil service reforms 
through a more gradual and “additive” criterion, in which the different initiatives have strived to 
combine with their previous accomplishments – causing fewer policy swings compared to other 
countries experiences (Iacoviello and Zuvanic, 2005). 
The judiciary, habitually recognized as a major enforcement technology overseeing a 
country’s political system, seems to also have presented different characteristics in both countries. 
Iaryczower et al. (2002) analyze the decision-making patterns of the Argentine Supreme Court over 
decades and conclude that it tended to be too aligned with the executive branch, generating a loss 
of credibility. In a comparative study using Latinobarometer data from 1997, Malone (2003) found 
that Chileans generally regard their judiciary as more accessible than Argentineans, and that 
differences about perceptions of efficiency were minor. 
Going back to the more conceptual approach used at the beginning of this section, what have 
been briefly described here are parts of two dissimilar institutional and political configurations that 
seem to foster cooperative behaviors to a very different degree. Key actors in Argentina seem to 
have had shorter horizons and worse incentives. Political agreements are weaker, which results in 
weakened incentives to work towards those agreements in the first place. In addition, the political 
weakness of Congress has frequently moved the center of the political scene away from the 
national legislature and toward other informal arenas – ones that have not been structured for the 
institutional enforcement of bargains (Spiller, Stein and Tommasi, 2003). On the other hand, since 
the return of democracy, Chile has exhibited stronger mechanisms in its policy-making process. 
Policy changes have been incremental and, in general, they have resulted as the outcome of a 
relatively intense and institutionalized political process. In sum, Chile seems to have a 
policy-making process that tends to facilitate cooperative outcomes in the political transactions 
game, a dynamic that Argentina has found more difficult to build. 
 
4.4  Some concluding remarks 
This section concludes looking at some highlights of the recent pension policy-making in 
Argentina and Chile. The latest reforms were adopted under quite different mechanisms in both 
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political processes that have been considered. For that reason, some previous aspects of pension 
policy in both countries (and the “atmosphere” surrounding pension debate) will be briefly alluded 
to. 
Both Chile’s (1980) and Argentina’s (1993) original pension reforms were presented as 
“icons” of broader policy reform processes at their time. Chile’s reform was probably the best 
known of the so-called “modernizations” performed by the military regime. Argentine reform was 
a significant piece of President Menem’s wide pro-market economic policy in the ‘90s. In being 
such “icons”, the reforms were surrounded by a notable communication battle between promoters 
and opponents, which ended up being called the “privatization” of pensions. Borzutzky (2002) 
argued that the pension reform publicity campaign, the most expensive in Chile’s history according 
to the author, “stressed the issues of modernity and self-reliance involved in the new system, as 
opposed to the politicization, chaos, and crisis involved in the old one” (ibid., p. 217). Also in 
Argentina the reform was politically introduced as something “up-and-coming” in contrast to the 
notorious, deficient, and broken old pension system. 
But the Argentine reform of 1993 did not completely eliminate the old system; the law that 
was finally approved, unlike the Chilean system and the President’s original proposal, did not close 
the pay-as-you-go scheme and created a true multipilar model. This phenomenon has not been 
trivial in the “public” vs. “private” controversy previously mentioned. Despite the fact of its 
legitimate importance, this singular controversy seems to have dominated all public debates 
regarding pensions in Argentina. At the time the reform was introduced, authorities explicitly 
promoted the advantages of the newly created private system of individual accounts and 
encouraged people to join in, but there was no objective and well-organized informative strategy to 
educate workers about their choices (Isuani et al., 1995). 
As in other policy fields, the Concertación governments in Chile have opted for continuity 
over radical change, and they have consistently supported the new pension system. Since 1990, 
reforms to the pension system had been minor, mostly affecting the investment regulations. Only in 
recent years the question of coverage emerged as a critical problem and became the center of policy 
debates. 
On the other hand, in Argentina the terms of the discussion concerning pension system have 
persistently survived and the “privatization” has been the axis where the political and public 
debates have frequently rotated. In fact, the main message transmitted by authorities with regards to 
the 2007 and 2008 reforms has been that workers would “recover” the possibility to switch from 
the “private” to the “public” system in 2007 (which before was not an alternative), and, in 2008, 
that the reunified State managed scheme would provide better benefits to retirees. 
In conclusion, the processes underlying the recently passed reforms in both countries are 
clearly different and resulted in different systems. Pension reform has been recognized as a process 
that requires careful and thorough technical analysis, as well as communication strategies in order 
to build support and consensus (IDB 2007). In that sense, in March 2006, Chile’s President created 
a Presidential Advisory Council on Pension Reform to review the system performance, study its 
most important deficits, and carry out a extensive process of public hearings which lasted 90 days. 
The Council – which was made up of respected specialists in the field – produced a full assessment 
and proposed several reforms. Subsequently, the government established a Committee of Ministers 
to assess the Council’s recommendations, the outcome of which was a comprehensive proposal for 
pension reform that was submitted to Congress and approved in January 2008. On the other hand, 
most of the recent reforms in Argentina have had limited analysis, and were approved either by 
decree or by laws that Congress approved with no inputs from experts, civil society or 




Argentina and Chile are among a few countries in the region that have traditionally 
pioneered the implementation of reforms in social policies. The two countries are among a small 
group that introduced pension systems in their legislation in the early 1900s, and then advanced 
through different stages including more workers. In 1980, Chile pioneered again by introducing a 
structural reform that, among other important changes, created a privately run system of pension 
funds. Argentina, with some differences, followed Chile’s model a decade later, when the 
traditional PAYG scheme was converted into a multipilar system. 
The pioneering tradition continues at the end of the first decade of this Century, as both 
countries introduced important reforms to their pension system once more. This time, the reforms 
clearly shared some objectives, such as the expansion of old-age coverage and a redefinition of the 
role of the State in ensuring ample access to benefits. However, there were important divergences 
in other aspects, including the institutional organization, partially due to differences in political 
views and policy making processes. 
The reforms in Argentina resulted in a sharper, immediate and dramatic increase in coverage 
and the role of the State. The number of pensions grew by 50 per cent within one year due to the 
introduction of a generous inclusion program, that allowed anyone past retirement age to apply for 
a benefit, regardless of their past contributions or even their current status as beneficiaries.
40 Also, 
the reforms resulted in the reversal of an important component of the 1993 system, as the system 
management was unified under a public agency (thus, closing down the private management 
industry), individual accounts eliminated and the prevailing model went back to a defined benefit 
scheme. However, it is important to note that these changes did not represent a return to the pre-
1993 situation, as most parameters of the system (including contribution rates, retirement age, and 
replacement rates) were not reinstated at the old levels, and the PAYG agency will continue to 
receive earmarked general taxes (originally assigned to finance the transition costs). Thus, it is 
likely that this agency will manage a growing fund, representing more than 10 per cent of GDP as 
of 2008. So far, there have been no official estimates of the fiscal impact of the reforms, either in 
the short or medium term. 
In Chile, instead, most reforms will have a gradual effect over time. The number of 
beneficiaries of the new “Solidarity Pillar” will be limited, but it will increase as the system is fully 
implemented. This is clearly the most important component of the new law, which should result in 
a nearly universal coverage of the pension system in the near future. Other reforms affect the 
operational aspects of the existing system, and the institutional structure of the supervisory and 
implementing governmental agencies. Also, a number of changes aimed at eliminating some 
inequities in the system, especially with regards to gender differences where introduced in the 
system. 
The design and approval of these reforms followed a very different process in each country, 
as a consequence of the prevalent political and institutional context. The Chilean reform started 
when President Bachelet announced her intention, and set up a Council of experts. Two years later, 
after many debates, publications and analyses, the law was approved. In Argentina, most decisions 
were taken rather quickly at the highest level of the Government, and debates were limited and 
very short. These differences are probably a contributing cause for the different results and, as 
such, are worth of further study and analyses. 
————— 
40  As the program advances, a restriction to limit duplication of pension benefits was introduced, but it did not include restrictions for 
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The slower and stepwise approach taken by Chile’s authorities will probably ensure more 
sustainable and better calibrated results for their reforms than in Argentina. On the other hand, the 
bolder, faster reforms of Argentina resulted in an immediate response to a current problem. Most 
elderly excluded from the system received a pension benefit within a year, improving their welfare 
immediately, while in Chile the process to reach all beneficiaries will be more gradual. 
Clearly, neither system has reached a “final” design, as there are remaining policy challenges 
that authorities will need to consider in the near future, and new problems or issues will probably 
emerge in the future. The ability of future governments to respond adequately to these challenges 
will certainly define the well being of future generations of Chileans and Argentines. 
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 PENSION FUNDS’ CONTRIBUTION TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF AGGREGATE 
PRIVATE SAVING: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Ernesto Rezk,
* Mariano Irace
* and Vanina Ricca
* 
1 Introduction 
As of the eighties, and later in the nineties, several countries in Latin America began to 
assess the convenience of substituting existing PAYG earning related pension schemes (as it 
happened with Chile’s pioneering reforms) or adding (as in Argentina) privately managed fully 
funded pension systems – based on individual capitalization accounts – leaving on contributors 
hands’ (labour and self-employed workers) the decision on the preferred system. 
In some cases, the switch took place all of a sudden following bankruptcy situations faced by 
PAYG regimes, whose causes could be traced back to sharp inflationary processes and economic 
and demographic unbalances dwindling to unbearable levels the workers/retirees ratio and 
increasing existing pension regimes’ deficits; the massive incorporation of beneficiaries (especially 
self-employed) through ad hoc plans amounting to a bail out
1 and the channeling of pension 
resources to general fiscal revenues, in order to deal with the important deficits originated by a 
growing public spending and the difficulties in tax collection and public financing, must also be 
accounted for at the moment of explaining the collapse of unfunded pension schemes. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that a widespread fall in saving rates occurring by 
the time in many Latin American countries, must also be acknowledged as an important motivation 
underlying substantial changes in pension systems, as the idea prevailed that the accumulation of 
pension fund assets would definitely encourage aggregate savings (Bailliu and Reisen, 1997) and 
contribute also to enlarge domestic capital stock markets (Reisen, 1997; Raddatz and Schmukler, 
2008).
2 
The economic appeal that individual capitalization schemes have upon policy makers, 
especially for their expected positive impact upon saving rates, must however be revised in the 
light of the very often ambiguous results found in the literature devoted to the analysis of several 
countries’ recent experience. Thus, while some analysts of the micro and macroeconomic 
performance of pension systems conclude that fully funded pension schemes definitely contributed 
to enhancing private saving in countries like Chile and Singapore others find running counter 
evidences for Malaysia (see for instance Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1996; Morandé, 1996 and 
Faruqee and Husain, 1994). 
In the context of the American economy, Feldstein (1974) also analyzed the impact upon 
individuals’ decision on saving of introducing social security systems; by resorting to a life-cycle 
model, his econometric estimations showed that social security funds depressed personal savings.
3 
Nevertheless, Feldstein also explored the implications of using an “extended life-cycle model”, 
allowing people to continue working after the age of 65 and in which the net impact of social 
security regimes upon aggregate savings fell short of being unambiguous. 
————— 
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1  Those programmes, known as “moratorias”, permitted contributors to enjoy the benefits after a limited number of years of 
contribution (smaller than the 35 legally required). 
2  The paper by Raddatz and Schmukler is a particularly interesting one as the authors aim at shedding light on the very interesting 
debate of how pension funds affect capital markets development. 
3  Mainly based on the rational of a PAYG system, the idea was that the  need of counting with savings for future consumption was 
averted by retirees’ guaranteed benefits financed through previously collected social security taxes. 310  Ernesto Rezk, Mariano Irace and Vanina Ricca 
It is to be noticed that the existing theoretical controversy with regard to the real impact of 
individual capitalization upon saving rates and capital formation is related to the Life-cycle 
Model’s nature, whose conclusions sensitively react to changes in assumptions held, but also to the 
type of pension system referred to. Bailliu and Reisen’s paper (1997) is in this regard worth 
mentioning as these authors also stressed the ambiguity of pension fund assets’ effect upon saving 
depending for instance on whether there were taxed returns or liquidity constraints, for what they 
concluded that the sign of the relation between pension fund assets and saving was a matter of 
empirical resolution. 
The empirical treatment of the subject also poses interesting challenges, as shown by 
econometric attempts forced to deal with the problem of a scarce number of degrees of freedom, 
this being explained by the relatively short existence of main fully funded pension regimes in the 
world and the consequent recourse to statistical series yielding information only for a limited 
number of periods. Grouping data for a set of countries and estimating coefficients by means of a 
fixed effect panel data model, in order to reflect included countries’ specificities, becomes 
therefore an alternative to sort out the mentioned difficulty. 
In the light of preceding paragraphs’ content, the paper aims at carrying out an analysis of 
pension regimes based on individual capitalization (fully funded pensions) implemented since the 
eighties in six Latin American countries: Argentina,
4 Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, 
in order to ascertain whether they were conducive to increasing aggregate saving and substantially 
or somehow helped to strengthen domestic capital stock markets. In pursuing the mentioned 
objective an updated version of the Life-cycle Model is used to provide the econometric model’s 
theoretical background; finally, it is expected that the econometric estimation of the effect of 
pension fund assets, as well as those stemming from other economic and demographic variables, 
upon the selected countries’ saving rates, will also serve the purpose of yielding conclusions with 
economic policy implications on the performance of fully funded pension regimes. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of stylized 
facts in all the six countries; Section 3 presents a theoretical analysis of the life-cycle framework 
including social security; Section 4 conducts a fixed effect panel data model’s econometric 
estimation and analysis of results; and Section 5 concludes. An Appendix is included in which 
main features of domestic individual capitalization regimes are outlined. 
 
2  Review of stylized facts 
The review of the fully funded pension regimes in all the six countries chosen, as well as the 
analysis of determined features of their investment portfolio structure and the evolution of some 
other related variables and indicators is intended to shed some light on individual capitalization’ 
performance in the Region following something more than a decade since it came into being.
5 
A first feature deserving a comment is the relative size and evolution of pension fund assets, 
in terms of gross domestic product, as depicted by Figure 1. 
Although an increasing path is observed in all cases, differences emerge once countries are 
individually considered; thus, while the ratio reached more than 50 per cent in Chile only in   
————— 
4  As is publicly known the Argentine Congress enacted, in November 2008 and following a project received from the Executive 
Branch, a law that stopped the privately managed fully funded pension scheme based on individual capitalization. From that 
moment on, the ANSES (Social Security National Administration) already managing the PAYG regime, took over exclusive 
responsibility for the collection of all social security taxes and the payment of pension benefits. 
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Colombia, Uruguay and 
Argentina it climbed over 
10 per cent
6 in the 
1995-2006 period. Two 
main reasons can be 
accounted for in 
explaining differences in 
percentages: in the first 
place, individual 
capitalization started 
much earlier in Chile for 
what the regime exhibits 
more maturity;
7 in the 
second place, individual 
capitalization is 
mandatory in Chile and 
Mexico whereas PAYG 
regimes in Argentina, 
Colombia and Peru have 
not been eliminated and 
compete with the former 
as people are allowed to 
choose. Uruguay presents 
in turn an interesting 
situation as inclusion in 
either of the two regimes 
depends on individuals’ 
scale of income or 
wages.
8 
An analysis of the 
evolution of government 
budget surpluses is next 
in order, since the model 
to be presented below in 
Section 4 suggests a 
negative relationship 
between pension fund 
assets and this variable. 
Except for Argentina and 
Peru, as of 2003 and 
2006 respectively, Chile 
was the only of the six 
countries exhibiting an 
outstanding budget 
surplus throughout the 
————— 
6  With an average of 6.8 per cent for the remainder five countries. 
7  Nevertheless, the assets’ yearly percentage growth is higher in the other five countries as suggested by Bailliu and Reisin (op.cit., 
p. 23) due to the fact that, by being more recent, they have greater contributors/retirees ratios. 
8  People can however express their decision to be included in one of them. 
Figure 1 
Pension Fund Assets 
(percent of GDP) 
Figure 2 
Budget Surplus/deficit 
(percent of GDP) 
Source: Data from FIAP (International Federation of Pension Fund Associations) and national 
series. 
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period considered 
(Figure  2), due to a 
sound fiscal discipline 
and the setting of debt 
targets and stabilization 
funds following the 
effect of favourable 
cyclical conditions for 
Chilean copper exports. 
Contrariwise, persistent 
fiscal deficits were the 
prevailing situation in the 
rest of countries, save for 




public sector saving are 
somehow reflecting price 
behaviour in the region; 
thus, whereas Chile,
9 and 
to a lesser extent 
Colombia and Peru 
achieved a gradual 
reduction in their 
 
inflation levels to around an annual 3 per cent increase, Argentina (leaving behind the extreme 
price stability of the Convertibility period) and Uruguay, had more inflation than the rest and did 
not show evidence of theirs curbing the pattern of sustained price increases. 
With regards to another of the variables included in the econometric model, persisting 
inflationary levels caused that Argentina began experiencing decreasing real interest rates (and 
even negative figures in 2005 and 2006); however, positive real rates of interest prevailed during 
the period in the rest although variability in time showed notorious differences among countries. 
Two alternatives were in turn considered for assessing income per capita’s performance in 
the six countries, variable whose importance resides in that the theoretical framework suggests a 
positive relationship with saving rates:
10 income per capita measured in current dollars and income 
per capita in purchasing power parity (seeking data to be comparable among countries); the second 
variant seems more appropriate for the analysis as it is to be expected that income measurement 
should somehow reflect individuals’ average purchasing power. 
As shown by Figure 3, the income per capita similarly evolved in all the six countries, 
although in Colombia and Peru the variable exhibited, in absolute terms, much lower levels than 
the rest with figures only averaging 60 per cent of the other four countries’ income per capita 
(61 per cent in the case of Colombia and 57 per cent for Peru). 
It must be borne in mind, in order to better analyze the relationship between pension fund 
assets and aggregate savings, that let alone Chile whose individual capitalization regime began 
much earlier in 1980, the implementation took place in the middle of nineties for the rest of 
————— 
9  Chile is, together with Brazil, a clear example of inflation targeting in Latin America. 
10  Without much need of emphasis higher income levels give more room to save once basic needs are taken care of. 
Figure 3 
Income per Capita 
(purchasing power parity) 







1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ARG  CHI  COL  MEX  PER  URU Pension Funds’ Contribution to the Enhancement of Aggregate Private Saving: A Panel Data Analysis for Emerging Economies  313 
 
countries.
11 As will be 
seen below, this caused 
an impact on the 
variables in two ways: 
the size of the fund 
relative to gross domestic 
product and the probable 
impact of pension funds 
upon private savings. 
Figure 4 features 
the importance of when 
the regime was started 
upon the fund’s relative 
size; thus in Chile, where 
the regime creation dates 
from 1980, pension fund 
assets reached 40 to 
50  per cent of gross 
domestic product, 
whereas in the newer 
systems figures normally 
range from 0-3 per cent, 
at the beginning of the 
period to 10/12-15/20 per 
cent in 2006. It is also 
worth mentioning that, 
apart from being the first 
implemented regime, the 
mandatory and 
exclusivity features of 
the Chilean system must 
also be accounted for at 
the moment of explaining 
the relatively major size 
reached by its assets. 
Figure 4 helps also 
to visualize the impact of 
pension funds upon 
aggregate saving, 
which will be later 
econometrically proved 
in Section 4. Conversely 
to Chile and Uruguay, 
where there seems to 
exist – prima facie – a 
negative relationship 
between both plots, in the 
————— 
11  Peru in 1993, Colombia in 1994, Argentina and Uruguay in 1995 and Mexico in 1997. 
Figure 4 
Pension Fund Assets and Aggregate Private Savings, by Country 
(percent of GDP) 
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rest of countries the 
graph shows that pension 
fund assets clearly 
dragged aggregate 
savings, the effect being 
more visible generally as 
of the fifth year of the 
regime implementation. 
Argentina is in particular 
a worth quoting case as 
aggregate private saving 
kept stable between 1997 
and 2000 although gross 
domestic product shrank 
in these years as a 
consequence of an 
industrial recession 
lasting until 2001; it can 
be inferred therefore that 
the sustained growth 
shown by pension funds 
somehow helped to 
compensate a fall in 
savings that would 
otherwise happened 
following the reduction 
of income.  
As for the 
supposedly paradoxical 
Chilean case, the 
explanation can again be 
sought in that, due to the 
earlier regime 
implementation, the 
effect must have been 
stronger in the eighties 
when restrictions on 
foreign investment by the 
new pension funds 
existed.
12 In short, 
the stagnation and 
consequent small fall in 
aggregate savings in 
percent of gross domestic 
product must be looked 
at in the light of the 
————— 
12  While Fontaine (1996) recalled that until 1989 Chilean regulations banned any international diversification of pension funds, Reisen 
(1997) in turn asserted that this restriction was crucial in explaining why the Chilean domestic capital market grew in size and depth 
despite an internal climate of debt crisis and uncertainty. 
Figure 4 (continued) 
Pension Fund Assets and Aggregate Private Savings, by Country 
(percent of GDP) 
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banning lift in foreign 
investment, which is in 
turn confirmed by the 
figure showing the 
latter’s incidence in 
portfolios.  
In seeking next an 
explanation for the 
Uruguayan case, the 
saving plot’s pattern 
must somehow be 
reflecting a feature of the 
implemented system 
which notwithstanding 
the fact that it is 
mandatory for certain 
wage earner groups, 
inclusion by default is 
based on the individuals’ 
income scale. 
The variations and 
lack of similarities in 
portfolio structures, as 
shown by Figure 5, are 
the best examples of 
differences, in many 
cases significant ones, 
that can be found in 
national legislation 
concerning how pension 
fund assets can be 
invested. In particular, 
and even if it is taken for 
granted that public bonds 
will always be important 
part of portfolios, 
countries often place a 
limit to their share in 
investment composition.
13 
Despite this, countries 
have somehow managed 
to find shortcuts to the 
mentioned limitations, as 
it is particularly 
noticeable in the case of 
Argentina, whose 
legislation banned   
————— 
13  See National Legislation in the Appendix to this paper. 
Figure 4 (continued) 
Pension Fund Assets and Aggregate Private Savings, by Country 
(percent of GDP) 
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pension funds to invest in 
public bonds beyond 50 
per cent of the whole 
portfolio. Fiscal matters 
and the restructuring of 
public debt must be 
borne in mind when the 
excessive government 
bonds’ participation in 
pension funds is analyzed 
in Argentina; in 
particular, severe credit 
restrictions preventing 
the access to foreign and 
domestic financing led 
the authorities to resort to 
pension funds which 
became forced lenders. 
As for the rest of 
countries, Chile and Peru 
exhibit public bonds’ 
lesser shares but while in 
the former the evolution 
shows a downturn trend 
there is an increasing 
participation in the latter 
country. The cases of 
Mexico and Uruguay 
are also noticeable 
in that public bonds 




Colombia reflects in turn 
the average situation of 
around 45-50 per cent. 
Figure 5 permits to 
observe that the 
participation of other 
portfolio components 
also fell short of being 
stable, or similar among 
countries, throughout the 
period considered. In 
general, there has been a 
tendency, on the part of 
————— 
14  Investment of Mexican pension funds in government bonds represented more than 90 per cent in 1997, although they later stabilized 
in around 70-80 per cent for the rest of the period; the opposite took place in Uruguay as the initial participation rounding 
60-80 per cent climbed to 80-90 per cent by the end of the considered period. 
Figure 5 
Pension Fund Assets: 
Portfolio Investment Structure, by Sector 
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pension funds and except 
for Uruguay, to increase 
investment in foreign 
assets shares although at 
a slow rhythm and 
reaching a level that 
rounded 5 to 10 per cent 
of total. Chile is however 
the worth stressing case 
here as, following the 
end of the initial banning 
over pension funds’ 
international diversification 
of portfolios, foreign 
assets started to climb 
reaching to date more 
than 35 per cent of all 
applications. 
Financial invest-
ments by pension funds 
both exhibited an 
irregular performance 
among countries as well 
as a marked cyclical 
behavior in the period; 
except for the case of 
Chile where they have 
had a very stable share 
within the portfolio, with 
moderate variations 
within a 25-30 per cent 
interval, investment in 
financial assets showed 
marked cyclical 
variations in Argentina, 
Colombia, Peru and 
Uruguay whereas their 
participation was 
negligible in the case of 
Mexico. Similar conclus-
ions can in general be 
drawn for the case of 
firm shares, although in 
this case Peru was the 
only country in which the 
latter’s participation kept 
stable around 40 to 
50 per cent of the total 
public fund’s portfolios. 
Figure 5 (continued) 
Pension Fund Assets: 
Portfolio Investment Structure, by Sector 
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Lack of uniformity 
among countries is also a 
prevailing feature 
concerning the level of 
fees
15 perceived by 
pension fund groups 
(Graph 6), despite the 
fact that the evolution 
towards smaller figures is 
common to all cases; 
fees’ decreasing paths are 
more notorious in Chile 
and Argentina than in the 
rest and only in 
Colombia stable levels 
prevailed in the period.  
Fees’ higher initial 
levels have normally 
been explained by the 
need to face major 
marketing and 
operational costs 
that firms managing 
pension funds incur when 
the system begins in a 
determined country. 
Once the regime is 
established, pension 
funds gradually start to 
compete to attracting 
new customers and the 
level of fees becomes 
thus one of items 
regarded by potential 
new entrants at the 
moment of choosing a 
pension fund.  
 
3 Theoretical 





grounds based on the 
————— 
15  Fees amount to a percent of the wage earned by workers and are supposed to embody the pension funds firms’ operational cost 
expenses and benefits. 
Figure 5 (continued) 
Pension Fund Assets: 
Portfolio Investment Structure, by Sector 
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“life-cycle hypothesis” 
were generally resorted 
to in order to analyze the 
impact of social security 
systems upon savings. 
The idea, originally due 
to Modigliani and 
Brumberg and later 
summarized and 
extended in the paper by 
Ando and Modigliani 
(1963), basically states 
that an individual 
consumer’s utility is a 
function of his own 
aggregate consumption 
in the current and future 
periods. As is to be 
expected, the approach 
emphasizes that 
individuals maximize 
consumption subject to 
their budget constraint; 
that is, subject to their 
lifetime resources, which 
in turn are the sum of 
current and discounted 
future earnings and 
current net worth. 
In simple graphical 
terms,
16 and assuming a 
consumer whose life lasts 
two periods: a working 
period in which he earns 
wages and/or other 
incomes and a second 
one in which he retires 
from working and ceases 
having incomes, the 
situation is represented in 
Figure 7. 
While Y0 and C0, 
on the horizontal axis, 
respectively stand for the 
individual’s earnings and 
consumption in period 0, 
Y1 and C1 in turn 
————— 
16  This diagrammatical analysis highly relies on Feldstein (1974). 
Figure 6 
Variabile Fees 
(percent of wage) 
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represent income and consumption in period 1. Assuming that the individual only receives earnings 
during his working life (Y0,a), and that there is neither social security taxes nor pension benefits, 
(C0,a) will indicate the desired level of current consumption resulting from the tangency between 
the utility function and the budget line; the individual’s saving decision in the pre retirement period 
– amounting to (Y0,a – C0,a) and resulting from the rate of interest implied by the slope of the budget 
line and the current income and consumption – allows him to enjoy a level of consumption equal to 
(C1,a) in period 1. 
Figure 7 also permits to analyze how the introduction of social security regimes,
17 whose 
benefits are financed by collecting social security taxes, affects individual’s savings. The collection 
of a tax immediately causes the current disposable income to reduce by the amount of the payroll 
tax, in this case (Y0,a – Y0,b) and savings to dwindle also to a new level equal to (Y0,b – C0,a); 
nevertheless, the equilibrium position indicated in E still holds as, by keeping unaltered the original 
budget line and its slope, benefits paid in the second period (out of capitalized taxes) will still 
guarantee the consumption level (C1,a). The assertion of savings’ reduction seems thus to be correct 
and based on the following two accounts: the reduction of disposable income and the ultrarational 
idea that payroll taxes are perfectly substituting the impact of private saving fall upon future 
consumption. 
The implication that social security regimes always have a negative impact upon savings has 
not however gone unchallenged in the related literature, as soon as one departs from the framework 
of analysis provided by simpler versions of the life-cycle model. Feldstein (1974) himself quoted 
authors’ yielding empirical evidence on that people covered by fully funded regimes save even 
more than those uncovered individuals, based on a “recognition effect”
18 emerging when people 
entering a private pension plan realize the benefits of saving for their old age (educational effect) 
and change their utility function, or a “goal gradient hypothesis”
19 whereby efforts are intensified 
the closer people are to set goals. 
Nevertheless, the dual effect of social security systems upon saving levels has appropriately 
been analyzed by Feldstein (1974), as shown in Figure 8, whose crucial contribution was to extend 
the traditional life-cycle model in order to allow for endogenous retirement ages. 
As can be seen, the budget line’s parallel displacement AN denotes the fact that the 
individual decides not to retire at the age of 65 and earns also incomes in period 1;
20 the situation 
regarding consumption and saving will now be C0,c and (Y0,a – C0,c) respectively whereas E’ 
indicates now the new equilibrium position. By assuming that a social security system is 
introduced, forcing the individual to retire at the age of 65, it is easily noticed that the situation 
reverts to point B in Figure 8 since the social security tax reduces period 0’s disposable income and 
the compulsory retirement makes no possible to have earnings in period 1. 
Since the situation indicated by B means that E is still the equilibrium position for 
consumption, the resulting saving level (Y0,b – C0,a) will in this case be larger than (Y0,a – C0,c) 
showing what Feldstein termed as the dual effect of social security; that is, when individuals retire 
at the age of 65, social security taxes have the unambiguous effect of reducing saving while for 
those working beyond 65 social security systems may induce early retirement and the effect of 
benefits upon savings will in this case be ambiguous. 
————— 
17  As will be shown, results more clearly depict the case of unfunded PAYG regimes. 
18  First stated by Cagan (1965). 
19  See Katona (1965, p. 4). 
20  As Feldstein (1974) stressed it, N stands for the individual’s initial position with incomes in the second period in addition to keeping 
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A very interesting 
theoretical analysis of the 
impact of voluntary and 
mandatory fully funded 
pension schemes was in 
turn provided by Bailliu 
and Reisen (op. cit.) who 
extended the traditional 
life-cycle model by 
allowing for the 
possibility of hetero-
geneous individuals, in 
terms of their saving 
capacity and of liquidity 
restraints. 
By modifying 
Figure 7, for homogeneous 
individuals, a scenario 
with low and high 
income earners
21 is 
presented in Figure 9 in 
which hypotheses of 
limited and unlimited tax 
exempt pensions, and 
taxable and tax exempt 
returns, are successively 
considered in order to 
assess the impact of fully 
funded pension funds 
upon savings. 
Figure 9 exhibits 
several modifications 
relative to the case 
shown earlier and 
developed by 
Feldstein: in the first 
place, while the budget 
line AD stands – as 
before – for disposable 
income, the new kinked 
line AF resulting from 
introducing a fully 
funded system with 
pension contributions 
only untaxed up to a 
determined amount 
depicts how untaxed 
————— 
21  Needless to emphasize, the implication of having heterogeneous  agents is that low income persons save little or lesser than high 
income ones.  
Figure 8 
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returns raise income more steeply for low savers (AL3 line) whereas tax exempt incomes for high 
savers is indicated by the parallel displacement of the budget line over the section L3F. 
If a voluntary pension fund regime, with untaxed contributions limited up to AG, is 
established, low savers’ final decision on consumption and saving will result from substitution and 
income effects: on the basis of the former one, a displacement over the broken line parallel to the 
new budget constraint will take place between L0
22 and L1, influenced by the higher rate of interest 
implicit in A L3 whereas the income effect will be in turn responsible for the motion towards L2. 
The outcome clearly shows that the impact of voluntary pension fund systems upon savings, when 
there exists a limit to low savers’ untaxed contributions, falls short of being unambiguous: in the 
case drawn, the income effect prevailed over the substitution effect, consumption increased from 
C0,a to C’0,a and saving consequently shrank; should substitution effects had succeeded in 
stimulating savings, consumption would have ended somewhere to the left of C0,a. As, by keeping 
unchanged the interest rate in the budget line relevant section, high savers’ decision will only be 
influenced by the income effect (H0 to H1) and consumption and savings will increase and fall 
respectively for what, and given their relatively higher economic weight, the overall result will 
undoubtedly be a saving net fall. 
Voluntary funded pension regimes hold however the chance of promoting savings when 
limits on untaxed contributions are abolished or not set, as indicated by the broken section L3H of 
the budget line; in such a case, substitution effects may influence both the behaviour of low and 
high savers, and prevail over income effects, making a net increase in savings a likely result.
23 
Figure 9 permits also to show Bailliu and Reisen’s assertion that savings unambiguously 
grow when a mandatory pension fund system, with taxable returns, is resorted to as the chosen 
social security regime. When contributions to the fund are mandatory low savers will displace from 
position L0 to L3, if pensions are tax exempted and to L4 if they are not; in either case, the new 
consumption level will be C’’0,a and the saving level will be greater than the ones implied by L0 or 
L2 over the respective budget lines. In terms of total net savings, compulsory pension funds with 
taxable returns are a good option as the mentioned low savers’ increase in savings will not be 
impaired by the behaviour of high savers who, in not having the influence of income effects, will 
choose to stay in H0. 
In furthering the analysis of pension funds’ impact upon aggregate savings, Bailliu and 
Reisin (op.cit.) introduced the case in which liquidity constraints strengthen mandatory pension 
funds’ capability of increasing private savings, as shown by Figure 10. 
Figure 10 depicts a mandatory pension fund, with taxable returns, in which liquidity 
constraints are highlighted by the dotted line passing through L3 whose slope, higher than AL3, 
stands for low savers’ borrowing costs. If the regime forces the individual to place himself at L4, as 
indicated above when pensions are taxed, he could only move to consumption level C’0,a > C’’0,a 
(corresponding to position L2 over the budget line) only by resorting to borrowing against pensions 
assets, which is precisely averted by loans’ interest rates being much higher than the rate of return 
implicit in the budget line.
24 In sum, and as pointed out by the authors, stimulated and high private 
savings require liquidity constraints to remain as tight as possible. 
It is here worth quoting than Bailliu-Reisin’s arguments had been raised earlier by Blinder 
(1982) who, in analyzing the relationship between pension funds and savings, concluded that 
————— 
22  Let it be noticed that L0 corresponds with the equilibrium situation depicted by point E in Figures 1 and 2. 
23  Nevertheless, Bailliu and Reisin (op. cit.) contend that, in this case, increases in private savings will be compensated by decreases in 
government savings and the net result is still an unknown. 
24  It is to be noticed that only to the extent that the borrowing cost line flattens, in the direction of the budget line, income and 
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borrowing constraints 
would increase savings 
should the pensions 
impose binding capital 
markets constraints, as 
portrayed in Figure 11. 
Thus, E1 depicts 
the endowment point, 
corresponding to 
incomes Y0 and Y1 
respectively whereas A 
indicates that – with no 
pensions – the optima 
consumption levels C0 
and C1; a mandatory 
pension will lead to a 
corner solution like E2 
which will in turn force 
the highest saving level, 
as consumption falls to γ0 
in period 0 while it 
climbs up to γ1 in the next 
period. 
Blinder also made 
the interesting point that 
while expansions in 
private pensions, in the 
presence of capital 
market imperfections, 
will raise savings, social 
security systems of the 
PAYG system will likely 
not as – based on the 
Modigliani Miller 
Theorem’s implications – 
saving in the latter case is 
solely aimed at financing 
consumption on 
retirement for what, and 
with no borrowing 
restraints, while private 
(funded) pension plans 
will not have any 
effect upon savings 
social security taxes 
in unfunded regimes will 
in fact reduce savings, as 
shown above with 
Feldstein’s developments. 
Figure 10 
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4  Fixed effect panel data model’s econometric estimation and results 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the relationship between aggregate private savings and 
pension fund assets will be assessed within the framework of a panel data model of the six 
countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay) and using series for the period 
1995-2006. As quoted earlier, the recourse to the panel data model aims at sorting out the problem 
of degrees of freedom stemming from data’s scarcity.
25 
The fixed effect variant was considered in place of pooled estimation as, by letting 
intersections to vary with each country,
26 it permits to capture countries’ particular features and yet 
consider similar variables’ coefficients or common slopes for all the cross section units. In line with 
this, each of the estimated regressions included country’s specific individual effects captured by 
means of a specific dummy variable for each cross section unit or country.
27 
Since not only the impact of pension fund assets over aggregate private savings but also of 
other economic and demographic variables will be analyzed, the econometric specification is fully 
described by the ensuing equation: 
 Y it = β1i + β2X2it + β3X3it + β4X4it + β5X5it + β6X6it + β7X7it + β8X8it + μit 
in which: 
Yit  stands for the dependent variable aggregate private savings, in terms of gross domestic 
product, for country i and for period t (PASV), and 
β1i  represents countries’ specific intersection, whereas the explanatory variables are in turn 
represented by: 
X2it  pension fund assets, in terms of gross domestic product, for country i and for period t (PFS) 
and whose coefficient’s sign is expected to be positive, indicating its stimulating effect upon 
savings, 
X3it  government budget surplus, in percent of gross domestic product, for country i and for 
period t (GOVS). As the hypothesis is being held that budget surpluses exert crowding out 
effects upon the private sector, the coefficient’s sign for this variable is expected to be 
unambiguously negative,
28 
X4it  domestic credit (loans) to the private sector, in percent of gross domestic product, for 
country i and for period t (PRICR). The coefficient’s sign is expected to be negative as the 
implication holds that the more accessible credits are, the more consumption will be eased 
and individuals will be less worried about their future and for building precautionary 
savings, 
X5it  short term nominal or real active interest rate, for country i and for period t (NIR-RIR). The 
ambiguity of the coefficient’s sign stems in this case of the possibility of substitution effects 
prevailing over income effects (positive sign) but also of the opposite actually holding 
(negative sign), as was already analyzed in Figure 3 above,
29 
————— 
25  Chile was the only of the six countries in which the individual capitalization system was already working in the nineties, when the 
rest introduced fully funded regimes. 
26  Nevertheless, intersections are invariant with respect to time. 
27  Following Greene (2007), in including constants, each dummy represents the country’s  differential effect relative to the base unit, 
in this case Argentina. In other words, the fixed effect model captures differences among units through differences in the constant. 
28  This assumption goes in line with Bailey’s idea of ultrarationality between public and private saving, which is simply an application 
of the Modigliani-Miller theorem for the specific case of government finance. See David and Scadding, pp. 239-42. 
29  The sign will also be influenced by borrowing constraints; that is, should the interest rate be to heavy for potential borrowers, these 
will be discouraged from resorting to bank loans and stimulated to save (see Figure 4 above). Pension Funds’ Contribution to the Enhancement of Aggregate Private Saving: A Panel Data Analysis for Emerging Economies  325 
X6it  dependence index standing for the ratio between depending people (inactive individuals 
placed outside labour markets either for not having yet reached the age, for having reached 
the legal age of retirement or for being unemployed) and working people (whose used proxy 
here is the employed economically active population) (DI). Needless to emphasize, the 
coefficient’s sign is expected to be negative as, following the ratio increase (indicating a 
prevalence of inactive over active people) the economy’s earned incomes and savings 
depress, 
X7it  per capita income level, as represented by the current per capita gross domestic product or 
the gross domestic product in purchasing power parity, for country i and for period t 
(GDP-PGDP). Given that savings are expected to increase following increases in gross 
domestic product, the variable’s coefficient must necessary bear a positive sign, indicating a 
direct relationship between the dependent and this explanatory variable, 
X8it  gross domestic product’s rate of growth, for country i and for period t (GDPGR). The 
coefficient’s sign is expected to be in this case unambiguously positive as increases in this 
variable’s rate of growth will move earners to higher income levels and to lower marginal 
propensities to consume
30 and, finally, 
μit  stands for the error term meeting the classical assumptions. 
Tables 1 through 4 below include results of the diverse econometric estimations carried out, 
depending on whether nominal or real interest rates and per capita gross domestic product in 
dollars or in purchasing power parity are used for obtaining the variables’ coefficients. 
The modified Wald test was applied in order to detect the likely existence of 
heteroskedasticity in the fixed effect regression model. As known, heteroskedasticity arises when 
the null hypothesis stating that errors have homogeneous variances
31 is rejected. The possibility of 
autocorrelation was assessed by running the Wooldridge test in order to confirm or discard the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
Whenever heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation could not be ruled out FGLS (Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares) were resorted to since this method permits to use an error variance 
matrix in which these effects are accounted for at the moment of performing the estimations. 
A first comment, regarding results yielded by econometric estimations (Tables 1 through 4) 
is that variables’ coefficients, save for the case of the dependence index, exhibit statistical 
significance at the 5 or 10 per cent levels and bear the expected signs according to the underlying 
theoretical framework. 
Econometric estimations also supplied widespread and conclusive support to the crucial 
assumption of the positive impact of pension fund assets upon aggregate private savings; in this 
regard, results confirm that the variable’s coefficient is significantly different from 0 in all cases 
but the third variant shown, in which the explanatory power seems to be taken by the real interest 
rate and the per capita gross domestic product in purchasing power parity. Let it be noticed that 
these results run counter the ones obtained by Bailliu and Reisin (1997) who, for a sample of 
eleven countries, could show a positive impact of pension fund assets upon private savings only 
when the former were demographically adjusted instead of being presented in percentage of gross 
domestic product. 
————— 
30  Bailliu and Reisen’s explanation for the sign places the emphasis on the life-cycle hypothesis’ implication whereby in growing 
economies saving by the workers will increase relative to dissaving by the retired (1997, p. 32). 
31  Homoskedasticity would in turn mean a standing null hypothesis stating that H0: 
2
i σ  =  







Modified Wald Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
2 χ (6) = 30.51  p-value = 0.0000 
 
 
Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation in panel data 
F(1, 5) = 75.425  p-value = 0.0003 
 
 
Dependent variable: PASV 
Sample: 1995-2006 
Included observations: 62 
 
 
Coefficients: Generalized least squares 
Panels: Heteroskedastic 
Correlation: Common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.4789) 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error t-statistics  p-value 
PFS .1621637  .0628633  2.58
* 0.010 
GOVS –.2781099  .1356909  –2.05
* 0.040 
PRICR –.0568928  .0329231  –1.73
** 0.084 
NIR .0816378  .0156141  5.23
* 0.000 
DI –.0331060  .2806352  –0.12  0.906 
GDP .0006660  .0002607  2.56
* 0.011 
GDPGR .0553130  .0308271  1.79
** 0.073 
CHI –1.7157470  3.3990870  –0.50  0.614 
COL 6.1097480  1.9959040  3.06  0.002 
MEX .3817979  1.9959040  3.06  0.002 
PER 1.731593  1.7559930  0.99  0.324 
URU –5.645603  1.3236610  –4.27  0.000 
CONSTANT 12.630470  2.1332570  5.92
** 0.000 
 
(a)  The series include nominal interest rate (NIR) and gross domestic product in current dollars. 
*  Statistical significance at the 5 per cent level. 







Modified Wald Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
2 χ (6) = 12.81  p-value = 0.0461 
 
 
Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation in panel data 
F(1, 5) = 56.009  p-value = 0.0007 
 
 
Dependent variable: PASV 
Sample: 1995-2006 
Included observations: 62 
 
 
Coefficients: Generalized least squares 
Panels: Heteroskedastic 
Correlation: Common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.4694) 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error t-statistics  p-value 
PFS .1230335  .0620584  1.98
* 0.047 
GOVS –.2333545  .1390807  –1.68
** 0.093 
PRICR –.0465444  .0326164  –1.43  0.154 
RIR .0725106  .0176939  4.10
* 0.000 
DI .0471230  .3244887  0.15  0.885 
GDP .0004358  .0002981  1.46  0.144 
GDPGR .0550942  .0365475  1.51  0.132 
CHI –1.4019280  3.3287210  –0.42  0.674 
COL 5.2789050  2.2901270  2.31  0.021 
MEX .4185314  1.1587690  0.36  0.718 
PER .4964914  2.0247090  0.25  0.806 
URU –5.280247  1.3901730  –3.80  0.000 
CONSTANT 14.89972  2.4741820  6.02
** 0.000 
 
(a)  The series include real interest rate (RIR) and gross domestic product in current dollars. 
*  Statistical significance at the 5 per cent level. 








Modified Wald Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
2 χ (6) = 20.86  p-value = 0.0019 
 
 
Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation  in panel data  
F(1, 5) = 44.892  p-value = 0.0011 
 
 
Dependent variable: PASV 
Sample: 1995-2006 
Included observations: 62 
 
 
Coefficients: Generalized least squares 
Panels: Heteroskedastic 
Correlation: Common AR(1) coefficient for all panels (0.5237) 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-statistics  p-value 
PFS .0844234  .0770657 1.10  0.273 
GOVS –.4672454  .1496016  –3.12
* 0.002 
PRICR –.0618667  .0335561  –1.84
** 0.065 
NIR .0933493  .0163286  5.72
* 0.000 
DI .0441775  .3054554  0.14  0.885 
PGDP .0009155  .0002773  3.30
* 0.001 
PGDPGR .0720348  .0478833  1.50  0.132 
CHI .3771742  3.88799  0.10  0.923 
COL 4.6743260  1.75403  2.66  0.008 
MEX –1.9652530  1.113703  –1.76  0.078 
PER 1.2536360  1.491691  0.84  0.401 
URU –6.6743010  1.383662  –4.82  0.000 
CONSTANT 9.3865820  2.521955  3.72
** 0.000 
 
(a)  The series include nominal interest rate (NIR) and gross domestic product in purchasing power parity. 
*  Statistical significance at the 5 per cent level. 
** Statistical significance at the 10 per cent level. 








Modified Wald Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
2 χ (6) = 8.83  p-value = 0.1833 
 
 
Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation in panel data 
F(1, 5) = 53.594  p-value = 0.0007 
 
 
Dependent variable: PASV 
Sample: 1995-2006 
Included observations: 62 
 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error  t-statistics  p-value 
PFS .2980042  .1264246  2.36
* 0.023 
GOVS –.3792299  .2071593  –1.83
** 0.074 
PRICR –.0579133  .0529605  –1.09  0.280 
RIR .072066  .0275331  2.62
* 0.012 
DI –.5128899  .3215314  –1.60
*** 0.118 
PGDP .0007609  .0004911  1.55  0.129 
PGDPGR –.0366699  .0608567  –0.60  0.550 
CONSTANT 8.290232  1.509061  5.49
* 0.000 
                             F(7,43) = 3.45                      p-value = 0.0051 
 
(a)  The series include real interest rate (RIR) and gross domestic product in purchasing power parity. 
*  Statistical significance at the 5 per cent level. 
**  Statistical significance at the 10 per cent level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 15 per cent level. 
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The decisive quoted results can however be better understood by resorting to the theoretical 
analysis of the preceding section, when the point was stressed that regimes’ design mattered and 
that only mandatory individual capitalization regimes would enhance the level of savings. As 
shown in the Appendix, except for the particular case of Uruguay, contribution to fully funded 
systems is compulsory in the other five countries.
32 
In relation to the rest of explanatory variables, notwithstanding the fact that the sign of 
coefficients fell generally in line with what the life-cycle model (when social security is included) 
predicted, estimations differ as to variables’ statistical significance. Thus, the estimated interest 
rate’s coefficient was statistically significant at the 5 per cent level no matter the variant resorted to 
(nominal or real active interest rate);
33 this result basically features the case – described in 
Section 2 – in which the substitution effect prevails over the income effect and causes savings to 
increase. By the same token, it can also be interpreted that the variable’s sign and statistical 
significance is highlighting the favourable impact of tight borrowing constraints upon aggregate 
private savings, as borrowing for consumption is notably discouraged when tight liquidity prevails. 
The government surplus’ negative sign also shows that the variable behaved according to the 
hypothesis of ultrarationality between public and private saving mentioned in the preceding 
theoretical section; nevertheless, differences arouse in relation to significance as in two cases it met 
the 5 per cent level and in the other two only the 10 per cent level. 
Despite bearing the expected negative sign, estimation of PRICR’s coefficient (bank credits 
to the private sector) yielded much less conclusive econometric results as in two cases showed to 
be significantly different from 0, but at 10 per cent level whereas in the other two cases results 
were even weaker. 
Poor results were in general achieved with relation to the growth rate of per capita income as 
only in one case (equation 1) the coefficient was significantly different from 0 at 10 per cent level. 
Finally, the dependence index exhibited in general a very poor econometric performance and signs 
running counter the expected ones, the exception being equation 4, in which the sign is correct and 
the coefficient significant at 15 per cent level. The lack of significance, at conventional levels, is 
not at odds with Bailliu and Reisin’s findings for the dependence index when the main variables are 
considered in terms of gross domestic product. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The article aimed at assessing whether fully funded pension regimes, based on individual 
capitalization, produced the distinctive effect of enhancing aggregate private savings and, in turn, 
helped somehow to strengthen domestic capital stock markets. Likewise, efforts were devoted to 
analysing the impact upon private savings of a group of economic and demographic variables 
which the related literature usually link to the performance of both defined benefit and defined 
contribution pension systems. 
In meeting the sought objectives, the traditional life-cycle hypothesis was resorted to, in the 
first place, in order to explain how individuals’ saving decisions were modified following the 
introduction of social security taxes within the framework of a PAYG regime. Next, and in line 
with contributions stemming from Feldstein (1974), Blinder (1982) and Bailliu and Reisen (1997), 
————— 
32  Even in the countries in which workers and self-employed individuals can choose between PAYG and fully funded systems, as it 
was in Argentina until 2008, contributions were compulsory for those deciding for individual capitalization. 
33  That coefficients of both the nominal and the real active interest rate resulted significantly different from 0 raises the question of 
whether the explanation must be sought in that inflation was not too high in most of  included countries during the period analyzed 
or else, that consumers – in observing the variable’s nominal level – were in fact suffering from money illusion and myopia. Pension Funds’ Contribution to the Enhancement of Aggregate Private Saving: A Panel Data Analysis for Emerging Economies  331 
the theoretical approach was extended in order to include the cases of endogenous retirement age 
and fully funded regimes. 
The impact of individual capitalization systems upon aggregate private savings was next 
considered within a life-cycle approach in which various hypotheses where successively upheld, 
such us: homogeneous and heterogeneous individuals, voluntary and compulsory contributions and 
loose and tight borrowing constraints. The theoretical analysis permitted to prove that only under 
mandatory contributions and operating liquidity restrictions private savings would unambiguously 
be increased by pension fund assets. 
In ascertaining the validity of the paper’s main hypothesis, the problem of degrees of 
freedom, stemming from data scarcity caused by the relatively recent implementation of most 
individual capitalization regimes, had to be dealt with by using a panel data model including 
statistical series from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay for the period 
1995-2006. 
Also, the recourse to the fixed effect variant whereby intersections were let to vary among 
countries, permitted to capture countries’ particular features and yet consider similar variables’ 
coefficients or common slopes for all the cross section units. 
In relation to the econometric estimation of coefficients, results gave ample support to the 
assertion that mandatory pension fund regimes would have a positive impact upon aggregate 
private savings as the coefficient of pension fund stocks not only held the expected sign but it was 
also significantly different from 0 in all but one single case. 
With regards to the rest of estimations, coefficients’ performance exhibited results of varying 
econometric soundness, depending on the variable analyzed, but generally falling in line with 
predictions of the life-cycle model; thus, the interest rate’s coefficient was always positive and 
statistically significant independent of whether the nominal or the real interest rate were used, the 
main implications being that substitution effects prevailed over income effect and that the assumed 
hypothesis of a positive impact of liquidity restrictions upon private savings really held. 
The idea of ultrarationality between private and public savings resulted also generally proven 
as the coefficient held the expected negative sign and resulted significantly different from 
0 at 5 per cent, in two cases and at 10 per cent in other two cases. On the other hand, the Keynesian 
relationship between saving and income (with gross domestic product used as a proxy for the latter) 
gathered in general econometric support as, apart from the bearing the correct sign, results showed 
coefficients statistically different from 0. 
Poor results were however found for the cases of loans to the private sector and the growth 
rate of per capita income as, in spite of expected signs generally being achieved, higher 
significance levels (10 or 15 per cent) were required for discarding equal to 0 coefficients. 
Finally, the almost null econometric performance of the dependence index is a worth 
stressing feature as, contrariwise to what it would have been expected, no relationship could be 
found between this ratio and the level of aggregate private savings and therefore the idea that 
demographic variables could somehow influence savings could not at this stage be proven. The 
point is not however ruled out that the short length of statistical series, as well as the way the ratio 
was computed, somehow conspired against the variable’s performance at the moment of assessing 




By Law 24.241, enacted in September 1993, the so-called Integrated Pension System was 
created embodying both the existing PAYG Regime and the fully-funded system based on 
individual capitalization, operating since 1994 and stopped in November 2008. 
Integration to any of the mentioned regimes was mandatory, falling on labour and 
self-employed workers the responsibility to choose. When PAYG was the decided upon regime, 
workers’ contribution amounted to 11 per cent of monthly wages whereas employers’ tax would in 
turn be 16 per cent of salaries paid. 
When workers chose the fully funded system their 11 per cent contribution covered a life 
insurance premium of around 1.50 per cent and a 1.50-2 per cent fee for pension funds’ operational 
expenses and portfolio management; the remainder went to personal capitalization accounts which 
also allowed the possibility for individuals to make voluntary contributions beyond the legally set 
11 per cent. The 16 per cent tax on employers would in this case continue being collected in order 
to finance pensions of the already retired people within the PAYG System. Pension fund 
associations, in charge of managing individual capitalization accounts, were regulated and 
supervised by the Superintendence of Pension Fund Associations. 
Benefits included ordinary pensions for the elderly, paid from the age of 65 for male and 60 
for female, and disability and death pensions in the case of people under 65 years whose 
contributions to the system extended for at least 18 months in the last 36 months. 
It is worth stressing that, no matter that beneficiaries belonged to PAYG or the individual 
capitalization system, the State guaranteed to individuals reaching the retirement age,
34 as a part of 
their pension, a Basic Universal Benefit (PBU)
35 that was equal to 2.5 times the average social 
security contribution. There was also a Compensatory Benefit (PC), aimed at bridging the years 
contributed by beneficiaries to the PAYG system before 1994, when the fully funded regime 
started and amounting to 1.5 per cent of average existing wages and computed on the basis of the 
number of years individuals belonged to the unfunded regime. The pension, at the age of 
retirement, completed with the Additional Benefit for Permanence (PAP), equal to 0.85 per cent 
per year beyond 1994. 
The mentioned Law 24.241 was also specific as to the participation that diverse national and 
foreign assets could reach within pension funds’ portfolios, as is indicated below: 
1)  central government’s public credit operations: up to 50 per cent, 
2)  provinces, local governments and public utilities’ bonds: up to 35 per cent, 
3)  public debt’s bonds, with public bid authorized by the National Securities and Exchange 
Commission: up to 40 and 20 per cent,
36 
4)  convertible corporate bonds with public bid authorized by the National Securities and 
Exchange Commission: up to 40 per cent, 
5)  convertible corporate bonds issued by privatized public ptilities: up to 20 per cent, 
6)  fixed term deposits in banks and other financial entities: up to 30 per cent, 
————— 
34  The PBU was however subject to the condition of potential beneficiaries proving at least contributions for a period of 30 years. 
35 Prestación  Básica  Universal. 
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7)  domestic firms’ shares with authorized public bid by the National Securities and Stock 
Exchange Commission: up to 50 per cent, 
8)  privatized public utilities’ shares with authorized public bid: up to 20 per cent, 
9)  shares in open-end or closed-end investment mutual funds: up to 20 per cent, 
10)  bonds issued by foreign states or international organisms: up to 10 per cent, 
11)  securities issued by foreign firms: up to 10 per cent, 
12)  contracts negotiated in future and options markets: up to 10 per cent, 
13)  securities holding a mortgage as a collateral and authorized in public bid: up to 40 per cent, 
14)  securities representing participation in investment mutual funds with authorized public bid: up 
to 10 per cent. 
In November 2008 the Argentine Government, following a political decision, sent a project 
to the Congress seeking to stop the existing fully funded capitalization regime. By Law 26425, 
Argentina came back to a single unified PAYG system. 
 
Chile 
The Decree Law 3500 approved in 1980 the creation of an individual capitalization scheme, 
whose operations started in 1981. The fully funded regime, based on individual capitalization 
completely substituted the PAYG system and voluntary contributions are also allowed. 
The individual capitalization regime was made mandatory for workers acceding to labour 
markets as of January 1983, whereas workers already contributing to the PAYG system had the 
option to switch to the new regime.
37 
Contributions amount to 12.37 per cent of individuals’ wages or earnings, 10 per cent out of 
which goes to individual capitalization accounts while the rest (1.04 and 1.33 per cent) includes the 
life insurance premium (1.04 per cent) and pension funds’ fees aimed at defraying administrative 
costs and returns. There are no contributions imposed upon employers who only act as withholding 
agents. Pension fund associations, in charge of collecting and administering social security taxes, 
are in turn under the supervision of the Superintendence of Pension Funds. 
Benefits of the individual capitalization system include ordinary pensions, paid at the age of 
65 for male and 60 for female, and disability and death pensions in the case of people under 
65 years and survival pensions. Pensions may accrue to beneficiaries under one of the following 
alternatives: an immediate annuity straightforwardly arranged by contributors with a chosen 
insurance company; a temporal rent combined with a differed annuity which is made possible by 
keeping funds in the individual capitalization account in order to enable the pension fund 
administrator to pay the former during the differed period and a programmed retirement, expressed 
in UF,
38 taken from the capitalization account by an amount determined by annually dividing the 
account’s effective balance by the capital necessary to pay a unit of pension. 
The Chilean state also guarantees a minimum pension to individuals showing contributions 
for 20 years and to those whose accumulated amount in their capitalization accounts falls short of 
the minimum required to finance the benefit. Contributors coming by choice from the PAYG 
system are entitled to a monetary expressed Recognition Government Bond for periods effectively 
————— 
37  Self-employed workers kept in turn the option of choosing between the old and the new system. 
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registered in the old regime.
39 Welfare-type pensions are also available for individuals under the 
poverty line, with monthly incomes inferior to 35.000 pesos.
40 
Chilean pension funds divide into five categories, depending on the maxima and minima 
percentages of their assets they are entitled to invest in equities, as shown by the table below:
41 
 
Fund  Maximum Limit  Minimum Limit 
A  80% 40% 
B  60% 25% 
C  40% 15% 
D  20% 5% 
E  0% 0% 
 
Pension funds are asked to offer alternatives B, C, D and E, of lesser relative risk, whereas 
the setting of option A, more intensive in equities, is not compulsory although effectively offered 
by all pension fund associations. The table in the following two pages in turn shows investment 
limits for type of instrument. 
 
Colombia 
The new Pension Regime was legally enacted in December 1993 and its operations initiated 
in 1994. The scheme is composed of a Non Contributory Public System and a Contributory 
Compulsory Mixed System in which a public defined benefit Average Premium Solidarity 
Regime
42 compete with an Individual Capitalization Private Regime
43 allowing also for voluntary 
contributions. Workers and self-employed individuals must indicate the regime to which they 
adhere with a switch between systems allowed each five years.
44 
Contributions to the individual capitalization regime reach 15.5 per cent of monthly earned 
wages (11 per cent goes to the individual pension fund, whereas the pension fund administrator’s 
fee and the insurance premium amount to 1.60 and 1.40 per cent respectively; the remainder 
1.5 per cent is absorbed by the Fund of Guarantee for the Minimum Pension, 75 per cent of which 
is in charge of employers and 25 per cent of workers. Self-employed workers, who finance by 
themselves the compulsory 15 per cent contribution, have also an additional 1 per cent contribution 
for the Fund of Pension Solidarity when their incomes exceed four minima wages. 
The contribution rate gradually increased from 9 per cent in 2004 to the present 11 per cent. 
As of 2008, the Government is entitled to add an extra 1 per cent whenever the rate of growth of 
————— 
39  This monetary benefit is subject to the condition that individuals prove an effective contribution of at least 12 months to the PAYG 
regime, between November 1975 and October 1980. 
40  Around US$ 66. 
41  See also Raddatz and Schmukler (2008). 
42  The Average Premium Solidarity Regime is managed by the Social Insurance Institute (ISS). 
43  Individuals deciding for Individual Capitalization are entitled to the so called “pensional bond” whereby previous contributions to 
the Social Insurance Institute are acknowledged and will make part, on retirement, of the fund financing the private system pension. 
44  The possibility for individuals to switch between regimes ceases within the 10 years to retirement date. Pension Funds’ Contribution to the Enhancement of Aggregate Private Saving: A Panel Data Analysis for Emerging Economies  335 
 
Maximum Limits for Each Type of Fund 
Instruments 
Fund A  Fund B  Fund C  Fund D  Fund E 
1.  Bonds issued by the Central Bank and the Treasury; 
letters of credit, recognition bonds and other bonds 
and securities issued public agencies and or institutes 
and bonds issued or bearing the State’s guarantee 
40% 40% 50% 70% 80% 
2.  Fixed term deposits, bonds and securities issued by 
financial institutions 
40% 40% 50% 70% 80% 
3.  Securities guaranteed by financial institutions  40%  40%  50%  70%  80% 
4.  Letters of credit issued by financial institutions  40%  40%  50%  60%  70% 
5.  Private and public enterprises’ securities  30%  30%  40%  50%  60% 
6.  Share-exchangeable private and public enterprises’ 
securities 
30% 30% 10%  5%  - 
7.  Shares of open corporate firms  60%  50%  30%  15%  - 
8.  Shares of open real estate corporations  60%  50%  30%  15%  - 
9.  Mutual investment funds’ quotas referred to by law 
Nº 18.815, plus compromised contributions in 
subscription promise contracts and payment of 
national mutual funds’ quotas, when ruled by D.L. 
No. 1.328/76 
40% 30% 20% 10%  - 
10.  Commercial instruments issued by private and public 
enterprises (promissory notes, credit and investment 
bonds) if time to maturity is up to a year 
10% 10% 10% 20% 30% 
11.  Credit bonds, securities and commercial papers issued 
or guaranteed by international or foreign or 
international banks or foreign states and central 
banks; credit bonds issued by municipalities, regional 
states and local governments; shares, securities and 
commercial papers issued by foreign firms; share 
convertible bonds issued by foreign banks and firms; 
securitized credit bonds issued by foreign firms; 
structured notes issued by foreign entities; 
participation quotas issued by foreign mutual funds; 
foreign bonds representing share indices; short term 
deposits; operations aimed at hedging fluctuation 
risks among foreign currency or rate of interest risks 
in a determined foreign currency; investment in 
foreign countries through participation quotas issued 
by mutual funds referred to in 9 above, when they 
have more than 50% of their assets invested abroad 
The investment in foreign bonds and securities of 
the same pension fund’s types of funds, plus the 
amount of foreign investment through mutual funds’ 
quotas and national investment, are limited to 35 per 
cent of total of the same pension fund’s types funds 
 








10% 5%  - 
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Maximum Limits for Each Type of Fund 
Instruments 
Fund A  Fund B  Fund C  Fund D  Fund E 
11b.  Current accounts in foreign banks (moving average 
for the last 30 days) 
0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 
11c. Structured notes issued by foreign institutions  4%  3%  2%  2%  - 
11d.  Overnight and short time deposits  2%  2%  2%  2%  2% 
11e. Contracts whose object is the loan or mutual of 
foreign issuers’ financial instruments, computed on 
the basis of lent instruments 
1/3 Foreign investment in each type of fund 
12.  Public bid instruments, authorized by the Central 
Bank and whose issuers are supervised by the 
Superintendence of Securities and Insurance or of 
Banks and Financial Institutions 
Investment limits for each instruments will range 
between 1 and 5 per cent of the respective fund’s 
total amount, as determined by the Central Bank of 
Chile 
12a. Foreign capital mutual funds’ quotas  1%  1%  1%  1%  - 
12b.  Commercial papers of Law 3500’s letter I) (not 
considered in 10 above) 
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
13.  Amount of investment in foreign currency without 
exchange coverage 
43% 28% 22% 17% 10% 
14.  Contracts whose object is the loan or mutual of 
domestic issuers’ financial instruments, computed on 
the basis of lent instruments 
15%  10%  5% 5% 5% 
15.  Term deposits; bonds and securities issued by 
financial institutions and securities guaranteed by 
financial institutions 
40% 40% 50% 70% 80% 
16.  Private and public enterprises’ securities, including 
those permitting their exchange for shares 
30% 30% 40% 50%  - 
17.  Shares of open corporate firms and open real state 
corporate firms 
60% 50% 30% 15%  - 
18.  Domestic mutual funds’ quotas ruled by Law 
1.328/76, referred to in 9 above 
5% 5% 5% 5%  - 
19.  Subscription promised contributions and payment of 
quotas belonging to mutual funds referred to in 9 
above 
2% 2% 2% 2%  - 
20.  For each type of financial risk coverage, customarily 
done in formal secondary markets (limit computed in 
function of coverage instruments and measured in net 
terms) 
Investment in coverage instruments 
21.  Risk cover operations in domestic and abroad markets Superintendence’s Circular No. 1216 determines 
investment limits to be met by Administrators when 
undertaking risk cover operations on behalf of 
Pension Funds 
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the gross domestic product reaches an average increase of 4 per cent during the preceding two 
years. In the case of the Solidarity Regime contributions amount to 15 per cent of earnings, 
12 per cent out of which is devoted to finance pensions for the elderly and the constitution of 
reserves and 3 per cent is used in covering administration costs and pensions for the disabled and 
death benefit payments. 
Benefits covered by the Pension General System are pensions for the elderly and the 
disabled, death benefit and burial expenses. Pensions for the elderly are offered under the following 
variants: annuities, reversible annuities, programmed retirement and programmed retirement with 
differed annuities. There also exists a minimum pension guarantee whereby the State makes up the 
possible difference between the pension and the legal minimum wage. 
The ensuing list illustrates about alternatives permitted by the Colombian legislation for 
investing funds from individual capitalization, as well as about the maximum limits, in percentage 
of the total portfolio, set for each type of instrument: 
1)  issued internal and external public debt’s bonds bearing the guarantee of the State, 
2)  other public debt’s bonds issued by governmental agencies (up to 20 per cent), 
3)  securities issued by or with the guarantee of the Financial Institutions Guarantee Fund 
(Fogarin) and Cooperatives Guarantee Fund (Fogacoop) (up to 10 per cent), 
4)  Bank of the Republic’s securities, 
5)  mortgage securities (Law 546/1999) (up to 40 per cent), 
6)  debt bonds issued, accepted or guaranteed by institutions under the control of the Colombian 
Financial Superintendence (up to 70 per cent), 
7)  securities issued by institutions not controlled by the Colombian Financial Superintendence 
(up to 30 per cent), 
8)  equities (up to 30 per cent), 
9)  current account deposits (up to 2 per cent), 
10) repurchase agreement operations and active simultaneous operations over admissible 
investments (up to 10 per cent), 
11) repurchase agreement operations and active simultaneous operations carried out through 
agricultural or agroindustrial stock exchanges (up to 5 per cent), 
12)  investment in securities issued by foreign entities (up to 20 per cent), 
13)  protected capital structured products domestically issued or issued abroad whose contractual 
terms referring to 100 per cent payment of capital and yield are guaranteed by issuers, 
14)  temporal value transfers (only for securities allowed in pension funds’ regime of admissible 
investments) (up to 30 per cent). 
 
Mexico 
The Social Insurance Law enacted in December 1995 did away with the existing PAYG 
system and created a defined contribution regime (individual capitalization) privately managed by 
the so called Retirement Fund Administrators (AFORES).
45 
As of 1 July 1997, individuals acceding to labour markets freely choose an AFORE whereas 
they also decide where their contributions will be invested by choosing, on the basis of investment 
————— 
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profiles, preferences and age, one of the two Retirement Funds Specialized Investment Societies 
(SIEFORES). Benefits include retirement pensions and pensions for the elderly. 
Contributions to the fully funded regime reach 6.5 per cent of earnings, 5.30 points of which 
go to individual capitalization accounts while AFORES in turn perceive 1.20 points in concept of 
average fees.
46 In addition to this, a social quota (solidarity contribution) equal to 5.5 per cent of 
the minimum wage prevailing in the Federal District is provided by the Mexican State to each 
capitalization account. Individuals can also increase pension fund assets with short and long run 
voluntary contributions. 
Benefits include retirement pensions and pensions for the elderly. Given the regime’s 
defined contribution feature, benefits depend upon the accumulated value and interests in the 
respective individual capitalization account; beneficiaries have the choice of buying an annuity 
from an insurance company or deciding for programmed periodic retirements from the AFORES, 
computed on the basis of the life expectancy and the expected return. 
Pension fund administrators are subject to the supervision of an autonomous organism called 
the System of Saving for Retirement National Commission (CONSAR). 
There also exists an insurance for the disabled and the surviving spouse, administered by the 
Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) and jointly financed by workers, firms and the State 
(0.62,1.75 and 0.13 per cent of earned wages respectively). 
Workers with proven contributions until June 1997 are entitled to perceive PAYG’s benefits, 
whereas individuals having contributed to PAYG and the fully funded regime have the possibility 
of choosing between both systems. 
A minimum pension, equal to a minimum wage, is guaranteed by the government to 
individuals proving 1250 weekly contributions and reaching 60/65 years of age. 
A multifund system is available from AFORES, as of January 2005, to which pension fund 
assets can be directed: 
•  Basic 1 SIEFORE (SB1), whose assets can be only invested in domestic and foreign fixed 
interest securities and in international permitted bonds and securities from governments and 
qualified firms. 
•  Basic 2 SIEFORE (SB2), differing from the preceding one in that investment in equities is also 
permitted up to a maximum participation of 15 per cent of total. SB3, SB4 and SB5, created in 
2008, have authorized participations of 20, 25 and 40 per cent, respectively.
47 
The evolution of the legal framework, from a single fund basically investing in bonds of the 
domestic public debt to funds respectively investing only in fixed interest securities and in a 
combination of fixed interest securities and equities, shows that investment alternatives have 
increased for individual capitalization and that individuals’ risk-return profiles are better served 
now by the five funds available to date. 
The new investment regime permitted also to introduce three new possibilities for 
SIEFORES: investment in private capital and infrastructure (by using structured notes and trusts) 
and real estate investment (by using trusts). 
————— 
46  Since AFORES charge different fees, a single uniform fee for all administrators is computed in terms of the contribution flow, 
following the CONSAR’s  methodology. 
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Peru 
The Peruvian retirement structure embodies a public not contributive regime and a 
mandatory mixed contributive system with public PAYG and private individual capitalization 
regimes operating in competence. By being affiliation compulsory, workers must decide to which 
one they will adhere. The fully funded system, enacted in 1992 by Law 25987, started its operation 
in June 1993. 
The average worker’s contribution to the private system
48 is 12.66 per cent of his/her taxable 
income, 10 points of which go to individual capitalization accounts, 0.91 is devoted to finance 
disability and survival insurances and 1.81 is the fee perceived by the fund administrators. Workers 
can also realize voluntary contributions. Contributions to the public regime amount to 13 per cent 
of earned wages. 
Benefits from the private system are retirement pensions and pensions for the disabled and 
the surviving spouse, paid by pension fund administrators or insurance companies under one of the 
following alternatives: monthly programmed withdrawals from the individual account until funds’ 
exhaustion, family annuities whereby individuals contract an annuity for him/her until death 
including a survival pension for his/her beneficiaries, temporal rents with differed annuities during 
a determined first period and a family annuity thereafter. 
The Superintendence of Bank and Insurance is in charge of supervising pension fund 
administrators whereas the PAYG regime is managed by the Prevision Normalization Office. 
There are variants whereby pension fund assets can be invested by administrators, the 
percentage in brackets indicating each instrument’s maximum allowed participation within 
portfolios: 
1)  government bonds (30 per cent), 
2)  Central Bank bonds (30 per cent), 
3)  term deposits and securities from financial system’s firms (30 per cent), 
4)  securities issued by financial system’s firms (25 per cent), 
5) subordinated securities issued by financial system’s firms and insurance companies 
(15 per cent), 
6)  investment bonds issued by banks, financial firms and other entities for mortgage financing 
(40 per cent), 
7)  securities issued by private legal entities not belonging to the financial system (40 per cent), 
8)  short term instruments (15 per cent), 
9)  repurchase agreement operations (10 per cent), 
10)  shares and representative values of rights upon deposited shares registered in the stock 
exchange (35 per cent), 
11) certificates of preferential subscription (3 per cent), 
12) derivatives of values traded in the stock exchange (0,1 per cent), 
13) financial risk coverage operations (5 per cent), 
14) participation quotas in investment mutual funds (15 per cent) 
15) investment instruments representing securitized assets (10 per cent), 
16)  financial instruments issued or guaranteed by foreign states and central banks; shares and 
values representing rights upon deposited shares registered in the stock exchange; debt bonds, 
————— 
48  Contributions to the private system are not deductible from the Income Tax. 340  Ernesto Rezk, Mariano Irace and Vanina Ricca 
participation quota in mutual funds and risk coverage operations issued by foreign entities 
(9 per cent), 
17)  share primary issuance and securities representing credit rights oriented to financing new 
projects (4 per cent), 
18) promissory notes issued or guaranteed by financial system’s firms (5 per cent), 
19) promissory notes issued or guaranteed by other entities (5 per cent). 
The above mentioned investment possibilities are however subject to general participation 
limits, as indicated below: 
a)  bonds issued or guaranteed by the Peruvian Government (30 per cent), 
b)  bonds issued or guaranteed by the Central Bank (30 per cent), 
c)  the overall sum of a) and b) (40 per cent), 
d) bonds and securities issued by foreign governments and for financial and not financial entities 
whose economic activity is mostly carried out abroad (17 per cent). 
There exist, since 2005, a multifund scheme for mandatory contributions composed of 
Type 1 Fund (Conservative or Capital Preservation Fund), oriented to a stable growth with low 
investment volatility; Type 2 Fund (Balanced or Mixed Fund), seeking a moderate growth level 
with investment medium volatility and Type 3 Fund (Growth Fund), pursuing the fund’s highest 
growth levels with high investment volatility. 
Asset investment limits in each fund was set as follows: 
 
Instruments and maximum limits for each type of fund 
Fund type 




Type 1  10%  10%  40%  100% 
Type 2  45%  10%  30%  75% 
Type 3  80%  20%  30%  70% 
 





The present Social Security System dates from 1995 (Law 16713), but its operation actually 
started in 1996. It is a mixed scheme composed of a defined benefit contributive public regime, a 
private defined contribution individual capitalization regime and derived benefits integrating 
therefore the Intergenerational Solidarity Retirement System (PAYG) with Individual 
Capitalization System. Affiliation to the corresponding regime is determined in function of the 
three following earning levels: 
————— 
49  We are very grateful to Alvaro Forteza for his helpful comments on the Uruguayan case. Pension Funds’ Contribution to the Enhancement of Aggregate Private Saving: A Panel Data Analysis for Emerging Economies  341 
a) retirement regime for intergenerational solidarity (PAYG): it includes workers whose monthly 
incomes are equal to or less than $ 5,000 pesos (215 dollars), 
b) individual capitalization system: it includes individuals whose monthly income ranges between 
$ 5,000 and $ 15,000 (between 215 and 644 dollars) and those deciding for the fully funded 
system although their monthly incomes fall below $ 5,000, 
c) voluntary individual capitalization regime: for all individuals, for amounts exceeding the 
mentioned compulsory upper limits. 
Contributions to the PAYG regime reach 15 per cent of wages and, depending on 
individuals’ earnings and choices, this percentage is split between the public and the private 
system. Workers with monthly incomes below $ 5,000 (215 dollars) may also opt for devoting half 
of their contributions to the individual capitalization regime (voluntary option for the mixed 
regime). 
Contributions to the mandatory fully funded regime reach 15 per cent, of which 12.16 points 
go to individuals’ accounts, 1.854 points is the administrator’s fee and 0.988 the insurance 
premium. Employers’ contributions (12.5 plus 5 per cent for mutual insurance for all salary levels) 
are directed to the PAYG system. 
Benefits include pensions for the elderly,
50 computed on the basis of individuals’ 
accumulated assets, the interest rate paid by the insurance company and the beneficiary’s life 
expectancy.
51 Disability contingencies and pensions to the surviving spouse are financed by means 
of a specific insurance that AFAPS must compulsory take; this insurance’s premium is discounted 
from monthly individuals’ contribution to their capitalization accounts. 
Pension fund assets are managed by Prevision Save Funds Administrators (AFAP), whereas 
the Bank of Social Prevision administers the PAYG regime, non contributive benefits, the 
unemployment insurance, the health insurance and family allowances. The AFAP Control Division, 
at the Central Bank of Uruguay, is in charge of supervising the individual capitalization regime of 
second and third pillars. 
There also exist a non contributive welfare benefit (62.58 dollars) granted to individuals 
beyond 70 years who, due to age or disabilities can not accede to a permanent paid job. 
The legislation is also specific concerning the participation that diverse national and foreign 
assets can reach within pension funds’ portfolios, as well as the Previsional Save Funds’ permitted 
investments to administrators, as is indicated below: 
1)  bonds issued by the Uruguayan Government (up to 65 per cent), 
2) securities issued by the Uruguayan Mortgage Bank and instruments of monetary regulation 
issued by the Central Bank of Uruguay (up to 30 per cent), 
3)  term deposits in domestic financial entities, in national or foreign currency (up to 30 per cent), 
4) securities from Uruguayan utilities or private firms and mutual investment funds’ quota parts, 
operating in formal markets and authorized by the Uruguayan Central Bank (up to 25 per cent), 
5) instruments standing for domestically located real estate, industrial, forest and other productive 
sectors gathering acceptable conditions of safety, return and guarantee, according to the 
requirements of the Uruguayan Central Bank (up to 20 per cent), 
————— 
50  Contrariwise to the capitalization scheme, in which a lower limit does not exist for benefits (pension for the elderly), there is a 
minimum value for the quota part in the public Intergenerational Solidarity Retirement System equal to $ 550 (23,60 dollars), which 
is annually increased in 12 per cent (each year after retirement) with a ceiling of 120 per cent. 
51  Acknowledgement bonds’ issuance is not considered by the new regime. 342  Ernesto Rezk, Mariano Irace and Vanina Ricca 
6) guaranteed investments in public and private entities whose purpose is to grant loans to social 
security system’s contributors and beneficiaries, Individual loans
52 should be not higher to six 
salaries or pensions (up to 15 per cent), 
7) operations aiming at supplying financial risk coverage to the prevision save fund, with 
limitations and conditions set by the Uruguayan Central Bank (up to 10 per cent), 
8) fixed interest securities issued by international credit entities, subject to conditions established 
by the Executive Power (up to 15 per cent). 
 
————— 
52  Loans granted should be cancelled within the year and their rate of interest will at least equal the evolution of the Wage Average 
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* and Arnoldo López-Marmolejo
** 
This paper explores how privatizing a pension system can affect sovereign credit risk. For 
this purpose, it analyzes the importance that rating agencies give to implicit pension debt (IPD) in 
their assessments of sovereign creditworthiness. We find that rating agencies generally do not seem 
to give much weight to IPD, focusing instead on explicit public debt. However, by channeling 
pension contributions away from the government and creating a deficit of resources to cover the 
current pension liabilities during the reform’s transition period, a pension privatization reform 
may transform IPD into explicit public debt, adversely affecting a sovereign’s perceived 
creditworthiness, thus increasing its risk premium. In this light, accompanying pension reform with 




Pension “privatization” (social security reform characterized by the introduction of a 
defined-contribution pension scheme) aims at correcting actuarial imbalances at the root of 
long-run solvency problems in pre-existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) defined-benefit public pension 
systems. However, other things equal, the reform’s diversion of social security contributions to 
private personal accounts deprives the general government of revenues without an offsetting 
reduction in public spending because ongoing pension payments to existing pensioneers must 
continue, at least during a transition period. It is during this transition that governments often resort 
to market financing to make up for lost social security contribution revenue, leading to an increase 
in public debt. 
During the wave of pension reform – particularly in Latin America during the 1990s – it was 
often argued that issuing debt to cover the imbalances that usually followed such reforms was not a 
cause for concern, since it just meant replacing implicit pension debt (IPD) with “explicit” public 
debt. A PAYG system is an intergenerational redistribution mechanism based on the rollover of 
IPD across generations of workers.
 1 Contributors implicitly buy claims to future income from the 
government, which uses the proceeds to finance the benefits of retirees – that is, to redeem 
previously issued claims. However, once pension privatization takes place, the government cannot 
rollover pension claims any further, and must find new financing for the redemption of pension 
claims still falling due. Thus, financing the payments of benefits to pensioners (or making up for 
lost contribution revenue) by issuing financial debt would be, in some sense, gradually making IPD 
explicit.
2 However, if markets do not consider IPD and explicit public debt as equivalent, then 
turning one into the other could affect the market’s perception of a government’s credit risk. 
————— 
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2  Strictly speaking, making up for lost contribution revenue with financial borrowing is to replace a flow of new implicit financing 
with a flow of new explicit borrowing. Issuing “recognition bonds” to compensate workers for the loss of acquired rights, as has 
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Several factors would seem to make financial debt a more problematic liability for the 
government than IPD. In most cases, IPD can be seen a contingent liability,
3 whereas explicit 
financial debt is a firm commitment. By definition, IPD is a very long-dated liability, payable in the 
country’s own currency, and positively correlated with the tax base. In contrast, in most countries’ 
financial debt has a relatively shorter average maturity, is often denominated in foreign currency, 
and its burden generally bears little relation to the tax base – if it does not bear a negative 
correlation to it. Creditors hold financial debt on a voluntary basis, which gives rise to relatively 
high rollover risks, whereas social security contributions are mandatory. More fundamentally, 
governments can, and often do, change the terms of PAYG pension schemes, thereby unilaterally 
restructuring IPD, whereas the terms of financial debt cannot be unilaterally modified. 
Not only does pension privatization change the composition of the government's liabilities; it 
also changes the relationship between government and pension scheme’s participants. Under a 
defined-benefit, PAYG-financed scheme, workers and retirees hold junior claims on the 
government, while bondholders and other creditors hold more senior claims. In fact, experience 
shows that governments will try to reduce pension benefits or increase pension contributions under 
PAYG plans before considering defaulting on financial debt. Workers and retirees are like equity 
holders, subject to residual risk. However, once pension privatization takes place, workers and 
pensioners become, through their pension funds, creditors on a par with other bondholders. The 
bonds held by pension fund managers (largely government bonds) are quite similar to the bonds 
held by other investors. Thus, a reform that kept the size of total obligations unchanged, but 
transformed IPD into explicit debt would increase the riskiness of the government’s balance sheet 
and dilute the value of the financial claims already held by creditors. 
Starting from an unsustainable PAYG scheme, a pension reform will usually aim at curbing 
the growth in total government liabilities over time. Thus, a pension privatization can involve a 
trade-off between reducing total public (implicit plus financial) debt in the long run, but increasing 
the riskiness of the composition of liabilities in the short and medium term as financial debt 
replaces IPD, at least during the transition period of the reform. This is not an argument against 
pension reform; it is an argument in favor of accompanying pension reform with fiscal efforts to 
offset the tendency of the reform to increase riskiness associated with the higher path of financial 
debt. 
In this paper, we explore whether these conclusions can be supported by showing that 
financial markets – and financial analysts in particular – judge IPD and financial public debt 
differently as they assess sovereign creditworthiness. Our empirical evidence suggests that this may 
be, in fact, the case. This diverging perception of financial analysts over both types of debt may be 
simply due to their understanding of the intrinsic differences between the two, (as mentioned 
above), but it could also reflect myopia by the financial analysts themselves, who may not fully 
appreciate the obligations represented by IPD – in fact, such a myopic perception of IPD by the 
markets would constitute yet another difference between IPD and explicit debt. 
Previous research in this area is scant, but the few available studies have mixed views on the 
equivalence between implicit and explicit liabilities.
4 When assessing the private sector, Feldstein 
and Seligman (1981) and Moody’s (1998) argue that unfunded pension liabilities of corporations 
do end up reflected in corporate share prices and credit ratings. However, when assessing the 
determinants of sovereign credit risk, results are less clear. For example, Fiess (2003) seemingly 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
been done under some pension reforms, is closer to the idea of making the stock of IPD explicit, although it really involves putting a 
definitive value on IPD. 
3  Pension obligations under a PAYG-defined benefit system would be contingent on the life of the pensioneer who holds the claim, 
but also subject to discretionary changes in the parameters of the pension system itself. 
4  However, economists have increasingly emphasized the need to include the concept of IPD in the standard set of debt sustainability 
indicators (see Holzman, Palacios and Zviniene, 2004).   Pension Privatization and Country Risk  347 
confirms the differential treatment of financial debt and IPD for the case of Mexico, by observing 
that the country’s credit ratings remained broadly unchanged before and after the 1997 pension 
system reform, despite the fact that the reform’s features generated, upon its approval, an 
immediate reduction of IPD. More generally, a widely held view among practitioners is that net 
present value estimates of IPD should not influence sovereign credit risk ratings for two reasons: 
first, these estimates are highly sensitive to small changes in parameters and assumptions, as noted 
by Truglia (2002) and Pinheiro (2004);
5 and second, they do not account for possible future policy 
actions to improve the finances of defined-benefit pension systems.
6 
We regress indicators of sovereign creditworthiness on IPD and explicit public debt, 
controlling for the main determinants of debt sustainability. The analysis shows that cross-country 
differences in financial public debt help explain differences in sovereign credit ratings, but 
differences in IPD do not. The apparent lack of attention to IPD on the assessment of sovereign 
creditworthiness could be an indication that markets, though concerned over contingent liabilities, 
simply do not trust available measures of IPD, which are subject to considerable error. To address 
this problem, we also estimate dynamic panel models of credit ratings that look at the effects of 
pension privatization without using direct measures of IPD – but focusing on the impact of the 
implementation of pension reforms. These models also suggest that markets focus mainly on 
explicit public debt levels without giving much weight to the IPD reductions generated by pension 
privatization. The corollary is that if a government wants to preserve its credit standing while it 
carries out a radical pension reform, then it must strengthen its non-pension fiscal balance to offset 
the loss of revenue from social security contributions, and avoid incurring additional explicit 
liabilities to finance the transition costs of the reform. 
To illustrate the results of the econometric analysis, we present one simple counterfactual 
pension reform scenario. We look at the case of Mexico, which privatized its pension system in the 
late 1990’s  We construct simple fiscal scenario to show what might have happened to public debt 
and ratings, other things being equal, if it had done otherwise, and calculate the resulting impact on 
their credit standing, in line with our econometric estimates. This case helps illustrate the corollary 
mentioned above: public debt can become hard to manage when a country undertaking pension 
privatization does not offset its adverse cash flow effects with fiscal adjustment. 
 
2  Country risk, credit ratings and implicit pension debt (IPD) 
Financial debt is an important variable for rating agencies assessing government credit risk, 
and there is a strong relationship between a sovereign’s debt and its credit rating (Figure 1).
7 For 
instance, as Argentina’s federal government debt rose from 34½ per cent of GDP in 1997 to about 
135 per cent of GDP in 2002, Standard and Poor’s gradually downgraded its rating from BB to CC 
and ultimately SD (default). Similarly, Argentina’s rating by the Institutional Investor’s Country 
Credit Rating (IIR) System – which captures the aggregate views of economists and financial 
analysts on sovereign creditworthiness – fell from about 42½ in 1999 to 34¾ in 2001 and 23¾ 
 
————— 
5  In particular, Pinheiro (2004) argues that in the late nineties estimates of IPD for Brazil from various sources varied by as much as 
60 per cent of GDP. 
6  See Moody’s Investor Service’s Sovereign Risk Unit managing director Truglia (2002). 
7  General government debt is one key criterion for both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s for assigning sovereign credit ratings, as 
stressed by Powell and Martinez (2008). Many other variables affect ratings – including the country’s default history, the external 
and fiscal stance and the perceived institutional and governability status – which explains why advanced countries such as Japan, 
Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain can be in the “AA” range despite their high debts. These countries can rollover debt with relative 




Credit ratings are 
closely correlated with 
the risk premia countries 
face in the international 
capital markets 
(Figure 2). Thus, markets 
seem to penalize the 
same developments that 
rating agencies consider 
harmful to a country’s 
creditworthiness, and are 
certainly informed by the 
ratings themselves. In 
this context, an increase 
in explicit debt (even if it 
is related to a generally 
beneficial pension 
reform), could be 
perceived as a sign of 
deteriorating creditworth-
iness – and be reflected 
in worsening borrowing 
terms for the sovereign.  
The close link 
between financial debt 
and country risk is well 
documented, as noted in 
Powell and Martinez 
(2008). Moreover, some 
aspects of such link have 
been summed up in the 
concepts of “original sin” 
and “debt intolerance”. 
Eichengreen, Hausman 
and Panizza (2003a and 
2003b) define as the 
“original sin” a country’s 
inability to borrow 
abroad in its own 
currency, even in the 
presence of good 
institutions and stability. 
In the context of pension 
reform, the “original sin” 
theory suggests that even 
————— 
8  The country credit ratings developed by the Institutional Investor (IIR) are based on information provided by senior economists and 
sovereign-risk analysts at leading global banks and money management and securities firms. Respondents grade each country in a 
scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents the least chance of default. 
Figure 1 
Standard and Poor’s Credit Ratings and Government Debt 
Net General Government Debt, 2004 
(percent of GDP) 
Figure 2 
Risk Premia and International Investor Ratings 
Source: Standard and Poor’s. 
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if IPD is brought under control by the reform, the country may find it difficult to find financing on 
adequate terms for the transition costs arising from the reform itself. Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003) define “debt intolerance” as the inability of emerging countries to function with 
levels of external debt that are easily manageable for advanced countries. A corollary of this view 
in the context of pension reform is that financing the transition costs with debt can generate or raise 
instability. Reinhart et al. (2003) also show that, as debt increases, the ratings deteriorate more 
rapidly in emerging countries than in advanced economies, a phenomenon that may be interpreted 
as a perception of lower debt management capacity in emerging markets. 
In any case, whether IPD and explicit public debt are seen as equivalent by the financial 
markets is an empirical issue. In the following section we take this question to the data. 
 
3 Econometric  analysis 
To test the hypothesis that IPD matters as much as financial debt for credit risk assessments 
we first use a direct approach, based on cross-country regressions of IIR against IPD, controlling 
for financial public debt and other factors.
9 This approach is constrained by data availability, 
especially since it is difficult to find data on IPD for a large sample of countries. 
We also use an indirect approach based on the idea that if financial markets care about IPD, 
they should react positively to a pension privatization reform that reduces it. The coefficient of a 
pension reform dummy should capture the impact that reducing IPD has on the rating. This 
approach does not require estimates of IPD, which allows us to use a much larger sample of 
countries, and to avoid the measurement and conceptual problems affecting IPD estimates. 
Moreover, we can use panel regressions in this case, since we have identified 21 countries where a 
pension privatization took place and the ratings and control variables can be sampled over several 
years. The main constraint for this regression is the availability of time series for country ratings. 
 
3.1 Direct  approach 
As our dependent variable, we use a transformation of the IIR for 2000, defined as 
100 minus the original IIR (thus, for our variable, a value of 100 represents the highest risk of 
default). That is, a positive sign in an estimated coefficient means that a variable has a positive 
effect on the perceived probability of default. The focus of the analysis is a measure of IPD in 
33 countries in 1999/2000 taken from Holzman, Palacios and Zviniene (2004), which is the widest 
homogeneous IPD data set available. The well-known debt sustainability condition suggests that 
the primary balance in percent of GDP and real growth should be on the right-hand side of a 
regression explaining the perceived creditworthiness of a sovereign, along with financial debt. Two 
measures of financial debt are used: in dataset (A), we include the public debt series as a share of 
GDP, presented in Holzman et al. (2004), while dataset (B) uses the public debt series provided by 
Tsibouris  et al. (2006), to ensure robustness in our results regarding coverage.
10 In addition, 
international reserves, inflation, country size (proxied by the ratio of the country’s GDP relative to 
————— 
9  As noted by Baek et al. (2005), in the country risk literature, indicators of sovereign creditworthiness are usually represented by 
ratings of agencies and publications. For example, Jacque et al. (1996) also use the IIR and the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), 
while Cantor and Packer (1996) use Moody’s and S&P ratings. 
10  The key difference in the series is that of coverage, with the Tsibouris et al. (2006) database including generally wider public sector 
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that of the U.S.), the current account balance in percent of GDP, an index of political stability
11 and 
an indicator of the regional “Original Sin” (as calculated by Hausman and Panizza, 2003a)
12 are 
used as control variables. All variables are for the year 2000, with the exception of real growth, 
which is the average for 1995-2000, and the “Original Sin”, which is averaged for 1999-2001 
(Annexes B and C). 
We test for the effect of debt and IPD on country ratings by defining two different model 
specifications. In the first case, debt and IPD enter into the regression linearly, and a single 
coefficient for their impact on IIR is estimated across the sampled countries. The second 
specification allows for country-specific effects on the coefficients for debt and IPD by rescaling 
these variables by each country’s relative size to the US economy. 
Our estimates suggest that rating agencies do not consider financial debt and IPD equivalent 
when assessing country risk (Table 1, columns 1, 3, 5 and 7). Public debt has the expected positive 
sign and is significant across specifications; in contrast, the coefficient on IPD is close to zero, and 
not significant in all specifications, including those allowing for non-linearities on the countries’ 
size. The coefficients on average growth rate, reserves, primary balance and relative size of the 
country are broadly significant across specifications and, as expected, tend to reduce the probability 
of default. The coefficient of the index of political stability has the expected sign, but is significant 
only in some of the specifications, suggesting that economic factors are the most important in the 
assessment of sovereign country risk. The multicollinearity test using the VIF (Variance Inflation 
Factor) reveals weak multicollinearity between total debt and the current account balance 
(Annex D). Thus, the same regressions are estimated by considering the net exports rather than the 
current account balance. The estimates for this specification are reported in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8, 
and broadly similar in magnitude and level of significance to those that included the current 
account balance. 
Based on our regression estimates, we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
IPD and public debt are equal. This provides support for the idea that markets see important 
differences between a sovereign’s pension liabilities and financial public debt – differences which 
are relevant for the assessment of country risk. In consequence, making IPD explicit by financing 
the transition costs of a pension reform in the financial markets could trigger a deterioration of 
sovereign credit ratings. 
 
3.2 Indirect  approach 
We assess the impact of enacting a pension reform law on credit ratings by estimating a 
panel regression with fixed effects, in which country risk is the dependent variable and the key 
regressor is a dummy variable indicating a pension reform. The panel used in this section contains 
data for 63 countries, including available data for each country between 1979 and 2003. The credit 
risk perception is again measured using the IIR. The dataset has 20 countries where a pension 
privatization reform took place in the period 1979-2003; introduction of a fully funded pension 
scheme is represented with dummy variables following three different specifications.
13 In the first 
specification, the dummy takes a unit value the year the pension reform law is enacted. Taking the 
year of enactment as the date of the pension reform implies that the expectation of a known 
————— 
11  The political stability variable measures the likelihood of violence threats to, or changes in, government, including terrorism. The 
source is Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) and it is measured in units ranging from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to more stability. 
12  See “OSIN3” variable, Hausmann and Pannizza (2004), Table 1. 
13  The countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Uruguay, Iceland, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Russia, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Croatia.   Pension Privatization and Country Risk  351 
 
Table 1 







































































Robust p values in parentheses. * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. 
1234 5 6 78
Constant 56.28 56.67 64.63 66.98 59.61 59.29 66.10 68.43
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Public Debt 13.13 14.56 –1071.25 –982.69 13.71 14.01 –1588.71 –1535.34
(0.08)* (0.05)** (0.07)* (0.11) (0.02)** (0.01)*** (0.06)** (0.10)*
IPD –0.10 0.08 28.43 28.27 –0.52 –0.48 119.57 119.84
(0.95) (0.96) (0.49) (0.51) (0.75) (0.76) (0.17) (0.21)
Primary Balance –1.20 –1.25 –0.65 –0.75 –0.75 –0.74 –0.95 –1.00
(0.11) (0.11) (0.36) (0.35) (0.27) (0.28) (0.19) (0.20)
Reserves –96.31 –100.45 –68.92 –70.15 –85.99 –85.69 –77.51 –78.52
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)***
Average Growth –1.66 –1.83 –1.58 –1.79 –1.96 –1.94 –1.76 –1.95
(0.17) (0.15) (0.10)* (0.11) (0.10)* (0.09)* (0.08)* (0.09)*
Inflation –0.02 –0.03 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10
(0.88) (0.83) (0.29) (0.29) (0.47) (0.52) (0.40) (0.40)
Current Account –0.39 –0.55 –0.01 –0.53
(0.21) (0.05) (0.98) (0.09)*
Net Exports –0.37 –0.47 0.02 –0.46
(0.14) (0.15) (0.96) (0.15)
Relative GDP –216.24 –194.88 –219.85 –221.78
(0.06)* (0.11) (0.05)** (0.06)*
Political Stability –7.48 –7.11 –10.34 –9.90 –6.62 –6.61 –10.86 –10.48
(0.14) (0.15) (0.06)* (0.07)* (0.19) (0.19) (0.05)** (0.07)*
Original Sin 17.09 16.26 8.92 6.62 12.36 12.47 10.44 8.12
(0.29) (0.36) (0.57) (0.71) (0.43) (0.44) (0.48) (0.63)
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.68 0.74 0.74 0.70 0.69
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upcoming reduction in IPD should be immediately reflected in the country’s rating if the rating 
agencies are concerned about IPD. In the second specification, the dummy variable equals one both 
in the year of the reform and on the years that follow, to capture the permanent effect that the 
reform might have on country ratings. The third specification has dummy variables for the short 
term after the reform (when the reform is 0-4 years old), medium term (5-8 years old) and long 
term (9+ years old). 
The control variables are largely as in the direct approach. The variables that represent 
macroeconomic and fiscal conditions are total public debt, international reserves, the primary 
balance, and the current account balance, all expressed in percent of GDP; real growth, inflation 
and country size (once more measured as the ratio of a country’s GDP to that of the U.S.). 
Unfortunately, the political stability and Original Sin variables are not available for a sufficiently 
long period to be included in the exercise.
14 
We employ two different panel estimation techniques. We start with a static panel to 
estimate a model similar to the cross-country regressions in the direct approach. We also estimate a 
dynamic panel data analysis including instrumental variables for two reasons. First, the high 
persistence of IIR ratings might indicate a “reputation effect” (thus, the lagged ratings could 
contain relevant economic information); second, more robust estimation techniques can rule out 
potential inconsistency and biases in our regressions. 
 
3.2.1 Static  panel 
The estimates for our static panel regressions indicate that pension reform dummies (and 
hence, IPD) generally do not help explain a country’s credit rating. Table 2 shows the results of the 
indirect approach following a model similar to the one used in the cross-country regressions. In 
general, the pension reform dummy variables are not significant
15 – a surprising result, given that 
about 80 per cent of the pension reforms in the sample also cut workers’ pension benefits, which 
should have reduced the probability of defaulting on total debt in the future, at least to some extent. 
Most control variables have the expected signs. Total debt has a positive and significant 
effect on the probability of default (as measured by the IIR), while higher international reserves 
reduce this probability; inflation has a significant but low positive coefficient. The positive and 
highly significant coefficient in the current account may seem unintuitive at first glance, but it is 
correct – with the average country in the sample holding a current account deficit, the coefficient 
implies a negative elasticity between the probability of default and improvements in the current 
account. Country size and the primary balance have the expected negative sign, but the coefficients 
are not significant. These results suggest that given the relevance of total debt and international 
reserves in the country risk assessments, the rest of the macroeconomic variables might have a 
relatively minor bearing for the rating agencies. 
 
3.2.2 Dynamic  panel 
As noted earlier, data inspection
16 suggests that our static panel results might be subject to 
potential problems of biased and inconsistent estimators. To address these issues, we estimate a 
dynamic panel using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method yielding asymptotically efficient 
————— 
14  The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) shows no multicollinearity among these variables (Annex E). 
15  The exception is the medium-term dummy variable in the third specification, both when included alone and when interacted by the 
country’s relative size. This implies that the pension reform might improve the rating only after 4 years. However, the lack of 
significance of the long-term dummy variable could mean that benefit on country ratings again fade away 8 years after the reform. 
16  The Arellano-Bond test confirms the existence of serial correlation of order one in our dataset.   Pension Privatization and Country Risk  353 
 
Table 2 
































Robust p values in parentheses. * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. 
Year dummies included in all models. 




















Constant 46.73 46.770 46.59 47.614 47.51 47.48
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Total Debt  7.97 7.76 7.78 24.00 22.35 22.43
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.08)* (0.11) (0.11)
Pension Temporal Dummy 0.91 64.77
(0.44) (0.11)
Pension Permanent Dummy –4.05 –106.79
(0.12) (0.21)
Pension Dummy Short Run –3.22 –39.82
(0.24) (0.70)
Pension Dummy Medium Run –7.62 –156.88
(0.01)*** (0.04)**
Pension Dummy Long Run –5.19 –40.002
(0.13) (0.90)
Primary Balance –2.624 –3.87 –5.27 6.09 4.78 4.65
(0.83) (0.74) (0.66) (0.64) (0.72) (0.72)
Reserves –24.72 –24.76 –24.20 –26.60 –26.58 –26.49
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Current Account Balance 21.53 19.69 19.05 24.74 23.50 23.27
(0.01)*** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Growth 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.047 –0.044 –0.047
(0.79) (0.70) (0.79) (0.62) (0.63) (0.61)
Inflation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.07)* (0.06)* (0.05)*
Relative GDP –57.030 –55.235 –53.825
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
Observations 831 831 831 831 831 831
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.32 0.33 0.33
N u m b e r  o f  C o u n t r i e s 6 36 36 36 36 36 3
Non-interacted Debt and Dummies
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estimates of our coefficients,
17 including the first lag of the suspected endogenous variables as 
instruments in the regression (Table 3).
18 
The estimation results are somewhat more mixed. In our first model, which considers both 
debt and the pension dummy variables independently of country size, the exercise again suggests 
that pension reform has not had a significant impact in the determination of credit ratings. In 
particular, the pension privatization dummy variables have statistically insignificant coefficients 
under each one of their potential specifications. Higher growth rates and primary balances reduce 
the probability of default as perceived by the rating agencies. Also, total debt and inflation raise 
perceived country risk. Most of the remaining control variables have the expected signs and are 
significant. As before, the apparently unexpected sign in the coefficient on the current account can 
be explained by the presence of current accounts deficits across the sample, yielding the correct 
sign for the elasticity of the modified IIR to improvements in the current account – with a 
narrowing current account deficit reducing the probability of default. 
The coefficient on reserves also appears to have an incorrect sign in the estimation. A likely 
explanation is that the instruments used in this estimation could be introducing some inconsistency 
to the reserves variable. In this light, an alternative model that incorporates a different instrument 
(the third lag of the rating) was also estimated, showing that the lagged dependent variable captures 
the explanatory power of the reserves and the total debt. This is not surprising considering that 
these variables have shown to be the most relevant determinants of the ratings. In this context, the 
results of this estimation are consistent with the static model. 
Finally, allowing for the interaction between the countries’ relative size with the debt and 
pension dummy variables delivers a coefficient for public financial debt with a significant but 
unexpected negative sign, possibly suggesting that the “quality” of the country – as measured by its 
relative economic power – might have relatively more bearing on the sovereign’s IIR ranking than 
its actual debt stock.
19 Pension dummies generally continue to prove insignificant and, at best, their 
effect on country ratings seem to show with a considerable lag and fade away quickly. 
In sum, the econometric evidence suggests that, under a reasonable range of specifications 
and estimation methods, rating agencies treat IPD and financial public debt differently. As argued 
earlier, there are good reasons that could explain this differentiation, and this is a factor that must 
be taken into account when planning a pension reform. 
 
4  A counterfactual study: Mexico’s pension reform 
In this section we illustrate the implications of pension reform by constructing simple 
counterfactual scenarios for the Mexican case As the country undertook a radical pension reforms 
in the nineties, we ask how fiscal balances and debt would have evolved if such a reform had not 
taken place. For this purpose, we construct a counterfactual scenario by adding to fiscal revenues 
the contributions actually paid into individual capitalization accounts by the insured populations 
since the reform. We also reduce the government interest bill in proportion to the debt that the 
government would have avoided issuing if they had received those contributions as revenue. We 
keep the observed underlying (non-pension) fiscal balance. The construction of such a 
 
————— 
17  See Technical Appendix. 
18  The bottom of Table 3 displays the tests for serial correlation, and the number of observations and countries. The tests for serial 
correlation show that there is no serial correlation of order 1 and 2. 
19  Furthermore, the relative size indicator could likely be picking up the impact of other structural issues (such as political stability and 








































































































Robust p values in parentheses. * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. 
L. indicates that the variable is lagged a period. Year dummies included in all models. 
2SLS effects results are estimates with standard errors and test statistics consistent to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 














Constant –0.18 0.48 –4.23 0.04 0.20 0.16
(0.76) (0.47) (0.00)*** (0.94) (0.68) (0.76)
Total Debt  1.54 1.49 1.26 –18.48 –18.51 –17.72
(0.13) (0.14) (0.10)* (0.10)* (0.09)* (0.10)*
Pension Temporal Dummy –0.07 11.65
(0.89) (0.62)
Pension Permanent Dummy –0.81 –62.83
(0.36) (0.33)
Pension Dummy Short Run –0.81 –21.88
(0.36) (0.59)
Pension Dummy Medium Run –1.14 -60.41
(0.20) (0.06)*
Pension Dummy Long Run 0.92 80.00
(0.62) (0.05)**
Primary Balance –2.26 –2.14 –2.26 –1.98 –1.91 –2.01
(0.54) (0.56) (0.54) (0.60) (0.61) (0.59)
Reserves 4.290 4.18 4.01 4.61 4.45 4.34
(0.064* (0.07)* (0.09)* (0.07)* (0.08)* (0.10)
Current Account Balance 11.15 10.81 10.49 10.95 10.37 9.73
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Growth –0.06 –0.06 –0.06 –0.07 –0.07 –0.06
(0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)** (0.03)** (0.02)** (0.05)**
Inflation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Relative GDP –22.03 –21.39 –20.52
(0.36) (0.37) (0.37)
L. IIR 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.40 0.39
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
L. Total Debt 1.80 1.77 1.72 11.98 11.20 10.52
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.02)** (0.23) (0.23) (0.27)
L. Total Debt
L. Pension Temporal Dummy 0.01 3.24
(0.98) (0.88)
L. Pension Permanent Dummy -0.60 –38.72
(0.20) (0.00)***
L. Pension Dummy Short Run 0.51 –53.48
(0.24) (0.02)**
L. Pension Dummy Medium Run –1.67 –92.27
(0.03)** (0.00)***
L. Pension Dummy Long Run 2.68 320.68
(0.29) (0.00)***
L. Primary Balance –8.36 –8.41 –8.290 –9.36 –9.29 –8.91
(0.07)* (0.07)* (0.07)* (0.06)* (0.07)* (0.08)*
L. Reserves –2.70 –2.90 –2.47 –3.60 –3.36 –2.87
(0.51) (0.47) (0.53) (0.40) (0.41) (0.47)
L. Current Account Balance 9.59 9.54 9.35 8.99 8.87 8.68
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)** (0.02)**
L. Growth –0.09 –0.090 –0.09 –0.10 –0.10 –0.10
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
L. Inflation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
L. Relative GDP –7.49 –7.84 –8.13
(0.43) (0.43) (0.41)
m1 1.26 1.23 1.40 1.34 1.16 1.28
m2 –1.33 –1.30 –1.14 –1.15 –1.27 0.99
Observations 651 651 651 651 651 651
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.58
Number of Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60
Non-interacted
Debt and Dummies
Debt and Pension Dummies
Interacted with Relative Country Size356  Alfredo Cuevas, María González, Davide Lombardo and Arnoldo López-Marmolejo 
 
counterfactual helps illustrate the order of magnitude of the adjustment needed in the fiscal sector if 
a pension reform is to be absorbed without allowing the trajectory of financial debt to change. 
 
4.1  Pension privatization in Mexico 
The Mexican pension reform replaced the old defined-benefit, PAYG system for private 
sector workers with a privately managed, defined-contributions scheme in July 1997. According to 
Zviniene and Packard (2002), this reform reduced IPD by 7 per cent of GDP by 2001. With the 
reform, workers affiliated to the old program had to switch to the new one. These workers (but not 
those joining social security schemes for the first time after the reform) retained the option of 
retiring under the provisions of the old scheme by transferring to the government the assets 
accumulated in their capitalization accounts at the moment of retiring. Thus, while the government 
remained liable to service its previous implicit contracts when workers chose to remain under the 
old scheme, it stopped collecting the pension contributions paid by all private sector workers. 
As noted earlier, Fiess (2003) examined country risk indexes for Mexico before and after the 
pension reform, concluding that it had no impact on country risk. While we agree with this 
observation, we argue that the pension reform did not have a negative impact on the country’s 
credit rating because the government made a significant effort to control its total explicit debt – 
which, as we have seen, is the main indicator used by rating agencies in determining their risk 
assessments.
20 
To illustrate this point, we calculate a counterfactual scenario for Mexico’s public debt as 
explained earlier.
21 We add to fiscal revenues workers’ contributions to their private capitalization 
accounts (AFORES) and subtract from government expenditures the interest cost that the 
government would have saved if it had reduced financing with those contributions (Figure 3). The 
contributions that actually went to private capitalization accounts represent the gap between the 
actual primary balance and the counterfactual primary balance; both measures show a surplus 
between 1996 and 2004. The exercise reveals an effort to undo the easing of policies that followed 
the 1995 crisis. The path of the counterfactual debt following the pension reform in 1997 shows a 
clear downward trend, hinting that an adjustment of the non-pension or underlying balance 
prevented the large cash imbalance in the residual public pension system from causing financial 
debt to rise and thereby helped preserve the country’s credit rating. 
 
4.2 Risk  assessment 
Based on the regression estimates of previous section, we measure the impact of pension 
reform on the Mexican credit rating.
22 Table 4 summarizes the cumulative estimated effect of the 
pension reform on IPD and explicit debt in the country. By 2001, IPD had declined as expected, 
while explicit debt had risen moderately. In fact, the reduction in IPD exceeded, in absolute terms, 
the increase in financial debt, as one should have hoped for reforms aimed at improving long-term 
solvency. The final column presents the estimated impact of this change in Mexico’s composition 
of public liabilities on the country’s sovereign credit ratings, based on our estimates from Table 1 
————— 
20  Another possibility (see Gil, Packard and Yermo, 2005, chapter 3) is that the negligible effect on Mexico’s country risk may reflect 
the country’s low IPDs by Latin American standards prior to the reform. However, even if relatively low by regional standards, IPD 
was high in absolute terms and the reform reduced it by a significant amount in a few years. 
21  The concept of public debt used in the calculations shown in this section is the broadest one available for Mexico, the historical 
stock of the financial requirements of the public sector.  
22  The IIR used in this exercise is the one officially released, rather than the transformed variable used in the regressions presented in 
the previous sections.   Pension Privatization and Country Risk  357 
 
Figure 3 
Mexico: Counterfactual Explicit Debt and Primary Balance 




































The counterfactual debt takes into account the debt creating flow generated from the lost of AFORES contributions and its cost. 
Source: Fund staff estimates. 
 
Table 4 
Estimated Impact of Pension Reform on IIR 
 
Change in Explicit Debt 
Due to the Reform, 2001
Reduction in IPD Due 
to the Reform, 2001
a  Country  Pension Reform 
Implementation 
(percent of GDP) 
Estimated Change 
in IIR Due to the 
Reform by 2001
b 
Mexico lug-97  4.6  7.1  0.66 
 
a  Source: Zviniene and Packard (2002) and authors. 
b  Impact from the increase in explicit debt and the law enactment. Calculated from estimates presented in Table 1, specification A(2), 
and the counterfactual debt scenarios. 
 
and the counterfactual debt scenario. In fact, the estimated sovereign credit risk was expected to 
rise marginally, given the limited increase in explicit public debt, and despite the large reduction in 
IPD. This result is consistent with the observations presented by Fiess (2003). 
We also simulate the counterfactual credit ratings for Mexico over a time period (Figure 4), 
based on the estimation results of the dynamic panel estimates with a period dummy presented in 
Table 3. The counterfactual rating comes from the difference between actual and counterfactual 
debt.
23 According to our estimates, the IIR for Mexico in 2001 would have been 5.70 points better 
in the absence of a pension privatization – a relatively small amount, also in line with the results of 
Fiess (2003). 
————— 
23  The effect of the counerfactual primary balance is not taken into account into the counterfactual ratings, since the estimated 
coefficient on the primary balance is not statistically significant. 
Primary balance
Primary balance, incl. AFORES
Public debt (right axis)



















Private contributions358  Alfredo Cuevas, María González, Davide Lombardo and Arnoldo López-Marmolejo 
Figure 4 
Mexico: Counterfactual IIR 
















Source: Staff estimates. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we explored the effect of a pension reform on country risk perceptions by 
examining the relevance of government debt and IPD debt for the credit ratings. We find that, 
rating agencies do not take into account IPD when assessing sovereign risk, but focus on the 
country’s explicit financial debt. Now, determining whether this is the result of a rational 
assessment of the differences between IPD and financial debt – which we judge economically 
significant – or of myopia is probably besides the point. This bias (if we can call it so) in the 
assessment of sovereign risk appears to be robust to a reasonable range of model specifications, and 
does not just reflect problems in the measurement of IPD. Thus, the implications for the perception 
of creditworthiness of financing the transition costs of pension reform with debt, and a 
government’s ability to finance them with adjustment, are factors to take into account when 
considering reform. It would be an error to waive the issue away by declaring that the reform 
simply makes implicit debt explicit. 
A clear policy implication of the paper is that a radical pension reform that aims at 
improving a sovereign’s long-term solvency by reducing implicit pension liabilities could end up 
increasing the riskiness of the government’s balance sheet in the short and medium term, thereby 
hurting the country’s credit rating, unless fiscal adjustment keeps the explicit debt trajectory from 
deteriorating. There are two corollaries to this conclusion. The first is that pension reforms require 
fiscal space to be implemented, to help compensate their transition costs in the short and medium 
terms. In support of pension privatization, the reforming government would be well advised to take 
policy actions to offset some or all of the transitional costs of the reform and their effects on the 
path of financial debt. The second is that when governments do not have room to implement the 
needed fiscal adjustment to offset the near- and medium-term cash costs of a pension privatization, 
it might be preferable to follow a gradual but decisive parametric approach to improve the 
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Distribution of Countries by Rating, S&P, 2004 
 
AAA  Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Isle of Man, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States 
AA  Andorra, Belgium, Bermuda, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Taiwan 
A  The Bahamas, Bahrain, Botswana, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia 
BBB  Barbados, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Montserrat, Oman, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia 
BB  Brazil, Colombia, Cock Islands, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Jordan, 
Macedonia, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Vietnam 
B  Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Grenada, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lebanon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Senegal, 
Serbia, Suriname, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela 
CCC Cameroon,  Ecuador 
CC Dominican  Republic 
 




Series  Description and Sources  Sample Period 
Institutional Investor’s Country 
Credit Ratings  Institutional Investor  1979-2003 
Standard and Poor’s Country 
Sovereign Ratings  Standard and Poor’s  2000 
Implicit Pension Debt/GDP  Holzmann, Palacios and Zviniene(2004), 
World Bank Discussion Papers  2000 
Political Stability  World Bank’s Governance Research Indicator 
Country Snapshot (GRICS)  2000 
Public Debt/GDP  Holzmann, Palacios and Zviniene(2004), 
World Bank Discussion Papers  1979-2003 
Total Debt/GDP  Experience with Large Fiscal Adjustments database: 
Tsibouris et al. (2006), completed with IMF data  1979-2003 
Primary Balance/GDP  Experience with Large Fiscal Adjustments database: 
Tsibouris et al. (2006) and OECD  1979-2003 
Reserves  World Development Indicators, World Bank  1979-2002 
Growth Rate  World Development Indicators, World Bank  1979-2003 
Inflation  World Development Indicators, World Bank  1979-2003 
GDP  World Development Indicators, World Bank  1979-2003 
Current Account Balance  World Development Indicators, World Bank  1979-2003 
Net Exports  World Development Indicators, World Bank  1979-2003 
Pension Reform Dummy  Own Research  Different years 
Spreads JP  Morgan  1998-2001 




Argentina Hungary  Peru 
Bolivia Iran  Philippines 
Brazil Korea  Poland 
Chile Kyrgyz  Republic  Portugal 
Colombia Lithuania Romania 
Costa Rica  Malta  Senegal 
Croatia Mauritius  Slovakia 
Dominican Republic  Mexico  Slovenia 
Ecuador Moldova Turkey 
El Salvador  Morocco  Ukraine 




Variable  Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
a Tolerance
b 
CA Balance  2.67  0.37 
Total Debt  2.52  0.40 
Political Stability  2.09  0.48 
Inflation 1.78  0.56 
IPD 1.69  0.59 
Average Growth  1.57  0.64 
Reserves 1.54  0.65 
Primary Balance  1.50  0.67 
Relative GDP  1.33  0.75 
Variable  Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
a Tolerance
b 
Net Exports  2.44  0.41 
Political Stability  2.07  0.48 
Total Debt  2.05  0.49 
Inflation 1.79  0.56 
Average Growth  1.71  0.58 
IPD 1.61  0.62 
Reserves 1.58  0.63 
Primary Balance  1.53  0.65 
Relative GDP  1.38  0.72 
 
a  VIF = 1/(1–R
2);  
b  Tolerance = 1–R




   Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
a  Tolerance
b 
Pension Reform  1.01  0.99 
Primary Balance  1.13  0.88 
Total Debt  1.11  0.90 
Reserves 1.23  0.81 
Net Exports  1.27  0.79 
Growth 1.06  0.95 
Inflation 1.01  0.99 
Relative GDP  1.07  0.93 
 
a  VIF = 1/(1–R
2);  





  OLS FE 
Institutional Investor Rating    




Primary Balance    




Inflation    
L.inflation 0.30  0.22 
 (0.12)  (0.03)
** 
Growth    




Current Account Balance    




Reserves    




Total Debt    





Robust p values in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10 per cent; 
** significant at 5 per cent; 
*** significant at 1 per cent. 
L. indicates that the variable is lagged a period. 
Year dummies included in all models. 362  Alfredo Cuevas, María González, Davide Lombardo and Arnoldo López-Marmolejo 
 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
There are two reasons for considering a dynamic panel data analysis for our estimation in 
Section 2. First, the high persistence of the ratings provided by the IIR might indicate a “reputation 
effect” faced by the rating agencies. Thus the lagged ratings should contain relevant economic 
information. The AR(1) process estimations for each dependent variable, included in Annex F, 
show that series such as the investor rating, current account balance, reserves and the total debt are 
highly persistent. Second, the size of the coefficients on total debt and international reserves 
estimated in the static panel seem very high, hinting at a possible overestimation. 
The model considered here is: 
  yi,t = βxi,t + ηi + vi,t  (1) 
  vi,t = ρvi,t–1 + εi,t  (2) 
for i = 1,…, N and t = 2,…, T, 
where: 
  E(εi,s εi,t) = 0 for s ≠ t 
  E(yi,t εi,t) = 0 for t = 2,…,T 
The dependent variable, yi,t , represents the IIR for country i at period t, while xi,t  represents a 
matrix containing the rest of the variables. There is an unobservable individual effect for each 
country, ηi. The error term is given by vi,t . The Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation confirms 
the existence of serial correlation of order one for our dataset. In order to quantify the level of serial 
correlation the residuals from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation are regressed on the 
lagged residuals. This is: 
  vi,t = ρvi,t–1 + εi,t 
Obtaining a significant and strong serial correlation of order one, represented by ρ > 0. The 
static model is transformed in order to obtain a dynamic representation with serially uncorrelated 
shocks. Lagging equation 1 by one period and multiplying it by ρ gives: 
  ρyi,t–1 = ρβxi,t–1 + ρηi + ρvi,t–1  (3) 
Using (3), equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
  yi,t – ρyi,t–1 = βxi,t – ρβxi,t–1 + ηi – ρηi + vi,t – ρvi,t–1 
  yi,t = ρyi,t–1 + βxi,t – ρβxi,t–1 + (1– ρ)ηi + εi,t  (4) 
This is a dynamic panel model with serially uncorrelated shocks. 
Some considerations about estimation alternatives are relevant to find the consistent 
estimator for ρ and β. Since the explanatory variable yi,t–1 is positively correlated with the error term 
(1 – ρ)ηi + εi,t  due to the presence of the individual effects, the OLS estimator in the levels equation 
(4) is inconsistent. This estimator is biased upwards as a result of the positive correlation between 
yi,t–1 and ηi. In principle, the Fixed Effects (FE) estimator could be seen as addressing this 
inconsistency by transforming equation (4) to eliminate ηi. This transformation consists in 
expressing the original observations as deviations from the individual means. OLS is used to 
estimate the transformed equation. The individual effects are removed from the transformed 
equations since the mean of the time invariant ηi is itself ηi. For simplicity, we focus on the simple 
AR(1) model, abstracting from the variables yi,t–2, xi,t and xi,t–1 , however, the same reasoning applies 
when they are present. The transformed model is given by: 
   Pension Privatization and Country Risk  363 
  ỹi,t = ρ1ỹi,t–1 + ẽi,t (5) 
where: 
  ỹi,t –1 = yi,t –1 – 1/(T–1)(yi,1 +… + yi,t  + … + yi,T–1) (6) 
  ẽi,t  = ei,t – 1/(T–1)(ei,2 + … + ei,t–1 + … + ei,T) (7) 
Thus, this transformation implies a correlation between the transformed lagged dependent 
variable and the transformed error term. The component –yi,t/(T–1) in equation (6) is correlated 
with ei,t in equation (7), and the component –ei,t–1/(T–1) in (7) is correlated with yi,t–1 in (6). Nickel 
(1981) and Bond (2002) show that these negative correlations dominate positive correlations 
between other components such as –ei,t–1/(T–1) and –yi,t–1/(T–1), so that the correlations between the 
transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term are negative. This indicates 
that the FE estimator is biased downwards. Thus, we might expect that a consistent estimator will 
lie between OLS and FE estimates, or at least not be significantly out of the interval described by 
these two estimators. 
A class of consistent estimators would require to first transforming the model to eliminate 
the individual effects and then apply instrumental variables. As noted before the FE estimator is not 
useful in this context, since it introduces the shocks from all time periods into the transformed error 
term. In this context, the first-differencing transformation has proved to be more promising. First 
differencing equation (4) gives: 
  yi,t – yi,t–1 = ρ(yi,t–1 – yi,t–2) + β(xi,t – xi,t–1) – ρβ(xi,t–1 – xi,t–2) + εi,t – εi,t–1 
  ∆yi,t = π1∆yi,t–1 + π2∆xi,t – π3∆xi,t–1 + ∆εi,t  (8) 
For t=2,…,T, for which we have the moment conditions: 
 E (yi,t–s ∆εi,t) = 0 for s≥2 
 E (xi,t–s ∆εi,t) = 0 for s≥1 
In equation (8) the correlation between ∆yi,t–1 and ∆εi,t is negative since ∆yi,t–1 = yi,t–1 – yi,t–2 
and ∆εi,t = εi,t – εi,t–1. However, if yi,t–1 is uncorrelated with the subsequent disturbances, εi,t , then 
yi,t–2 and ∆yi,t–2 are valid instrumental variables for ∆yi,t–1 in the first-differencing equations. The 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator
24 provides asymptotically efficient estimators in this 
context. In particular, for the small size that characterizes our sample. In the case of large samples 
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  PENSION FUNDS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES 
Nadine Leiner-Killinger,
* Christiane Nickel
* and Michal Slavík
* 
The recently established pension funds in the new EU Member States face investment risks 
that stem from a challenging macroeconomic environment, including, inter alia, volatile inflation 
and shallow domestic capital markets. The question arises whether a move to funded pension 
system in such a volatile economic environment always increases the long-term sustainability of 
public finances. Against this background, this paper surveys the main challenges for pension 
systems and public finances in the new EU Member States and provides evidence on pension fund 
performance in recent years. We conclude that in some of these countries the limited diversification 
of assets, the impact of high inflation as well as the financial market turmoil may have indeed 
reduced the positive impact of systemic pension reforms on fiscal sustainability. 
 
1 Introduction 
During the 1990s many of the Member States that entered the EU in 2004 or 2007 faced 
severe problems with the functioning of their statutory pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension 
systems. Particularly the relatively low retirement ages, high replacement rates and rather high 
social security contribution rates – which provided limited incentives to participate in the system – 
put the PAYG schemes under pressure as their economies shrank and the informal sector rose. As a 
consequence, several of these countries started to implement parametric reforms of their PAYG 
public pension systems in order to contain the rise in pension expenditure, including, inter alia, 
reductions in replacement rates.
1 At the same time, several of the new EU Member States (NMS) 
started to introduce a mandatory fully funded component into their pension systems and/or set the 
framework for a voluntary pension pillar (see Holzmann and Palacios, 2001, and Nickel and 
Almenberg, 2006). Notwithstanding these parametric and systemic pension reforms, this paper 
argues that challenges for these countries’ age-related public expenditures may remain sizeable, 
both in the short-to-medium as well as in the long term. First, in the presence of a substantial 
ageing of the population, in several NMS public pension expenditure-to-GDP ratios are projected 
to rise partly significantly over the long term, despite already enacted reforms (see European 
Commission and Economic Policy Committee, 2009). Second, in addition, governments in the 
NMS may be called upon to step in also for risks associated with the private pension pillar. For 
example, in the NMS the newly established private pension funds face significant risks related to 
shallow domestic capital markets, volatile inflation and flexible exchange rates. The economic 
crisis has shown that funded pension systems are vulnerable to financial market developments. 
Pensioners who retired recently and who had to buy annuities out of their savings from the private 
pension pillar tended to suffer losses. Nevertheless, at the current juncture, these losses seem to be 
contained in the NMS as many of these systems are not yet mature and the amount of accumulated 
savings in these pension funds is thus limited. This notwithstanding, with increasing maturity of 
these systems and rising importance of private pension income, risks of losses from the private 
pension pillar may give rise to calls to governments to step in and ensure sufficient retirement 
————— 
* European  Central  Bank. 
  The authors are grateful to Frank Eich and Ad van Riet for helpful comments. The opinions expressed herein are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank. 
1  See for a survey provided in Cangiano, Cottarelli and Cubeddu (1998). 368  Nadine Leiner-Killinger, Christiane Nickel and Michal Slavík 
 
incomes.
2 For example, as the experience with the economic crisis shows, Worldbank (2009) 
argues – though not specifically for the NMS – “Indeed, there are some, primarily, low income 
workers with lower saving levels who might, even under a phased annuity purchase or withdrawal 
program, be required to liquidate their diminished accounts in the short term. This group could be 
assisted through programs that offer a minimum return guarantee, analogous to what has been 
provided in the banking system in response to the crisis”. They conclude that “A well-designed 
zero pillar or the incorporation of a minimum pension guarantee into one of the other pillars can 
mitigate the effects of future economic volatility on the vulnerable elderly and lifetime poor. These 
systems need to be carefully designed to ensure their affordability and that they do not have 
negative incentive effects”. Also IMF (2009a) sees private pension related risks for the general 
government arsing from the crisis to stem from “[..] pressures to make up for the losses suffered by 
pensioners covered by private pension plans”. Thus, to sum up, if the aggregate outcome the 
individual pensioner receives from both the public PAYG as well as from statutory and voluntary 
funded private pension systems would be inadequate to ensure a decent standard of living, pressure 
on governments to top up “insufficient” pensions may tend to rise, posing additional risks to the 
general government budget, which governments had originally hoped to reduce through the 
implementation of funded pensions systems.
3 
Against this background, this paper addresses the risks to public finances associated with a 
move to funded pension systems in a volatile economic environment as in catching up economies 
such as the NMS. The analysis covers ten countries, namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. As a caveat, the analysis is 
impeded by poor data availability in the area of private pensions. Not only are there often only a 
few annual observations, given the relatively short period of time since the implementation of these 
funded systems. In addition, the lack of comparable data across the NMS impedes an in-depth 
econometric analysis in this field. Against this backdrop, this paper takes stock of the available 
pension asset data and links it with inflation as well as with the most recent financial market 
developments. This way it identifies exposures to risks and where government budgets should 
therefore account for these risks over the medium to long term. The paper finds the risks for public 
finances not so much to come from potentially strong variation in pensions incomes due to stock 
market developments as the share of pension funds invested in stocks tends to be comparatively 
low. In the contrary, it finds that in some of the NMS the limited diversification of assets and 
especially the relatively high fraction of total assets held in government debt securities limits to 
some extent the possible positive impact from systemic pension reforms over the long term. In case 
pension outcomes would render pension incomes insufficient during the catching up process over 
the medium to long term, this could potentially lead to a stepping in of the government and thus 
imply a smaller relieve to general government budgets than anticipated. As a consequence, while 
maintaining multi-pillar pension systems continues to be of paramount importance, a wider 
diversification of assets and better financial knowledge is decisive. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of pension systems in 
the NMS. Section 3 then surveys the pension system related challenges for public finances in the 
NMS. Section 4 first addresses the severe data limitations in the area of research on private 
pensions in the NMS. In order to analyse the performance of private pension funds in these 
countries against the background of inflationary and capital market developments, the paper then 
surveys the asset structure of private pension funds and aims at identifying the vulnerability of 
————— 
2  At the same time, several NMS weakened the second pillar by, inter alia, allowing employees to reduce contributions to the second 
pillar and increase contributions to the PAYG systems (see for a survey Antolin and Stewart, 2009). 
3  Against this background, also the Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2009) in their regular projections on 
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Bulgaria x  x  x  x  x 
Czech Republic  x  -  x  -  x 
Estonia x  x x  - x 
Latvia x  x  x -  x 
Lithuania x  voluntary  x  -  x 
Hungary x  x  x  -  x 
Poland  x  x and voluntary  x  x  x 
Romania x  x  -  -  x 
Slovenia x  -  x  x  x 
Slovakia  x  x and voluntary  x  -  x 
 
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009). 
 
these schemes against the background of the in some instances high inflation over the past years 
and the 2008-09 stock market developments. Section 5 draws policy conclusions. 
 
2  Overview of pension systems in the NMS 
All NMS have a funded pension pillar in combination with the standard old-age PAYG 
public pension scheme (see Table 1). While all of these countries apart from Romania have a 
private pension scheme with voluntary participation, not all of these countries have yet 
implemented a private pension scheme with mandatory participation. In the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia a mandatory private pension scheme does not exist at all, while in Lithuania, Poland and 
Slovakia, participation in these schemes is voluntary for some groups. In principle, the younger 
cohorts are encouraged to participate in the funded schemes, while the older cohorts closer to 
retirement have more flexibility to decide whether to participate or not. Occupational pension 
schemes exist only in Bulgaria, Poland and Slovenia. As the last column of Table 1 indicates, in all 
of the countries analysed here, a minimum pension and/or social assistance scheme exists. 
Consequently, it could, in principle, have a budgetary impact if pensions received from the first, 
second and third pillar of the pension system would turn out to be below the levels of either a 
minimum pension or social assistance, which would in such cases be paid to pensioners. 
As Table 2 shows, statutory funded private pension schemes differ significantly across 




Statutory-funded Private Pension Schemes 
 
Country  Year of 
Introduction 
Total Contribution 
(percent of gross wages) 
Share Paid by 
Employer 
Share Paid by 
Employee 
Bulgaria 2002  5  60  40 
Estonia 2002  6  67  33 
Latvia  2001  4 (in 2007) rising to 10 in 2010 27  73 
Hungary 1998  8  (for  participants of so-called 
hybrid system: 2% can be 
given by employer) 
0-(20) 100-(80) 
Poland 1999  7.3  0  100 
Romania  2004  2 (in 2008) rising to 6 by 2016  0  100 
Slovakia 2005  9  100  0 
 
Source: Social Protection Committee (2008). 
 
implementation. For example, Hungary
4 already introduced its statutory private pension 
scheme in 1998, while Slovakia implemented it only in 2005. In other words, the Slovak scheme is 
in this sense less mature than the Hungarian. Second, statutory funded private pension schemes 
differ both in terms of contribution levels and how these are shared between employers and 
employees. For example, in Poland and Romania the statutory pension scheme is fully financed by 
employees, while it is fully financed by employers in Slovakia.
5 
 
3  Pension system related challenges for public finances in the NMS 
The share of public expenditure on pensions in total general government expenditure varies 
widely across the NMS (see Figure 1). With around 26 per cent of total general government 
expenditure, this share was largest in Romania in 2008, followed by Bulgaria (22.4 per cent). In 
contrast, with about 13 per cent, this share was lowest in Hungary.
6 As Figure 1 also shows, Poland 
and Latvia have reduced the share of public pension expenditure in total general government 
————— 
4  However, Orbán and Palotai (2005) showed that the Hungarian pension system was even after the pension reform in 1998 
unsustainable. In addition, they claim that the returns recorded in the private pension funds fall short of expectations and, on the 
condition that these low returns persist, the second pillar is projected to provide annuities that do not make up for the reduction in 
benefits received from the public pillar. 
5  Dušek and Kopecsni (2008) provide a survey of pension reform measures in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia and 
estimated of the policy risk of social security. They conclude that PAYG is not a secure source of retirement income since pension 
reforms do change the future contributions and benefits in different directions for different workers, and the magnitude of the 
reductions in social security wealth sometimes exceeds several years’ worth of the workers’ earnings. 
6  The size of the share of public pension expenditure in total general government expenditure gives a very first indication of the 
sensitivity of the latter with respect to shifting to a second pension pillar. In principle, the relief to the general government budget 
resulting from a shift to a private pension scheme or public occupational scheme outside the government budget should tend to be 
largest in those countries, in which the public PAYG scheme represents a particularly large share of total general government 
expenditure. Obviously, the budgetary impact depends on the magnitude of shift towards private pensions. Moreover, also 




2002 and 2008, while in 
the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary and 
Romania this share 
increased slightly. These 
changes may reflect 
systemic and parametric 
pension reforms as well 
as shifts in the overall 
structure of public 
expenditure,  i.e., efforts 
aimed at cutting back 
other expenditure. 
Looking ahead, 
multiple challenges for 
public finances can be 
identified, depending on 
the channels through 
which the structure of the 
pension system affects 
public expenditure. 
 
These channels comprise, first, pressure from the public PAYG pensions systems and 
second, pressure arising from risks associated with the private pension pillar. In what follows, these 
channels are discussed in more depth. 
Turning to the first channel, pressure on PAYG pension schemes and thus public finances in 
the NMS arise from demographic and macroeconomic developments. Regarding demographics, as 
Figure 2 shows, the old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of the population aged 65 and above 
over the population aged 15-64 has increased steadily over 1996-2007 in the NMS. This is due to 
several factors, for example, improved health care services increasing the life expectancy of the 
elderly. At the same time, the economic catching-up process opened new career opportunities for 
the young generations who changed their behavioural patterns (e.g. increased migration abroad, 
postponed childbearing) which generally reduced the population aged 15-64. Only in Slovakia, the 
old-age dependency ratio was slightly lower in 2007 than in 1996. However, with the exception of 
Bulgaria until 2006, the old-age dependency ratios in these countries remained partly significantly 
below the EU27 average. 
Nevertheless, demographic pressures are projected to rise strongly in the future. As indicated 
in Figure 3, old-age dependency ratios, which in 2007 were in all NMS below both the EU27 and 
the euro area average, are projected to be above these levels in 2060. The strongest increases in the 
old-age dependency ratio are projected for Romania, the Czech Republic
7 and Lithuania. 
Furthermore, developments in employment affect the net position of the public pension 
systems via revenue collection.
8 As the accession to the EU brought a growth stimulus to the NMS 
economies, the large increases in employment that many of the NMS saw boosted revenues in the 
————— 
7  For example, Botman and Tuladhar (2008) claim that given the ageing pressures in the Czech Republic, restoring debt sustainability 
will require additional reforms and a further increase in the retirement age is desirable, but will not suffice.  
8  Looking back to the 1990s, in many NMS early retirement was often used as a measure to lower high official unemployment 
figures. Eligibility rules for retirement were relaxed and older workers close to retirement who lost their jobs often exited the labour 
force and retired. This rendered the PAYG systems increasingly unsustainable. 
Figure 1 
Public Pension Expenditure, 2002-08 










Romania  Bulgaria  Poland  Estonia  Czech
Republic
Latvia Lithuania Hungary
Public expenditure as a share of total 
general government expenditure, 2008  
Change in the share of public 
expenditure in total government 
expenditure, 2002-2008
Source: ESCB, ECB calculations. 




Old-age Dependency Ratios, 1996-2007 









































Source: Eurostat, ECB staff calculations. 
 
statutory PAYG schemes 
(as well as in the 
individual accounts of 
the private pension 
schemes). As Figure 4 
indicates, with 
13.6 percentage  points, 
Bulgaria saw the largest 
increase in the 
employment rate 
between 2000 and 2008, 
followed by Latvia 
(11.1 percentage points) 
and Estonia 
(9.4 percentage  points). 
Looking forward, the 
beneficial contribution 
from strong employment 
growth is at least 
partially reversed. 
Instead, the projected and 
in part substantial 
increase in 
unemployment brought 
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and financial crisis in all 
of these countries will 
deteriorate general 
government revenue in 
the short-term, putting 
some stress on public 
PAYG schemes. In 
addition, via lower 
contributions also to 
private schemes, the rise 
in unemployment also 
tends to reduce 
individual pensions 
accounts. As Figure 4 
shows, the increase in 
unemployment over 
2008-10 is projected 
to be the strongest 
in Lithuania 
(10.1 percentage  points), 
followed by Estonia 
(8.6 percentage points) 
and Latvia 
(8.5 percentage points). 
The second 
channel through which 
the structure of the 
pension system affects 
public finances relates to 
the risk that governments 
would need to top up 
“inadequately” low 
public and private 




project the developments 
of benefit ratios and 
gross average 
replacement rates from 
public and private 
pensions for several of 
the NMS, the results of 
which are displayed in 
Table 3. These long-term 
projections should be 
treated with extreme 
caution given the large 
uncertainty and poor data  
Figure 4 
Labour Market Developments in the NMS 
Employment Rates, 2000-08 
Unemployment Rates, 2008-10 
 

























































































































































































































































































































































Benefit Ratios and Replacement Rates in the NMS, 2007-60 
(percent) 
 
Benefit Ratio  Gross Average Replacement Rate 
Public Pensions  Public and Private 
Pensions  Public Pensions  Public and Private 
Pensions 
Country 
2007 2007-60  2007 2007-60 2007 2007-60 2007 2007-60 
Bulgaria  44  –20 44 –8  -  -  -  - 
Czech  Republic  45  –17 - -  33  –17  33  –17 
Estonia 26  –40  26  –18  28  –41  28  9 
Latvia 24  –47  24  4  33  –33  33  2 
Lithuania  33  –16 33 –2 32  –10 32 15 
Hungary  39 –8 39 –3 49  –23 49  –13 
Poland  56  –54  56  –44 - - - - 
Romania  29 26 29 41 36  - 36 34 
Slovenia  41 –6 41 –2  -  -  -  - 
Slovakia  45  –27  45  –11 - - - - 
 
Note: The benefit ratio is the average benefit of public/private pensions as a share of economy-wide average wage (gross wages and 
salaries in relation to employees). The gross average replacement rate is calculated as the average first pension as a share of 
economy-wide average wage. 
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009). 
 
availability. This notwithstanding, the table shows that benefit ratios and replacement rates differ 
widely among the NMS. Benefit ratios from public pension schemes are highest in Poland and 
lowest in Latvia and Estonia. In all NMS apart from Romania, where the public pension pillar may 
still be considered as being in a “built-up” phase, the benefit ratios in public pension schemes are 
projected to decline – partly significantly. The projected decline in the public pension benefit ratio 
over 2007-60 is projected to be largest in Poland, Latvia and Estonia and smallest in Slovenia and 
Hungary. Accounting for income from private pensions, the table shows that the benefit ratio is 
projected to fall strongly in Poland and to lesser extents in Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania and Slovenia. As regards gross average replacement rates, for the few NMS for which 
projections are available, the table points to expected substantial declines in the area of public 
pensions. Accounting for private pensions, the picture is less clear, as in several countries the gross 
average replacement rate is projected to rise slightly. Generally, declines in these indicators over 
time need to be assessed against their starting levels. In this respect, for example, the declines in the 
public and private benefit ratio in Estonia from a low level in 2007 to the lowest level across this 
section of countries in 2060 may point to very low pension levels, potentially raising pressure on 
government budgets in the future. 
 
4  Pension fund performance und risks 
This chapter surveys pension fund performance in the new EU Member States and captures   Pension Funds and Financial Markets: Evidence from the New EU Member States  375 
 
several risks to these systems that have increasingly emerged since their implementation. Many of 
these risks are not unique to the new EU Member States and apply to other countries as well. These 
risks include in particular the inflation risk, namely the fact that inflation grows faster than nominal 
returns on assets, as well as the financial market risk, which is associated with exposure of the 
pension assets to stock market developments. The global financial and economic crisis in 2008-09 
has shown that in particular the financial market risk and the associated melt-down in pension 
assets worldwide has become a major concern for policy makers.
9, 10 
Before we provide some evidence on pension fund performance in the NMS, the next section 
first briefly discusses the available data. 
 
4.1 Data 
The availability of homogenous data on pension funds in the NMS is limited. First, as shown 
above, the 2
nd and 3
rd pension pillars were introduced only recently in many NMS – the time series 
have therefore only a few observations. Second, data is only available on an annual basis. Third, 
while publicly accessible data on pension funds from national sources, such as pension funds 
associations or supervisors, are often richer and available at higher than annual frequencies, they 
are not fully comparable across countries. 
The main two sources of homogenous data that we use in this paper are from the OECD (the 
Pension Funds database) and from Eurostat. Both include annual data on pension funds 
developments. However, the available time series for the countries considered here are short, with 
the number of observations depending on the indicator chosen. For example, several indicators 
cover the period 2000 to 2007, while some cover only the years 2003-06. The data cover all 
pension funds and similar vehicles (i.e., pension funds, book reserve arrangements and pension 
insurance contracts), thus both mandatory and voluntary schemes that are either occupational or 
personal.
11 The OECD Pension funds database provides a comprehensive set of indicators on 
pension. However, the OECD database does not cover all NMS, but only its members: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Data provision for some of the other NMS, while 
sometimes provided, is rather limited. 
The Eurostat database provides a dataset on pension funds performance that in principle 
covers all NMS, but misses many observations, especially for the period before 2004. This is likely 
due to the fact that the systemic pension reforms were implemented often only recently and that the 
pension fund segments of financial markets played a relatively limited role in the financial 
intermediation in the NMS. 
————— 
9  See also IMF (2009b). 
10  There are various measures of pension funds performance, for example, Amir-Benartzi (1998) examine the correlation between the 
expected rate of return on pension assets as reported in the financial statements and the composition of the pension portfolio 
measured as the percent invested in equities. They find that these variables are related, but the relation is rather weak. Impavido and 
Rocha (2006) investigate the performance of the Hungarian second pillar and claimed that its performance since inception has been 
mixed. They concentrate on growth, portfolio and investment return, costs and fees. In terms of investment return, they find that 
government securities accounted for 73 per cent of the portfolio in 2004. They also find that the real rate of return net of fees was 
negative in some years and the annualized average net real rate return in the 1998-2005 period amounted to only 3.9 per cent p.a., 
lower than the average real wage growth of 5.3 per cent. Tapia (2008, p. 25) provides estimates of the financial performance of 
privately managed mandatory and voluntary pension funds in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and concludes that the 
average annual real investment rates of return has been positive for all, ranging from 1.0 per cent in the Czech Republic to 
8.8 per cent in Poland, since the implementation of the 2
nd or 3
rd pillar. In addition, the average annual real investment rates of 
returns show important fluctuations for the entire period since the pension reform has been in place. The uneven performance could 
be, according to Tapia (2008), explained partially by the very high proportion of assets held in government bonds (around 
60 per cent) and the irregular trends in government securities yields over the past years. 




Assets of Pension Funds in 2007 
(percent of GDP) 
 
Country  AT BE DE DK ES  FI FR LU IE 
Assets  4.8  4.0  4.1 32.4 7.5 71.0 1.1  1.0 46.6 
      
Country IT  NL  PT  SE  UK  CZ  HU  PL  SK 
Assets  3.3  138.1  13.7 8.9 78.9 4.7 10.9  12.2 4.2 
 
Note: In Denmark, France and Sweden, the significant fraction of pension savings is held in the form of pension insurance contracts 
which are not reflected in this table. 
Source: OECD. 
 
Despite these caveats, the available data nevertheless provide important information 
regarding pension fund developments in the NMS. However, the small number of observations 
prevents a more sophisticated empirical analysis. The next section provides some findings based on 
the available data. 
 
4.2  The size and structure of private pension fund assets 
The savings cumulated in the pension funds increased sharply in the NMS, but still remained 
at low levels when compared to many of the old EU Member States. For example, the pension 
funds assets as a share of GDP represented only about 4.7 per cent in the Czech Republic in 2007 
(2.3 per cent in 2001), 10.8 per cent in Hungary (3.8 per cent in 2001), 12.2 per cent in Poland 
(2.4 per cent in 2001) and 4.2 per cent in Slovakia (0 per cent in 2001), while they were about 
79 per cent in the United Kingdom or 138 per cent in the Netherlands (see Table 4). Consequently, 
only a limited amount of pension income currently comes from private pensions in these countries. 
OECD (2009a) finds that compared to the OECD average of 19.5 per cent of retirement income 
coming from private pensions, this share is 2.9 per cent in Hungary, 1.2 per cent in Poland, 
1.1 per cent in Slovakia and 0.7 per cent in the Czech Republic. 
The impact of inflation and financial market developments on pension fund performance is 
determined by the structure of pension fund portfolios. Private pension fund assets consist of 
(1) bills and bonds issued by the public and the private sector, (2) mutual funds, (3) shares, (4) cash 
and deposits as well as (5) other investment (e.g. mutual funds). The distribution of private pension 
fund assets across these categories varies widely across countries, reflecting, inter alia, differing 
risk aversion, existing country-specific investment regulations and available investment 
opportunities in domestic capital markets. 
As they should secure income for their members in their post-retirement period, pension 
funds in the NMS have often (but not always) opted for investing rather conservatively. As 
indicated by Figure 5, in 2007, the share of pension fund assets invested in cash and deposits, 
associated with low returns and low risks, varies from 70 per cent in Romania to 1 per cent in 
Hungary. In contrast, the share of pension funds assets invested in shares, which are associated 
with sizeable risks against the background of stock market volatility (that, from the historical 
perspective of developed economies, paid off in higher yields in the long run), range from 
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and Romania, bills and bonds issued by the public and the private sector formed the largest share of 
private pension assets in 2007. The majority of these debt securities were issued by the public 
sector (at the central government or municipal level). The corporate sector is mainly financed 
through loans from the banking sector in the NMS; and only a limited number of larger financial 
and non-financial private corporations issue corporate bonds. This limits to a certain degree the 
domestic investment opportunities for pension funds. 
The large share of bills and bonds issued by the public sector indicates that these pension 
fund assets are an important source of financing for the government. Against the background of the 
2008-09 crisis and the arising financing problems for the government, in Hungary, for example, the 
private pension schemes have been obliged to invest a larger share of their funds in government 
bills and bonds. On the one hand, investment in debt securities issued by the public sector increases 
in principle the security of pension funds’ investments due to a generally lower sovereign default 
risk when compared to the default risk of the financial and non-financial corporate sector. On the 
other hand, if government bonds represent a large fraction of total pension funds assets, it is 
questionable whether pension funds improve the overall efficiency of resource allocation. In the 
extreme case, if pension funds invested 100 per cent of their total assets in government debt 
securities they would act in principle as the first PAYG pillar; however, likely at higher 
administrative costs. One can assume that such a system would be more costly than a typical 
PAYG with implicit liabilities, due to administrative and other costs related to pension funds’ 
maintenance, marketing, remunerations of pension funds’ managers and owners. 
According to Eurostat data, the geographical structure of pension fund investments differed 
substantially in 2006 and 2007 (the latest data available). For example, 100 per cent of pension 
funds’ total assets were invested domestically in Poland in 2006 and Slovakia in 2007, while it was 
about 80 per cent in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic in 2007. On the contrary, this ratio was only 
16 per cent in Lithuania in 2007. 
The currency breakdown shows that a high share of investment is denominated in euro. This 
is particularly the case for the ERM-II countries and countries with a currency board exchange rate 
regime. In this respect, the share of pension fund assets denominated in euros was about 70 per cent 
of total investments in Lithuania, 46 per cent in Latvia and 38 per cent in Bulgaria in 2007. On the 
contrary, euro-denominated investment was only about 6 per cent in the Czech Republic in the 
same period.
12 
The limited diversification of assets in some of the New EU Member States, as shown in 
Figure 5, and especially the relatively high fraction of total assets held in government debt 
securities limit to some extent the possible positive impact from systemic pension reforms. If 
pension savings are allocated mainly into public sector debt securities, and if one assumes that the 
public sector is allocating financial resources generally less efficiently than the private sector, the 
funded pension pillars do not contribute to a higher economic efficiency via a better allocation of 
available resources. All in all, if the funded pillar is mandatory and used mainly to finance 
government deficits via purchasing government bonds, one can consider the pension funds’ 
contributions as a special form of taxes, rather than voluntary savings. 
 
4.3  The exposure to inflation risk: some indications 
For an assessment of the inflation risk, Figure 6 depicts the estimates of real yields on 
long-term year government bonds between January 2003 and May 2009. They indicate that in 
several of the NMS, the catching-up process observed over the last decade was associated with 
————— 








































































































Note: The real interest rates were calculated as a difference between the (observed) nominal yields on ten year government bond yields 
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partly high rates of inflation that lowered the investment real yields. In these Figures, the real yields 
were approximated by the difference between the nominal yields on ten year government bonds (or 
a similar instrument if no government bond was available) and the annual rate of change in the 
harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP). In some of the countries, the historical real yields 
from investments into government bonds were close to zero or even negative for protracted periods 
of time. For example, in Bulgaria and Latvia, past investments in government bonds were generally 
generating losses in real terms so that the contribution of these investments to the accumulation of 
pension assets tended to be negligible. However, the ongoing economic contraction brought 
inflation down. At the same time, the nominal interest yields on government bonds increased due to 
several factor including e.g. worsened fiscal outlook, pushing real yield further up. 
Also other forms of investment are exposed to inflation risk. In particular, holdings of cash 
or investment in financial instruments with a fixed interest rate (such as bank deposits) were 
eroding in real terms in the inflationary environment. 
Against this background, the question can be posed whether a move to funded pension 
systems in catching-up economies is helpful in the long-term. The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis 
would lead to the conclusion that price levels in less productive economies will increase as the 
productivity increases to equalize with productivity levels in more developed economies. As a 
consequence, the catching-up process is often accompanied by a higher inflation (or a currency 
appreciation). The instability of prices creates difficult conditions for all savers, pension funds 
included. For example, the double digit inflation rates in the Baltic countries have damaged 
significantly the real value of savings accumulated until 2008. If the funded pension pillars were 
supposed to reduce the burden of the PAYG pillar in the future, low and stable inflation together 
with a savings-friendly environment is required in order to accumulate sufficient savings under the 
funded pillars with a positive real return. 
In principle, establishing funded pension pillars before providing a stable (low-inflationary) 
macroeconomic environment brings about the risk that funded pillars may loose credibility and 
thus not attract sufficient voluntary savings in the future. In addition, if the real value of savings 
would be destroyed by high inflation, the establishment of pension funds does not improve the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. 
 
4.4  The exposure to the global financial crisis: some early indications 
The OECD (2009b, p. 16) estimates that the total investment loss worldwide of private 
pension plans due to the 2008 turmoil in financial markets was around USD 5 trillion (out of which 
USD 3.3 trillion in the United States). According to OECD (2009b, p. 15), pension funds in the 
OECD countries experienced a negative return of about 20 per cent in nominal terms between 
January and October 2008 (22 per cent in real terms), amounting to a loss of about 
USD 3.3 trillion. Against this background, the question may be posed how the economic crisis has 
affected the NMS, bearing in mind that, as indicated above, the pension funds segment is still 
rather small in the NMS. 
Figure 7 shows how the stock markets in the NMS developed between October 2000 and 
May 2009. In particular, the stock market indices in Bulgaria and Romania had grown substantially 
faster since August 2007 than what would have been in line with economic fundamentals. By 
February 2009, the NMS stock market indices dropped to about 20-45 per cent of their values in 
August 2007, but since then started to recover somewhat, in particularly in Hungary, Poland and 
the Czech Republic. All in all, the global financial market turmoil has negatively influenced the 
stock markets in all NMS and many of the stock market indices returned down to levels observed 
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As many of the 
pension funds profited 
from the substantial 
increase in stock prices 
in the past, the decline in 
stock prices implies 
losses for the stock 
holders in the short term. 
Figure 8 shows that 
particularly pension funds 
in Poland and Bulgaria 
would tend to be affected 
due to the relatively 
larger shares of stock in 
their portfolios. In the 
Czech Republic, Estonia 
and partly also Hungary, 
the adverse impacts of 
the economic crisis and 
the related stock market 
deterioration on pension 
fund assets were to some 
extent limited by a 
 
relatively modest representation of stocks in pension fund portfolios (less than 10 per cent, 
respectively 15 per cent of total assets). 
Consequently, indeed, also pension funds in the NMS faced significant losses stemming 
from the ongoing crisis. However, due to their relative short history, the absolute amounts of assets 
cumulated in the pension funds are rather limited in the NMS. Also, the NMS pension funds’ 
exposure to stock markets is, except Poland and Bulgaria, rather limited. At the same time, pension 
funds that invested previously mostly in bonds may have benefited from the flight-to-quality that 
tends to lead to a higher demand for bonds associated with low risk. The higher demand tended to 
increase the prices of these bonds compared to other assets and thus may have mitigated to some 
degree the negative impact of the crisis on pension fund portfolios. This notwithstanding, many 
foreign investors pulled out of the NMS financial markets so that the liquidity of these markets 
declined significantly. 
 
4.5  Convergence of New Member States to the old EU Member State levels 
This section outlines developments in household savings, profitability of pension funds and 
funds’ contribution rates in order to highlight differences or common trends in the NMS and the old 
EU Member States. To overcome the problem of missing observations at the country level in the 
NMS, we pooled available data on relevant macroeconomic, financial and pension fund variables. 
Figures in this section show an aggregated view on how the household savings rate evolved over 
time in these two groups of countries. In this respect, Figure 9 indicates that the household savings 
rate has on average been higher in the old Member States. In the NMS, the household savings rate 
was between 4 and 7 per cent of disposable household income – it declined from levels broadly 
comparable with the old Member States in 2001 to just about 4 per cent in 2003 and 2004 and since then it 
started to rise to about 6 per cent in 2008. On the contrary, in the old Member States, the household 
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Figure 10 shows a 
declining trend in the 
nominal yields of pension 
funds between 2003 and 
2006 in the NMS. The 
nominal yields of pension 
funds were higher in the 
NMS than in the old EU 
Member States; they 
declined from about 
20 per cent in 2003 to 
about 16 per cent in 2006 
in the NMS, while they 
fluctuated in the old 
Member States. The 
explanation of higher 
returns in the NMS may 
be higher inflation and 
more profitable investment 
opportunities in the 
NMS, e.g. related to their 
lower GDP per capita. 
Employees’ and 
employers’ contributions 
to pension funds have 
been rising sharply in the 
NMS since 2003; 
however, their level 
remained below that in 
the old Member States in 
2007, reaching only 
1.2  per cent of GDP 
while it was about 
1.7  per cent of GDP in 
the old Member States. 
This, together with the 
lower households saving 
rate shown in Figure 9, 
could potentially be an 
indication that the 
population in the NMS is 
not accumulating 
sufficient savings for the 
post-retirement period. 
All in all, the NMS 
seem to be catching up 
with the savings patterns 
observed in the old 
Member States. Both the 
household savings rate 
Figure 9 
Household Saving Rate 
(percent of disposable income) 
Source: OECD, own calculations. 
Figure 10 
Profitability of Pension Funds Investments 
(net investment income divided by total investments * 100) 
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and contributions to 
pension funds are at 
lower levels in the NMS, 
but are converging to the 
levels observable in the 
old Member States. 
 
5 Conclusion 
By way of a 
stock-taking exercise, 
this paper is an attempt 
to assess the multi-pillar 
pension systems and the 
associated budgetary 
risks in the new EU 
Member States. We find 
that the assets of pension 
funds are not well 
diversified in all 
countries that we 
consider here. In fact, to 
a large extent the pension 
funds in some of the  
 
NMS are invested in government bills and bonds. On the one hand, this increases in principle 
the security of pension funds’ investments due to a generally lower sovereign default risk when 
compared to the default risk of the financial and non-financial corporate sector. On the other hand, 
if government bonds represent a large fraction of total pension funds assets, pension funds are in 
fact mimicking the first pension pillar. In addition, we find that pension fund assets have been 
subject to inflation risk, with real yields on government bonds having turned negative for several 
years for some of the NMS. This implies that the real value of the assets has been vanishing and the 
return has been lower, increasing the risk to the government that the future pensioners might not be 
able to sustain a living on the (meagre) return of their assets. This problem may be compounded by 
the effects of the ongoing global financial and economic crisis. We find that, indeed, pension funds 
in the NMS (as well as elsewhere) also faced significant losses stemming from the crisis. However, 
mainly due to their relative short history, the absolute amounts of assets cumulated in the pension 
funds have been rather limited in the NMS. Also, the NMS pension funds’ exposure to stock 
markets was, except for Poland and Bulgaria, rather low. On the other hand, the relatively newly 
established funded pension schemes in the NMS face generally a higher risk of loosing credibility 
than schemes established earlier in the old Member States that already have a solid track record. A 
severe underperformance relative to previous expectations may hamper a further development of 
this financial segment in the NMS. 
The adverse impacts of inflation and financial market volatility on the performance of 
pension funds that has been witnessed in recent years in several NMS underlines the fact that the 
problems concerning the sustainability of pension systems are not solved, yet. Of course, any 
assessment of this kind must distinguish between persons, who would now lose in such an 
environment (e.g. pensioners that need to buy annuities out of melt-down private pensions funds) 
or young persons, who, in times of deteriorating stock markets, buy equities cheaply at depressed 
prices and may profit from the increase of their prices in the future (see, for this argument, OECD, 
Figure 11 
Contributions to Pension Funds 
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2009b). However, not withstanding this argument, the witnessed volatility of financial markets and 
the impact of inflation give rise to the question who would pay the pension if pension funds fail to 
deliver what they were set out to deliver. 
In addition, the available option of different investment strategies of pension funds that 
imply different risks call for an increased financial education of the population. Sufficient financial 
knowledge is necessary to enable responsible and qualified decisions about risks to future pension 
income. Only sufficiently educated pension savers are able to identify possible risks related to a 
particular investment strategy. 
This basic stocktaking exercise has shown that the assessment of long-term sustainability of 
public finances in the presence of an increasing importance of private pension systems is important. 
A proper empirical assessment, however, requires first an improvement in the data situation in this 
area. From a policy point of view, portfolio and risk diversification remain an issue as does 




Afonso, A., L. Agnello, D. Furceri and R. Sousa (2009), “Assessing Long-term Fiscal 
Developments – A New Approach”, ECB, Working Paper, No. 1032. 
Antolin, P. and F. Stewart (2009), “Private Pensions and Policy Responses to the Financial and 
Economic Crisis”, OECD, Working Paper on Insurance and Private Pensions, No. 36, Paris. 
Botman, D. and A. Tuladhar (2008), “Tax and Pension Reform in the Czech Republic – 
Implications for Growth and Debt Sustainability”, IMF, Working Paper, No. 125. 
Cangiano, M., C. Cottarelli and L. Cubeddu (1998), “Pension Developments and Reforms in 
Transition Economies”, IMF, Working Paper, No. 151, Washington (D.C.). 
Dušek, L. and J. Kopecsni (2006), “Policy Risk in Action: Pension Reforms and Social Security 
Wealth in Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia”, The Pensions Institute, Discussion 
Paper, No. PI-0812, London. 
European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2008), The 2009 Ageing Report: 
Underlying Assumptions and Projections Methodologies, European Economy. 
————— (2009),  The 2009 Ageing Report – Economic and Budgetary Projections for the 
EU-27 Member States (2008-60), European Economy, No. 2/2009. 
Holzmann, R. and R. Palacios (2001), “Individual Accounts as Social Insurance: A World Bank 
Perspective”, The World Bank, Discussion Paper, No. 114. 
IMF (2009a), “Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis”, IMF staff 
position note, SPN/09/13, Washington (D.C.), June. 
—————  (2009b), “Fiscal Policy for the Crisis”, IMF staff position note, December 2008, 
Washington (D.C.). 
Impavido, G. and R. Rocha (2006), “Competition and Performance in the Hungarian Second 
Pillar”, The World Bank, Policy Research, Working Paper, No. 3876. 
Maddaloni, A., A. Musso, P.C. Rother, M. Ward-Warmedinger and T. Westermann (2006), 
“Macroeconomic Implications of Demographic Developments in the Euro Area”, ECB, 
Occasional Paper, No. 51. 
Nickel, C. and J. Almenberg (2006), “Ageing, Pension Reforms and Capital Market Development 
in Transition Countries”, EBRD. 
Nickel, C., P.C. Rother and A. Theophilopoulou (2008), “Population Ageing and Public Pension 
Reforms in a Small Open Economy”, ECB, Working Paper, No. 863. 
OECD (2009a), Pensions at a Glance 2009, Paris. 
————— (2009b), Private Pension Outlook 2008, Paris. 
Orbán, G. and D. Palotai (2005), “The Sustainability of the Hungarian Pension System: A 
Reassessment”, MNB, Occasional Paper, No. 40. 
Rother, P.C., M. Catenaro and G. Schwab (2002), “Ageing and Pensions in the Euro Area Survey 
and Projection Results”. 
Social Protection Committee (2008), “Privately-managed Funded Pension Provision and Their 
Contribution to Adequate and Sustainable Pensions”. 
Verbic, M. (2008), “The Ageing Population and the Associated Challenges of the Slovenian 
Pension System”, Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana.   Pension Funds and Financial Markets: Evidence from the New EU Member States  387 
 
World Bank (2009), “The Financial Crisis and Mandatory Pension Systems in Developing 




  COMMENTS ON SESSION 2 




I was asked to comment on three of the papers presented in the session that addressed the 
issue of pension reform and capital markets. More specifically, I will comment on the papers by 
Draper and Westerhout; Gillingham, Leive and Tuladhar; and Rezk, Irace and Ricca. These three 
studies cover related issues – pensions and savings – although in a different setting. For instance, 
the first paper is a theoretical paper presenting simulation results, based on a model capturing life-
cycle behaviour of households. The second paper is a descriptive analysis of the consequences of 
the financial crisis on funded pension saving. On the other hand, the third paper offers an empirical 
analysis of the effects on saving from the substitution of PAYGO systems by fully funded pension 
schemes. 
 
2  On “Privatizing Pensions: More than an Interesting Thought?” by Nick Draper and 
Ed Westerhout 
The paper by Draper and Westerhout assesses the privatization of pension systems in an 
OLG life-cycle behaviour model. The sources of income include labour, capital and 
intergenerational transfers. One assumption is that equity as a percentage of wealth is roughly 
constant over time (implying constant return risk aversion). 
According to the results, an economy with a defined benefits scheme can see an increase in 
utility of around 63 per cent and the privatization of pension funds would imply a 48 per cent 
decrease of utility at the steady state. In addition, in the presence of an annuity market there is a 
negative effect of 4.5 per cent at the steady state, and precautionary saving for longevity risk is no 
longer necessary. Finally, considering either endogenous or exogenous labour supply, there only 
very small differences in terms of utility. 
From my reading of the version presented in the workshop, the privatization message and its 
implications were not too clear from the paper. On the other hand, are there significant changes if 
perfect capital markets are absent? For instance, short-selling is not always possible (may not even 
be allowed). 
Regarding the calibration of some of the parameters in model I would see it as an added 
value if the authors are clearer on their sources and possible sources. For instance, the authors use 
an intertemporal substitution elasticity of 0.5, a rate of time preference of 0.0125 and an expected 
excess return on equity of 0.01. For example, in order to assess the magnitude of the excess return 
on equity, we can observe such measure for the U.S. and Japan (see Figure 1 and Table 1). During 
the period 1970:1-2008:3, the average equity excess return was 0.8 and 3.2 per cent respectively for 
the U.S. and for Japan, which is somewhat different from the working hypothesis of the model 
————— 
*  ISEG/TULisbon – Technical University of Lisbon, Department of Economics; UECE – Research Unit on Complexity and 
Economics, R. Miguel Lupi 20, 1249-078 Lisbon, Portugal. E-mail: aafonso@iseg.utl.pt. UECE is supported by FCT (Fundação 
para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal), financed by ERDF and Portuguese funds. European Central Bank, Kaiserstraße 29, 
D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. E-mail: antonio.afonso@ecb.europa.eu 
  The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank or the 




some sensitivity analysis 
with the calibration 
parameters would be 
useful to see to what 
extent some results still 
hold.  
 
3  On “The Impact 
of the Financial 




Leive and Anita 
Tuladhar 
As already 
mentioned, the paper by 
Gillingham, Leive and 
Tuladhar is a descriptive 
study of the effects of the 
financial crisis 
on pension funds. 
According to the 
evidence reported equity 
is a relevant part of 
pension funds assets 
(45  per cent in 2007), 
and pension funds in the 
U.S., the U.K., Australia, 
the Netherlands, Canada 
and Sweden, seem more 
prone to the effects of the 
2008 crisis, while there is 
a broader predominance 
of defined benefits 
PAYGO systems in the 
EU. Moreover, and not 
surprisingly, the richest 
income quintiles are 
more exposed to a crisis 
situation and the ensuing 
loss in market value of 
assets in the capital 
markets. Still, 
government assistance to 
pension plans in a 
situation of crisis should 
be targeted to 
Figure 1 
Excess Equity Return 
 
a) United States 
b) Japan 
















































































































































































































































































































































Excess Equity Return Statistics, 1970:1-2008:3 
 
  U.S. Japan 
  Average Maximum  Minimum Average Maximum  Minimum 
Bond return  7.4  14.8  3.6  4.9  9.5  0.7 
Equity  return  8.2 44.3  –29.7  8.1 93.7  –36.5 
Excess equity return  0.8  29.5  –33.3  3.2  87.3  –43.9 
 
Data source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
lower-income households. Finally, a natural concern of such government interventions is how the 
fiscal impact of the financial crisis may impinge on fiscal sustainability. 
This paper provides us input for some questions and further thinking on how governments 
should react under a crisis in terms of supporting the losses suffered by pension funds. For 
instance, should the government step in to assist depleted pension funds, if they are privately 
owned and run? On the other hand, if the existence of such pension schemes was mandatory, then 
the authorities cannot disregard lightly the losses in portfolios. Moreover, if higher (current and 
future) taxes are needed to finance such assistance, does it matter how big was the share of non-risk 
free assets in the pension funds’ portfolios? In the end, if higher income households are more 
represented in such pension funds doesn’t government help distort income distribution policies? 
What policy makers and the public face are, to some extent, alternative ways of thinking 
government intervention. The simple, somewhat demagogical query seems to be: do we want to 
pay taxes to finance minimum subsistence social networks or to bail out private business, be it 
pension funds or not, as for instance in the financial hiccups of 2008? In the end, and after full 
consideration, pragmatism should help and prevail when dealing with the problem of allowing past 
private profits to become current of future public losses. 
 
4  On “Pension Funds’ Contribution to the Enhancement of Aggregate Private Saving: 
A Panel Data Analysis for Emerging Economies” by Ernesto Rezk, Mariano Irace and 
Vanina Ricca 
The paper by Rezk, Irace and Ricca assesses the effect of pension fund assets on private 
saving rates. The main intuitions in the paper draw on Feldstein (1974) well-known study, which 
discussed how the introduction of social security impinges on private saving. The paper estimates a 
private saving reaction function in a panel of six Latin American countries for the period 
1995-2006. The thesis of the study and the conclusion from the empirical results is that mandatory 
pension fund regimes have a positive impact on private saving. Interestingly, different results can 
be found in other studies (see Freitas and Martins, 2009, for OECD countries). 
For the simple rationalisation of the issue at end, the standard text-book relationship between 
external and budgetary imbalances, investment and saving is useful (see the Appendix), in order to 
recall that the two main sources of saving are private domestic saving and foreign capital inflow 
(due to the current account deficit), which are used to finance the two main sources of demand for 
financial capital: private investment and the government budget imbalances. 
One alternative way to address the question studied by the authors would be to use a 
consumption specification as in Feldstein (1974, 1982) to assess how pension funds’ assets 392 António  Afonso 
 
impinge on private consumption. In addition, the authors could also link to the current account 
balances, on the basis of its relationship with private saving, government saving and investment 
(Afonso and Rault, 2008, provide panel evidence for the EU). 
Other points that came to my mind when reading the paper, relate to the need to check 
formally whether indeed a fixed effects specification is superior (different) to simple OLS or 
random effects; how to deal with the endogenous behaviour from pension funds; and that instead of 
short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates (or eventually excess equity returns), could be 
used in the analysis. In addition, instead of the demographic variable used, the authors could use 
the old-age dependency ratio, which more clearly proxies the aging burden on saving decisions. 
Finally, given the rather small sample size (around 60 observations) used in the panel, one 
necessarily needs to read the results with some care. 




The identity for GDP, Y, in an open economy can be written as: 
  YCIGXM =+ ++−  (1) 
where: 
C = private consumption 
I = private investment 
G = government expenditure 
X = exports of goods and services 
M = imports of goods and services 
Private saving S is given by disposable income net of consumption expenditure and taxes, T: 
  SYCT =−− (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) relate the current account balance (CA=X–M) to the difference 
between national investment and national saving, the sum of private and public saving and the 
government balance (BUD=T–G). Thus, the current account balance is usually written as: 
  () ( ) ( ) X MS I T G −= − + −  (3) 
  () CA S I BUD =−+ , (4) 
and it is evident that the current account (CA=X–M) balance is related to the budget balance 
(BUD=T–G) through the difference between private saving and investment. In other words, the 
current account balance of a given country is by definition identical to the difference between 
national saving and domestic investment. 
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 COMMENTS ON SESSION 2 
PENSION REFORM AND CAPITAL MARKETS 
Laura Muriel Cuccaro
* 
1  Comments on “Pension Systems in EMES: Implications for Capital Flows and 
Financial Markets” by Ramón Moreno and Marjorie Santos 
The first paper, “Pension System in Emerging Economies: Implications for Capital Flows 
and Financial Markets”, written by Mr. Moreno and Mr. Majorie Santos, explores the effects of the 
pension system on capital flows, saving and investment, and the deepening of financial markets. 
The authors analyze three relevant aspects: the stage in the demographic transition, the 
pension system design and the pension fund asset accumulation and financial deepening. One of 
the most important conclusions of the paper is that the implications of demographic changes for 
saving and investment would depend on the stage in demographic transitions. However, according 
to the ambiguity of some results, the authors conclude that other factors than demographic can play 
an important role in influencing national saving and investment. 
As a second conclusion, it is not clear the expected effects with a funded pension scheme. 
One of the statement used to justify the introduction of a funded pension system is that could 
increase the incentive to save and reduce the evasion. The authors list several factors that may have 
limited the impact of pension reforms on national saving: the lack of financial literacy, the 
reduction of precautionary saving, the transitional costs, the declining pension coverage of workers 
and the high administrative costs. 
Finally, the authors analyze the assets accumulation and the financial deepening and 
conclude that in spite of the growth of accumulated assets in emerging economies, the levels in 
terms of GDP are still lower than in develop economies. At the same time, the portfolio 
composition of the managed funds in emerging economies is limited, with an important 
participation of public debt. According to the authors, as pension fund assets have grown, emerging 
securities markets have deepened in recent years. However, financial markets in emerging 
economies are still not as deep as in developed countries. 
The paper explores in an interested way the effects of the pension reforms on national saving 
and investment and on domestic capital markets. Most of the explanations provided by the authors 
help to understand the developments after the 1994 pension reform in Argentina. 
In spite of the authors’ mention of the relevance of the informal labor sector to explain the 
declining in pension coverage of workers, it is important to emphasize this effect, taking in account 
that the informal labor sector has an important participation in the majority of emerging economies. 
In addition, the lack of the institutional framework in some emerging economies is important 
to understand the portfolio composition of the pension managed funds. In this sense, for example, 
the fiscal cost of the transition has covered in part through the pension funds, explaining the high 
composition of government debt on the total pension managed funds. 
————— 
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2  Comments on “Reforming the Pension Reforms: The Recent Initiatives and Actions on 
Pension in Argentina and Chile” by Rafael Rofman, Eduardo Fajnzylber and German 
Herrera 
The paper “Reforming the Pension Reforms: the recent initiatives and actions on pension in 
Argentina and Chile”, written by Rofman, Fajnzylber and Herrera, is a very complete description 
of the recent pension measures that have been adopted in Argentina and Chile and a compared 
analysis of the institutional and political framework in both countries. The paper describes the most 
relevant components of the recent reforms, explaining why and how they were introduced, 
discussing their impacts and the remaining challenges. 
According to the authors, the introduced reforms during the recent years in Argentina and 
Chile recognize similar origin: the concerns about coverage, equity and efficiency of the systems, 
as well as a renew interest in defining the role of the state in the system. However, the measures 
and the process were very different in both cases. While in Chile there was a wide public debate, in 
Argentina the reforms were adopted through decrees or through laws whit little discussions about 
the contents and the goals. This difference reflects the disparity in political and institutional 
framework of the countries. Therefore, the expected results of recent reforms are also different. 
The authors provide an incredible summary of the pension measures introduced in Argentina 
during the recent years. Since 2002, the minimum benefit has been increased to compensate for 
inflation and also increase the real value. The government has introduced increases in other 
benefits than the minimum up to the year 2006. The minimum pension benefit rose more than 
70 per cent in real terms from 2002 to 2008, meanwhile the average pension benefit lost real value 
of around 4 per cent during the same period. As a result, the benefit pyramid has been reduced. 
The constitution of Argentina obligates the authorities to adjust the pension benefit 
according to the evolution of the market wages. However, the government, up to the year 2008, had 
adjusted the pension benefit using discretionary decisions due to the historical tightening fiscal 
position. However, in August 2006 the supreme court ruling for a specific beneficiary (called 
“Badaro case”) ordered that the pension benefit of that beneficiary be adjusted for the period 
between January, 2002 and December, 2006 on the basis of the annual changes in the level of the 
wage index (formal and informal wages) published by the national official statistics institution 
(INDEC). A class action ordering the extension of the benefit adjustments to all beneficiaries was 
approved in June 2008. 
In this context, the government introduced a mobile adjusted rule on the basis of the 
minimum result of the simple average between the six-monthly increase in wages for the registered 
workers and the year over year evolution of tax revenue for the National Social Security Institution 
(ANSES) and the year over year rate of the total resources of ANSES. As it was indicated in the 
paper, originally the index had some technical mistakes because it was estimated using a 
semiannual rate together with an inter-annual rate. 
After the decision of introducing the mobile index of pension’s adjustments, the government 
changed the annual for a semi-annual rate to estimation. Nevertheless some details of the index’s 
estimation have not been provided yet by the government. At the present, there are some doubts 
regarding the calculation. For example, the updated number of beneficiaries of the pension system 
is unknown and it is key information to estimate the mobile index. 
The anticipated retirement and the moratorium plans are two of the most important measures 
that have been taken during recent years. The plans were closed at the beginning of 2007, however 
according to the administrative steps; some new beneficiaries were registered into the 
pay-as-you-go system during 2008. According to the official information, as of March 2008 more 
than 1.8 billion people entered to the pay-as-you-go system through these plans.   Comments on Session 2: Pension Reform and Capital Markets  397 
In 2007, the government introduced a pension system reform. According to the government, 
the main goals of that reform were to: increase the pension coverage rates, increase the replacement 
rates, allow contributors to choose between the two schemes, reduce the commission of the funded 
system and improve the portfolio composition of the managed funds by the pension administrators. 
However, the voluntary transfers to the pay-as-you-go system were limited and the composition of 
the pension funds has not registered significant changes. 
In spite of the lower rate of voluntary transfers from the funded scheme to the pay-as-you-go 
scheme, in 2008 the congress approved the nationalization of the funded pension scheme proposed 
by the executive branch, introducing marginal changes to the original plan. The recent pension 
measures have had fiscal impacts in the short-term but also in the medium and long-term. As the 
paper describes, there are not enough official information of the total fiscal impacts. 
The anticipated retirement and the moratorium plans generated a net fiscal cost in 2007 
(when the majority of people were registered) of 0.7 per cent of GDP. Under the design of the 
plans, after five years, people will receive the total pension benefit, so the estimated net fiscal cost 
of these measures will increase during the next years with an important impact on the year 2012 of 
around 1.3 per cent of GDP. 
The 2007 pension system reform included non-voluntary transfers from the funded scheme 
to the unfunded scheme for some professionals and old-age people that had low levels of 
accumulated assets in their individual capital accounts. The transfer of the accumulated assets 
generated extraordinary resources for the government by around 1.0 per cent of GDP during 2007. 
As of the end of the year 2008 the managed funds by the pension fund administrators were 
transferred to the National Social Security Institution (ANSES), but this transfer was not accounted 
as fiscal revenues such as was the case in 2007. The managed funds represent around 8 per cent of 
GDP. At the same time, during 2009 the government will receive in net terms 4 billion dollars 
(more than 1 per cent of GDP) of additional cash funds from the nationalization of the pension 
system. 
It is important to explain the fiscal framework in which these measures were implemented. 
The authors cite that the improvement in the fiscal position in Argentina and Chile during the 
recent years has permitted to the governments adopt the described pension measures. However, the 
introduction of a briefly analysis of the fiscal framework could be provide a most complete 
description of the context in which pension reforms were adopted. 
In Argentina, tax collection has increased at unprecedented rate during the last six years 
(2003-2009) helped by the economic expansion, the increase in exports volumes, the high 
commodities prices and the local inflation. Tax resources represented 25.9 per cent of GDP in 
2008, the highest level during the last fifteen years. At the same time, the primary fiscal 
expenditures of the Non-financial National Public Sector have been increased too, but at a lower 
rate, and represented in 2008 24.5 per cent of GDP. 
According to the evolution of tax collection, the transfers to the provinces, that include the 
tax share, have accounted for the highest increase during the last few years. At the same time, the 
current transfers to the private sector have risen 1.6 percentage points of GDP from 2002 boosted 
by the subsidies to some key sectors (such as energy and public transport) to reduce the impact of 
the high commodity prices on local inflation. 
The third primary expenditure item that has registered the highest increase has been the 
pension benefits, increasing from 2.8 per cent of GDP in 2002 to 4.4 per cent in 2008. As a result, 
of the evolution of the fiscal revenues and expenditures, the primary fiscal balance and the overall 
fiscal balance of the Non-financial National Public Sector have reached a historical surplus, 
representing 3.1 and 1.4 per cent of GDP, respectively, in 2008. 398  Laura Muriel Cuccaro 
During the last few years, the National Social Security Institution (ANSES) has increased 
their composition of the total primary surplus of Non-financial National Public Sector from 
0.1 per cent of GPD in 2002 to 0.7 per cent of GDP in 2008. This increase has been helped by the 
evolution of tax collection. In particular, by the increases in vat and income taxes, both of which 
are shared with the pension public system. However, considering only the resources of the pay as 
you go system (that is the pension contributions) and the pension benefit expenditures, the chronic 
pension system deficit has not eliminated. The participation of the resources other than contribution 
to the pension system has increased during the last few years. 
Regarding the pending challenges, all the challenges described by the authors are very 
important and constitute part of the core. However, Argentina has been characterized by a 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy. The recent pension measures are reflecting the pro-cyclical behavior of 
the fiscal policy. Therefore, one additional challenge is the reduction of the pro-cyclical behavior of 
the policy makers. For the short-term, the challenge is the management of the pension system in a 
less favorable fiscal environment. Additionally, the government has had limited access to the 
capital market, responding to some local factors, such as the absence of a final solution of part of 
the defaulted public debt, and the external financial crisis. 
In this context, the national treasury has financed their gap through other public entities such 
as the National Social Security Institution (ANSES). Therefore, the intra public sector debt has 
increased during the last few years. At the same time, the nationalization of the private pension 
scheme increased the composition of the intra public sector debt. As of October 2008, more than 
50  per cent of total managed funds by the private scheme was allocated to public debt 
corresponding to the national treasury. As a result, the composition of the pension funds are 
concentrated in national treasury’s debt. In this sense, the fiscal solvency and the improvements in 
public debt management are important challenges to preserve the real value of the pension 
contributions and to guarantee the sustainability of the system. 
Finally, the enhancement of the institutions and the independency of the social security 
institutions are the most important long-term challenges. Legal framework to guarantee the 
transparency, efficiency and predictability of the pension fund administration are other pending 
issues. 
 COMMENTS ON SESSION 2 
PENSION REFORM AND CAPITAL MARKETS 
Frank Eich
* 
1  Comments on “Pension Privatization and Country Risk” by Alfredo Cuevas, 
María Gonzáles, Davide Lombardo and Arnoldo López-Marmolejo 
1.1  Brief summary and motivation 
The paper looks at how rating agencies factor in explicit government debt and implicit 
pension debt (IPD) in their assessment of country risk. The motivation for the paper is that rating 
agencies could change risk assessment during the transition phase from unfunded pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) to funded private pensions, requiring counter-balancing actions from governments to 
maintain their ratings. Figure 1 illustrates the set up of the simple unfunded pay-as-you-go system. 
 
Figure 1 



















The paper argues that the issue under consideration has arisen in the context of unsustainable 
PAYG pension systems but the basic story holds even when the PAYG system is sustainable, as is 
illustrated in Figure 1. To see this, assume that the unfunded PAYG arrangement is mature and 
sustainable, with population stable and parameters set in a way that revenue meets spending at any 
point in time. In Figure 1 the black lines are the contributions to the PAYG system made by today’s 
workers. At any point in time the inflow equals the outflow to pensioners, depicted by the grey 
                                                 
*  Senior economist, Pension Corporation. 
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Figure 2 



















arrows. Overall the PAYG pension system is neutral for the public finances. It could be part of 
general government finances or a closed system as in some countries. 
Now assume that the government introduces pension reforms and closes the unfunded 
PAYG system in favour of a funded defined contribution scheme in the private sector. During the 
transition phase, the government would have to continue to pay the state pension for several 
cohorts of actual pensioners or those who have build up entitlements to receive a state pension in 
the future. 
During the transition phase funds will be diverted away from financing these state pensions 
and a funding gap in the social security system will emerge. Everything else equal, the public 
finances would deteriorate. Eventually accrued liabilities in the state scheme will be unwound and 
there would be no longer a funding gap but in the meantime the public debt will go up. So while 
the pension reform reduces future government exposure to pension liabilities, in the short to 
medium term the government will have accumulated additional debt. Figure 2 shows the inflows 
and outflows into the system during the transition phase towards a funded regime. 
 
1.2  Explicit debt versus implicit pension debt 
The paper finds that rating agencies care more about explicit debt than IPD when assessing 
risk, which could be due to: 
•  myopia, with agencies focussing primarily on short term; and/or 
•  explicit debt being qualitatively different to implicit pension debt, reflecting hierarchy of 
spending commitments. 
At the top of the hierarchy of spending commitments is non-discretionary spending (legal 
obligations) such as debt interest payments, which a government will have to honour. Breaking 
these commitments would generally come with an extreme loss in reputation (e.g., debt defaults). 
  
Social security contributions 
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Second are the social/moral obligations such as state pensions, which can and are being 
renegotiated unilaterally by government. Renegotiating these social obligations might be unpopular 
with the electorate – and hence might be difficult to do in practice – but unlike with 
non-discretionary spending, the government is at least not legally bound. Third is discretionary 
spending, which governments frequently alter as policy objectives and priorities change, or which 
are made possible by generous tax revenues (or conversely impossible by weak tax revenues). 
 
1.3  Short-term versus long-term considerations 
Rating agencies are not alone facing the challenge of translating long-term trends into an 
assessment of the public finances. Following the reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact, the 
European Commission for example has put greater emphasis on long-term budgetary developments 
in its assessment of EU public finances. One innovation over recent years has been to incorporate 
implicit pension liabilities into medium-term public finance objectives for the member states. To 
derive its assessment, it uses quantitative and qualitative indicators, e.g. to weigh up potential 
long-term benefits of reforms against potential short-term fiscal costs. Admittedly, many countries 
have not been very successful themselves deriving clear policy objectives from the analysis of 
long-term trends. 
 
2  Comments on “Pension Funds and Financial Markets: Evidence from the New EU 
Member States” by Nadine Leiner-Killinger, Christiane Nickel and Michal Slavík 
1.1  Brief summary and motivation 
The paper studies the role of funded private pensions in pension provision in new EU 
member states (NMS). It finds that all NMS have funded private pension schemes and minimum 
pension/social assistance but only a few have occupational pensions. It shows that investment 
strategies vary across NMS, e.g. in Hungary private schemes have been obliged to invest in 
government bonds and bills. The paper seems motivated by the authors’ concerns about credibility 
of multi-pillar pension. 
 
1.2  Private pensions in NMS 
Funded private pensions in NMS are exposed to inflation and investment risk, which: 
•  existed before current crisis but which latter has crystallised; and 
•  raises question regarding feasibility & credibility of pension strategy and regarding efficiency, 
fairness and sustainability of the structures created in the NMS (longevity risk important too). 
The paper concludes that shifting the burden to the private sector has not been without its 
problems and that an assessment of fiscal sustainability needs to take account of private sector 
arrangements. This is because the role of government in providing pensions in the future will to a 
large degree depend on the future role of occupational and private pensions. All these points seem 
valid for other countries too. 
 
1.3  Some reflections on moving to three pillar pension provision… 
Over the last decade governments have tried to reduce future exposure to pension spending 
by making state pensions less generous, for example by raising retirement age, encouraging more 402 Frank  Eich 
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generous occupational pensions and incentivising individuals to save more themselves for their 
retirement. 
International organisations such as the OECD supported (or even encouraged) the move to 
three pillar pension provision and have assessed fiscal sustainability based on this formal allocation 
of responsibilities. Figure 3 shows the three-pillar approach to pension provision. 
 
1.4  …but who really owns the future liabilities/how credible is the arrangement? 
Is it realistic though for a government to disown itself from future pension spending? It 
might seem fine ex ante on paper but will the outcome look similar? This will to a large extent 
depend on the performance of occupational and private pensions over the coming decades. 
The current economic crisis shows that occupational pensions – whether defined benefit or 
contributions – are under immense pressure and private pensions have also done badly in most 
countries. The crisis has also demonstrated the usefulness of a strong mixed system, with unfunded 
social security pensions complementing funded occupational or private pensions. With pensioners 
representing an ever larger share of the electorate (and the baby boom cohorts considered to be 
particularly demanding), can a government realistically assume that future pensioners would accept 
disappointing pension incomes if and when occupational and private pensions fail to perform as 
expected/hoped for? Would the electoral process not put pressure on the political system to make 
up for potentially disappointing pension incomes? Indeed, how efficient, fair and sustainable are 
these arrangements? Starting today, as a minimum it appears that governments ought to be 
determined to ensure that occupational and private pensions can be long-term successful. 
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 DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF ISRAEL’S PENSION SYSTEM 
Adi Brender
* 
This paper examines several aspects of Israel’s restructured retirement benefits system, 
focusing on distributive effects. We characterize 10 stylized representative prototypes of Israeli 
households, reflecting common demographic, wage and employment profiles. These prototypes are 
used to examine the joint effects of tax benefits for pensions and the public Old Age Allowances 
program’s contributions and disbursements on the lifetime income distribution, net replacement 
rates at retirement and lifetime consumption smoothing. We find that the system is neutral in terms 
of its effect on lifetime income distribution, except for the top income decile which gains less than 
the others. We also find that pension savings result in a net loss for many low-income households, 
unsmooth their consumption and lead to “too high” post-retirement net replacement rates. 
Furthermore, evidence from a unique dataset point to rational and active behavior of households 
with respect to these incentives, raising questions about the necessity of compulsory pension 
savings which were enacted in Israel recently. 
 
1 Introduction 
Israel’s pension and social-security Old-Age-Allowance (OAA) systems have undergone 
substantial reforms since 1995 dealing predominantly with their solvency. The reforms, resembling 
those in many OECD countries (Salomaki, 2006; Dang et al., 2001), included a rapid increase of 
the legal retirement age, substantial cuts in the terms offered by the defined-benefits occupational 
pension-funds for their existing members and closing these funds for new members. Additionally, 
new entrants to public-sector employment were moved from employer-fully-funded arrangements 
to defined contribution – unsubsidized – private pension funds. 
After the solvency risks were alleviated, policy-makers’ focus shifted to poverty among the 
elderly. The high and rising overall poverty rates in Israel drew attention to the large proportion 
(about 22 per cent) of old people living below the poverty line – in contrast to most OECD 
countries.
1 Additionally, the government was concerned with the fiscal costs of Social Security’s 
means-tested income supplement program and wanted to ensure that retirees will be able to provide 
for themselves instead of relying on public funds; there also was a concern that retirees take 
advantage of the means-tested support.
2 The main factor pointed-out as responsible for the limited 
availability of own-resources to employees was too-small pension savings among those in the 
lower part of the income distribution (Table 1). Consequently, the structure of tax incentives for 
long-term savings was altered to support almost exclusively pension savings (defined as savings 
towards the payment of a retirement age annuity). Furthermore, against the background of pending 
legislative intervention, employers and the trade-unions agreed to adopt a national pension accord 
from 2008, which was extended by government decree to cover all the employees. 
Pensions offer two key advantages for individuals: 1) consumption smoothing over a 
—————  
*  Bank of Israel, Research Department. 
  Superb research assistance by Anna Brodeski is gratefully acknowledged. 
1  Forster and Mira D’Ercole (2005) find that only in 7 OECD countries poverty rates among the elderly are higher than for the whole 
population. 
2  Part of this concern is that non-pension savings are not effectively accounted for in the calculation of the means-tested support, due 
to misreporting by applicants. 406 Adi  Brender 
 
Table 1 
Pension and Employment when Reaching the Retirement Age 
(percent of the employees in each quintile) 
 













Does Not Work and 
Has No Pension
*** 
Working Men aged 60-65 in 2000      Working Men 
Aged 64-66 in 2005 
1 44.8  29.8  25.5  37.0 
2 31.3  38.0  30.7  24.9 
3 24.1  39.3  36.6  18.3 
4 19.9  30.3  49.9  14.4 
5 15.5  26.5  58.0  15.8 
Total 25.8  31.2  43.0  22.1 
           
Working Women aged 55-65 in 2000
****   Working Women Aged 
59-65 in 2005
***** 
1 48.0  42.0  10.0  36.9 
2 27.5  48.0  24.4  21.7 
3 16.2  38.6  45.2  12.1 
4 14.1  35.7  50.2  9.4 
5 14.1  37.0  48.9  9.8 
Total 27.3  40.3  32.4  19.0 
 
Source: calculations based on the tax records panel dataset for 2000, 2005 and 2007. 
* The income quintiles are calculated for the entire population and not for each group separately. 
** Either work or not. 
*** Based on the income quintiles in 2005. 
**** Excluding those over 60 who already received a pension in 2000. 
***** Excluding those over 60 who already received a pension in 2005. 
 
lifetime span, including insurance for longevity;
3 2) potential financial gains due to direct 
government subsidies and tax breaks (financed by general taxation). With respect to the first 
advantage, it was argued that people may not save enough for retirement due to myopia about their 
needs at that age (Kotlikoff, 1987). This myopia can reflect either “wrong” discount rates or 
ignorance/passiveness regarding future needs.
4 On the other hand, mandatory savings can result in 
“too much” savings for various types of workers and in sub-optimal distribution of disposable 
income through life (e.g, as related to balancing pension savings and the costs of raising children 
and paying mortgages), especially if individuals are rational and informed (Martin and Whitehouse, 
2008). Rational individuals are also expected to respond to the net financial benefits from pension 
savings reflecting the various tax and subsidy incentives. These incentives, however, may also 
generate “too much” savings and might significantly affect the cross-section lifetime income 
—————  
3  Insurance for longevity and its pricing is a major determinant of pension-benefits’ value and a source for potential failures in the 
annuities market (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002 and 2004). 
4 Beschears  et al. (2006) and Choi et al. (2004) discuss the inertia and passiveness of individuals with respect to their pension 
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distribution.
5 While the desired level of income redistribution is primarily a matter of social and 
political preferences it is important that decision-makers be aware of the consequences of various 
decisions, because in the case of pensions the results may not be fully visible. 
This paper examines the distributive effects of Israel’s pension system from several angles 
related to the individual’s point-of-view, as related to the potential effects of “mandatory 
pensions”. First, we estimate the distributive effect of the pre-legislation pension system by 
calculating the net lifetime financial gains from participating in the compulsory social-security 
OAA system and from choosing to join a pension fund (accounting for the interactions between 
them). To make the analysis as realistic as possible we focus on typical lifetime employment and 
income profiles depicted for prototypes derived from labor market and demographic data. This 
approach differs from various previous studies.
6 Then we point-out the potential effects of 
pension-savings on these net gains. Consumption smoothing is examined by analyzing pension 
replacement rates for various types of workers and the ratio of disposable income per 
“standardized’ person in the household during the families’ life. A unique dataset – containing a 
panel of randomly selected 300,000 Israeli tax payers (10 per cent of the population) in 2000, 2005 and 
2007 – is used to examine the individual and household characteristics associated with the decision 
to save for retirement and the degree to which individuals and households responded to the changes 
in pension regulations in recent years. Specifically, one of the implications of moving to a 
fully-funded defined contribution system is that low-income individuals (those below the 
income-tax threshold) no longer have direct financial gain from participating in the system. Their 
response to this change can provide some insights as to whether individuals are indeed passive with 
respect to their pension savings. 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides a short description of 
Israel’s pension system and of the changes implemented since 1996. Section 3 provides 
information on characteristics of the Israeli labor force that were used to generate wage profiles and 
behavior patterns for the different household types used in the analysis. In Section 4 we calculate 
the net financial benefits from participating in Social-Security’s OAA and saving for pension. We 
then calculate the joint impact of the programs on the size and spread of lifetime income of various 
household types. Section 5 evaluates the arguments in favor of mandating pension savings and 
Section 6 concludes by discussing the potential impact of the “mandatory pension” decree and 
highlighting issues and options for policy adjustment. 
 
2  Characteristics of the Israeli pension system 
Israel’s retirement income system is based on a universal social-security pillar, augmented 
by a means-tested income-supplement program, and on individual savings in pension funds. Until 
2008 pension-fund savings were optional, but a government decree has now made such savings 
mandatory for incomes up to the average wage (an income level exceeded by roughly one third of 
all employees). This legislation complements an overhaul of Israel’s pension system that began in 
1995. To set the ground for the analysis this section briefly describes these changes and the current 
characteristics of the system.
7 
Until 1995 Israelis’ retirement savings were concentrated in occupational pension funds 
which offered generous defined-benefit schemes. Public sector employees, as well as those in large 
organizations such as the banks and the utility companies, were offered similar benefits in 
—————  
5  Diamond (2009) points-out the need to account for the interactions between the tax and pension systems. 
6  See, e.g., Martin and Whitehouse (2008), OECD (2005 and 2007) and Bank of Israel (2008). 
7  This section relies to a large extent on Achdut and Spivak (2008). 408 Adi  Brender 
employer-funded programs with no direct employee contribution. Individuals could also enjoy tax 
benefits for depositing a portion of their uncovered salaries into private savings accounts – 
provided that the amounts were not withdrawn for at least 15 years from the date the account was 
opened. 
Government support for pension saving took two forms: tax allowances at the times of 
deposit and withdrawal and preferential yields for the deposited amounts. The pension funds 
received special non-tradable government bonds at above market yields (5.57 per cent plus 
indexation to the CPI) to cover 93 per cent of their deposits. Still, by the early 1990s it became 
clear that the generosity of benefits made the funds operations unsustainable – in line with 
developments in other developed countries (The World Bank, 1994; Martin and Whitehouse, 
2008). Therefore, in March 1995 the funds were closed to new members and the rights of their 
existing members were somewhat reduced. New pension funds were launched which were required 
to be actuarially balanced. These funds still received preferential government bonds to cover 
70 per cent of their deposits, although the yield was reduced to 5.05 per cent. The government also 
guaranteed a real return of 3.5 per cent for the remaining 30 per cent of their assets and assumed 
the risk of changes in longevity. 
The 1995 reform was only a first step in the pension system’s restructuring. Between 1995 
and 2002 the government stepped away from the guarantee to the new pension funds’ yields and 
for the risks associated with changes in life expectancy.
8 After 2001 new public sector employees 
were not eligible to participate in the employer-funded pension scheme and were placed in the new 
pension funds. These modifications were, however, only a prelude for the 2003 reform. 
In 2003, as part of the fiscal consolidation program, the government significantly reduced the 
benefits for pension savings at all levels. First, the retirement age was raised from 65 to 67 for men 
(phased-in until 2009) and from 60 to 64 for women (to be completed in 2017). At the same time 
tax benefits for early retirement were reduced and the preconditions for receiving early pensions 
toughened. The “old” pension funds were nationalized, the benefits for their existing members 
were substantially reduced and their contributions increased. The share of special government 
bonds issued for these funds was lowered to 30 per cent of their assets, and instead the government 
offered a substantial one-off subsidy to cover the existing estimated actuarial deficits of the funds.
9 
The government also removed its guarantee for the rights of the existing members. 
The terms of pension savers in the “new” pension funds were also downgraded. The 
coverage of special government bonds was reduced to 30 per cent of the funds’ assets and the yield 
was lowered. Combined with raising the management fees the preferential return in the funds was 
essentially eliminated. The funds were also transformed to a pure defined-contribution setting 
which implied that the only financial benefit for investing in the funds is due to tax incentives. 
Another policy change implemented gradually since 2003 was the removal of tax benefits for 
long-term savings not directly designed towards retirement-age annuities. Since 2008 individuals 
are required to save in an annuity-oriented account a sufficient amount to ensure a pension equal at 
least to the minimum wage in order to qualify for tax benefits for additional savings towards a 
lump-sum payment upon retirement. 
Finally (so far) in 2008 the trade unions and the employers’ organizations agreed on 
“mandatory pensions”. This agreement was extended by government decree to all the employees. It 
mandates that each employee working for at least 6 months with the same employer will be insured 
in a pension fund. Employees that already have an account with a pension fund will be insured after 
the 3
rd month. Coverage under this decree applies to amounts up to the average national wage, and 
—————  
8  The costs associated with this move for savers are discussed in Yosef and Spivak (2008). 
9  The actual payment will be phased-in over 35 years.   Distributive Effects of Israel’s Pension System  409 
the legislation does not pertain to employees that were in a better scheme before the decree was 
issued. The contributions are set to rise gradually and reach 15 per cent (10 per cent by the 
employer and 5 by the employee) by 2013. 
Following the various reforms the current benefits for pension savings by the young cohorts 
in Israel are composed of four tax incentives: 
1) employer deposits into a pension fund or an employer-funded program up to 7.5 per cent of the 
insured salary are non-taxable for the employee. This provision covers salaries up to 4 times the 
average wage. These amounts are also exempt from social security contributions; 
2) employee contributions on the portion of their salary for which the employer also deposited are 
eligible for a 35 per cent tax credit. This credit is provided for deposits of up to 7 per cent of the 
insured income, for incomes up to the average wage. A credit of 5 per cent is granted for the 
portion of income between the average wage and twice the average wage. Similar provisions 
exist for employees whose employers do not share in their pension savings; 
3)  the return on amounts deposited in pension funds is exempt from taxation;
10 
4) the annuity payments are taxed as regular income at the time they are disbursed with an 
additional exemption of 35 per cent of the annuity, up to a level of about 30 per cent of the 
average wage. Additionally, pensioners are eligible for a supplementary credit point (197 NIS 
monthly) if their spouse does not work and has no pension. 
In addition to pension savings individuals are eligible for OAA from Social Security. The 
monthly contribution for these benefits is 0.22 per cent of incomes below 60 per cent of the average 
wage and 3.85 per cent for the portion of income above this threshold (capped at 5 times the 
average wage). Employers also contribute 1.45 per cent on wages up to 60 per cent of the average wage 
and 2.04 per cent on higher incomes. The benefits offered by the system include three components: 
1) a monthly lump-sum amount of about 16 per cent of the average national wage for a single 
person and 24 per cent for a couple. The amounts are indexed to the CPI; 
2) an addition of 2 per cent for each year of contribution – beyond the first 10. This addition is 
limited to 50 per cent of the basic amount. Couples of two workers are eligible for the benefit 
based on the sum of their individual rights; 
3) a means-tested income-guarantee scheme providing a minimum income of 30 per cent of the 
average wage for individuals and 45 per cent for couples. The eligibility is not affected by 
pensions up to 13 per cent of the average wage for individuals and 20 per cent for couples.
11 
 
3  Typical income and employment profiles 
An analysis of the lifetime effects of retirement savings and benefits on income distribution 
requires information on the income and employment patterns of individuals, on the persistence of 
their rank in the income distribution, on the typical household characteristics and on the incomes of 
other members of the household – particularly the spouse. To identify the most common prototypes 
we combine three datasets, each with a unique contribution: 
1) the annual national Incomes Surveys which allow tracing changes in the wages of various types 
of individuals over time. Although the surveys do not follow a fixed panel they do facilitate a 
—————  
10  The general tax rate on interest and capital gains for individuals is 15 per cent on indexed assets (on the real yield) and 20 per cent 
on non-indexed assets (on the nominal yield). 
11  The latest increase in the means-tested benefits for people over the age of 80, implemented since late 2008, is not accounted for in 
the calculations. 410 Adi  Brender 
comparison of the wages of individuals with similar characteristics over long periods. The surveys 
also contain data on education, and additional household and demographic characteristics; 
2) the Social Survey of 2002, which focused on pensions and lifetime employment, provides 
information about the number of years worked by individuals with various characteristics 
during their adulthood; 
3) a dataset including a random sample of 10 per cent of all the tax payers in Israel in 2000, 2005 
and 2007. This unique dataset was constructed to include the tax records of the same individuals 
in these years (provided that they worked or received a pension in at least one of them), as well 
as the tax records of their spouses. The data are augmented by additional variables from the 
official state registry such as the number and dates of birth of their children, including those 
who passed the age of 18. This facilitates tracing the pattern of births over the individual’s life – 
particularly important data for identifying potential breaking points in female careers as well as 
per capita income of the household. 
The key characteristics identified with the various datasets are the following: 
1)  working people are typically married. More than three quarters of all the working individuals in 
the tax dataset were married; this share is quite stable across age groups (Table 2). Therefore, 
meaningful analysis of pre-retirement income patterns and post-retirement standard of living 
has to center on couples; 
2) more than 90 per cent of working adults between the ages of 40 and 65 have children 
(including those over the age of 18). More than 50 per cent have at least three offsprings (Table 
2). The larger number of parents compared to married individuals is mostly accounted for by 
divorced parents and widows (Table 3); 
3)  more than 75 per cent of working men, and 89 per cent of working women have a working 
spouse. There is a positive correlation between own-income and the probability that the wife is 
working (Table 4); 
4)  the average age difference between male workers and their wives is about three years among 
couples in which both spouses work. Given the existing and planned official retirement ages this 
implies that married couples typically reach the retirement age at about the same time (Table 5); 
5)  from the Social Survey we find that men typically worked with few interruptions throughout 
their adulthood. However, those with low incomes experience somewhat longer breaks (Table 
6A). A specific and quantitatively important sub-group is Arab (mostly manual) workers that 
tend to retire relatively early; this tendency is somewhat reflected in the persistently low share 
of work years among Arabs over the age of 40 (Table 6B). However, on average Arab men are 
likely to meet the 35-years minimum requirement for full tenure at social security because they 
can start working at age 18; 
6)  working woman tend to have much longer interruptions of their working life. This is correlated 
with having a large number of children (Table 6C) and with their income: those who reach 
monthly salaries of over 5,000 NIS work a proportion of their adult life that is only moderately 
lower than that of parallel men
12 – but they are less than a half of the working women (Table 
6A). We also find the reverse phenomenon –the more experience women accumulated during 
their working lives – the higher their average income (Table 6D). Additionally a positive 
correlation exists between working years and education, but quite a few women with high 
education work part-time or quit the labor force for significant periods. Only a small fraction of 
Arab women works; 
7)  using the Incomes Survey we simulate the lifetime wage patterns of various individuals. We do 
that by examining the change in the prototypes’ wages between 1988 and 2007 (looking at a  
—————  
12  Since the purpose of this examination is to identify common patterns the question of causality is not discussed here.   Distributive Effects of Israel’s Pension System  411 
 
Table 2 
Family Structure by Age Group and the Lifetime Number of Children 
Working Individuals in 2005 
(percent of all working families) 
 
Age  Married  With one child  With 2 children  With 3+ children  With Children under 18
25-29 53.7  16.7  10.7  6.2  33.6 
30-39 75.6  17.3  27.9  29.6  74.2 
40-49 79.9  9.9  23.7  57.7  78.7 
50-59 79.5  10.6  22.7  58.1  32.3 
60-64 78.7  9.7  19.6  58.9  6.5 
65-69 74.2  12.7  14.8  47.7  2.1 
70-74 72.7  11.7  17.4  45.6  1.1 
75+ 59.9  16.5  19.6  28.3  14.9 
 
Source: Calculations based on the tax records dataset for 2005. 
 
Table 3 
Marital Status of Working Single Mothers
* 
(percent of all working women) 
 
Age Single  Divorced  Widowed 
25-29 3.5 4.7 0.1 
30-34 2.6 7.4 0.3 
35-39 3.2  12.2  0.9 
40-44 3.2  14.3  1.4 
45-49 2.2  16.3  2.6 
50-54 2.1  16.4  4.1 
55-59 2.1  15.9  6.6 
60-64 1.7  15.5  11.7 
65-69 1.1  12.1  23.9 
70-74 2.7 8.2  34.6 
75+ 3.2  3.8  39.6 
Total 2.7  12.4  3.0 
 
* The term “single mothers” refers here to women that had children during the course of their lives and were not married in 2005. 
Source: calculations based on the 2005 tax records dataset. 
 
Table 4 
Work Status Given the Spouse’s Income 
(percent of spouses in the quintile) 
 
Wife Husband  Spouse’s Income 
Quintile  Works
*  Doesn’t Work  Works
*  Doesn’t Work 
1  68.2 31.8 86.2 13.8 
2  67.9 32.1 89.2 10.8 
3  73.6 26.4 89.6 10.4 
4  80.0 20.0 88.2 11.8 
5 84.3  15.7  91.5  8.6 
Total  76.9 23.1 88.8 11.2 
 
* Either the observed individual reported that the spouse works or the spouse appears in the dataset with positive labor income. 
Source: calculations based on the 2005 tax records dataset. 412 Adi  Brender 
 
 
  20 years older age group in 2007) as well as by looking at a cross-section of individuals in 2007. 
We find clear and consistent patterns for men, which differ between education levels. Those 
with high education move up the wage ladder early in their careers and enjoy large wage 
increases for about 30 years before their wages stabilize. The pattern is similar, although more 
moderate, for those with post-secondary education up to – and including – a bachelor’s degree. 
In contrast, those with lower education have an initial low wage which is rising by less than the 
national average wage over the course of their employment (that is, they have no premium for 
tenure); 
8)  women’s wages rise more moderately than men’s, especially at the ages 30-45. This reflects the 
interruptions in their career and shorter working hours, especially in the periods of raising 
children (Brender and Gallo, 2008). Even at the high education level a significant share of 
women work part-time (Table 7). The wages of women with low education tend to increase at a 
similar, or even higher, rate than men in these ages – but this may be due to a statistical artifact, 
since a large share of the women in this group does not work; 
9) consistent with the wage profiles identified above, in the tax dataset we find significant 
persistence of individuals’ rank in the income distribution in the main working age (30-55). 
While these data only cover a 5 years period they have the advantage of being based on a panel 
(Table 8A). We also find that the dropout rate among those at the bottom deciles is double that 
of those at the top. The same type of persistence is observed between 2005 and 2007 
(Table 8B); 
10) there is a strong correlation between workers’ incomes and those of their spouses. It is also 
much more common to find non-working wives of men with low incomes (Table 9). 
Based on these observations we set up several prototypes of individuals which share the 
most common characteristics of the Israeli population in order to analyze the pension system. 
These are described in Table 10 and their detailed characteristics appear in Appendix A. 
 




The analysis of the 
net gains or losses from 
participating in the social 
security OAA program 
and from contributing to 
a pension plan was based 
on the simulated wage 
profiles of the various 
types described in 
Table 10. At the first 
stage we calculated 
the contributions and 
potential benefits in the – 
compulsory – OAA 
program; then the 
marginal benefit from 
choosing to save in a 
pension fund, accounting  
Table 5 
Age Differences between Spouses
* 
(years) 
* Calculated as the individual’s age minus the spouse’s age. 




25-29  0.4 –3.3 
30-34  1.6 –2.9 
35-44  2.5 –3.2 
45-54  3.0 –2.7 
55-64  3.5 –2.9 
65-74  4.9 –3.6 
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Table 6 
Accumulated Years of Experience
* Compared to Potential
** 
(percent of potential working years) 
 
a) by Income and Gender 
 
Male Female 
Income  Experience/ 
Potential 
Percent 




of the Group 
up  to  1500  83.8 2.3 63.6 6.1 
1501-3000 87.7  6.0  67.6  17.7 
3001-5000  88.9 22.4 81.5 32.7 
5001-7000  94.0 19.2 89.2 20.3 
7001-9000 95.9  12.3  85.0  8.9 
9001-12000 94.7  14.0  89.7  7.6 
12000+ 92.1  23.9  87.4  6.6 
 
b) by Gender, Religion and Age 
 
Age  Male, Jewish  Male, Arab  Female 
30-34 88.8 79.3 70.0 
35-39 89.5 84.8 70.8 
40-44 91.0 75.9 73.7 
45-49 93.7 79.9 72.8 
50-54 90.0 75.6 68.4 
55-59 93.4 79.1 65.4 
 
c) Females by Age and Number of Children 
 
Age  No Children  1 Child  2 Children  3+ Children 
35-39  75.1 82.2 81.4 66.1 
40-44  73.2 88.6 81.1 71.8 
45-49  71.8 80.5 84.4 69.4 
 
d) Monthly Income by Percent of Potential Years Actually Worked and Age 
 
The Ratio of Actual Years of Experience Accumulated to Potential 
Age 
up to 30%  30%-50%  50%-70%  70%-85%  86%+ 
35-49  2,245 3,381 4,816 5,208 6,179 
50-59  2,427 3,382 4,565 4,931 6,383 
 
* Defined as the self-reported number of years worked by the individual. The figures used here are based on averages of the reported 
categories. 
** Potential years are age less 21 for Jewish Men, age minus 18 for Arabs and age minus 20 for Jewish women. The tables include 
individuals over the age of 25. 
Source: Calculations based on the 2002 Social Survey. 414 Adi  Brender 
 
Table 7 
Employment of Women, by Education 
 
Age 
Years of Schooling 
25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 
   (percent working from all the women in the group) 
0-10  21.7 20.6 28.9 27.9 
11-12  49.1 58.0 67.3 58.9 
13-15  76.3 74.6 80.8 74.2 
16+  78.8 86.3 88.6 82.4 
   (percent working less than 30 hours per week)
* 
0-10  35.2 35.2 32.9 32.4 
11-12  37.7 36.4 35.9 34.8 
13-15  36.3 37.3 37.8 35.9 
16+  35.4 37.7 36.8 36.2 
 
* Among those working at least 5 hours. 
Source: Calculations based on the 2007 Incomes Survey. 
 
Table 8 
Persistence of Income Distribution 
 




***  Income Quintile 
in 2000




   (percent of all the workers in the quintile) 
1  32.2  21.4  8.4 3.1 0.8  34.1 
2 16.0  36.6  22.3 5.0  1.1  19.1 
3 7.7  12.1  41.2  22.5 2.1  14.3 
4 4.1  4.6  9.3  48.5  17.1 16.4 
5  2.9 2.1 2.7 8.0  66.6  17.8 
Total  12.4 15.3 16.8 17.5 17.7  20.3 
 




***  Income Quintile 
in 2005




   (percent of all the workers in the quintile) 
1  37.2  18.7  7.0 2.2 1.0  34.0 
2 15.0  48.1  14.9 3.9  1.1  17.1 
3 5.1  14.0  55.2  12.7 1.4  11.7 
4 2.3  3.1  12.6  62.4  8.6 11.0 
5  0.8 0.8 1.2 9.0  72.4  15.7 
Total  12.0 16.8 18.2 18.1 17.0  17.8 
 
* For the age group 35-50 in 2000 and 40-55 in 2005. 
** “Not working” is defined as not being reported in the dataset for that year. 
*** Quintiles are defined across the relevant group (e.g., individuals aged 35-50 who worked in 2000). 
**** For the age group 35-55 in 2005 and 37-57 in 2007. 
Source: calculations based on the tax records panel dataset for 2000, 2005 and 2007.   Distributive Effects of Israel’s Pension System  415 
Table 9 
Correlation Between Spouses’ Income Quintiles in 2007 
 






**  1 2 3 4 5 
1 45.8  17.6  12.9  10.1  7.9  5.7 
2  34.0  16.3 16.7 15.4 10.7  6.9 
3  25.9  14.7 16.6 17.6 14.8 10.4 
4  20.6  11.5 14.0 15.8 18.9 19.3 
5  22.1  9.2  10.0 11.9 18.4 28.5 
Total  29.6  13.9 14.0 14.2 14.2 14.2 
 
Source: calculations based on the 2007 tax records dataset. 
* based on data for married men aged 30-55 with minimum annual income of 12,000 NIS and women with a minimum income of 6,000 
NIS. 











1  Manual worker, married to a non-working wife, 4 kids, retires at age 60  5.9 
2  Secondary education, married to a non-working wife, 3 kids  7.2 
3 
Secondary education, wife working part-time when the children are in pre-school 
age: 0.7 of full-time when the first child is born and 0.5 when the second is born. 
Three kids 
10.3 
4 Bachelor,  post-secondary  education  9.3 
5  Post-secondary education for both husband and wife, 2 kids  16.0 
6 
Single (divorced mother) with post-secondary education, two kids. Working 
part-time until the kids reach age 18. Housing costs are covered by alimony until 
the children reach age 18 
5.3 
7  Academic degree for both husband and wife, 3 kids. Wife works 50 per cent of a 
full-time job all her adult life  17.1 
8  Post secondary education, wife has secondary education and works 20 years. 
Three kids  11.8 
9  Academic degree for both husband and wife, 3 kids  21.0 
10  “Fast-track” successful couple, both with tertiary education and working full-time. 
Two kids  30.4 
 
* In millions of NIS capitalized to the retirement date. 416 Adi  Brender 
 
for potential offsets with the OAA. We focus on three parameters: 1) net lifetime financial gain 
or loss from participating in a program, 2) the net replacement rate offered by the program relative 
to the last income earned by the employee, 3) the path of the ratio of disposable income to the 
“poverty line” over the course of the individual’s life. 
 
4.1 Old-age  allowances 
The OAA program’s three main components are the universal basic amount, the 
tenure-based supplement and the means-tested income supplement. For two-worker couples with 
tenure of at least 35 years for each spouse (regardless of the hours worked or income during these 
years) the means-tested program is irrelevant because the sum of their regular benefits slightly 
exceeds those of the means-tested income supplement. This latter program has disregard 
boundaries for labor income and pensions that differ between individuals and couples. Once the 
disregard level is exceeded the phase-out rate of the allowance is 60 per cent, until it reaches the 
basic – universal – amount (which includes the tenure supplement). Contributions to the OAA are 
based on a two-level schedule with a cap at 5 times the average wage. Direct contributions are not 
expected to cover the full cost of the program and the balance is covered by pre-specified 
government contributions. 
To calculate the net benefits from the program each “type’s” OAA annual contributions were 
simulated and accumulated using a real interest rate of 3.5 per cent.
13 Then the accumulated 
contributions were compared to the value of the benefits the individual (or couple) are eligible for 
if they do not have a pension. For two-worker couples this typically means that they would receive 
the sum of their individual benefits (except if one of them did not work for at least 35 years). For 
other couples and for singles the potential benefits include the means-tested supplement. The 
calculated potential benefit is then capitalized by using pension fund conversion coefficients for the 
equivalent amount and conditions.
14 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 11 report the lifetime contributions and potential benefits of the 
OAA. It is evident that the program is very progressive and provides a large subsidy for 
low-income households. For higher-income households it offers a much smaller subsidy, but they 
still enjoy a net benefit from participating. Only at the very top of the income distribution – about 
15 per cent of all households which are represented by “type 10” (and those on the range between 
types 9 and 10) – do the program contributions exceed the benefits.
15 
Table 12 shows that the OAA provides quite an adequate replacement rate for low-income 
households: the replacement rate is close to 100 per cent for “type 1” which represents about one 
fifth of the working population. “Type 2” also enjoys quite adequate replacement when accounting 
for job-related costs during their employment years. In contrast, the replacement rates appear to be 
insufficient for higher-income households. This is hardly surprising as the program’s purpose is to 
protect the elderly from poverty, rather than provide a standard of living consistent with their 
employment income – especially when compared to the top of their earnings which is typically 
reached prior to retirement. 
—————  
13  This is an assumed long-term net return accounting for management fees of pension funds. As discussed in Whitehouse (2000 and 
2001) differences in administrative fees may have significant impact on the real return. Such differences seem to have emerged 
between funds in Israel but we abstract from this issue here. 
14  Specifically, we use the coefficients applied to individuals who are currently 25 years old. Notwithstanding the uncertainty of these 
numbers, as discussed by Whitehouse (2007), the current coefficients do not vary significantly between cohorts and the results are 
not qualitatively sensitive to changes in the magnitudes of those prevailing between cohorts. 
15  The comparison between income groups abstracts from the possibility, discussed in Cutler et al. (2006) and Breyer and 
Hupfeld (2007) that life-expectancy is positively correlated with income.   Distributive Effects of Israel’s Pension System  417 
 
Table 11 
Life-time Benefits from Social Security’s Old-age Allowance Program and from Pension Savings 
(thousands of NIS at 2009 prices) 
 
Social-security  
OAA Program   Life-time   
Net Gains  
from Pension Savings









Savings   Only 







(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
1  94  1,148  29  –143  …  1,054  
2  138  1,148  190  –82  …  1,010  
3  187  1,161  198  190  198  1,172  
4  336  643  463  308  …  615  
5  447  1,161  500  463  500  1,214  
6  95  685  32  …  –165  591  
7  703  1,161  729  719  729  1,187  
8  371  1,161  468  463  468  1,258  
9  845  1,161  850  719  850  1,166  
10  1,711  1,161  1,443  1,196  1,443  893  
 
* The capitalized benefit if the post-retirement income of the individual/household is below the means-tested program's threshold, where 
relevant. 
** Accounting for offsets of old-age allowances. 
*** Assuming that households losing from pension savings do not contribute to a pension fund. 
 
4.2 Pensions 
The placement of all new pension savers in Israel in pure defined contribution programs 
implies that the only net financial benefits from such savings are due to tax incentives. These 
benefits are granted in Israel mostly at the contribution stage but also at the time the annuities are 
disbursed. However, to enjoy these tax benefits one has to reach the income tax threshold – an 
income level which 45 per cent of all employees (30 per cent of working men) fall below.
16 Upon 
retirement, the annuity payments are taxed at the regular brackets with an additional discount on 
pensions up to about a third of the average wage. An additional tax benefit is granted to pensioners 
whose spouses have no pension and Social security’s OAA are tax-exempt. This implies that many 
of those who enjoyed tax advantages at the contribution stage enjoy a substantial – or full – 
exemption at the withdrawal stage as well. 
—————  
16  The cap on tax-exemptions for employer contributions is at 4 times the average wage – an income level reached by only 3 per cent 
of all employees. 418 Adi  Brender 
To calculate the 
net benefits from pension 
savings we simulated 
the contributions of 
the employees (or 
households) through their 
(assumed) entire working 
life.
17 The hypothesized 
contribution rate for 
those who contribute was 
the maximum allowed 
by the tax 
authorities, regardless 
of whether the 
individual’s income is 
above the threshold for 
affecting tax benefits. 
This assumption is in the 
spirit of the “mandatory 
pension” decree and 
consistent with the 
current practice; it will 
be revisited below. 
Column 3 of Table 11 shows the capitalized value of the lifetime pension tax benefits 
granted to the household. These amounts include the capitalized sum of the tax benefits during the 
contribution period reduced by the taxes paid on the annuity – net of the tax benefits at that stage. 
The benefits are quite small for the low-income types, reflecting their low income-tax rates – if 
they pay at all – throughout their working lives.
18 This is particularly true with respect to women 
who enjoy extra tax credits for their children.
19 In contrast, the tax benefits for high-income 
households are large and may even exceed the value of the OAA. 
While all households may gain from the pension tax benefits, these gains can be offset, or 
even reversed, by a phase-out of the means-tested component of the OAA. As discussed above this 
offset is relevant only for couples in which at least one spouse did not work 35 years and for 
singles. In such cases the magnitude of the offset depends on the joint annuities amount. Columns 4 
and 5 show that this offset can be quite substantial. Household types 1, 2 and 6 – in which there is 
only a single worker with low income – actually lose from saving for a pension. These types 
represent a substantial share of households in Israel, especially in the populations targeted by the 
“mandatory pension” decree.
20 The mid-high income bachelor (type 4) loses about a third of the 
pension tax benefits but retains a positive incentive for savings. All the household types that 
represent two fully working spouses are not affected by the offset and retain their tax benefits 
(although in the case of the relatively low-income type 3 these are quite small). 
—————  
17  The hypothesized alternative to pension savings is not saving at all. In this way we abstract from the tax exemption on the pension 
accumulation return.  
18  The benefit is always positive due to the exemption of employer contributions from social-security. 
19  The Israeli tax unit is the individual. Women receive an additional 0.5 tax credit (2.75 compared to 2.25 for men) and one more for 
each child. As a result only a relatively small fraction of working women – especially of working mothers – actually reaches the tax 
threshold (Brender, 2005 and 2009). 
20  Individuals with higher income at relatively old ages who lack the 35 years tenure and did not save for a pension may also lose from 
the legislation, but such individuals are quite rare. 
Table 12 
Net Replacement Rate at Retirement
* 
(percent of pre-retirement income) 
* The ratio of post-retirement income to the last net income before retirement. Pre-retirement 
income is calculated net of pension contributions.  
No Pension  With Pension 
Type 
(1) (2) 
1 94.2  171.1 
2 74.8  141.4 
3 54.4  145.1 
4 33.8  116.5 
5 31.1  113.2 
6 49.8  112.9 
7 29.4  112.1 
8 35.7  100.6 
9 24.4  108.7 
10 15.5  87.9 
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Column 6 presents the net combined benefits from the OAA program and joining a pension 
fund (if yielding a net gain). We find that there are only small differences between the various 
household types: low income ones enjoy a large net surplus in the OAA while the others replace 
these benefits with tax incentives.
21 The only, somewhat different household type is 10, which 
enjoys a smaller benefit due to high taxes on the annuities. Household types 4 and 6, which include 
singles, have similar benefits to the others, proportionally reduced to their size. Therefore it appears 
that, in their pre-mandatory pension design, Israel’s joint OAA and pension systems are neutral in 
terms of lifetime income distribution.
22 
Column 2 of Table 12 shows the net replacement rates for the various types of households if 
they contribute to a pension fund through their entire working life. These rates are calculated 
relative to the pre-retirement income, net of taxes, social-security charges and pension 
contributions. It is evident that for low-income households full pension savings create replacement 
rates that are too high, especially given that they also lose out on a net basis from pension savings. 
For higher-income households the lifetime savings produce a more moderate replacement rate, 
although still substantially higher than 100 per cent. This may suggest that lifetime savings at the 
maximum permitted rates are too high, at least at the assumed real net return of 3.5 per cent. It 
should be noted that the mandatory contribution rate from 2013 will be slightly higher than those 
assumed here. Furthermore, the tax-records data indicate that in practice the pensions of the current 
retirees that do collect a pension typically provide a replacement rate of about 40 per cent (for the 
top 4 quintiles, excluding OAA). These rates are much lower than those mandated by the current 
law and similar to the prevailing rates in most OECD countries. 
 
4.3  Pension contributions and income allocation through life 
While the discussion of pensions is often focused on the need to secure an adequate standard 
of living for the elderly there is also the opposite concern: does the pension system produce “too 
much” savings? When decisions take place freely between market-priced pension alternatives such 
a result is unlikely. However, the presence of tax-subsidy incentives and mandatory savings may 
lead to different outcomes. 
The main reason why pensions can actually “unsmooth” consumption is that tax benefits are 
typically granted with an annual cap based on gross income, attempting to smooth contributions. 
This approach ignores the distribution of other expenses during a families’ life – most notably on 
raising children and mortgages. Although a family could ideally spread mortgage payments over its 
entire life, typically it is paid during a limited period – while the “residence” consumption 
continues deep into retirement. This problem is intensified in Israel (as in several other countries) 
because there is no tax relief for mortgage payers. The costs of child raising are particularly 
relevant in Israel where families typically have 2 or 3 – and in many cases more – kids, child 
allowances are significantly lower than in most developed countries, and tax benefits for parents 
are small and limited to women. 
To estimate the household’s “appropriate” consumption level its simulated income 
(including child allowances) was divided by the number of “standard” persons, using the scale 
employed in the calculation of the “poverty line”. We also deducted the simulated mortgage 
payments for those household types that are expected to have one – based on the national 
Expenditures Survey conducted by the Bureau of Statistics (Table 13). 
—————  
21  The benefits for non-working individuals and households are of the same magnitude as those for working ones. 
22  Although the taxes used to cover the residual cost of the OAA program are paid disproportionately by those at the top life-time 
income levels. Also, high-income households have to actually save for pension in order to enjoy the same benefits provided to 
low-income ones by the OAA. 420 Adi  Brender 
 
Table 14 provides 
some evidence on the 
level of net income per 
“standard person” 
relative to the poverty 
line (27 per cent of the 
average wage per 
“standard person”). For 
each household type this 
ratio is calculated under 
the alternative 
assumptions of saving 
for pension and not 
saving. The results show 
that for all family types 
full pension savings tend 
to exacerbate the 
phenomenon of relatively 
low disposable income at  
 
the early stages of a family’s life. This phenomenon is most notable in the low-income types where 
the already low disposable income in younger ages is further reduced in order to generate high 
post-retirement income. It therefore seems quite rational for low and median-income families to 
postpone pension savings, especially if their salaries trend towards higher tax brackets.
23 
 
5  Myopia, passivity and irrationality of savers 
Some of the arguments for government intervention in the pension market relate to 
households’ myopia with respect to post-retirement savings. It is argued that young persons 
underestimate their pension needs and are consequently “stuck” with too little resources when they 
retire. An observationally similar argument is that even if individuals are aware of these needs they 
tend to postpone action with respect to their pensions, so by the time they start saving it may be too 
late to accumulate sufficient funds to pay for a decent annuity. 
While distinguishing between optimization based on individual discount rates and myopia is 
not a trivial analytical issue, this section tries to examine the saving behavior of Israeli workers in 
this light. The analysis above suggests that saving for pension is a poor financial move for 
low-income individuals and for families with one earner – both in the present and during the course 
of adulthood. We also find that consumption smoothing would suggest that younger families that 
pay mortgages and those with children are likely to be less inclined to save at that stage of their 
life. 
Figure 1 shows that pension contributions are indeed positively correlated with income.
24 In 
the bottom deciles of the employment-income distribution less than one fifth of men and less than a 
third of working women save for pension while at the top deciles pension contributions are almost 
universal. In the lower deciles the larger share of women saving for pension compared to men is 
consistent with the fact that nearly 90 per cent of working women have a working spouse (Table 4), 
—————  
23  The tax incentives in Israel are granted in the form of non-refundable tax credits; many employees spend a significant share of their 
working lives under the tax threshold and cannot use these credits. Moreover, the value of the exemption for the employer 
contributions directly depends on the tax bracket.  
24  The figure is based on the 2007 tax-records dataset. The figures for earlier years are similar. 
Table 13 
Mortgage Payments by Age Group 








25-29 24.8 30.7 
30-34 34.0 23.4 
35-44 48.5 18.7 
45-54 43.4 20.1 
55-64 28.5 36.7 
 
* Percent of all households in the age-group. 
** Among those paying a mortgage, in percent of gross labor income. 
Source: Calculations based on the 2007 Household Expenditure Survey.   Distributive Effects of Israel’s Pension System  421 
 
Table 14 
Disposable Income Per “Standard Person” Relative to the Poverty Line 




30 40 50 60  Retirement 
1  With  pension  71 65 84  101  152 
   No pension  81  74  97  118  98 
                
2  With  pension  82 71 92  115  160 
   No pension  92  80  105  133  98 
                
3 With  pension  103  79  126  161  207 
   No pension  121  92  145  185  99 
                
4  With  pension  241 261 280 288  295 
   No pension  271  294  315  325  104 
                
5  With  pension  171 147 292 294  294 
   No pension  199  172  333  335  99 
                
6 With  pension  126  71  84  186  203 
   No pension  145  82  97  216  104 
                
7  With  pension  169 135 208 317  316 
   No pension  196  157  235  359  99 
                
8 With  pension  142  72  162  258  235 
   No pension  167  83  184  293  88 
                
9  With  pension  196 154 254 384  373 
   No pension  231  182  288  433  99 
                
10  With  pension  268 290 400 616  490 
   No pension  310  336  447  683  99 
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so they are less likely to 
fall into the position 
of net losers from 
savings due to an offset 
of the means-tested 
component of the OAA. 
Women are also more 
commonly employed in 
the public sector, banks 
and large corporations 
where pensions are 
almost universal. 
Table 15 examines 
the savings decisions of 
households in a more 
detailed and formal way. 
The table reports the 
results of a Probit 
equation where the 
dependent variable was 
whether the individual 
contributed to a pension 
 
fund or not. This analysis is based on more the 100,000 tax files of males in 2007 (the coefficients 
are similar for the 2005 data) and the results are quite consistent with the expectations discussed 
above.
25 
•  Income has a strong and positive effect that rises throughout the relevant incomes range.
26 
Consistent with expectations there is a strong a distinct negative effect for individuals with 
salaries below the income-tax threshold. Having a working wife also has a strong positive effect 
– as it reduces the potential loss from the phase-out of the income supplement. 
•  Having a wife that contributes to a pension fund has an additional strong effect on the choice to 
save. Given the other variables in the equation this quantitatively important variable (0.36) is 
likely to reflect two factors: 1) the lower probability to be at the phase-out level of the OAA 
income supplement which is based on the joint pension income, 2) the wife’s work experience: 
it is required to reach 35 working years to receive the full tenure supplement in the OAA, and 
women who contribute to pension have, on average, longer working spells than those who do 
not. 
•  The equation also points to the liquidity effect: the presence of children, especially young ones, 
in the household reduces the tendency to save for retirement. 
•  Age has a positive effect until retirement. This effect may be due to the phase-out of mortgage 
payments (Table 13). It may also be associated with the reduction of pension benefits for those 
who started to work after 1995, but the continuing increase of the probability to save at the 
pre-retirement cohorts is more consistent with the former explanation. 
—————  
25  Equations estimated for women showed similar results. The noticeable difference was that the coefficient for young children was 
positive. This non-intuitive result is likely to reflect a selection bias: mothers for young children are more likely to quit work if their 
employers do not accommodate their special needs. The employers that would typically do that are large and established 
organizations (e.g., the public sector and the banks) where pensions are universal. 
26 The  joint  effect of the coefficients of income and squared income begins to decrease at incomes more than 65 times the average 
wage. 
Figure 1 








































Women  Distributive Effects of Israel’s Pension System  423 
 
Table 15 
Probit Equation for the Probability of a Working Men to Contribute to a Pension-Plan 
 
   Coefficient  Z    
Age 0.01786  4.4 
* 
Age squared  –0.00009  –1.9 
*** 
Single (binary variable) –0.03465  –2.2 
** 
Divorced/Widowed (binary variable) –0.03808  –1.8 
*** 
Annual income (thousands) 0.00736  94.7 
* 
Squared annual income (thousands) 0.00000  –66.9 
* 
Annual income <45,000 (binary variable) –0.85144  –61.1 
* 
Number of jobs during the year  –0.06455  –12.0 
* 
Months worked (up to 12) 0.01968  9.7 
* 
Does the spouse work (binary variable) 0.50414  28.8 
* 
Spouse contributing to pension (binary variable) 0.35625  24.7 
* 
Annual income of Spouse (thousands) –0.00093  –8.4 
* 
Number of children  –0.03552  –6.7 
* 
Number of Children aged 0-3  –0.02785  –2.9 
* 
Number of Children aged 4-8  –0.02909  –3.5 
* 
Number of Children aged 9-18  –0.01566  –2.2 
** 
Age of spouse  –0.00854  –17.5 
* 
Constant –0.89339  –10.16 
* 
Number of observations  117,107    
  
Pseudo R squared  0.34520    
  
 
* Significant at the 1 per cent level, 
** significant at the 5 per cent level, 
*** significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Source: calculations based on the 2007 tax records dataset. 
 
•  Single individuals (including divorced) tend to contribute less. This may reflect their larger 
probability to be eligible to the means-tested part of the OAA compared to married working 
couples. 
The analysis so far has focused on the snapshot of individuals’ behavior in 2005. We do find 
however that this behavior is quite reflective of their longer term choices as reflected in the 
correlation between the decision to contribute in 2000 and 2005 (Table 16). It turns out that those 
who already contributed in 2000 continued to do so in 2005, while those who did not, have not 
started. Nevertheless, about half of the males and a third of females in the lowest income quintile 
stopped contributing (the comparison relates only to individuals who continued working). 424 Adi  Brender 
 
Table 16 
Percent of Workers Contributing to Pension Savings in 2005, 
by Gender, Age, Income and Whether they Contributed in 2000 
 
Men Women Men Women 
Age 
Contributed in 2000  Did Not Contribute in 2000 
25-29  76.5 80.3 42.0 47.0 
30-44  82.3 85.7 31.2 37.8 
45-54  84.1 84.1 26.9 27.4 
55-64  75.2 66.1 17.8 10.8 
Total  80.7 81.7 29.3 29.5 
Income Quintile
*         
1  51.5 64.5 30.8 34.9 
2  60.9 79.0 31.0 41.9 
3  76.1 87.9 39.7 48.5 
4  86.2 91.7 40.6 51.2 
5  91.7 92.7 38.9 48.8 
Total  81.7 84.1 33.6 38.7 
 
* For men aged 25-60 and women aged 25-55 in 2000. 
Source: calculations based on the tax records panel dataset for 2000 and 2005. 
 
One of the proposed justifications for government intervention in the pension market is that 
individuals may be passive with respect to their retirement. As discussed above, the pension 
reforms between 2000 and 2005 eliminated the financial benefits from pension savings for workers 
at the bottom 5 deciles of the income distribution (since they do not reach the tax threshold and 
because the funds were converted to pure DC schemes – with no subsidy). Table 17 examines the 
response of workers to the changes that took place in the tax system between 2000 and 2005. It 
shows a marked decrease in the share of contributing individuals at the bottom 5 deciles and a 
much milder decrease at the higher ones.
27 There was also quite a noticeable decrease in employer 
contributions, suggesting that this component of savings also responded rapidly to the changes. 
Finally, the drop in contributions was much larger among the young cohorts, while among the older 
ones – in which many still belong to the pre-1995 schemes or to employer-funded programs – the 
decrease was milder.
28 
Table 18 shows that too little pension savings is not necessarily the dominant problem. It 
reports the share of individuals in post-retirement ages that collect a pension, have no other income 
and continue to contribute to pension-related schemes. We find that about a third of the men and 
—————  
27  Overall, the per cent of contributing employees in Israel – 62 per cent – is quite similar to those in Germany, Canada, Ireland the 
UK and the US (Antolin and Whitehouse, 2008). 
28  While the members of the old funds also suffered a substantial downgrading of their benefits, these funds still offer much better 
terms than any available alternative.   Distributive Effects of Israel’s Pension System  425 
 
Table 17 
























1 21.0  –14.9  12.5 –5.1  7.2  –8.9 
2 40.1  –18.6  15.8 –4.1  23.4  –14.1 
3 67.6  –13.5  19.7 –2.1  47.6  –11.1 
4 88.1  –4.5  19.5  0.9  68.4  –5.1 
5 96.1  –1.1  11.8 –1.6  84.1  0.5 
Total 62.6  –10.5  15.9  –2.4  46.2  –7.7 
           
Age             
 21-24   16.0  –22.2          
 25-29   46.8  –18.0          
 30-44   64.5  –9.2          
 45-64   68.7  –8.5          
 65+   45.5  –15.5          
Total   51.9  –12.5             
 
* The change is expressed in percentage points from the 2000 level. 
** Ages 25+. 




* Pension Contributions by Type of Income and Income Level 
 
   Men  Women 








Source of income            
Receives a pension on account of a late spouse  21.1  1.7  44.2  21.1 
Has labor income and no pension  30.6  22.4  47.5  24.2 
Has pension and no labor income 56.6  64.7  36.4  47.7 
Has both labor income and pension 74.3  11.2  63.5  7.0 
Total 52.2  100.0  42.6  100.0 
             
Income quintile in 2005
**            
1 63.3  …  44.4  … 
2 65.1  …  30.8  … 
3 59.4  …  29.1  … 
4 53.0  …  35.6  … 
5 49.0  …  42.9  … 
Total 56.6  …  36.4  … 
 
* Men over the age of 65 and women over 60. 
** Among those that have only income from pension. 
Source: calculations based on the 2005 tax records dataset. 
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half of the women continue to save after retirement
29 and that this phenomenon covers individuals 
at all (post-retirement) income levels. These findings suggest that many individuals reach their 
pension age with an income level beyond their immediate consumption needs. It should be noted 
that these retirees saved in a period where pension savings were optional. Therefore, it seems that 
these – perhaps – excessive savings reflect a response to the high and unsustainable returns offered 
in the old system. Nevertheless it is indicative that individuals do respond to financial incentives 
for post-retirement savings, an indication that received further support by the sharp decline in the 
share of post-retirement savers between 2000 and 2005 (Table 17), as the incentives for such 
contributions were eroded. 
Overall the behavior of workers with respect to their pension contributions seems to be 
rational and active: employees seem to adjust their saving choices in a way that is consistent with 
the financial incentives. It appears that the low contribution rates of low-income employees reflect 
the meager financial incentives for pension savings, and the undesired consumption path in which 
such savings result. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Government intervention in the pension market is often justified by a need to protect the 
public from miscalculating and underestimating the advantages of saving for retirement. A similar 
argument is that young cohorts are too passive with respect to their post-retirement needs and may 
therefore act too late to ensure sufficient resources for that age. Another argument – to some extent 
an analytical opposite of the previous ones – is that individuals optimize their lifetime income 
profiles by taking (unfair) advantage of old-age income-support programs. All these arguments 
were used in the debate preceding the recent adoption of “mandatory pensions” in Israel. 
The current paper studied the reality of the Israeli pension system in its post-reform 
pre-mandatory pension structure. Using stylized representative prototypes of the most common 
Israeli household compositions and employment profiles it examined the potential benefits of 
pension savings for each “type”. The findings suggest that mandating pension savings imposes a 
net loss on low-income households. Moreover, this loss breaks the egalitarian feature of the current 
system: while at present all family types (except those at the top lifetime income decile) roughly 
enjoy the same subsidy/tax incentive, compulsory contributions will make the benefits for 
low-income households smaller than those of the others. This loss results from eroding their 
entitlement for the means-tested income supplement without offering offsetting effective tax 
incentives.
30 These calculations make the argument that low-income households take an excessive 
advantage of the means-tested income support program less convincing. 
The disadvantage of mandatory savings for low-income households is also evident in its 
impact on their lifetime income distribution. The post-retirement replacement rates offered by the 
new system are over 140 per cent, and for quite a significant group they exceed 150 per cent. These 
high incomes come at the expense of low disposable income at younger ages, when households 
have to care for children and pay mortgages. 
The analysis therefore shows that, given the existing level and structure of OAA, saving for 
retirement is not beneficial for low-income households while it is for higher-income ones. An 
examination of the households’ behavior suggests that they indeed act in line with these 
—————  
29  The figures relate only to pension-related savings that require reporting to the tax authorities. Other savings, such as bank deposits, 
bonds and stocks, are not recorded in this dataset. 
30  The recently adopted plan to raise the means-tested benefits for retirees at the oldest cohorts increases the loss inflicted on 
low-income families by mandatory pensions, but its magnitude does not qualitatively change the analysis.   Distributive Effects of Israel’s Pension System  427 
calculations. Moreover, households’ response to the restructuring of pension incentives between 
2000 and 2005 suggests that they are not indifferent to developments in this area – notwithstanding 
that the magnitude of change in this period was quite extreme. 
The disadvantages of “mandatory pensions” are not limited to lifetime low-income 
households. Many middle-income households begin their careers at income levels below the tax 
threshold. For these families it may be preferable to postpone savings until their income grows due 
to consumption smoothing and to yield considerations (losing the tax credit of 35 per cent is 
equivalent to 9 years of – assumed – net returns in the pension fund). The current decree forces 
them to contribute in each month regardless of their income. Moreover, there is no provision for 
partial contributions which would allow couples to optimize their contributions with respect to their 
eligibility for tax credits – e.g., when women work part-time post-partum. This is a substantial 
restriction in the decree because half of those who did not contribute to pension before it was 
affected had a spouse that did. These individuals are also highly unlikely to need assistance from 
the OAA income supplement. 
The initial concerns that led policy makers to adopt the “mandatory pension” had to do with 
the income distribution and the low-standard of living of the elderly. It seems, however, that the 
policy action they adopted only harms further the weakest segments among the working 
population. The high income inequality appears to be a reflection of labor market outcomes and not 
a result of the restructured pre-compulsory pension system. While the pension decree may reduce 
future fiscal expenses of the OAA’s income supplement, it will do so at the cost of increasing 
lifetime inequality and the effective tax rate on the lifetime poor. A potential positive outcome of 
that may be raising labor market participation of non-working spouses from low-income 
households’ to avoid the reduction in their allowance. However, this participation can be minimal 
as there is no floor for the necessary monthly working hours to meet the tenure requirement.
31 
Working couples may actually reduce their labor supply, due to the substitution effect; although 
Brender and Strawczynski (2006) and Brender and Gallo (2009) show that the elasticity of labor 
supply to wages is quite small in Israel. 
Finally, if policy makers are concerned with reducing the number of income supplement 
recipients, this target may be achieved in a way that is more consistent with retaining the lifetime 
neutrality of the pension system. One way of achieving that is by making the tax credits refundable 
while financing the additional cost by reducing the size of the credit to about 30 per cent. Such a 




31  While one could suggest that families will raise their participation in order to offset the loss in their permanent income, the smaller 
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 “SO PENSIONS IN EUROPE WILL REMAIN SUSTAINABLE. 
BUT WILL THEY REMAIN ADEQUATE?” 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE AWG PROJECTIONS 
ON THE ADEQUACY OF SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS 
IN BELGIUM, ITALY AND GERMANY 
Gijs Dekkers,











*** and Frédéric Verschueren
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Introduction 
Europe faces important demographic changes in the coming decades. These will have 
profound consequences on both the sustainability and adequacy of social security, including 
pensions. In Europe, the focus was primarily on securing the financial sustainability. Indeed, the 
long-term sustainability of public finances was considered an important part of the Stability and 
Growth pact. Already in 1974, the European Council decided to set up the Economic Policy 
Committee (henceforth EPC) to contribute to the work of the Ecofin Council, by focussing on 
structural policies for improving growth potential and employment. The EPC established the 
Ageing Working Group (henceforth AWG), which was assigned among other things to assess the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. It does so by presenting a set of public expenditure 
projections for all Member States, including the spending on pensions. These projections are based 
on demographic forecasts provided by Eurostat and agreed assumptions on key economic variables. 
Table 1 presents public pension expenditures as a percentage of GDP in Belgium, Germany and 
Italy, as well as for the EU15 and EU25 as a whole. 
In 2004, public pension expenditures amount to 10.6 per cent of GDP in the EU15 Member 
States. The share is lowest in Ireland (4.7 per cent) and highest in Italy (14.2). Public pension 
spending in Belgium is roughly on the EU15 average, whereas spending in Germany is somewhat 
higher. In the EU15 Member States, the share of public pension expenditures of GDP is projected 
to increase by 2.3 percentage points. The strongest decrease is projected for Poland with 
5.9  percentage points the strongest increase will be observed for Cyprus with 12.9 percentage 
points (EC, 2006, p. 71). In Italy, the increases are very small because of the introduction of an 
NDC scheme. Like many EU15 Member States, public pension spending in Germany show a 
relatively moderate increase. Projected increases are larger in Belgium (5.1 percentage points), but 
this is still far from the rates reported for the countries that face the largest challenges. This 
includes Portugal (9.7 percentage points of GDP), Luxembourg (7.4 percentage points of GDP) and 
Spain (7.1 percentage points of GDP). 
To date, the projections that Member States produce for the AWG include only a limited 
notion of adequacy, being the benefit ratio. However, the sustainability and adequacy of pensions 
————— 
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Table 1 
Gross Public Pension Expenditures between 2004 and 2050 
(percent of GDP) 
 





    Belgium  10.4 10.4 11.0 12.1 13.4 14.7 15.7 15.5  5.1 
    Germany  11.4 10.5 10.5 11.0 11.6 12.3 12.8 13.1  1.7 
    Italy  14.2 14.0 13.8 14.0 14.4 15.0 15.9 14.7  0.4 
  EU15
(1)  10.6 10.4 10.5 10.8 11.4 12.1 12.9 12.9  2.3 
  EU25
(1)  10.6 10.3 10.4 10.7 11.3 11.9 12.8 12.8  2.2 
 
(1) Excluding  Greece. 
(2)  Percentage points of GDP. 
Source: EC (2006) Table 3.3, page 71. 
 
are two sides of the same coin. The assessment of sustainability may not be very meaningful 
without considering current or prospective developments in adequacy, and vice versa. This paper 
aims to set a first step into integration by assessing the consequences of the AWG projections and 
assumptions on the adequacy of social security pensions in Belgium, Germany and Italy. 
The setup of this paper is as follows. The second paragraph of this paper will give a flavour 
of the MIDAS model, without however going too much into its nuts and bolts. The third paragraph 
will present and discuss some simulation results, insofar as they pertain to the adequacy of 
pensions. The fourth and final paragraph will conclude. For a more detailed discussion of this 
project, the model and a broad range of simulation results, the reader is invited to read the report of 
the project (Dekkers et al., 2009). We will refer to this report as the MIDAS Report in the 
remainder of the text. 
 
1  The MIDAS model for Belgium, Germany and Italy 
Lusardi et al. (2008, p. 8) define a pension system to be adequate when it provides means for 
individual consumption smoothing, and reduces inequality and poverty. To assess the adequacy of 
pensions, a model is needed that allows for the simulation of inequality, poverty and 
(re)distribution. A micro simulation model is the most obvious candidate for this, since it starts 
modelling at the level of the individual. As the conclusions of the AWG pertaining to sustainability 
are prospective, so should the model be dynamic. Finally, since the simulation of pension benefits 
and eligibility conditions, as well as the simulation of poverty and inequality require the modelling 
of households, the model needs to be a dynamic, closed, cross-sectional micro simulation model. 
These are the broad characteristics of the model MIDAS, (an acronym for “Microsimulation for the 
Development of Adequacy and Sustainability”). This model is designed to simulate future 
developments of the adequacy of pensions in Italy, Germany and Belgium,
1 following wherever 
possible the projections and assumptions of the AWG. 
MIDAS starts from a cross-sectional dataset representing a population of all ages at a certain 
point in time, in this case the PSBH dataset for Belgium in 2002, the SOEP for Germany in 2002 
————— 
1  In the remainder of this paper, the specific Belgian, German and Italian versions of the model will be denoted MIDAS_BE, 
MIDAS_GE and MIDAS_IT. The name MIDAS without the country-specific suffix is used for general descriptions of the model.    “So Pensions in Europe Will Remain Sustainable. But Will They Remain Adequate?”  433 
and a compound dataset based on the ECHP, for Italy in 2001.
2 From that starting year up to 2050, 
the life spans of individuals in the dataset are simulated, together with their interactions. Events 
simulated include birth, receiving schooling, marriage or cohabitation, divorce or separation, 
entering the labour market, work, unemployment, disability, retirement and death. During their 
active years, individuals build up pension rights, which result in a pension benefit when they retire. 
MIDAS is developed in the programming language LIAM (the Life-cycle Income Analysis 
Model). One of the strong points of LIAM is that it allows for extensive alignment, which ensures 
that aggregates from the micro model match AWG projections. Mortality and fertility as well as the 
labour market participation decision are aligned to AWG projections in each country model. Thus, 
for example, the activity rates that result from a behavioural equation are aligned with the AWG 
activity rate projections differentiated by age and gender. In MIDAS_IT, also the unemployment 
rates are aligned to AWG projections, while disability rates are aligned to national data. In 
MIDAS_BE, alignment is used for unemployment, disability, retirement, and conventional early 
leavers’ scheme (“prépension conventionnelle”, henceforth CELS). Besides via alignment, AWG 
assumptions and projections are also included through the development of aggregate earnings 
(assumed to follow the growth rate of productivity) and the social policy hypothesis pertaining to 
the relation between the growth rate of wages and of social security benefits. 
MIDAS consists of different modules, the demographic module, the labour market module 
and the pension module. The structure of the demographic module is identical in the three country-
specific versions of the model; the labour market modules are based on a common general setup, 
but take some country-specific characteristics into account, mostly depending on the information 
necessary to run the pension module. Finally, the three development teams had complete freedom 
in the development of the pension module. 
 
2  The demographic module 
The demographic module consists of four different parts: The birth process, the survival 
process, the education process and the marriage market. The first two processes are essentially 
alignment-driven random selection processes, and are based on the 2004 demographic projections 
created by Eurostat and used by the AWG. 
The education submodule consists of two serial steps. First, using observed education levels 
on data from the Labour Force Survey, OECD, every ten-year old individual is by chance 
“assigned” a level of education. Given the assigned or observed level of education, the second step 
of the education submodule determines if an individual is still in education or not. This status will 
depend on the level of education. An age of education ending will be associated with each 
education level. The average age of education ending is computed on AWG participation rates for 
each level of education. 
The third demographic sub module is the partnership formation process or “marriage 
market”. Figure 1 overleaf describes this module. 
This process links candidates eligible to marriage as well as cohabitation. It is therefore 
better to speak of it as the “partnership formation process”. It is a three stage process, which starts 
with a simple random selection procedure selecting males and females in the population who are 
eligible for marriage or cohabitation. In the second step and for each of the selected females, a 
vector is constructed that contains the probability that she will become partner with any of the 
————— 
2 See  Doutrelepont  et al. (2004), Wagner et al. (2007), and Nicoletti (2005), for a discussion of the PSBH, the SOEP, and the ECHP, 
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Figure 1 












males eligible. These estimated probabilities are a function of the difference between the two 
potential partners with respect to several variables, such as age, education level, having a job, and 
so forth. The third step in this process is the selection procedure itself. This selects each female in 
turn, and matches her with a male. When a female is to be matched, the male with the highest 
probability calculated from the regression and still available, is selected to form a partnership. 
Links are then created between the new partners, and they receive the same household number. 
Once two individuals are linked into a couple, a simple logit regression determines whether 
these individuals are married or cohabiting. Another logit regression is used to model the 
probability that cohabiting couples later decide to enter into marriage. 
Note that marriage or cohabitation is just one way in which a new household can be formed. 
By default, individuals that reach the age of 24 without being married “leave the nest” and start a 
new household of their own. 
Any routines describing household formation obviously come with routines describing 
household dissolution. Indeed, all couples are subject to a certain risk of divorce (in case of 
marriage) or separation (in case of cohabitation). The probabilities of this happening are again the 
result of logits, with among other things the duration of the marriage or cohabitation as explanatory 
variable. 
 
3  The labour market module 
The general setup of the labour market module, and the relation with the pension module, is 
described by two figures. Figure 2 describes the labour market states of individuals that are 
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Figure 2 




“selected” to be in work. 
The process of being in work is modelled by a logit regression whose results are aligned to 
AWG prospective data. If an individual enters the active state, then the next decision is whether or 
not he or she is an employee or a self-employed. In the first case, the next decision is whether or 
not he or she works in the public sector, and – if so – whether he or she does so as a civil servant.
3 
Given the labour market state one occupies in a certain period, logit regressions describe the 
probability that one moves to another labour market state, or leaves the labour market for one of the 
inactive states (see Figure 3). Figure 2 also shows that for wage-earners and civil servants, separate 
regressions are used to simulate months of work, hours of work per month (conditional on working 
full time) and the hourly wage. This results in the annual wage, which, together with annual 
increases of the length of career, is the information on which the future pension benefit is based. 
When working, individuals build up a virtual pension claim in the pension module, and they 
therefore become eligible to a pension benefit once they enter retirement. In MIDAS_BE and _IT, 
the pensions module includes wage-earners’ pensions, self-employed pensions and civil servants’ 
pensions, early retirement pensions, disability pensions and widow(er)s pensions. In MIDAS_GE, 
employees’ pensions, including civil servants and widow(er)s pensions are simulated. Figure 3 
overleaf presents the decisions for those that are not active in the labour market. 
Given that a person does not work in a given year, it is simulated sequentially whether the 
person is unemployed, retired or in a residual inactivity category which comprises all remaining 
inactive states. Else and specific to the Belgian case, one may be eligible for Conventional Early 
Retirement’ Benefit (CELS). In MIDAS_BE, all of these states, use age and gender to align to 
AWG labour market projections. In MIDAS_IT, unemployment and disability are aligned. 
————— 
3  In MIDAS_IT, this last decision does not occur, because there is a full overlap between civil servants and workers in the public 
sector. 
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Figure 3 

















In the inactive states, one can still build up a (virtual) pension claim, for example via a 
prolongation of the career. For example, in Belgium, unemployed build up an “equivalent period” 
in the sense that the length of the career increases, and that the pertaining income is based on the 
income of the last year employed. For disabled persons and retirees (also CELS), MIDAS simulates 
the amount of social security pension benefits. 
 
4  The pension module 
Of the three modules of the model, the pension module is the most country-specific. It will 
therefore be described for each country separately. Given the scope of this paper, the description 
will be limited to social security pensions. 
 
4.1  The Belgian pension module 
As in most countries with a Bismarckian pension system, social security pension benefits in 
Belgium have an occupationally tied character that is toned down by diverse minimum provisions 
and ceilings. The first-pillar retirement system for wage-earners provides former private sector 
employees and public-sector employees that were no civil servants a pension benefit that 
essentially is a function of the past career. The mandatory age of retirement is 65 for males. For 
females it is gradually increasing from 61 years of age (1997) up to 65 (from 2009 on). However, 
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The pension benefit is calculated as: 
  Benefit = (.60 or .75)*(length of career / length of career for full pension)*wage-base 
The wage-base essentially is the average of past salaries, indexed on the development of 
prices and with additional discretionary adjustments for the development of wages between the 
years of receiving the salary and the year of retirement. This modified average of corrected salaries 
is then multiplied by the length of the career and divided by the length of the career needed for a 
full pension. The latter equals the age at which one becomes eligible to a full pension benefit minus 
20. So, for males, it is 65–20=45 years. For females, it is gradually increasing to 45 years. This 
wage-base is then multiplied by either 60 or 75 per cent. If the individual is single, the 60 per cent 
is used. If (s)he is married to someone with a very low pension entitlement, the couple can opt for a 
“family pension benefit”, based on of 75 per cent of the wage-base of the high-earning partner. In 
this case, the low-earning partner loses his or her own pension entitlement.
4 
Redistributive solidarity elements are embedded in the pension system in several ways. First 
of all, pensions are a function of lifetime earnings up to a ceiling. Inversely stated, the wage one 
earns in a certain year during ones career is taken into account only up to a certain limit or ceiling. 
Those earning a higher income therefore face a lower replacement rate. Moreover, there are two 
ways in which a minimum benefit is implemented in the pension benefit: the minimum right by 
career year and the minimum pension. 
The conventional early leavers’ scheme (CELS) for employees is essentially an 
unemployment scheme for private-sector workers of 58 and older. Unlike the retirement benefit, 
the CELS benefit does not depend on the number of working years. Furthermore, when one enters 
the CELS, the career length, on which the future old-age pension will be based, continues to 
increase. 
The disability scheme for wage earners is also considered as a pathway of withdrawal out of 
the labour market. Indeed, disability is in practice an absorbing state for workers aged 50 and older. 
The disability benefit is equal to 40 per cent of the last wage when the individual is cohabiting and 
50 per cent of the last wage when he or she is not. This amount also is subjected to a minimum and 
maximum. 
Civil servants are subject to a first-pillar pension system that is separate to that of the private 
sector. Retirement is compulsory as of age of 65 for both men and women. Early retirement is 
possible from the age of 60 if at least 5 years of work as civil servant is proved. Public sector 
pensions are based on the income earned by an individual during the last five years before 
retirement. Benefits are computed according to the following formula: 
 Benefit  =  n/N * reference earning 
where n is the number of eligible years spent in the public service, N is a benefit accrual factor and 
the reference earning is the average wage over the last five years. The benefit accrual factor N is in 
general equal to 60, but there are many exceptions. 
Self-employed retirement benefits are not modelled using exact regulation as it is done for 
civil servants and wage-earners. Data describing earnings of the self-employed are often missing or 
unreliable, so we assume that self-employed retirees receive the minimum pension for 
self-employed. This minimum is adjusted for those that do not have a full career. As 78 per cent of 
“pure” self-employed benefit from the minimum pension (Scholtus 2008), the error introduced by 
this simplification might be limited. 
————— 
4  Actually, the “family pension benefit” is divided over the two partners. The high-earning partner receives 60 per cent of the 
wage-base, so an amount equal to the individual pension, and the low-earning partner receives 15 per cent of the wage-base of the 
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Summarizing, the Belgian pension module of MIDAS simulates first-pillar old-age pension 
benefits for private sector employees, civil servants and self-employed. Furthermore, it simulates 
the Conventional Early Retirements (CELS) benefit, the disability pension benefit for private sector 
employees, and – finally – the widow(er)s’ pension benefit, again for private sector employees, 
civil servants as well as self-employed. 
As said in the previous section, hourly wages increase with productivity over time, and the 
speed of this increase is the hourly productivity growth rate assumed by the AWG. Social policy 
hypotheses used in MIDAS for other pension systems are those used to produce the 2005 AWG 
projections for Belgium. These growth rates are defined as a difference relative to the productivity 
growth rate. 
•  Wage ceiling: difference of 0.5 per cent with productivity growth 
•  Welfare adjustment: difference of 1.25 per cent with productivity growth 
•  Welfare adjustment for civil servants: difference of 0.5 per cent with productivity growth  
•  Lump-sum benefits: difference of 0.75 per cent with productivity growth 
•  Minimum right by career year: difference of 0.5 per cent with productivity growth 
 
4.2  The German pension module 
The vast majority of gainfully employed persons in Germany is compulsorily insured in the 
public pension scheme (PPS). The most important exceptions are civil servants and the majority of 
self-employed persons. These are not simulated by MIDAS_GE, so we will not discuss their 
pension systems in more detail. Furthermore, disability pensions exist and derived pensions such as 
surviving spouse pensions. 
The PPS is a pay-as-you-go system of the Bismarck-type. Most of accumulated pension 
rights result from so called “earning points” which represent the relation of individual earnings to 
average earnings in a given year. Earnings points can also be derived from other sources, e.g. from 
childbearing, education, unemployment. A person becomes eligible to a pension if she has a 
minimum insurance record and if she reaches a threshold age (this depends on the birth cohort). At 
present, the regular retirement age (65) is equal for all individuals with the exception of 
handicapped persons.
5 Several groups are allowed to retire before the regular retirement age (up to 
5 years). However, each month (year) of early retirement leads to a deduction of pensions of 
0.3 per cent (3.6 per cent). Retirement before the age of 60 is only possible for disabled persons. 
The old-age pension amount without deductions is given by the product of the sum of 
earnings points and the current pension value. The current pension value is identical for all persons 
and is adjusted, depending on the growth rate of the average gross wage, changes in the ratio of 
pensioners to employees, changes in the income share of subsidized private pension provisions, and 
changes in the PPS contribution rate. 
The social security pension scheme also provides surviving spouse benefits. The amount of a 
surviving spouse benefit is a fraction of the pension of the deceased spouse. The pension is 
withdrawn to some extent if own income of the surviving spouse exceeds a threshold. 
For the growth of gross wages, we use the assumptions of the AWG (1.6 per cent on average 
per year). We use a simulation of the current pension value of Buslei and Steiner (2006) to capture 
assumptions on the changes of all factors that enter the adjustment rule. The development of wages 
and current pension value are shown in the following Table 2. 
————— 
5  The regular retirement age will gradually increase to 67 between 2012 and 2030. This reform is not modelled in MIDAS_GE.   “So Pensions in Europe Will Remain Sustainable. But Will They Remain Adequate?”  439 
 
Table 2 
Assumptions on the Development of Wages and Current Pension Value 
 
  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
 Percent increase of wage compared to 2002  4.6  21.4  43.7  70.0  101.3 
 Percent increase of pension compared to 2002  2.9  15.7  27.9  48.0  73.4 
 
While wages double up to the year 2050, the current pension value increases by about 
73  per  cent. This lower growth rate of pensions is essentially driven by demographic ageing. 
Pension growth is linked to gross wages but the new adjustment formula for the current pension 
value takes into account changes in the ratio of pension benefit recipients and contributors. This 
ratio is likely to grow strongly up until 2030 which works like a discount factor and lowers the 
growth rate of pensions. Thus the difference between the increase of gross wages and pensions is 
maximized around 2030 when demographic ageing is expected to reach its peak. This adjustment 
mechanism is one of the core elements that are assumed to guarantee financial sustainability of the 
pension insurance in Germany. 
 
4.3  The Italian pension module 
The Italian public pension system has been subject to many reforms during the last 15 years, 
changing both the age at which one becomes eligible to seniority and old age pensions and the 
formula for computing benefits. 
In Italy two different kinds of options for retirement are allowed. The first option is the old 
age pension. Workers can receive an old age pension benefit when they are aged 65 (males) or 60 
(females) and their contribution years exceed a specific threshold. The mandatory retirement age is 
65 so women can choose to take up an old age pension benefit between 60 and 65. 
The second option for retirement is called the seniority pension. One becomes eligible to this 
when, before being aged 65 or 60, specific requirements concerning both age and seniority are 
satisfied (e.g. 40 years of seniority or, since 2008, at least 58 years old with at least 35 seniority 
years). 
The 1995 reform introduces a NDC regime for those entering the labour market after that 
moment. For older workers with vested rights, the old scheme rests in place, and a transitory 
system applies to others. Three different public pension schemes therefore currently apply in Italy. 
Workers’ enrolment to such schemes depends on their seniority in 1995 according to the following 
rules: 
1) individuals with a seniority of at least 18 years in 1995 receive a benefit that is fully earnings 
related (so called retributivo). This retributivo is compound of the “A quota” and “B quota”. For 
private sector employees, the “A quota” is based on the average of wages earned during last five 
working years. For public sector employees, the “A quota” is based on the final wage. In the 
“A quota” wages are indexed only to inflation rate. The “B quota” is linked to the average wage 
over the last 10 working years for both civil servants and private sector employees. In the 
“B quota”, pensions are indexed to inflation rate plus 1 per cent; 
2) individuals entering the labour market on or after 1995 receive a benefit wholly based on the 
NDC scheme (so called contributivo). In the NDC regime the pension is based on contributions 
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transformed in an annuity stream through transformation coefficients depending in an 
actuarially fair way on retirement age. Coefficients do not differ between males and females; 
3) individuals working in 1995 with less than 18 years of seniority receive a mixed benefit 
computed pro quota by a weighted average of pension benefits resulting in earnings related and 
NDC schemes, where weights are, respectively, years worked until and after 1995. The 
“B quota” of the earnings related part is now based on wages earned during the whole working 
life rather than only on last 10 working years. 
In addition, for workers fulfilling the requirement concerning years of contributions for 
receiving an old age pension, in the earnings related (1) and mixed scheme (2), a means tested 
integration to a fixed minimum pension is guaranteed, taking into account income only. Individuals 
enrolled in the NDC scheme are eligible at 65 to a means tested social assistance benefit, 
amounting to less than the minimum pension. This however is not included in MIDAS_IT. 
Until the 1992 reform, pension benefits were indexed to gross nominal wages. Since then, 
pension benefits are indexed only to prices. 
The pension module simulates first pillar old age and early retirement pensions for private 
and public sector employees, as well as the minimum pension. In addition to “pure” pensions 
MIDAS_IT includes survivor pensions and disability pensions for wage earners and civil servants. 
Finally, like the Belgian version of the model, MIDAS_IT simulates pension benefits for the 
self-employed. Most self-employed in Italy pay the minimum contribution fixed by the law. As a 
consequence merely the minimum pension is imputed as pension benefit to self-employed enrolled 
(wholly or pro quota) to the earnings related scheme (and fulfilling requirements for receiving such 
pension). For self-employed enrolled to the NDC, the payment of the minimum contribution is 
instead accumulated into the model and the benefit is computed according to the usual rules of the 
NDC scheme. 
 
5  Simulation results describing the prospective adequacy of pensions 
This section presents and discusses the main simulation results pertaining to retirement and 
the adequacy of pension benefits, as projected by MIDAS. This presentation will be limited to the 
bare necessities for reaching the conclusions on adequacy. These are the replacement rate, the 
redistributive impact of pensions and the different risks of poverty pertaining to pension 
beneficiaries relative to wage-earners. 
When analysing retirement income in MIDAS, two problems have to be dealt with. First of 
all, questions on pension income in the PSBH and ECHP starting dataset do not make a difference 
between benefits from the first, second or third pillar of the pension system. Neither does it make a 
difference between pension benefits coming from the pension systems for former employees, civil 
servants or self-employed. So, the pension income in the starting dataset (i.e., of those retired in the 
starting year 2002) is likely to be too high on average, and to much skewed to the right. 
Furthermore, it does not allow making a separate analysis of the systems for civil servants or 
employees. 
A second problem which is common to all three versions of MIDAS is that transitions within 
labour market states result in many low pension benefits. This does not necessarily mean that the 
individuals actually have a low retirement income, because a considerable share of individuals in 
MIDAS receives benefits from multiple systems. Consequently, studying the benefits from the 
pension systems of employees and civil servants separately might result in an overestimating of the 




cannot be solved, but we 
can try to surface them as 
much as possible so that 
they become explicit in 
the analysis. 
 
5.1 Adequacy  of 
pensions in Belgium 
Figure 4 shows the 
replacement rate for 
Belgium. Note that the 
development of the 
replacement rate is 
somewhat erratic, due to 
the sometimes low 
numbers of people 
actually making the 
transition into retirement. 
To clarify their   
 
development, quadratic trends have been estimated and the fitted values are added to the figure. In 
the largest part of the simulation period, the trend is decreasing. One important reason for this is 
that less and less pensions are allocated at the higher household rate. As it is most of the time the 
man who receive this family pension, it is not surprising to see the replacement rate of men 
decreasing. Furthermore, women that forego their own individual pension benefit in order to 
benefit from the household rate pension of their partner, are obviously not included in Figure 4. As 
more and more women apply for the individual pension benefit, the replacement rate of women 
decreases as well. 
The growth rates of productivity that the AWG assumes for Belgium provide a second 
explanation of the trends in the replacement rate. However, as pensions of new retirees are based 
on past growth rates, the replacement rate will show an opposite development. The AWG assumes 
that the growth rate of productivity will increase from 1.5 (the years up to 2010) to 1.8 (from 2010 
to 2030) and this implies a lowering of the replacement rate from 2010 on. From 2030 on, the 
assumed growth rate decreases somewhat, namely from 1.8 to 1.7, and the replacement rate hence 
starts to catch up from the mid-2030s on. 
A third explanation pertains to the effect of the wage ceiling in the calculation of the pension 
benefit. This ceiling lags to the development of wages, and therefore depresses the growth of the 
pension benefit relative to wages. As a result, the replacement ratio decreases over time. However, 
following the social policy assumptions of the AWG, this lag of the development of the pension 
ceiling becomes smaller. As a result, the speed of decrease of the replacement rate will decline over 
time. 
Figure 4 also shows that the replacement rate is generally higher for women than for men. 
This is because men have a higher wage than women. This implies that the annual wage of men 
more often than women exceeds the ceiling, thus resulting in a proportionally lower pension 
benefit. Furthermore, women more often than men see their pension being adjusted upwards to the 
minimum, which means that their pension increases proportionally to their wage. The replacement 
rates of men and women however converge, and this is mainly due to the increasing labour market 
participation of women, which results in an increasing length of their career. 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 specifies 
the redistributive impact 
of pensions to gender. 
In general, the 
inequality of retirement 
benefits is considerably 
lower than that of 
earnings. This 
redistributive effect 
confirms the findings of 
Brown and Prus (2006). 
The figure suggests 
that this redistribution 
increases after 2020. 
A first reason 
pertains to the 
comparison of the 
linkage between wages 
and benefits before and 
after the start of the 
simulation. Following 
the assumptions of the 
AWG, we assume that 
benefits lag behind the 
development of wages. 
 
The difference between the growth rate of pension benefits, for example, and that of wages is 
assumed 1.25 percent. Fasquelle et al. (2008) show that this lag was on average 1.8 percent 
between 1956 and 2002. Thus, the assumptions used by the AWG – and hence by MIDAS_BE – 
imply a reinforcement of the link between wages and pension benefits. Hence, the relative decrease 
of the benefit of older retirees is slowed down, not only relative to workers but also relative to 
younger retirees (who retired later). As a result, the inequality of pension benefits will ceteris 
paribus decrease over time. 
A second reason that explains this decreasing inequality starts by emphasizing that the model 
takes only earnings and pension benefits into account. Welfare benefits, unemployment benefits 
and all other kinds of replacement incomes are ignored. This not only means that the levels of 
inequality are most likely too high, but this omission may make the simulation results dependent on 
the structure of households. Indeed, the larger the household, the higher the probability of 
observing other types of income. Or, the more individuals in the household, the more the 
simulation results of MIDAS will overestimate actual inequality. Consequently, when the average 
number of individuals in the household decreases, then the overestimation would become smaller 
in size, and we therefore can expect inequality to decrease as well. Figure 11 in the MIDAS Report 
indeed shows that the average number of individuals in households – restricted to households 
whose at least one individual is retired – is first slightly increasing until 2020 and therefore 
decreases a lot until the end of the period. This development coincides with the Gini index of 
pension benefits. Indeed, we see this inequality index increase until 2020 and decrease thereafter. 
The inequality of earnings is higher for females than for males because the proportion of part 
time workers and workers that work only a limited number of months is higher for the former than 
for the latter. However, the inequality of pension benefits is lower for females than for males, and 
Figure 5 
Inequality of Gross Earnings and Retirement Benefits – Belgium 
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the redistributive effect 
of pensions is therefore 
stronger for the former 
than for the latter. As the 
average pension benefit 
is lower for women as 
well, these pensions 
more often are 
confronted with the 
various minimum 
benefits. As a result, the 
inequality is lower. 
Furthermore, retired men 
more often than women 
receive a pension benefit 
from the second or third 
pension pillar. Even 
though the effect of this 
is diminished by the fact 
that we use equivalent 
household income, 
we can expect this to 
increase the inequality of 
the pension benefit of 
men at least up to 2020. 
Figure 6 shows the incidence of poverty among individuals with households that have only 
earnings, only retirement benefits, or both. The first conclusion from Figure 6 is that those who live 
in households that have both earnings and pension benefits, have a lower risk of poverty as 
compared to the other categories. These individuals have best of both worlds: they benefit from the 
high but unequal earnings, as well as the lower but highly redistributive pension benefits. 
The advantageous position of those having both earnings and pensions relative to others who 
live in households with only earnings can furthermore be explained by noticing that those that live 
in “mixed households” often are older than those that live in households that have only earnings as 
income. This means that their income from work is usually higher, and their households are usually 
smaller in size to that welfare is ceteris paribus higher. 
The lower risk of poverty of those that have household earnings relative to those that receive 
just pensions can be explained by the fact that one common poverty line has been used in all 
previous figures. The lower mean pension benefit compared to earnings (see the replacement rate 
in Figure 4) thus results in a higher poverty risk for those having only a pension benefit. 
Next we consider the development of poverty risks and intensities over time in Figure 6. 
This shows a rather grim picture where both the risk and intensity of poverty of those having 
earnings remain more or less the same, while both the risk and intensity of poverty of those 
receiving only a pension benefit shows a development that can roughly be decomposed in five 
phases corresponding to the five decades. Poverty among pension recipients increases during the 
first decade. Next, it roughly stays constant between 2010 and 2020, decreases during the third 
decade, on average stays more or less constant between 2030 and 2040 and finally increases again 
during the 2040s. This evolution is mainly explained by the evolution of the household structure 
combined with the evolution of earnings composition into households. These are presented in 
Table 79 of the MIDAS Report. 
Figure 6 
Incidence of Poverty Pertaining to Individuals 
from Working and Retired Households – Belgium 
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During the 2010s, the number of two-person households with two incomes goes down at the 
benefit of the three other categories. The two above-mentioned effects go in the same direction and 
combine each other to cause poverty to increase. A second effect, works though the 4 percentage 
points increase of two-person households with only one income, and reinforces poverty growth: 
Figure 29 in the MIDAS Report shows that the proportion of “household rate” pensions raises until 
about 2010. Couples benefiting from “household rate” pensions being worse off than couples 
benefiting from two pensions or even than single households with a single pension,
6 this proportion 
increasing makes poverty rise. 
The analysis of Table 79 in the MIDAS Report reveals only minor changes into the 
composition of households between 2010 and 2020. Furthermore these changes have opposite 
impacts on poverty and cancel each other out. 
The 2020s are characterized by an important decrease in poverty among pension recipients. 
The number of one-individual households stays constant during that period while the number of 
two-person households with two incomes increases considerably at the expense of households with 
2 or more individuals and two-person households with one income. As explained above, a 
reduction in the average number of dependent individuals in households leads to a reduction of 
poverty. Moreover, because they receive more often two incomes, households consisting of two 
individuals become wealthier. The two effects joining together result in a considerable reduction of 
poverty. 
The 2030s do not present a significant trend in poverty. The two opposite effects explained 
above cancel each other out. 
Finally, the 2040s show an increase of the poverty level by 10 percentage points. The effect 
at work here is the first one explained above. The number of single-person households increases 
considerably, from 57 to 68 per cent, and this at the expense of households consisting of two 
individuals with two incomes. 
So, far, the development of poverty among pension-receiving households has been explained 
using developments in the structure and income composition of these households. These however 
are not the only factors influencing poverty. Several other important explanations will be discussed 
in what follows. 
First of all, the poverty increase from 2002 to 2010 is also the result of a technical 
characteristic of the model that was discussed at length before. The observed pension benefits in 
the starting year 2002 indeed consist of benefits from not only the first, but also the second and 
third pillar of the pension system. As new generations of individuals enter retirement, the observed 
retirement benefits become merged with fully simulated retirement benefits. The latter do not 
include benefits from the second and third pension pillar, and poverty therefore increases. This, 
obviously, is not necessarily a realistic development, but a technical characteristic. 
Figure 38 of the MIDAS Report shows that the average age of the recipients of pension 
benefits start to increase considerably from the early 2030s. Ongoing pension benefits are only 
partially linked to the development of wages – even though this linkage is stronger in projection 
than it was in the past – so a strong increase of the average age of recipients explains the increase 
of poverty among the recipients of pensions. 
Ignoring the increase of poverty among the pensioners in the first decade of the simulation 
period, a contradiction between the poverty among pensioners and the replacement rate becomes 
visible. Between about 2020 and the first half of the 2030s, the position of retirees will meliorate 
————— 
6  The proportional difference between the “household rate” and the “single rate” (being 25 per cent) is lower than the increase of the 
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relative to that of the other categories. This development seems in contradiction with the ongoing 
decrease of the replacement rate in Figure 4. Furthermore, poverty among pensioners in Figure 6 
increases again from the 2030s on, which is just when the replacement rate has reached its 
minimum and is again increasing! So the development of the poverty position of the elderly seems 
somewhat in contradiction to the development of the replacement rate. An answer lies in realizing 
that the replacement rate represents “only” the income fall at retirement. It hence represents only 
the youngest cohort of retirees and not all those that retired earlier. Indeed, the higher the average 
age of the pensioners, the lower the value of the replacement rate in explaining poverty among 
pension beneficiaries. This suggests that the age development of pensioners could explain the 
development of poverty. 
 
5.2  Adequacy of pensions in Germany 
The replacement rate takes into account our growth scenarios in which pensions are assumed 
to grow slower than earnings (see prior section). Pensions will grow at a slower rate than gross 
wages which in turn implies that the replacement rate can increase only if supplied labour increases 
over the cohorts which are affected. For men, it turns out to result in a slightly decreasing average 
replacement rate. For women, on the other hand, the increase in labour supply over the lifetime of 
future cohorts of female retirees more than compensates the reduction in the current pension value. 
The erratic movement is caused by low sample size since we only look at new transitions to 
retirement in each year. A quadratic trend was added to make it easier to identify the overall 
development of the replacement ratios of men and women. Replacement ratios decrease 
significantly for men from about 45 per cent in 2003 to roughly 42 per cent in 2050. The slight 
negative trend can be attributed to the lower growth rate of pensions compared to wages and 
 
increasing male labour 
force participation. 
The increase in the 
employment rates leads 
c.p. to higher pensions 
and compensates partly 
the slow growth of 
pensions. For women, 
the mechanisms apply 
but the employment 
effects – i.e., higher 
labour market attachment 
of women – even 
dominates the effect of 
the lower growth rate of 
pensions, at least after 
2025. It is also important 
to keep in mind that 
replacement ratios of 
men and women are 
different in terms of 
levels: a higher 
replacement ratio of 
women does not mean a 
higher pension, after all 
male pensions remain   
Figure 7 
Replacement Rates – Germany 
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higher than those of 
females and the same 
holds true for wage 
income. 
This result 
resembles well the 
ageing process of the 
population because – 
somewhat simplified – 
pension growth is slower 
the higher the old age 
dependency ratio is. 
Around 2030 
demographic ageing 
reaches its peak and the 
difference in growth 
rates of pension and 
earnings shrinks. For 
women we also find that 
a higher employment rate 
leads to higher pensions 
in the future. This 
mitigates the downturn in 
the replacement rate for 
women. 
Figure 8 shows the development of the Gini of equivalized household earnings and pensions. 
Interestingly, the Gini of equivalized earnings develops like that of unweighted individual 
earnings.
7 This means that the household structure does not change its trend. The inequality 
increases up until the end of the simulation period for both men and women. For both, the Gini 
starts off from about 34 points and increases for men to a value of about 37 and for women to about 
39. The household dimension leads to a lower difference between the Gini of men and women 
compared to the comparison based on individual earnings. This difference is obviously driven by 
single households since household income is equivalized. 
A different development can be observed for households with pension benefit recipients. The 
Gini for male pensioners starts off with about 0.27 and increases until 2020 to about 0.3. After that 
it starts to decrease relatively fast until 2030 when it again starts to rise until 2050. But comparing 
2002 and 2050 no large difference can be observed. The development for women is less volatile. 
Their Gini remains relatively stable with slight positive trend over the simulated period. That both 
measures do not develop as parallel as those for equivalized earnings can be attributed to a higher 
share of single households within the group of pension recipients. Here they even dominate the 
development of the Gini. And since the Gini of unweighted individual pensions develops 
differently for men and women, a similar development can be observed for equivalized pensions. 
Figure 9 shows the incidence of poverty among individuals with households that have only 
earnings, only retirement benefits, or both. 
Note that we analysis gross income components and do not take into account welfare, 
self-employed income, private pensions or income from other sources than dependent employment 
————— 
7  Figure 92 in the MIDAS Report (p. 222). 
Figure 8 
Gini of Individual Monthly Earnings and Pensions by Gender 
(age 16-64, Employees and Retirees) – Germany 
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and public pensions. 
Typically retirees pay no 
or only low taxes, thus 
looking at gross income 
means that the income 
difference between 
workers and pensioner is 
higher than for net 
income components. A 
higher income difference 
implies in turn a higher 
poverty risk for retirees 
in this perspective. 
Concerning the missing 
household income 
components, it has to be 
kept in mind that we 
restrict this poverty 
analysis to simulated 
income components. 
This leads to a relatively 
high poverty rate for 
pensioners for three 
reasons. The first is 
 
mentioned above: the difference between pensions and gross earnings is higher than that between 
pensions and net earnings. The second reason is that households without earnings and pensions are 
not part of the analysis. However, we observe virtually no household without pension rights in the 
simulation but we do observe that households have no market income from time to time. These 
pension rights might be very small. This leads to the third reason for high poverty rates of 
pensioners: very low pensions are often associated with welfare recipience which we do not 
simulate. Taken all together, the following figures are not comparable to official poverty statistics. 
However, they show in a very pure way the relation of gross earnings and pensions before taxes 
and redistribution. 
Receiving income from both sources, earnings and pensions, leads to a lower risk of poverty 
as compared to having only one source of income. Adding to the difference in levels, pensions 
show a negative trend in poverty risks over time. This trend is dominated by higher pension 
benefits for women and a stable or slightly negative growth for men. All households experience the 
aforementioned trends regardless of their sources of income. That explains the decrease in poverty 
risks over time for pensions and total income. 
 
5.3  Adequacy of pensions in Italy 
The development of the replacement rate in Figure 10 again is somewhat erratic, due to the 
sometimes low numbers of people making the actual transition into retirement. Hence, global 
trends emerging from these figures, rather than their punctual values, should be observed and 
assessed. 
The increase of career length, assessed through seniority years, is lower than that of the 
average age of retirement (see Figure 117 in the MIDAS Report). This is because of two factors that 
counteract an increase in the age of withdrawal from work: an increase in the average age of labour 
Figure 9 
Incidence of Poverty Pertaining to Individuals 
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market entry (due to 
higher educational 
attainments) and the 
decrease of the seniority 
requirements for 
receiving an old age 
pension in the NDC 
system (amounting to 
5 years, while it amounts 
to 15/20 years in 
earnings related and 
mixed schemes). Finally, 
over the whole 
simulation period, male 
average career length 
increases, while female 
one is quite constant, 
maybe due to the higher 
share of women getting 
an old age benefit after 
having worked for few 
years. 
The counteracting 
effect played by 
1) benefits  remaining 
rather constant over time  
 
(see the discussion of the replacement rate in the MIDAS Report) and 2) real wages that increase 
steadily with the productivity growth level, emerges in the development of the replacement rates 
(i.e., the ratio between the first pension received and the last wage earned) in Figure 10. The more 
benefits are based on the NDC formula, the more replacement rates decrease both for males and 
females. The increases in career length and in age of retirement shown before are not enough for 
compensating this decrease in replacement rate brought about by the change from the earnings 
related to the NDC formula. 
Figure 11 shows the development of the inequality of (equivalent) earnings and pension 
benefits in Italy. 
In MIDAS-IT like in the other countries, earnings inequality remains fairly constant in the 
whole period. On the contrary, the trend of the Gini coefficient of pension benefits is much more 
diversified. It starts from a value slightly higher than the one pertaining to wages 
(about 0.36 vs. 0.35), but it steadily increases towards 0.40 in the mid-2010s. From 2020 onward, 
the Gini of pension benefits decreases, crosses the Gini of wages around 2035 and finally reaches a 
value around 0.31 in 2050. This trend of the Gini seems consistent with the evolution of the Italian 
pension system; at the beginning of the simulation the inequality of pension benefits increase 
because individuals with high pensions retire, then such increase is exacerbated by the coexistence 
of cohorts of retired belonging to different (and differently generous) schemes. After 2025, the 
death of the most of individuals fully belonging to the more generous earnings related scheme 
contributes to reduce the inequality of pension benefits. 
Figure 12 shows the spread of poverty risks among the different groups of the population. 
During the whole simulation period, the incidence of poverty among households receiving only 
pension benefits increases importantly, while it steadily reduces among households receiving 
Figure 10 
Average Replacement Rate of Individuals 
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earnings. After 2010, 
poverty risks are much 
higher for pensioners 
than for workers. This 
trend can be explained by 
the different evolution of 
wages, which steadily 
increases in line with 
productivity, raising then 
also the poverty 
threshold (the 60 per cent 
of median income), while 
benefits, being not 
indexed according to the 
real wage growth, reduce 
their relative value 
compared to wages in all 




projections of social 
security pensions in the 
European Member States 
are an important tool in 
the assessment of their 
sustainability. To date, 
the projections that 
Member States produce 
for the AWG include 
only a limited notion of 
adequacy, being the 
replacement rate. Other 
relevant aspects of 
pensions, specifically 
pertaining to the 
adequacy of pensions, 
are not considered. This 
paper aims to set a first 
step into integration by 
assessing the consequences 
of the AWG projections 
and assumptions on the 
adequacy of pensions in 
Belgium, Germany and 
Italy. 
The simulation 
results pertaining to the 
Figure 11 
Gini Coefficients of Gross Earnings and Retirement Benefits – 
Italy 
Figure 12 
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adequacy of pensions show that the Belgian replacement rate will gradually decrease until the 
beginning of the 2030s, after which it will recover. The level of the replacement rate is lower in 
Germany, but the development over time is comparable to Belgium. This is not so for Italy: here, 
the replacement rate starts off higher than in Belgium, but shows a continuous decrease as benefits 
from the earnings related system are gradually replaced by benefits from the NDC pension system. 
This larger impact in Italy than in Belgium and Germany seems to be consistent with the findings 
of Zaidi and Grech (2007, Table 1, page 305) 
Also, the difference between men and women in terms of their replacement rates is smaller 
in Belgium and Germany than in Italy. Seeing that the difference between men and women seems 
to appear only in the second half of the 2010s, it seems to be caused by the NDC pension system as 
well. 
In all three countries, and for Italy only in the first years of simulation, levels of income 
inequality decline from working to retirement ages, confirming the findings of Brown and Prus 
(2006). 
Inequality of equivalent pension benefits in all three countries are roughly alike in their 
development, but not in their level. The inequality of pension benefits increases at first, reaches a 
maximum in the early 2010s (late 2020s for men in Germany) and then decreases again. The 
redistributive effect of pensions (measured by comparing the inequality of earnings with that of 
pension benefits) will increase from the late 2020s on in Italy and Belgium, and from the early 
2020s on in Germany. 
The forces causing this development in equality of pension benefits are quite different, at 
least between Belgium and Italy. Using the terminology of Zaidi and Grech (2007), the increasing 
redistributive impact of pensions in Belgium is caused by the parametric reform of reinforcing the 
link between pensions and earnings. In Italy, the effect is caused by the systemic changes of 
pension system. This also explains why the effect is stronger in Italy than in Belgium. Furthermore, 
inequality of pension benefits in Belgium is in all years well below that of earnings. In Italy, it is 
the opposite in the period up to the first half of the 2030s. 
The paper also discusses the difference between workers and retirees in terms of their 
relative risk of poverty. Here the differences are more outspoken. In Belgium and Germany, the 
risk of poverty of those receiving only pension benefits is in all years higher than for those living in 
households receiving earnings (as well). In Italy, the poverty risk of those receiving a pension 
benefit starts of lower than those receiving earnings (as well), but increases very considerably until 
about 2030. This suggests that the systemic reform in Italy has a more profound impact on poverty 
than the parametric reform in Belgium and Germany. 
Next, we consider the development of the incidence of poverty of those living in households 
that receive only pension benefits. The developments are roughly comparable between the three 
counties, as was the case with inequality, but the levels are not. Furthermore, the risk of poverty 
shows a rising trend in Italy, and the “common pattern” therefore surfaces in the speed of this 
increase, rather than in the change itself. 
In the three countries, the risk of poverty pertaining to pension benefit recipients increases at 
first, and then decreases. In Belgium and Germany, this turning point is early in the 2020s, whereas 
it is late in the 2020s in Italy. Furthermore, relative to the preceding increase, the decrease of both 
risk of poverty is considerably stronger in Belgium and Germany than in Italy. As a result, the 
poverty rate of Italian pension benefit recipients show a positive trend, which is absent in Belgium 
and Germany. About a decade later after the first turning point (i.e., early 2030s for Belgium, and 
early 2040s for Italy), poverty risks stabilize and then starts a modest increase again. This last 
change is again stronger in Belgium than in Italy and Germany. The explanations for these   “So Pensions in Europe Will Remain Sustainable. But Will They Remain Adequate?”  451 
developments in both countries are comparable as well, namely the link between the development 
of wages and pension benefits. In Belgium, however, the impact of the average age of the elderly 
seems to play an important role in conjunction with this linkage. This is not reported in the Italian 
case. On the whole, poverty among the recipients of social security pension benefits increases more 
in Italy than in Belgium and Germany, which for the first two countries confirms the tentative 
results of Zaidi et al., 2006, Table 16, page 51. 
An international comparison of the simulation results suggests that the impact of the 
parametric reform in Belgium and Germany and the systemic reform in Italy on (re)distribution and 
poverty should go into the same direction, but that the magnitudes would differ. Indeed, this impact 
is expected to be stronger in Italy than in Belgium and Germany. 
Demographic ageing, in combination with projected growth rates of productivity and the 
assumed linkage between the development of earnings and pensions, has a profound impact on the 
future adequacy of pensions. Policies aiming to restore or improve sustainability therefore are 
bound to affect adequacy, and this makes it all the more important that both aspects of pension 
systems be assessed in unison. 
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Benefits, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 299-311. PUBLIC TRANSFERS AND THE AGE-PROFILE OF POVERTY IN EUROPE 
Daniele Franco,
* Maria Rosaria Marino
* and Pietro Tommasino
* 
Ensuring adequate living standards to a growing number of elderly while restraining the 
growth of pension spending represents the main challenge for pension policy in most countries. 
There is a need for an in-depth analysis of the economic conditions of the elderly which can help 
targeting resources in the coming years to the more needy groups. Children are another potentially 
vulnerable group of the population: their poverty can affect human capital accumulation and have 
long lasting effects on life-time well-being. Using data from the latest wave of the EU Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC), we document that the poverty rates of these two age groups 
with respect to the other components of the population differ considerably across European 
countries. These differences are largely due to the different anti-poverty effectiveness of national 
social policies. In particular, in “Social-democratic” and “Corporatist” welfare states the age-
profile of poverty is flat; on the contrary, in Anglo-saxon and especially in Southern European 
countries young and elderly groups show remarkably higher poverty rates. 
 
1 Introduction 
The main aim of this paper is to assess the extent of income deprivation among children and 
elderly in EU countries, as well as the role of social spending policies in shaping cross-country 
differences in the age-profile of poverty. 
Focusing on poverty is especially relevant from a normative point of view. Indeed, while 
there is a lot of disagreement about the “just” or “fair” amount of inequality within a society, there 
is wide agreement that poverty and social exclusion are the source of huge individual and collective 
costs (see, e.g., Feldstein, 2005). Widespread poverty can put into question the European 
endeavour itself, which might be seen as unable to promote social cohesion and to protect the 
living conditions of a significant fraction of the European population. These concerns are 
confirmed by the inclusion of “eradication of poverty and social exclusion” as one of the main 
objectives of the Open method of co-ordination (OMC) on Social inclusion and social protection 
launched in 2006.
1 Focusing on the young and the old is also justified by the fact that these two 
subgroups are particularly vulnerable: indeed, we show below that both the elderly and the young 
face a higher-than-average risk of poverty, and that for both groups public transfers represent a 
large fraction of their resources. Children deserve particular attention for two further reasons: they 
do not bear responsibilities for their conditions, and deprivation in the first part of life can have 
long lasting effects on their lifetime well-being (OECD, 2009). 
————— 
*  Banca d’Italia, Structural Economic Analysis Department. 
  The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of Banca d’Italia. 
1  In the EU jargon, the OMC is an approach to the coordination of member states’ policies which is intermediate between EU 
common policies and the policies left to the single countries. Under the OMC, the member states agree on common objectives and 
on a set of common indicators. They prepare national reports on a regular basis, in which plans are outlined in order to meet the 
common objectives, and plans are then evaluated in joint reports by the EU Commission and the Council. The OMC on Social 
inclusion and social protection brings together two previously separated sets of policies in the field of social inclusion and pensions, 
and encompasses for the first time the field of health and long-term care. This process has three “overarching objectives”: promote 
social cohesion and equal opportunity for all; interact closely with the Lisbon objectives; strengthen governance, transparency and 
the involvement of the stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring of policy. It also has three more specific aims 
(one for each of the three policy areas): eradication of poverty and social exclusion, adequate and sustainable pensions, accessible, 
high-quality and sustainable health care and long-term care. Based on the work of its Indicators Subgroup, the Social Protection 
Committee of the European Union adopted a set of common indicators for the social protection and social inclusion process. It 
consists of a set of fourteen indicators meant to reflect the overarching objectives and of three sets of further indicators specific to 
the policy areas of social inclusion, pensions, and health and long-term care. See European Commission (2009a). 454  Daniele Franco, Maria Rosaria Marino and Pietro Tommasino 
 
An in-depth examination of the conditions of these vulnerable age-groups is also particularly 
relevant from a public finance point of view. At the moment, most European countries are striving 
with difficult budgetary choices. On one side, it is urgent to gain fiscal room to finance 
expansionary stimulus packages. On the other side, long-term challenges, especially those due to 
the aging process and to the related spending pressures, are looming large. So it seems important 
that increasingly scarce fiscal resources are targeted toward the most needy groups of the 
population. 
While it is well known that European countries differ markedly in the incidence of poverty 
among the population (Marlier et al., 2007; European Commission, 2009a; OECD, 2008), in this 
paper we show that European countries differ with respect to another less-discussed dimension, 
namely the relative condition of children and elderly citizens with respect to the rest of the 
population.
2 Moreover, we show that in some – but not all – European countries the tax-benefit 
system is particularly effective in smoothing-out the age-profile of poverty, thereby reducing the 
differences in deprivation between young and elderly citizens and the other groups of the 
population. 
An assessment of welfare policies is complicated by the fact that they differ along many 
dimensions across European countries. Following Esping-Andersen (1990), we group European 
welfare states into a small number of clusters: “Liberal” (the United Kingdom and Ireland), 
“Corporatist” (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg), “Social-democratic” (which 
comprises the Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – and the 
Netherlands), and “Southern European” (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). 
As the labels suggest, the typology is built to reflect hypotheses concerning (1) the common 
historical and political origins of each different welfare regime and (2) the common consequences 
in terms of inequality and class differences. It is argued that in Liberal regimes the state has a 
residual welfare role with respect to the market; it provides means-tested social benefits targeted to 
the very poor. Corporatist countries allegedly give less emphasis to redistribution and use welfare 
primarily for reasons of mutual aid and risk pooling, with rights to benefits depending on the 
individual being inserted in the labour market. In Social-democratic countries the state has instead 
a substantial redistributive role, through generous social welfare and unemployment benefits. 
Finally, the Southern European group is singled out for the strong role of family support, while 
labour market policies are relatively less developed and selective. 
In what follows, we do not take a stance in this debate. However, although researchers 
disagree about the causes and consequences of different welfare regimes, they broadly agree on the 
grouping of countries (Arts and Gelissen, 2002). So we use the four-group distinction (to which we 
add the Post-communist country group) as a handy way to present and summarize our findings.
3 
The four groups also dovetail nicely in the two-dimensional classification proposed by 
Bonoli (1997), based on (1) the amount of spending, distinguishing small welfare states (Liberal 
and Southern) from large welfare states (Corporatist and Social-democratic) and (2) the 
redistributive impact of policies, separating Beveridgean welfare states (Liberal and 
Social-democratic) from Bismarkian welfare states (Southern and Corporatist). The significance of 
————— 
2  Two exceptions are Smeeding and Sullivan (1998) and Dang et al. (2006). The former paper considers four countries (Canada, 
Sweden, UK and USA) over the 1974-1994 period. The latter uses data for the late nineties about 9 OECD countries. Both papers 
differ from ours because they rely on national surveys, each with a different questionnaire design and definition of variables. 
3  There is some disagreement about the usefulness of separating southern and corporatist countries (in favour of the separation are, for 
example, Bonoli (1997) and Ferrera (1996). There is also some debate about the right place for the Netherlands. We put it in the 
Social-democratic cluster following, among others, Nolan and Whelan (2007). Lynch (2006) provides an in-depth analysis of the 
post-war II evolution of the Netherlands welfare state towards Scandinavian standards.   Public Transfers and the Age-profile of Poverty in Europe  455 
 
these two dimensions has also been emphasized in the economics literature (e.g., Conde-Ruiz and 
Profeta, 2007; Koethenbuerger et al., 2008). 
The importance of the age-orientation of public spending has been stressed by several 
studies. The literature on generational accounting (Raffelhuschen, 1999; European Commission, 
1999) takes an inter-temporal approach. Combining cross-sectional micro-data with 
macroeconomic and demographic projections, and imposing an economically meaningful 
inter-temporal government budget constraint, this stream of literature aims at assessing whether 
public policies treat different cohorts differently. Instead, we limit ourselves to the first step, taking 
a snapshot of differences in policies as of today. This might be a limit if one considers that in many 
European countries current fiscal policies might not be sustainable (they do not comply with the 
inter-temporal government budget constraint), so that they will have to be changed in some point in 
the future (see European Commission, 2009b; Balassone et al., 2009).
4 
There are two more fundamental differences between the generational accounting approach 
and ours. First, we consider the distribution of resources across and within age groups, whereas the 
latter dimension is ignored in generational accounting studies. Second, while in generational 
accounting studies the approach is completely individualistic (it assumes the absence of 
resource-sharing within families), we assume that resources are shared equally among the members 
of the same household. Of course in the two frameworks the impact of public transfers on the 
well-being of different cohorts/age groups can be quite different. For example in our framework 
old-age pensions benefit not only the recipient, but also the people who live with her or him, some 
of which may be young. 
Our paper is particularly related to Lynch (2001 and 2006), who has made the first attempt at 
measuring and explaining the age-orientation of developed countries’ welfare states. We improve 
on her contribution in two respects: first, we provide more accurate and comprehensive measures 
of the age-bias of European social policies; second, we explore the impact of such age-bias on 
poverty. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Chapter 2 we briefly describe our micro-data 
(drawn from the EU-SILC survey), review the main concepts usually employed in the study of 
poverty, and highlight their main limitations. In Chapter 3 we provide a short overview of poverty 
and deprivation across Europe, considering in particular the role played by living arrangements and 
working conditions. In Chapter 4 we focus on our main issue of interest: the age-profile of poverty 
and its cross-country variations. In Chapter 5 we provide measures of effectiveness, efficiency and 
age-orientation of public policies and evaluate their impact on the age-profile of poverty. Chapter 6 
offers some tentative conclusion. 
 
2  Data, definitions and measurement issues 
Our analysis is based on data from the latest available wave of the European Union Survey 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). It has been conducted in 2006 with reference to 
2005 and contains data for twenty-six countries, namely all EU member states in that year except 
Malta plus Iceland and Norway.
5 
————— 
4  Moreover, government policies are already changing. In recent years, many countries have introduced pension reforms which are 
characterized by less generous benefits and tighter eligibility conditions (Feldstein and Siebert, 2002). As a result, the economic 
conditions of elderly people are likely to deteriorate with respect to those of workers, unless longer working lives and a quick 
development of private pensions can offset the less generous social security rules. 
5  The survey has been launched for the first time in 2004, with reference to 2003. EU-SILC is organised under a common framework 
and is compulsory for all EU member states. A Regulation defines the minimum effective sample size to be achieved. For the 
cross-sectional component, it is planned to achieve a minimum effective sample size of around 121,000 households or 250,000 
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The EU-SILC sample covers about 203,000 households and 537,000 individuals. One sixth 
of these individuals are younger than 16, two thirds are in the 16 to 64 bracket, and one sixth are 
older than 64 (Table 1). 
Among households, 30.3 per cent are composed by only one person, 36.5 per cent is made 
up of two or more adults without children. Among the households with children (32.5 per cent), 
those with a single parent are slightly more than 4 per cent (Table 2).
6 
EU-SILC, which adopts a questionnaire common to all countries, provides information on 
individuals living in private households.
7 It includes variables measured both at the household and 
individual level. These variables include: income, education, information on current and past 
working status, health, access to health care, detailed labour and career information. 
An important goal of the survey is to provide both gross and net income data. In particular, 
three main aggregates are made available by EU-SILC: total disposable household income, total 
disposable household income less transfers, and total gross income (disposable income plus taxes 
and social contributions). However, the latter will only be fully available with the data concerning 
2007. The years 2004-06 can be seen as transitional period as five countries, namely France, 
Greece, Italy, Latvia and Portugal, are allowed to deliver only net income components and for all 
countries a limited number of components is not compulsory. 
Gross income components covered by EU-SILC are: employee income, self-employment 
income, imputed rents, property income, interests paid on mortgage, current transfers paid (this 
item is in turn made up of: tax on income and regular taxes on wealth, social security contributions 
and regular inter-household transfers), and current transfers received. 
For our aims, transfers received from the government are particularly important. Social 
benefits are decomposed in: unemployment benefits, old-age benefits, survivor’ benefits, sickness 
benefits, disability benefits and education related allowances. At the household level, we also have 
family/children related allowances, housing allowances, and a third item concerning other transfers 
generically directed to the problem of social exclusion.
8 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
individuals older than sixteen years in the EU (respectively 127,000 and 260,000 including Iceland and Norway). Useful 
information about the EU-SILC survey can be found in Eurostat (2007b). 
6  Here and in what follows, we will focus on the population counterparts of the sample variables. The latter are derived from the 
former applying a specific set of weights. Indeed, if the sampling design is such that individuals in the population have different 
probabilities of sample participation, due to sampling design or to systematically different non-response behaviour, this may bias 
inference from the sample to the population, unless selection probabilities are properly taken into account through weights (see, e.g., 
the discussion in Deaton, 1997). In accordance with the Commission Regulation on sampling and tracing rules (Regulation 
No. 982/2003 of 21 October 2003, par. 7.4), EU-SILC provides weights “calculated as required to take into account the units’ 
probability of selection, non-response and, as appropriate, to adjust the sample to external data relating to the distribution of 
households and persons in the target population, such as by sex, age (five-year age groups), household size and composition and 
region (NUTS II level), or relating to income data from other national sources where the Member States concerned consider such 
external data to be sufficiently reliable”. 
7  All individuals living in collective households and in institutions are therefore excluded. In some countries this implies an under-
representation of elderly people, which often live in specialised institutions. Furthermore, the exclusion of collective households, 
hospitals and prisons may conduct to an under-estimation of the incidence and intensity of poverty. 
8  In order to be considered as social transfers, the monetary benefit has to come from collectively organised schemes or by 
government units and non profit institutions serving households and should meet one of two criteria: coverage in the scheme is 
compulsory or it is based on the principle of social solidarity. In the EU-SILC, social benefits are consistent with the European 
System of integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS) classification, even if not all elements of ESSPROS itself are included 
(in particular, EU-SILC definition covers only cash benefits with the exceptions of housing and only current transfers; it includes 
the function education while ESSPROS does not; the ESSPROS definition, differently from EU-SILC, covers certain reductions on 
taxes different from family allowances if they meet the general criteria for social protection schemes and other specific criteria). The 
ESSPROS classification is in turn consistent with the COFOG classification of government expenditures by function. In some 




Individuals and Households in EU-SILC 
 













































































































































































Austria  14,883 2,778 9,680 2,425 6,028  1,754  2,192 273  1,809 
Belgium  14,329 2,840 9,378 2,111 5,860  1,642  2,134 366  1,708 
Cyprus  11,069 2,251 7,280 1,538 3,621  533  1,412  98  1,578 
Czech 
Republic  17,830 2,907  11,807 3,116 7,483 2,923 2,916  361 2,083 
Germany  31,777 5,515  20,400 5,862 13,799 3,832 5,415  1,016 3,521 
Denmark  14,676 3,222 9,763 1,691 5,711  1,108  2,294 254  2,022 
Estonia  15,840 2,503  10,830 2,507 5,631  1,139  1,960 326  2,180 
Spain  34,694 5,667  22,896 6,131 12,205 1,981 5,246  314 4,521 
Finland  28,039 5,768  19,125 3,146 10,868 2,377 4,408  392 3,691 
France  24,940 5,279  15,966 3,695 10,036 2,752 3,452  536 3,242 
Greece  15,190 2,415 9,475 3,300 5,700 1,228 2,558  102 1,793 
Hungary  19,902 3,290  13,009 3,603 7,722  1,939  3,057 366  2,360 
Ireland  14,634 3,139 8,600 2,895 5,836  1,816  2,065 312  1,643 
Iceland  8,598 2,061 5,734  803 2,845  383  938 152  1,359 
Italy  54,512  8,035 35,215 11,262 21,499 5,491 8,805  599 6,604 
Lithuania 12,134 1,811 7,928 2,395 4,660  1,016  1,838 219  1,587 
Luxembourg  10,242 2,391 6,857 994  3,836  866  1,306  199  1,465 
Latvia  10,985 1,678 7,005 2,302 4,315  1,120  1,591 261  1,318 
Netherlands 23,096  5,489  15,128  2,479 8,986  2,091  3,358 327  3,209 
Norway  15,454 3,434  10,541 1,479 5,768  1,232  2,071 274  2,109 
Poland  45,122 8,201  30,613 6,308 14,914 2,726 5,165  528 6,256 
Portugal  12,071 1,788 7,820 2,463 4,367  770  1,933 112  1,545 
Sweden  17,149 3,577  11,419 2,153 6,803  1,664  2,441 344  2,330 
Slovenia 31,276  4,136  23,044  4,096 9,478  872  3,936 258  4,412 
Slovakia  15,147 2,258  10,917 1,972 5,105  1,122  1,801 151  2,028 
UK  23,365 4,789  14,592 3,984 9,902 2,768 3,983  634 2,309 
Total  536,954 97,222  355,022 84,710  202,978 47,145 78,275 8,774 68,682  
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We estimate household poverty considering the equivalised total disposable income obtained 
using the modified OECD equivalence scale.
9  This allows to take into account that larger 
households can exploit economies of scale in housing and in the consumption of goods and services. 
As it is typical in poverty studies for rich countries, we endorse a relative concept of 
poverty.
10 This is not incompatible with an “absolute” view of deprivation, as long as the minimum 
amount of resources which are necessary to avoid social exclusion rises with general prosperity 
(Sen, 1983 and 1987). In particular, for each country we calculate the poverty line as the 
60 per cent of the country median equivalised income and define as poor persons those living in 
households with a total equivalised disposable income lower than this threshold.
11 Robustness of 
the poverty rates is tested considering two alternative poverty lines (respectively equal to 50 and 
70 per cent of the national median income). 
Even controlling for family composition, other comparability problems remain. First of all, 
for a given level of income and for a given household composition, well-being also depends on 
personal characteristics, such as health, education and the amount of available leisure time. 
Secondly, we ignore in-kind transfers, which in many countries are quite sizable (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2002; Garfinkel et al., 2006). Thirdly, we do not take into account the 
flow of benefits stemming from the ownership of durable consumption goods and real assets 
(however, we do try to capture some of the effects of real-asset ownership by taking into account 
imputed rents). 
Finally, while in most of the paper we consider a nation-specific poverty line (as it is 
customary in cross-country studies), we also provide some poverty statistics using both a single 
EU-wide poverty line and a mixed poverty line (built as a geometric mean of the national and the 
EU-wide thresholds). These estimates are to be considered with extreme caution, given the many 
conceptual and empirical difficulties implied by this kind of exercises (see, e.g., Atkinson, 1998; 
Brandolini, 2007; Mogstad et al., 2007). 
 
3  A bird’s eye on poverty in Europe 
3.1  The incidence of poverty 
Poverty rates among households differ widely across EU countries. They range from 
8.6 per cent in the Czech Republic to 22.8 per cent in Latvia (Table 3). Four countries have poverty 
rates near or below 10 per cent (Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Iceland); eleven 
countries have rates between 11 and 15 per cent (Denmark, France, Sweden, Norway, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Hungary, Slovenia, Finland, Austria and Germany); the remaining ones 
have poverty rates above 15 per cent. Eleven countries have poverty rates above the EU average 
(16.2 per cent). 
The relative position of countries in terms of poverty rates does not change significantly if we use 
poverty lines equal to 50 and 70 per cent of the median equivalised disposable income (Table 4). 
The only exceptions are represented by Finland, Latvia, Austria and, to a lesser extent, Ireland and 




9  This scale assigns a unitary weight to the head of the household, a weight of 0.5 to each household component aged 14 and over at 
the end of the income reference period and a weight of 0.3 to members aged 13 or less. It is the scale endorsed by the EU in the 
construction of the indicators used in the OMC on Social inclusion and social protection. 
10  Relative poverty is also one of the indicators agreed upon by EU member states in the context of the OMC on Social protection and 
inclusion. 


























Austria 14.7  7.0  22.1  5.0  8.0 
Belgium 14.2  7.3  22.7  7.7  9.9 
Cyprus 19.6  11.9  27.1  14.0  14.0 
Czech Republic  8.6  4.2 16.3  90.8  50.3 
Germany 14.9  8.7  22.5  9.3  10.9 
Denmark 12.1  6.5  20.5  3.0  4.4 
Estonia 16.5  9.9  27.8  92.1  57.6 
Spain 20.4  13.2  28.0  30.1  24.4 
Finland 14.6  6.7  24.4  3.7  6.2 
France 13.1  7.3  21.0  8.4  10.0 
Greece 19.8  13.1  27.5  40.2  28.4 
Hungary 14.5  9.0  22.3  93.3  61.1 
Ireland 18.7  8.7  28.4  4.6  8.9 
Iceland 10.3  5.4  18.7  1.3  3.2 
Italy 19.6  12.5  27.0  17.9  18.4 
Lithuania 18.2  11.5  27.4  96.8  69.9 
Luxembourg 13.9  8.0 21.7 1.0 3.7 
Latvia 22.8  12.7  30.5  95.7  67.0 
Netherlands 10.0  5.3  19.0  4.8  6.4 
Norway 13.4  6.9  21.4  2.2  3.7 
Poland 17.7  11.2  25.8  95.3  67.5 
Portugal 19.0  12.0  27.5  60.2  35.5 
Sweden 13.2  8.1  20.7  6.4  8.3 
Slovenia 14.5  8.0  21.8  39.6  20.8 
Slovakia 10.1  5.6  17.5  97.5  69.4 
United Kingdom  18.8  11.8  27.2  8.1  12.2 
    
Min 8.6  4.2  16.3  1.0  3.2 
Max 22.8  13.2  30.5  97.5  69.9 
EU average  16.2  9.8  24.1  24.5  20.6 
All countries 
average  16.2 9.7  24.1  24.3  20.4 
 
 
(1) It is a poverty line calculated as 60 per cent of the European equivalised median income. It is equal for all counties. 
(2)  Calculated as 
α α − ⋅
1 p pli , where the first term is the poverty line of each country (equal to 60 per cent of the median equivalised 
income) and the second term the unique poverty line described in footnote (1). We used α = ½. 




Correlation between Poverty Rates Computed with Different Poverty Lines 
 
Median  Income  60% 50% 70%  EU-wide  Hybrid 
60%  1.000 0,948 0.970 0.156 0.214 
50%    1.000 0.898 0.240 0.294 
70%      1.000 0.170 0.224 
EU-wide      1.000  0.989 
Hybrid       1.000 
 
Table 5 

































































Poverty rates       
Overall  9.8 12.7 16.7 17.6 14.3 
0-15  9.9 14.3 20.5 18.8 18.7 
16-64  9.4 11.7 14.4 15.0 13.6 
65+  11.1 14.5 22.2 29.1 12.1 
       
Poverty rates pre-transfers       
0-15  27.7 22.5 28.4 23.6 30.1 
16-64  27.7 28.0 24.5 27.3 30.1 
65+  91.6 91.3 87.4 82.3 83.6 
Overall  37.1  37.7  33.8  36.0  38.3 
       
Age-bias index        
Old/Working  age  4.19 4.07 4.17 3.53 3.78 
Child/Working  age  0.79 0.35 0.53 0.22 0.52 
       
VEE       
Families with children  52.4  57.8  74.0  46.6  46.4 
Families with working-age adults  67.3  71.9  54.1  52.7  58.7 
Families with elderly  93.9  91.8  87.6  81.8  85.7 
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Overall, low levels of poverty rates characterise Social-democratic countries (12.3 per cent 
on average) and Corporatist countries (14.2 per cent), whereas above EU-average levels of poverty 
characterize Liberal (18.8 per cent), Southern (19.7 per cent) and Post-communist (15.4 per cent) 
countries (Table 5). 
 
3.2  The intensity and inequality of poverty 
Together with the incidence of poverty (how many are the poor) summarized by the poverty 
rate, a further dimension of poverty is its “intensity” (how poor are the poor). To capture intensity 
we computed the widely-used poverty gap, defined as the difference between the average income 
among poor families and the poverty line, expressed as a percentage of the latter.
12 
Neither the poverty ratios nor the poverty gaps are sensitive to changes in the income 
distribution among the poor (to the so called “inequality” of poverty). To keep this element into 
account we also consider a version of the so-called Forster-Greer-Thorbecke index (FGT2).
13 As 
with the poverty gap, this index can be seen as a weighted sum of the households’ poverty gaps. 
The difference is that the weights are not equal for all: instead, in the summation the gaps of very 
poor households have bigger weights. 
According to our data, poverty gaps in Europe range from around 20 per cent in Finland and 
Ireland to a maximum of 44 per cent in Norway (Table 6). However, the majority of countries has 
poverty gaps between 25 and 35 per cent, and the average poverty gap is slightly above 30 per cent. 
No clear-cut distinction emerges across different groups of countries. The poverty rates and the 
poverty gaps are weakly correlated: there are some countries with relatively high headcount ratios 
but relatively low poverty gaps (i.e., Cyprus, Finland and Ireland) and vice versa (i.e., Denmark, 
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) (Table 7). If one disregards outliers 
(Norway, Belgium and Germany), these considerations are confirmed if one looks at the FGT2 
index. 
 
3.3  Poverty and family composition 
Behind national differences in poverty rates there can be differences in factors such as family 
structure and labour market characteristics. 
————— 
12  Sometimes the poverty gap is averaged over the entire population (non-poor have obviously a gap of 0). Indeed the measure we 
show in the main text does not satisfy some desiderable monotonicity properties (for example, if one of the richest among the poor 
gets out of poverty, the index may well increase); besides it is not decomposable among subgroups (see the next footnote). 

















i  ) (
 
 where  a is greater than or equal to 0 (if a = 0 one has the headcount ratio, with a = 1 one has the poverty gap). The poverty indices 
which are used more frequently in applied work belong to two main families: the family of Sen indices, which have the nice 
property to be sensitive to inequality among the poor, and the Foster-Shorrocks indices, which have the property of being 
decomposable among population subgroups. The poverty ratio and the poverty gap (averaged over the whole population) belong to 
the second family but not to the first. Foster-Greer-Thoerbeke indices with a > 1 share both set of properties. In our calculation we 






Countries Poverty  Gap  Forster-Greer-Thorbecke Index (FGT2)
Austria 24.8 1.7 
Belgium 28.9 11.8 
Cyprus 24.2 1.7 
Czech Republic  21.2  0.7 
Germany 35.6  13.3 
Denmark 35.4  5.9 
Estonia 29.6 2.8 
Spain 30.7  3.3 
Finland 20.5 1.2 
France 24.6  1.5 
Greece 32.2 5.5 
Hungary 32.6  4.5 
Ireland 19.0 1.2 
Iceland 26.7 2.6 
Italy 32.7  4.0 
Lithuania 32.5  3.3 
Luxembourg 26.7  2.8 
Latvia 31.7  5.2 
Netherlands 33.4  4.4 
Norway 44.0  80.5 
Poland 29.8 2.6 
Portugal 28.8  2.6 
Sweden 35.2  3.1 
Slovenia 25.3  1.6 
Slovakia 25.4  1.1 
United Kingdom  30.5  3.2 
  
Min 19.0  0.7 
Max 44.0  80.5 
EU average  30.7  5.3 
All countries average  30.8  6.1 
 
Table 7 
Correlation among Poverty Indicators 
 
  Poverty Rate Poverty Gap FGT2  Poverty Rate × Poverty Gap
Poverty rate  1.000  0.070  -0.100  0.810 
Poverty gap    1.000  0.630  0.620 
FGT2     1.000  0.260 




Poverty Rates by Household Types 
 
Countries  One-person 
Households 
Households 












Austria 21.8  9.7  26.8  10.2  14.7 
Belgium 19.9  11.3  25.2  8.6  14.2 
Cyprus 40.9  25.0  26.6  7.0  19.6 
Czech Republic  13.4  3.3 33.7  8.7 8.6 
Germany 21.5  10.4  23.3  8.6  14.9 
Denmark 20.5  5.2  9.9  5.0  12.1 
Estonia 26.7  8.3  33.9  10.1  16.5 
Spain 34.1  16.0  35.3  19.4  20.4 
Finland 28.3  5.6  13.2  5.3  14.6 
France 17.7  9.7  23.2  10.2  13.1 
Greece 23.9  17.3  26.3  20.6  19.8 
Hungary 12.2  18.3  35.1  16.8  14.5 
Ireland 15.2  22.6  38.9  11.1  18.7 
Iceland 5.9  11.5  25.7  7.9  10.3 
Italy 16.8  29.0  27.5  20.9  19.6 
Lithuania 9.8  20.9  33.3  15.1  18.2 
Luxembourg 9.1  17.7  44.5  14.9  13.9 
Latvia 19.3  30.3  31.3  15.9  22.8 
Netherlands 5.3  11.4  27.3  8.3  10.0 
Norway 4.3  13.6  14.1  5.3  13.4 
Poland 14.7  28.7  29.6  22.5  17.7 
Portugal 40.6  36.1  32.7  14.6  19.0 
Sweden 3.9  11.3  25.5  8.5  13.2 
Slovenia 16.1  20.1  17.7  7.1  14.5 
Slovakia 7.0  12.6  23.8  11.1  10.1 
United Kingdom  16.2  29.2  36.2  14.4  18.8 
          
Min 13.4  3.3  9.9  5.0  8.6 
Max 44.6  25.0  44.5  22.5  22.8 
EU average  22.5  11.2  27.8  14.3  16.2 
All countries average  22.5  11.2  27.6  14.2  16.2   Public Transfers and the Age-profile of Poverty in Europe  465 
 
Indeed, poverty 
risks differ among 
household types (Table 8 
and Figure 1). As one 
could expect, they are 
significantly higher than 
the average for 
one-person households 
(22.5 per cent) and 
especially for single-parent 
families (27.6 per cent).
14 
Households with one 
adult are often those 
made up of younger or 
older people which are 
more likely to be in poverty 
conditions; in households 
with two adults there is 
generally income pooling 
which represent a cushion 
against temporary income 
shocks. 
There are however 
huge differences across 
Europe. There are 
countries in which the 
poverty rate among 
one-adult households 
with dependent children 
is lower, or only slightly 
higher than the overall 
poverty rate (Denmark, 
Finland and Norway). At 
the other extreme, there 
are countries in which the 
poverty rate for single 
parent households is 
almost four times (Czech 
Republic) or three times 
(Luxemburg) higher than 
the overall average. 
 
3.4 Poverty  and 
occupation status 
Poverty risks 
depend also on the 
————— 
14  We defined as dependent children household members aged 17 or less and economically inactive members aged between 18 and 24. 
Figure 1 
Poverty Rates by Family Type 
Figure 2 























Without children With children and at least
two adults






Post-communist466  Daniele Franco, Maria Rosaria Marino and Pietro Tommasino 
 
 
occupational status. We grouped individuals in five categories: workers, retirees, disabled, 
unemployed and other non-occupied individuals. As expected, workers have the lowest poverty 
rate (8.3 per cent on average for the European countries), followed, in order, by retirees 
(14.8  per  cent), other non-occupied individuals (20.6 per cent), disabled (24.6 per cent) and 
unemployed (36.7 per cent) (Table 9 and Figure 2). 
Poverty rates vary substantially between and within countries. For example, the poverty risks 
for workers range from 0.1 per cent in Lithuania to 15 per cent in Poland; those for retirees range 
from 3.9 per cent in the Czech Republic to 46.3 per cent in Cyprus. In some countries retirees have 
a poverty rate which is close to the rate of workers (Czech Republic, Sweden and Slovakia); in 
some other countries they are actually better-off (Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Poland) 
(Table 9). 
Similar differences arise for the unemployed. Unsurprisingly, they always display higher 
poverty rates. In the Czech Republic their poverty rate is more than ten times the poverty rate of 
workers. In the United Kingdom, Finland, and Ireland it is more than seven times. In Cyprus, 
Spain, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden it is between two and four times higher. 
 
4  The age profile of poverty 
Children and elderly people tend to be poorer than individuals in working age. In Europe the 
poverty rate is 17.9 per cent for the young (less than 16-years-old) and 17.4 per cent for the old 
(more than 64-years-old). It is 14.1 per cent for the population in working age (between 16 and 
64 years old). Therefore, on average, poverty among the young and among the old is about one 
quarter higher than among the working age people. 
Table 10 shows that European countries differ not only with respect to the incidence of 
poverty, but also with respect to its age-profile. In four countries the risk of poverty among young 
people is even lower than that for the working age population (Cyprus, Denmark, Finland and 
Norway). In other countries the ratio between the two is quite high. 
Looking at different groups of countries, poverty among the young is higher than among the 
working age people by 42 per cent in Liberal countries, 25 per cent in Southern countries, 
22 per cent in Corporatist welfare states, 5 per cent in Social-democratic countries. It is 37 per cent 
higher in Post-communist states (Figure 3). 
As for elderly people, in nine countries, most of which Post-communist (the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Slovakia) their 
poverty rates are below national average. 
Poverty among the elderly is higher than among the working age people by 66 per cent in 
Liberal countries, 45 per cent in Southern countries, 19 per cent in Corporatist countries, and 
2  per  cent in Social-democratic countries. It is 5 per cent lower than that among working age 
people in Post-communist states. 
To sum up, Liberal and Southern welfare states display both a higher overall poverty rate, 
and a more pronounced V-shaped age profile of poverty, with respect to Corporatist and 
Social-democratic welfare states. In Post-communist countries the age profile of poverty is 
monotonically decreasing. 




Poverty Rates by Occupation Status 
 
Countries Workers  Unemployed  Retirees Disabled Other  Unemployed 
Austria 7.0  32.1  12.8  15.2  17.2 
Belgium 4.3  31.5  15.6  24.7  16.3 
Cyprus 6.7  20.3  46.3  28.0  10.9 
Czech Republic  3.3  35.9 3.9  10.7  13.5 
Germany 7.6  38.4  12.7  29.7 14.3 
Denmark 4.4  20.2  8.6  6.4 15.1 
Estonia 6.5  43.9  15.8  43.2  17.0 
Spain 10.2  30.3  23.4  28.3  24.8 
Finland 4.3  31.1  15.2  14.8  11.2 
France 6.5  28.3  11.9  23.7  16.8 
Greece 14.1  29.3  22.8  39.3  22.7 
Hungary 8.3  43.9  7.8  21.5  23.7 
Ireland 5.2  37.5  20.1  37.2  21.5 
Iceland 6.3  21.4  10.5  5.4  12.7 
Italy 10.4  39.8  16.0  28.2  26.0 
Lithuania 0.1  45.1  15.7  23.8 21.3 
Luxembourg 10.9  45.2  7.5  26.4  18.0 
Latvia 9.8  49.8  25.9  30.4  23.1 
Netherlands 5.8 28.0  5.6  10.0  14.0 
Norway 5.4  24.4  14.6  9.7  12.8 
Poland 15.0  44.7  7.9  22.6  25.8 
Portugal 10.6  25.1  21.0  26.9 22.0 
Sweden 7.3  23.5  9.6  10.9  17.1 
Slovenia 4.4  27.1  14.4  38.6  10.2 
Slovakia 6.1  34.9  6.7  8.6  14.1 
United Kingdom  6.4  55.9  25.1  34.1  24.4 
          
Min 0.1  20.2  3.9  5.4  10.2 
Max 15.0  55.9  46.3  43.2  26.0 
EU average  8.3  36.8  14.8  24.9  20.7 
All countries 
average  8.3 36.7  14.8  24.6  20.6 




Poverty Rates by Age 
 
Countries 0-15  16-64  65+  Total 
Austria 14.6  11.1  15.7  12.4 
Belgium 12.6  10.6  19.6  12.4 
Cyprus 8.8  9.5  48.1  14.0 
Czech Republic  14.5 8.0  3.7  8.4 
Germany 11.9  11.8  13.3  12.1 
Denmark 7.2  9.2  9.9  8.9 
Estonia 16.0  13.2  13.6  13.7 
Spain 22.9  15.5  28.7  18.8 
Finland 6.6  9.5  16.6  10.1 
France 12.5  11.0  15.1  12.0 
Greece 21.3  18.1  24.3  19.8 
Hungary 24.1  14.5  8.8  15.3 
Ireland 18.4  14.0  19.8  15.6 
Iceland 11.7  8.3  9.6  9.4 
Italy 23.1  17.3  20.6  18.9 
Lithuania 21.0  16.6  14.9  17.1 
Luxembourg 20.0  13.9  8.7  14.4 
Latvia 21.8  17.4  22.6  19.0 
Netherlands 13.4  9.1  5.8  9.5 
Norway 7.5  9.4  14.6  9.8 
Poland 27.7  21.1  8.7  20.5 
Portugal 17.7  14.7  23.7  16.8 
Sweden 12.9  11.0  9.8  11.2 
Slovenia 10.1  8.4  17.3  10.1 
Slovakia 14.4  9.8  6.9  10.1 
United Kingdom  22.5  14.7  24.6  17.7 
        
Min 6.6  8.0  3.7  8.4 
Max 27.7  21.1  48.1  20.5 
EU average  18.0  14.1  17.4  16.4 
All countries average  17.9  14.1  17.4  16.4 




These results are 
substantially confirmed 
by a multivariate analysis 
(Table 11).
15 Estimating 
logistic regressions in 
which the probability of 
being poor is related to 
the age-group of the 
individual and its regime, 
allowing for interaction 
terms between the two, it 
appears that: (1) elderly 
people are poorer that 
working age people in 
Southern and especially 
Liberal countries, while 
their position is not much 
worse than those of the 
middle-aged in 
Corporatist countries. 
It is virtually identical 
in Social-democratic   
 
countries, while it is actually better in post-communist countries; (2) the relative conditions of 
children appear to be worse than those of working age people in all regimes. Their relative position 
is however somewhat better in Social-democratic and Corporatist countries, while it is especially 
critical in liberal countries. 
Therefore, it remains true that the age profile of poverty is flatter in Social-democratic and 
Corporatist countries, whereas its V shaped profile is particularly pronounced in Liberal and 
Southern countries. Post-communist countries are somewhat a class of their own, due to the 
particularly good relative position of the elderly. 
————— 
15  The underlying assumptions are: (i) the difference between the national poverty threshold and the equivalized household income is 
measured with some noise, so that it is equal to the “real” difference plus an i.i.d. error term distributed according to a logistic 
distribution function; (ii) the “real” difference depends linearly on the regime type, and on the age group at which the individual 




















age regime age regime








)   0 i person    of   income   household   d equivalize -   reshold poverty th (   Prob  
 where  regimei,r (viz. agei,a) is equal to 1 if i belongs to regime r (viz.: i belongs to the age group a), and 0 otherwise. So the odd-ratio 












) , ( . An index of the relative 
disadvantage of group a’ with respect to group a in regime r is given by: 
ra a ra a
a r O
a r O γ β γ β − − + =
' ' e
) , (
) ' , (
, and to compare the relative 
disadvantage of group a’ one can look at: 
a r a r ra ra
a r a a r a





' ' ' '





) , ' (
) ' , ' (
) , (
) ' , (
γ γ γ γ
γ β γ β




= =  
  Notice that only the interaction terms matter. 
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Risk To Be Poor with Respect to Age and Welfare Regime 
 
Poors Coefficient  Standard 
Error  t  P > | t |  95% Confidence 
Interval 
Age1 0.37548  0.02775  13.53  0.000  0.32109  0.42987 
Age3 0.46378  0.02312  20.06  0.000  0.41847  0.50910 
           
Corporatist –0.42636  0.02322  –18.36  0.000  –0.47188  –0.38085 
Liberal  –0.13760  0.02723 –5.05  0.000 –0.19097 –0.08422 
Social-democratic –0.61737  0.02786  –22.16  0.000  –0.67198  –0.56277 
Post-communist  0.0154  0.01728 0.89 0.372  –0.01844 0.04930 
           
Age1 × Social-democratic  –0.22845  0.05369 –4.25  0.000 –0.33369 –0.12321 
Age3 × Social-democratic  –0.44004  0.05643 –7.80  0.000 –0.55065 –0.32943 
           
Age1 × Corporatist  –0.28172  0.04622 –6.09  0.000 –0.37232 –0.19113 
Age3 × Corporatist  –0.19432  0.04438 –4.38  0.000 –0.28130 –0.10733 
           
Age1 × Liberal  0.134318 0.05029 2.67 0.008 0.03576 0.23288 
Age3 × Liberal  0.166917 0.04980 3.35 0.001 0.06931 0.26452 
           
Age1 × Post-communist  0.04586  0.03553 1.29 0.197  –0.02377 0.11550 
Age3 × Post-communist  –1.15478 0.03865  –29.88  0.000  –1.23053  –1.07903 
           
Constant –1.62457  0.01304  –124.57  0.000  –1.65013  –1.59901 
 
 
Logistic regression. Number of observations = 534,997. Wald 
2 χ (14) = 3,797.31. Prob.> 
2 χ  = 0.0000. 
Log pseudo-likelihood =-224,126.6. Pseudo 
2 R  = 0.0162. 
 
If one takes a further step and distinguishes, inside the working age population, different 
working conditions, other interesting results emerge. It turns out that younger pensioners (i.e., less 
than 65-years-old) are better off than the elderly in the south, they are equally well off in the 
social-democratic regime, and they are worse off in the remaining regimes (Table 12). This might 
be due to the generous early retirement schemes which characterize several of those countries (e.g., 
France, Germany and Italy). 
Age seems to matter for poverty gaps as well, but the direction is opposite. For all groups of 
countries analysed in the paper poverty gaps have an hump-shaped curve if plotted against age 




Risk To Be Poor with Respect to Age, Occupational Status and Welfare Regime 
 
Poors Coefficient  Standard 
Error  t  P > | t |  95% Confidence 
Interval 
Age1 0.8881  0.0319  27.85  0.000  0.8256  0.9506 
Age2 × unemployed  1.4662 1.4662 34.04  0.000  1.3817 1.5506 
Age2 × retiree  0.0649 0.0649  1.06  0.288  –0.0549 0.1846 
Age2 × disabled  1.2333 1.2333 13.52  0.000 1.0544 1.4121 
Age2 × non-occupied  1.0698 1.0698 35.85  0.000 1.0113 1.1283 
Age3 0.9764  0.9764  34.94  0.000 0.9216 1.0311 
            
Corporatist (C)  –0.5031  –0.5031  –13.67  0.000 –0.5752 –0.4310 
Liberal (L)  –0.5749  –0.5749  –12.08  0.000 –0.6683 –0.4816 
Social-democratic (SD)  –0.6619  –0.6619  –15.75  0.000 –0.7443 –0.5795 
Post-communist (PC)  0.0176  0.0176  0.65  0.519  –0.0359  0.0712 
            
Age1 × SD  –0.1839 –0.1839  –2.95 0.003  –0.3059 –0.0619 
Age2 × unemployed × SD  0.3020 0.3020  2.96  0.003  0.10197  0.5021 
Age2 × retiree × SD  –0.3915 –0.3915  –2.24 0.025  –0.7335 –0.0494 
Age2 × disabled × SD  –0.5620 –0.5620  –3.97 0.000 –0.8392 –0.2849 
Age2 × non-occupied ×  0.3954 0.3954  6.33  0.000 0.2730 0.5178 
Age3 × SD  0.3955 –0.3955  –6.12 0.000 –0.5221 –0.2688 
            
Age1 × C  –0.2050 –0.2050  –3.77 0.000 –0.3114 –0.0985 
Age2 × unemployed × C  0.5430 0.5430  7.56  0.000 0.4022 0.6838 
Age2 × retiree × C  0.3231 0.3231  3.22  0.001  0.1262 0.5199 
Age2 × disabled × C  0.4227 0.4227  3.36  0.001  0.1764 0.6691 
Age2 × non-occupied × C  0.0443 .04427  0.78  0.433  –0.0664  0.1550 
Age3 × C  –0.1176 –0.1176  –2.23 0.026  –0.2210 –0.0141 
            
Age1 × L  0.5717 0.5717  8.98  0.000 0.4469 0.6964 
Age2 × unemployed × L  1.4155 1.4155 11.74  0.000 1.1792 1.6518 
Age2 × retiree × L  1.4336 1.4336 12.64  0.000 1.2112 1.6560 
Age2 × disabled × L  0.8814 0.8814  6.81  0.000 0.6279 1.1350 
Age2 × non-occupied × L  0.6043 0.6043  9.21  0.000 0.4756 0.7329 
Age3 × L  0.6043 0.6043  9.55  0.000 0.4802 0.7283 
            
Age1 × PC  0.0437 0.0437  1.06  0.291  –0.0374 0.1247 
Age2 × unemployed × PC  0.3535 0.3535  6.49  0.000 0.24668 0.4606 
Age2 × retiree × PC  –0.3926 –0.3926  –4.95 0.000 –0.5482 –0.2370 
Age2 × disabled × PC  –0.3130 –0.3130  –3.08 0.002  –0.5123 –0.1136 
Age2 × non-occupied ×  –0.1540 –0.1540  –3.69 0.000 –0.2358 –0.0722 
Age3 × PC  –1.1570 –1.1570 –26.26 0.000 –1.2433 –1.0701 
            
Constant –2.1371  –2.1372  –104.71  0.000  –2.1772  –2.0972 
Logistic regression. Number of observations = 534,997. Wald 
2 χ  (34) =12,501.54. Prob.> 
2 χ = 0.0000. 
Log pseudo-likelihood = –213,392.62. Pseudo 
2 R = 0.0633. 
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5  Public policies and the age-profile of poverty 
In the previous chapter, we documented that poverty and its age-profile differ markedly 
across welfare regimes. Our next step is to show that social policies have a major role in shaping 
these differences. 
 
5.1  Measuring the anti-poverty effectiveness of expenditures 
The amount of transfers received by each family can be computed using EU-SILC data 
(Table 13). Reassuringly, there is a very high correlation (above 80 per cent) between social 
expenditure as taken from our micro-data, and the amount of social expenditures recorded in the 
national accounts by Eurostat (Table 14). 
The amount of transfers can be used to compute some straightforward measure of the 
anti-poverty effectiveness of public policies. In particular, one can compare actual poverty with 
poverty computed in absence of government transfers (Tables 15 and Figure 4). It appears that 
anti-poverty effectiveness, defined as the ratio between the two (so that a higher value of the index 
means lower effectiveness), varies significantly across countries (Table 16).
16  The index is 
58 per cent in Cyprus, while it is below 25 per cent in Netherlands, Norway, Finland and Denmark. 
Anti-poverty effectiveness of public spending is highest in Social-democratic and 
Corporatist countries: the above mentioned index takes values, respectively, equal to 27 and 
34 per cent, while effectiveness is much lower in Liberal and Southern welfare states (in both 
cases, the index is around 50 per cent). 
Anti-poverty effectiveness can be also calculated for population subgroups. As with overall 
effectiveness, we find big differences. For example, in the case of children, poverty after transfers 
is just 22 per cent of poverty pre-transfer in the case of Finland, while it is still 87 per cent in the 
case of Greece. Concerning the elderly, the maximum reduction in poverty is achieved in the 
Czech Republic: post-transfers poverty is just 4.2 per cent of pre-transfer poverty; the minimum 
reduction is in Cyprus, where the index is equal to 57 per cent. 
Across regimes, differences in the age-profile of poverty before social transfers are quite 
small (Figure 4). For example, while the post-transfer poverty rate of children in the liberal regime 
is on average twice that in the Social-democratic regime, the pre-transfer poverty rates are 
respectively equal to 28.4 and 27.7 per cent (Table 5). For the elderly, pre-transfers poverty rate are 
very high (above 80 per cent) in all regimes. 
Therefore, most of the cross-regimes differences in the actual age-profile of poverty are 
attributable to differences in effectiveness. Social-democratic states are the most effective in 
reducing both child and old age poverty (with an index of 37 and 12 per cent respectively), while 
the Southern countries are the less effective (the index is equal to 79 and 35 per cent respectively). 
As a more formal way to capture the link between public transfers and (the age-profile of) 
poverty, we run a logistic regression in which the individual probability to exit the poverty status 
thanks to government transfers is related to the age class and the welfare regime of the individual’s 
country, also allowing for regime-age interaction terms. There are two main results (Tables 18 and 19): 
•  with respect to the other groups of the population, children have the highest probability to exit 
poverty in Social-democratic countries and the lowest in the Southern ones, while their 
probability to be in poverty before transfers is the same of that of the working age population in 
both groups of countries; 
————— 




Social Transfers in EU-SILC 
 
Average Social Transfers by Family Type 
















































































































































































Austria 10.33  835  3,662  14,755  0.23  4.03 
Belgium 10.68  2,867  4,092  12,027  0.70  2.94 
Cyprus 4.72  377  2,185  8,011  0.17  3.67 
Czech Republic  8.45  375 922  3,435 0.41  3.73 
Germany 13.12  1,099  3,292  14,541  0.33  4.42 
Denmark 15.64  4,670  6,271  22,833  0.74  3.64 
Estonia 6.32  137  387  2,080  0.35  5.37 
Spain 7.14  532  1,657  6,815  0.32  4.11 
Finland 13.34  3,802  4,710  16,259  0.81  3.45 
France 12.12  1,281  4,175  15,550  0.31  3.72 
Greece 8.05  284  1,870 6,278 0.15 3.36 
Hungary 11.05  850  1,013  3,182  0.84  3.14 
Ireland 5.24  1,591  3,335  11,538  0.48  3.46 
Iceland 5.71  3,765  2,918  19,362  1.29  6.64 
Italy 10.28  638  3,176  10,842  0.20  3.41 
Lithuania 7.47  320  386  1,618  0.83  4.19 
Luxembourg 7.94  962  4,758  25,019  0.20  5.26 
Latvia 5.65  155  302  1,332  0.51  4.41 
Netherlands 13.70  2,174  5,179  19,685  0.42  3.80 
Norway 12.40  6,142  6,744  24,355  0.91  3.61 
Poland 9.61  289  926  2,890  0.31  3.12 
Portugal 8.45  504  1,829  5,691  0.28  3.11 
Sweden 10.88  1,954  3,412  13,696  0.57  4.01 
Slovenia 8.12  571  2,047  5,986  0.28  2.92 
Slovakia 8.80  537  811  2,687  0.66  3.31 
United Kingdom  7.93  1,660  2,857  13,959  0.58  4.89 
            
Min   137  302  1,332  0.2  2.9 
Max   6,142  6,744  25,019  1.3  6.6 
All country average    1,476  2,804  10,939  0.5  3.9 
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Table 15 
Poverty Rates by Age in Absence of Social Transfers 
 
Countries 0-15  16-64  65+  Total 
Austria  21.3 26.1 87.2 35.5 
Belgium  26.6 29.3 90.3 40.0 
Cyprus  11.9 17.0 84.0 24.1 
Czech  Republic  21.9 24.7 88.2 33.2 
Germany  21.2 29.8 94.7 40.8 
Denmark  27.8 31.2 95.4 40.5 
Estonia  21.1 21.8 79.8 31.5 
Spain  29.0 29.7 83.0 38.5 
Finland  30.2 31.9 93.8 41.6 
France  19.8 28.8 95.6 38.3 
Greece  24.5 30.8 80.8 39.3 
Hungary  47.4 39.3 86.8 48.0 
Ireland  25.8 24.1 83.7 31.2 
Iceland  25.0 18.0 79.7 25.7 
Italy  27.5 30.5 82.2 40.6 
Lithuania  32.0 29.1 83.2 38.2 
Luxembourg  23.6 25.9 88.6 34.1 
Latvia  29.1 28.1 74.4 35.8 
Netherlands  27.9 29.4 96.2 38.6 
Norway  30.7 30.1 93.8 39.9 
Poland  38.8 42.0 87.1 47.6 
Portugal  24.9 28.6 81.5 37.3 
Sweden  24.6 25.7 90.6 36.1 
Slovenia  18.5 26.7 80.7 34.0 
Slovakia  32.3 29.4 88.4 37.7 
United  Kingdom  30.9 24.9 91.1 36.3 
      
Min  11.9 17.0 74.4 24.1 
Max  47.4 42.0 96.2 48.0 
EU  average      




Anti-poverty Effects of Transfers 
(post-transfer poverty as a fraction of pre-transfer poverty) 
 
Countries Total 0-15 16-64 65+ 
Austria  0.35 0.69 0.42 0.18 
Belgium  0.31 0.47 0.36 0.22 
Cyprus  0.58 0.74 0.56 0.57 
Czech Republic  0.25 0.66 0.32 0.04 
Germany  0.30 0.56 0.40 0.14 
Denmark  0.22 0.26 0.30 0.10 
Estonia  0.43 0.76 0.60 0.17 
Spain  0.49 0.79 0.52 0.35 
Finland  0.24 0.22 0.30 0.18 
France  0.31 0.63 0.38 0.16 
Greece 0.50  0.87 0.59 0.30 
Hungary  0.32 0.51 0.37 0.10 
Ireland  0.50 0.71 0.58 0.24 
Iceland  0.36 0.47 0.46 0.12 
Italy  0.46 0.84 0.57 0.25 
Lithuania  0.45 0.66 0.57 0.18 
Luxembourg  0.42 0.85 0.54 0.10 
Latvia  0.53 0.75 0.62 0.30 
Netherlands  0.25 0.48 0.31 0.06 
Norway  0.24 0.24 0.31 0.16 
Poland  0.43 0.71 0.50 0.10 
Portugal  0.45 0.71 0.51 0.29 
Sweden  0.31 0.53 0.43 0.11 
Slovenia  0.30 0.55 0.32 0.21 
Slovakia  0.27 0.44 0.33 0.08 
United  Kingdom  0.49 0.73 0.59 0.27 
      
Min  0.22 0.22 0.30 0.04 
Max  0.58 0.87 0.62 0.57 




•  the elderly have the 
highest probability to 
exit poverty thanks to 
transfers (relative to 
that of the working 
age population) in 
Southern countries 
and the lowest in the 
Social-democratic 
ones, notwithstanding 
a higher pre-transfer 
poverty rate with 
respect to working 
age people in the first 
group of countries 
with respect to the 
second group. 
The next natural 
step is to understand 
better why the 
age-profile of 
effectiveness differs so 
much across countries   
 
and regimes.To this aim, we investigate its two fundamental determinants: the age distribution and 
the degree of targeting of social transfers. 
 
5.2  The age-bias of European welfare states: a new measure 
As already mentioned, our measure of poverty, as it is common to all the literature on this 
subject, assumes that all the resources of the individuals are shared with the other members of the 
household, so that all the members of the household have the same poverty status, determined by 
the level of the disposable (equivalized) household income. Therefore, old-age pensions might in 
principle benefit a child, if he lives with the pension recipient. So our first step to compare the age 
orientation of national social policies is to compute the average amount of transfers which in each 
country accrues, respectively, to families with children, to families with just working age 
components (i.e., without children nor elderly) and to families with elderly components, in 
equivalized terms (in turns out that the number of families in which children and old people live 
together is negligible).
17 The distribution of transfers across family types is displayed in Table 13. 
We propose a new index of pro-old bias of policies, defined as the ratio between the transfers 
accruing to families with elderly components and those accruing to families with working age 
people (both divided by the number of equivalent persons in the household). According to such 
measure, Social-democratic countries, Corporatist and Liberal countries are the more pro-elderly 
(with an index of about 4.0/4.2) and the Southern ones are the less pro-elderly (with an average 
index equal to 3.5). 
————— 
17  We considered transfers gross of taxes. Only for the few countries for which this information was not available we used net 
amounts. This does not affect much our results, because generally transfers are not subject to taxes (as we could ascertain looking to 
those countries which report both figures). 
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Elderly  Total 
Austria  55.4 69.9 90.1 81.8 
Belgium  46.9 69.6 90.8 76.7 
Cyprus  40.1 41.2 79.3 64.1 
Czech  Republic  55.4 63.4 89.4 77.3 
Germany  60.9 73.1 93.5 86.2 
Denmark  57.1 76.4 96.9 83.7 
Estonia  28.3 46.6 81.9 69.7 
Spain  49.8 58.7 83.4 75.1 
Finland  49.7 71.3 93.9 79.2 
France  57.3 75.7 95.9 86.8 
Greece  51.8 57.9 80.8 74.0 
Hungary  59.3 65.3 87.1 75.4 
Ireland  64.5 50.6 85.3 70.7 
Iceland  43.1 45.4 90.0 65.9 
Italy  37.6 52.4 81.5 72.1 
Lithuania  44.9 54.1 85.5 70.2 
Luxembourg  68.4 71.0 88.5 82.3 
Latria  40.5 51.3 76.9 64.8 
Netherlands  60.1 82.7 95.6 87.3 
Norway  53.3 68.6 95.6 78.4 
Poland  58.8 70.9 89.4 79.5 
Portugal  53.9 53.4 84.1 72.4 
Sweden  51.3 59.3 91.6 76.9 
Slovenia  41.4 61.3 84.9 72.6 
Slovakia  42.2 56.3 90.2 69.9 
United  Kingdom  83.4 57.6 89.8 80.8 
      
Min  28.3 41.2 76.9 64.1 
Max  83.4 82.7 96.9 87.3 




Probability To Get Out of Poverty with Respect to Age and Welfare Regime 
 
Poor Coefficient  Standard  Errors  T  P > | t |  95% Confidence Interval 
Age1 –3.2624  0.0466  –70.04  0.000  –3.3537  –3.1711 
Age2 –2.2007  0.0215  –102.29  0.000  –2.2429  –2.1586 
            
Corporatist 0.9773  0.0318  30.77  0.000  0.9150  1.0395 
Liberal 0.3389  0.0374  9.07  0.000  0.2656  0.4121 
Social-democratic 1.3377  0.0378  35.37  0.000  1.2636  1.4118 
Post-communist 0.8992  0.0261  34.42  0.000  0.8480  0.9504 
            
Age1 × Social-democratic  –0.0200 0.0626 –0.32  0.749  –0.1427  0.1026 
Age2 × Social-democratic  –0.8909 0.0427  –20.88  0.000  –0.9745 –0.8073 
            
Age1 × Corporatist  –0.4140 0.0666 –6.22  0.000  –0.5446 –0.2835 
Age2× Corporatist  –0.7505 0.0378  –19.88  0.000  –0.8245 –0.6765 
            
Age1 × Liberal  0.1849 0.0777  2.38  0.017  0.0324  0.3373 
Age2 × Liberal  –0.6545 0.0479  –13.67  0.000  –0.7484 –0.5607 
            
Age1 × Post-communist  0.0859 0.0557  1.54  0.123  –0.0233  0.1951 
Age2 × Post-communist  –0.4333 0.0311  –13.92  0.000  –0.4943 –0.3723 
            
Constant 0.3397  0.0167  20.31  0.000  0.3070  0.3725 
 
Logistic regression. Number of observations = 534,997. Wald 
2 χ (14) = 50,987.54. Prob.> 
2 χ  = 0.0000. 
Log pseudo-likelihood = –230,934.65. Pseudo 
2 R  = 0.2156. 
 
Table 19 
Probability of Being Poor before Transfers with Respect to Age and Welfare Regime 
 
Poors Coefficient  Standard  Errors  t  P > | t |  95% Confidence Interval 
Age1 –2.5093  0.0315  –79.570  0.000  –2.5711  –2.4475 
Age2 –2.3857  0.0244  –97.790  0.000  –2.4335  –2.3379 
            
Corporatist 1.0962  0.0459  23.890  0.000  1.0062  1.1861 
Liberal 0.7469  0.0586  12.750  0.000  0.6321  0.8618 
Social-democratic 1.2294  0.0488  25.200  0.000  1.1338  1.3251 
Post-communist 0.3358  0.0331  10.150  0.000  0.2710  0.4007 
            
Age1 × Social-democratic  –1.2145  0.0582  –20.880  0.000  –1.3285  –1.1006 
Age2 × Social-democratic  –1.2657  0.0516  –24.530  0.000  –1.3668  –1.1646 
            
Age1 × Corporatist  –1.4456  0.0574  –25.200  0.000  –1.5581  –1.3332 
Age2× Corporatist  –1.2032  0.0488  –24.660  0.000  –1.2988  –1.1076 
            
Age1 × Liberal  –0.5930  0.0700  –8.470  0.000  –0.7303  –0.4558 
Age2 × Liberal  –1.0029  0.0625  –16.040  0.000  –1.1255  –0.8803 
            
Age1 × Post-communist  0.0618  0.0433  1.430  0.154  –0.0231  0.1468 
Age2 × Post-communist  –0.0370  0.0357  –1.030  0.301  –0.1070  0.0331 
            
Constant 1.5344  0.0221  69.520  0.000  1.4912  1.5777 
 
Logistic regression. Number of observations = 534,997. Wald 
2 χ (14) = 38,301.22. Prob.> 
2 χ  = 0.0000. 
Log pseudo-likelihood = –296,462.89. Pseudo 
2 R  = 0.1720. 
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Our index can be seen as a refined version of the one proposed by Lynch (2001 and 2006) 
based on national accounts data. First, as mentioned above, it takes the household as the unit of 
analysis, consistent with the literature on poverty and inequality. Second, it is more precise in 
estimating who gets what in the first place. For example Lynch assumes that all pension and 
survivors benefits are paid to elderly people, while a part of the benefits are actually paid to 
younger individuals. Symmetrically, unemployment benefits, which Lynch completely attributes to 
the working age group, can also be paid to elderly unemployed. Of course, even our refined index 
must be taken with caution. First, some important items which potentially show an age-related 
profile are not included in the index (this is the case of expenditure for health and education). 
Second, the revenue side of the budget is not taken into consideration.
18 One of the main reasons 
for the difference between the two indicators is the fact that a sizable share of pension benefits goes 
to people less than 65 years old.
19 
Shifting the focus from the elderly to the young, we compute an index of the pro-children 
bias of policies. It is defined as the ratio between the transfers accruing to families with children 
and those accruing to families with working age people (Table 13). Differences across countries are 
larger than those concerning the orientation towards the elderly. While in some countries the 
expenditure for families with children is less than 20 per cent of what is given to families with 
working age individuals, this ratio is above one in Iceland, close to one in Norway, and above 
80  per cent in Finland, Hungary, and Lithuania. Concerning the different regimes, the ratio is 
highest in Social-democratic countries (0.8). and lowest in the Southern countries (0.2). 
To sum up, Social-democratic and Southern countries appear to be polar cases: public 
spending in the former is the most pro-children and the most pro-elderly, while the opposite is true 
for Southern countries. The other regimes lie somewhere in between these two extremes. 
 
5.3  The degree of targeting 
Differences in effectiveness might be due not only to the distribution of transfers but also to 
the design of the transfer system itself. For example, even in a country in which most of the 
transfers go to families with elderly people, there is the possibility that these resources are enjoyed 
mainly by families which are not poor to start with. 
A widely used indicator of the anti-poverty efficiency of public expenditure (first introduced 
by Beckerman, 1979) is the so-called Vertical Expenditure Efficiency index (VEE).
20 It is defined 
as the percentage of transfers going to households which would have been poor without the 
transfers. This component of spending has a clear impact in the direction of reducing poverty, 
whereas money going to those who are not poor to start with does not change overall poverty 
indices. 
In Table 17, we display the Vertical Expenditure Efficiency (VEE) for each country. Data 
show that in several countries VEEs are lower than 70 per cent (Cyprus, Latvia, Iceland, Lithuania, 
Estonia and Slovakia), whereas in others it exceeds 80 per cent (the United Kingdom, Austria, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Netherlands and Germany). However, there is not much difference 
in expenditure efficiency across country groups, as in all of them there are very efficient and very 
inefficient countries. For example, while on average Social-democratic countries have the highest 
————— 
18  The correlation between the elderly-to-non-elderly spending ratio computed by Lynch and the ratio between transfers going to 
families with elderly and transfers going to the rest of the families computed by us from EU-SILC data is positive (56 per cent). 
Lynch has data for only 15 EU countries. She considers average spending between 1985 and 2000. 
19  An analysis of the economic conditions of older retirees relative to younger retirees for the case of a Southern country (Italy) can be 
found in Franco et al. (2008). 








Index for the Middle-aged – 
Anti-poverty Effectiveness 
Index for the Young 
Anti-poverty Effectiveness 
Index for the Middle-aged – 
Anti-poverty Effectiveness 
Index for the Old 
Constant –0.285  *** 0.204     
   (–4.03)     (0.63)    
Difference in VEE  –0.001     –0.002    
   (–0.45)     (–0.57)    
Pro-old Bias        0.060  **
         (2.66)    
Pro-young bias  0.317  ***      
   (6.47)          
R
2  0.65     0.25    
              
Observations  26     26    
 
average VEE, Iceland has the lowest score of all countries (64 per cent). While the Southern group 
has the lowest VEE, Portugal displays a very high score (82 per cent). Moreover, VEE is 
positively, not negatively related to the overall amount of transfers: it seems that smaller welfare 
states are not more, but less efficient than the bigger ones. 
We also compute VEE indicators for the different kinds of families. There are no big 
differences across regimes in the targeting of the transfers going to families with old age 
components (in all cases efficiency is above 80 per cent). The same is true for transfers accruing to 
families with children, with the exception of Liberal countries in which efficiency is relatively 
higher (74 per cent). 
Before concluding this section, in order to get a feeling of how far our measures of 
age-orientation go in explaining anti-poverty effectiveness, we run two simple cross-country OLS 
regressions (Table 20). In the first, we relate the difference in the effectiveness indices of the 
middle-aged and of the young to our pro-young bias index, controlling for differences in the degree 
of vertical efficiency. As expected, the coefficient of the pro-young bias index is positive and 
significant. In the second regression, the difference in the effectiveness indices of the middle-aged 
and of the old is regressed on our pro-old bias index, again controlling for differences in the degree 
of vertical efficiency between the two age groups. Again, the coefficient of the pro-old bias index is 
positive and significant. 
 
6  Conclusions and policy implications 
We have documented that sizeable differences exist across Europe with respect to the 
relative conditions of young and elderly citizens: in some countries (mainly belonging to the 
Southern European and Anglo-Saxon groups) their poverty rate is indeed much higher than that of 
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We showed that these cross-country differences are largely due to differences in the 
effectiveness of national social policies in lifting children and elderly people out of poverty, 
whereas pre-transfer age-poverty profiles are rather similar across countries. 
Finally, we have proposed new country-level measures of the age-orientation of social 
spending, and argued that they can be useful to explain why in some countries (mainly belonging to 
the Social-democratic and Corporatist groups) the transfer system is relatively more effective in 
lifting children and elderly people out of poverty. 
Understanding the determinants of the age-orientation of welfare states is an obvious area for 
further research. Concerning this issue, economists emphasize the role of the lobbying power of the 
elderly, given their-single-mindedness (they do not care about the adverse labour market 
implications of large spending programs) and their reduced opportunity cost of lobbying (Mulligan 
and Sala-i-Martín, 1999).
21 Political scientists add that the elderly and the retirees are 
over-represented and over-influential inside powerful collective actors (e.g. trade unions), and that 
certain characteristics of the political system may further enhance their influence (for example, the 
“familist” ideology of some Christian democratic parties). 
Of course, our results do not mechanically translate into a value judgement, or a ranking of 
European welfare states. As a matter of fact, we just investigate one particular dimension of social 
spending effectiveness – namely, the degree of protection against the risk of poverty – which is not 
the only, and not even the main goal of welfare systems. Moreover, as Esping-Andersen 
emphasizes, national systems differ in their ultimate targets, shaped as they are by country-specific 
historical forces and political struggles. So it would be wrong to look for a one-size-fits-all 
template, and for a common reform path. 
On the other hand, our findings are potentially relevant from a policy point of view, in 
particular for Southern countries, where the age-poverty profile is pronouncedly V shaped. The 
evidence provided in our paper suggests that they have ample room for a reorientation of 
expenditures towards the more vulnerable age groups. Another implication of our results is that 
generous and expensive pension systems, such as those which are in place in some Southern 
countries, do not automatically translate into low poverty levels for the elderly. Indeed, due to the 
rules of the system, a sizable fraction of pension expenditures might goto the richest part of the 
elderly population, and/or to working-age individuals. 
As we remarked at the beginning, EU welfare states do face common challenges, due to 
common socio-economic changes (Esping-Andersen, 1999) and to adverse budgetary 
developments, mainly due to the looming population ageing. We believe that there is much to be 
learnt from one’s neighbors. This also represents a test for European institutions and in particular 
for the OMC as a platform for mutual learning. If it succeeds, it might be also fruitfully applied to 
other policy areas, taking into account both EU-wide challenges and national peculiarities. 
 
————— 
21  See also the survey papers by Mulligan and and Sala-i-Martín (2004a and 2004b) and Galasso and Profeta (2002). While most of the 
papers consider the political sustainability of pensions and, more generally, transfers from the workers to the retirees, there is a more 
recent literature which brings transfers to the youngest part of the population into the picture (e.g., Boldrin and Montes, 2005; 
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 SOME REFLECTIONS ON PENSION REFORMS IN INDIA 
Mallavarapu Ramaiah
* 
Pension policy in India has been characterized by the dominance of the orgainsed sector 
based on financing through employer and employee participation. As a result the coverage has 
been limited to the organised sector and the employees in the unorganized sector needs to be 
brought into purview of the formal channels of old age financial support. Further, the existing 
mandatory and voluntary private pension system needs uniform regulatory framework for 
transparency and improved service. There is an imperative need to manage the pension funds 
through fund managers as is the practice in some of the developed countries to derive the positive 
spin-offs in terms of investment options and making available the resources for improving growth. 
In view of the experience with the current pension system in India, efforts have been made by the 
Government in the recent years towards the direction of reforms in pension policy with the 
introduction of a new pension system in 2004. The present paper focuses on the recent initiatives 
and reforms in the pension system in India in the light of international experience as also the 
compulsions due to demographic factors and attendant implications for finances of the Government 
both Central and State Governments. The policy initiatives include setting up of the Interim 
Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (October 2003), introduction of a New 
Pension System and introduction of the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority 
(PFRDA) Bill in Parliament in March 2005. Against this backdrop the paper also highlights some 
of the policy challenges and imperatives to be addressed in the medium term. 
 
The pension reforms initiatives have emerged as one of the important tenets of public policy 
in the recent past, although these are yet to take off on account of the pending of the passage of the 
PFRDA Bill. The introduction of pension is an integral component of the refining the social 
security system in India. The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 briefly deals with the 
international experience with regard to pension reforms. Section 2 presents necessity of pension 
reforms in Indian context and also focuses on the demographic factors having bearing on pension 
reforms. It also presents the salient features of the New Pension System and its architecture. A brief 
description of the role of private sector in pension also discussed in this section. Section 3 deals 
with the recent policy initiatives including some of the issues flagged by the PFRDA based on the 
recommendations of the Expert Group on investment guidelines for pension in the informal sector 
released recently. Section 4 concludes with emerging challenges and policy issues. 
 
1  Brief review of international experience on pension reform 
Many countries are grappling with the problem of how to reshape their onerous, tax-financed 
pension schemes. Latin America, however, has been a laboratory for pension reform. Starting with 
Chile in 1981, several countries such as Peru, Argentina and Mexico embarked on pension reforms. 
The details have varied across the region but, overall, pension provision has shifted decisively to a 
privatised model. What can the rest of the world learn from Latin America? A study by Gill et al., 
Keeping the Promise of Social Security in Latin America, from the World Bank, presented a 
————— 
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comprehensive analysis of the Latin American experiment. The World Bank set out a model of 
pension reform based on three “pillars”: first, a tax-financed public safety-net; second, compulsory 
saving by workers, generally into individual pension accounts; and third, voluntary saving for 
retirement. The study found that main success of Latin American pension reform aimed at 
improving the governments’ finances. The reform also galvanised the development of capital 
markets and helped to modernise the financial system, both by improving the quality of regulation 
and by generating services such as risk-rating. 
According to the World Bank report, Old-Age Income Support in the 21st Century, most 
pension systems in the world “do not deliver on their social objectives, they contribute to 
significant distortions in the operation of market economies, and they are not financially 
sustainable when faced with an ageing population”. Pension reform must take account of workers 
in the informal economy, who often make up more than half the labour force in developing 
countries. And it must also cater for people who will be poor throughout their lives. 
Chile has been considered to be model country for implementation of pension reforms. Its 
pension system is based on obligatory individual accounts and private administration. In Chile, the 
debate has focused on the people who remain outside the system – a problem that the Chilean 
government says it would fix broadening Social Security coverage. Overall, the consensus is that 
the system of pension fund administrators has more strengths than weaknesses. That explains why, 
from Central and South America to Eastern Europe, the Chilean system has served as the 
inspiration for 17 countries that have decided to get rid of their underfinanced systems of 
distribution. The main attraction of the Chilean pension system was that it was created at the 
beginning of the 1980s as the successor to the old state-run system, which went bankrupt. A second 
factor was that the Chilean reform included the concept of individual capital accounts. “This 
feature appeals to many people who believe that governments are often unable to maintain 
sufficient assets to finance a retirement system.” Individual accounts can be better protected against 
political risks. Its system incorporates a “security network” in the form of minimum pensions and 
old-age benefits guaranteed by the government (Olivia Mitchel). 
According to a study by the AFP Association (which comprises Chile’s seven private-sector 
pension administrators), the first foundation of the Chilean model is the country’s government. In 
its subsidiary role, the government finances a portion of the minimum pensions and all of the 
public-assistance pensions provided for the aged poor. The second foundation consists of the 
private-sector pension administrators who administer the obligatory Social Security savings. They 
help to relieve the burden on the government. The third pillar is Chile’s workforce, which 
voluntarily saves, either to increase its pensions or in order to take early retirement. The 
mechanism for doing this is called “voluntary provisional savings”. 
Individual accounts permit the establishment of a direct link between those contributions that 
people make to the system and the benefits they derive from it. This creates incentives for people to 
assume responsibility for their own pensions and can lead to a range of positive results for savings, 
the development of capital markets, and higher worker productivity. These factors, in turn, 
stimulate economic growth. Its impact on economic growth is a key “virtue” of the Chilean model. 
According to the OECD report, Pensions at a Glance: Asia/Pacific, a Joint OECD/World 
Bank Report, many Asian countries would need to reform their pension systems in order to deliver 
sustainable and adequate retirement incomes for today’s workers. In order to prepare for the rapid 
population ageing forecast over the next two decades, it is vital to act now to avoid future problems 
and repeating many of the mistakes made in Europe and North America. The report analyses the 
retirement income systems of 18 Asian countries, including Australia, China, India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It says that reform is needed because: 
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•  withdrawal of savings before retirement is very common; 
•  pension savings are often taken as lump sums and often do not provide people with adequate 
income over their lifetime; 
•  pensions payments are not automatically adjusted to reflect changes in the cost of living. 
In order to improve the pension systems in Asia Pacific region including India, the pension 
report by OECD relating to this region makes three key recommendations: Asian countries with 
defined-benefit schemes based on workers’ final salaries should shift to calculating pension 
entitlements using lifetime average earnings, as most OECD countries do. This would make them 
more financially sustainable and fairer; final salary plans tend to favour the higher paid whose 
earnings tend to rise more rapidly with age compared to lower paid manual workers; and many 
countries allow people to withdraw their pension benefits before retirement or pay lump-sum 
benefits, rather than a regular retirement income. Allowing people to take out their savings only on 
retirement via regular payments, known as annuities, would reduce the risk of people’s savings 
running out in retirement. 
In OECD countries, an average of 70 per cent of the working-age population is eligible for a 
pension. However in South Asia, just 7.5 per cent of the working-age population are eligible and in 
East Asia 18 per cent. Furthermore, few countries in Asia/Pacific have social pensions to provide 
safety-net retirement incomes for people who are not members of formal schemes. Only in India 
are social pensions significant, with around 10 to 15 per cent of older people covered. 
 
2  Demography and importance of pension reforms in India 
Nearly one eighth of the world’s elderly population lives in India. The vast majority of the 
population is not covered by any formal pension scheme. Instead they are dependent on their own 
earning and transfer from their children. Pension policy in India has traditionally been based on 
financing through employer and employee participation. As a result, the coverage has been 
restricted to organised sector and vast majority of the workforce in the unorganised sector has been 
denied access to formal channels of old age financial support. Only about 12 per cent of the 
working population in India is covered by some from of retirement benefit scheme. Besides the 
problem of limited coverage, the existing mandatory and voluntary private pension system is 
characterized by limitations like fragmented regulatory framework, lack of individual choice and 
portability and lack of uniform standards. High incidence of administrative cost and low real rate of 
returns characterize the existing system, which has become unsustainable. Non-sustainability of the 
existing pension system would be accentuated by the sharp increase in the financial burden on the 
Government and other employers on account of pension liabilities. The working age population is 
likely to increase in the next two decades at a brisk pace, thereby pension reform is vital to provide 
support at the old age without having any adverse effect on finances of the Government (Table 1). 
The total pension liability on account of the Central Government employees has increased 
from 6 per cent of its revenue receipts in 1990-91 to 11 per cent in 2000-01, sharp rise possibly 
reflecting the impact of Fifth Pay Commission, before falling to 5.8 per cent in 2008-09 (budget 
estimates). In respect of State Governments, the same ratio has increased from 5.4 per cent in 
1990-91 to 11.3 per cent in 2001-02 before sliding to 8.7 per cent in 2008-09 (budget estimates) 
(Table 2). There is an imperative to need reduce the burden on the Governments in view of the 
likely rise in these payments in future. 
India is one of the youngest country in the World today with an average age being only 
26  years. The dependency ratio in India is also one of the lowest in the World. However, 
old-dependency ratio during 2000-25 is estimated to increase almost 1.5 times (8.1 in 2000 to 12.2 
in 2025); the next 25 years is likely to witness a sharper increase of around 2 times (from   490 Mallavarapu  Ramaiah 
 
Table 1 
India’s Labor Force and Demographic Indicators 
 
 Indicator    Time  Period 
1  Life expectancy at birth (years)   2000-05 
   Male  63.2   
   Female    64.6   
2  Life expectancy at age 60 (years)   2001 
   Male  15.7   
   Female    17.1   
3  Total fertility rate (No. of children)  2.85  2001 
4 Population  (millions) 1028  2001 
    Females (millions)  496  
    Males (millions)  532  
    Sex Ratio (females per thousand males)  933  
5  Population above age 65 (millions) 46.6  2000 
    129.3 2030 
  Old Age Dependency Ratio (percent)  11.9 2001 
6 Total  workforce  (millions) 424.6  2001 
    Urban workforce (millions)  97.7  
    Rural Workforce (millions)  326.9  
7  Working age population (millions)    
   619.7  2000 
   921.5  2025 
   1048.2  2050 
 
Source: Asher and Vasudevan (2006). 
 
12.2 in 2025 to 22.6 in 2050). The policy imperative under these circumstances is to a establish a 
strong and sustainable social security network in the country. At the same time India is growing old 
at a very fast rate and the population of people above 60 years of age, constitute 80 million in 2008 
would double in the next 18 to 20 years. In order to reap the advantages implementation of pension 
reforms is vital. The coverage of old age constitute about 12 per cent of the total workforce in the 
formal social security system. The remaining 88 per cent do not have access to any formal scheme. 
New Pension Scheme is aimed at 88 per cent of the workforce. 
The pension scheme in operation in India can be broadly divided into the Civil Services 
Pension schemes (12 million), Employees Provident Fund (40 million), Empoyees’ Pension 
Scheme (28 million), Special Provident Funds (2.1 million) and New Pension Scheme 
(0.3 million). The Civil Servants’ Pension (CSP) is a traditional defined benefit scheme which runs 






Year States  as percent of 
revenue receipts  Centre  as percent of 
revenue receipts 
1  2 3 4  5 
1990-91 35.93 5.4  32.72  6.0 
1991-92 37.16 4.6  37.48  5.7 
1992-93 43.79 4.8  45.85  6.2 
1993-94 51.07 4.9  52.06  6.9 
1994-95 61.46 5.1  57.34  6.3 
1995-96 78.13 5.8  69.28  6.3 
1996-97 98.27 6.5  82.52  6.5 
1997-98 115.99  7.0  113.76  8.5 
1998-99 161.66  9.4  153.46  10.3 
1999-00 226.79 11.2  194.46  10.7 
2000-01 254.53 10.9  211.17  11.0 
2001-02 282.19 11.3  218.26  10.8 
2002-03 310.05 11.3  221.02  9.6 
2003-04 330.24 10.7  236.29  9.0 
2004-05 373.78 10.3  249.7  8.2 
2005-06 406.48  9.4  271.96  7.8 
2006-07 468.61  8.8  295.2  6.8 
2007-08 RE  560.02  8.9  324.44  6.2 
2008-09 BE  627.29  8.7  346.75  5.8 
 
BE: Budget Estimates. RE: Revised Estimates. 
Source: Union Budget documents, various issues, State Finances, A Study of Budgets and Swarup (2007). 
 
recruited up to December 31, 2003 and employees of State Governments recruited up to the 
effective date mentioned in notifications issued by those Governments. CSP is an unfunded scheme 
and there has been no attempt at building up pension assets through contribution or any other 
provision. 
 
2.1  New Pension System 
There was a marked shift in pension policy during the period 2000 to 2007 in India which 
culminated in introduction of new pension system. A High level Expert Group and Old Age Social 492 Mallavarapu  Ramaiah 
and Income Security (OASIS) project commissioned by the Government were two milestones on 
the road to pension reforms for the Government employees and the unorganised sector respectively. 
These efforts culminated in setting up of the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority 
(PFRDA) in October 2003, introduction of New Pension System in January 2004 and introduction 
of PFRDA Bill in March 2005. In order to reduce the liability, the Central Government has 
introduced the defined contributory system for the new employees. Similar schemes have been 
undertaken by nineteen State Governments. The remaining State Governments are expected to opt 
the Defined Contribution (DC) based New Pension System (NPS). The NPS contributions of the 
employees of the Central Government and 19 State Governments would be transferred to these 
fund managers by the respective Governments in the beginning of 2009-10. The NPS has been 
implemented for Central Government employees (excluding defence personnel) recruited on or 
after April 1, 2004. The NPS is designed for scalability, outreach, fair play and low cost, and 
provides choices to individual. For such a system sound regulatory framework is an imperative. 
The NPS envisages individual retirement based accounts, with the worker empowered to exercise 
investment choice. 
The salient features of the NPS are that it provides seamless portability across jobs and 
across locations, unlike all current pension plans, including that of the EPFO. It would provide 
hassle-free arrangement for the individual participants and a pure DC product with no defined 
benefit element, returns being totally market-related. NPS also provides various investment options 
and choices to individuals to switch over from one investment option to another or from one fund 
manager to another subject to certain regulatory restrictions. At present there shall be only two 
investment choices – investment of entire contribution in Government securities alone or adopting 
the investment guidelines applicable to non-government provident funds. The current government 
guidelines provide that up to 15 per cent can be invested in equities and the balance 85 per cent in 
fixed income instruments. After the passage of the PFRDA Bill by Parliament, the Regulator would 
provide more investment choices. NPS will have comparatively lower costs. Low costs will 
enhance pension wealth and bring in more customers. The main challenges are: providing safety 
and high returns; extending coverage to as many people as possible and to improve financial 
literacy levels. There is an imperative to make efforts to educate potential participants about 
benefits and advantages of saving for retirement. According to an estimate made by a 
FICCI-KPMG study the assets under management will be US$ 95 billion in less than 20 years. One 
important element which would greatly incentivise pension savings is the tax treatment given to it. 
At present, NPS is subject to the EET tax regime. On the other hand, Employees Provident Fund 
(EPF), General Provident Fund (GPF) and Public Provident Fund (PPF) have more favourable tax 
treatment. EEE benefit is available to them. This goes against the basic philosophy of encouraging 
contractual savings, which provide long-term funds for investment. 
One issue which needs attention for making the new pension scheme equitable is the tax 
treatment. Pension savings in general and the NPS in particular is a very long term saving 
instrument having a time horizon of 30-35 years. Therefore, the treatment of this instrument from a 
tax perspective, if not the most preferential, should at least be at par with other medium or short 
term financial instruments. This is especially important at the nascent stage of the new pension 
system development. In this context, example of Public Provident Fund (PPF) and other such 
instruments are worth mentioning. PPF having a life cycle of 15 years is under an EEE 
(exempt-exempt-exempt) tax regime and is not taxed at any point whereas NPS being a 30-35 years 
instrument is taxed at exit. Therefore, subscribers to NPS are at a disadvantage compared to the 
PPF especially when seen in the context that NPS is a mandatory scheme whereas PPF is a 
voluntary scheme. The Government employees appointed before January 1, 2004 participate in the 
GPF scheme which is again an EEE tax regime whereas NPS is subject to EET regime and the 
withdrawable tier-II account of NPS (a substitute to GPF) is envisaged to get no preferential tax 
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under the Income Tax Act, 1961 may be a disadvantage for the subscribers of NPS. Accordingly, a 
need is felt to treat all long term savings instruments equitably and provide the same tax treatment 
to NPS as being given to PPF and other similar schemes. The tax treatment merits a review so as to 
take care of the distortions across financial instruments and giving right fiscal incentives for the 
development of the pension sector. The main challenges in the development of this sector include: 
covering the unorganized sector; empowering the subscribers to take appropriate investment 
decisions based on their risk and return profile, provide safety and optimum returns, and to improve 
financial literacy levels. 
 
2.2 NPS  architecture 
The Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) and National Securities 
Depository Limited (NSDL) entered into a formal agreement on November 26, 2007 relating to the 
setting up of a Central Recordkeeping Agency (CRA) for the New Pension System (NPS). The 
CRA is a first of its kind venture in India and is critical to the successful operationalisation of the 
NPS. The main functions and responsibilities of the CRA are: (i) Recordkeeping, Administration 
and customer service functions for all subscribers of the NPS; (ii) Issue of unique Permanent 
Retirement Account Number (PRAN) to each subscriber, maintaining a database of all PRANs 
issued and recording transactions relating to each subscriber’s PRAN; (iii) Acting as an operational 
interface between PFRDA and other NPS intermediaries such as Pension Funds, Annuity Service 
Providers, Trustee Bank etc. An important feature of the PRAN to be issued by CRA is that it shall 
be portable across jobs and geographical locations. 
The NPS architecture consisting of a Central Recordkeeping Agency (CRA) and competing 
pension fund managers along with the NPS trust, custodian, Trustee bank, Retirement Advisers and 
other players. Based on the systems prevalent in both developing and developed countries, PFRDA 
devised a system that meets Indian conditions and needs. PFRDA had attempted to design an 
architecture which is simple, cost effective and robust. 
PFRDA has completed the process of putting in place the full NPS architecture. The 
selection of the Central Record Keeping Agency (CRA), Pension Fund Managers (PFMs) and 
Trustee Bank was made. State Bank of India (SBI), UTI Asset Management Company (UTI-AMC) 
and Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) have been appointed as Pension Fund sponsors under the NPS. 
As these intermediaries were selected through a bidding process, the fees/charges are very 
competitive  vis-à-vis the prevalent fee/charges in the mutual fund and insurance industry. A 
Custodian of NPS assets and an NPS Trust have also been appointed. Once the volumes increase, 
these costs can only move southwards. Low costs will enhance pension wealth and bring in more 
customers. Once the volumes increase, these costs can only move southwards. Low costs will 
enhance pension wealth and bring in more customers. 
 
2.3 Private  sector 
Three private sector groups – Reliance (ADAG), ICICI and Kotak Mahindra – were among 
the six bidders shortlisted by the Pension Fund Regulatory & Development Authority (PFRDA) for 
managing pension funds for citizens other than government employees. The other three are UTI, 
SBI and IDFC. As per the Government plan, the New Pension System for all citizens will be rolled 
out from April 1 2009. The six parties were shortlisted by PFRDA from more than a dozen 
participants in the competitive bidding. Under the NPS, fund managers, besides incurring the 
operating expenses, will have to pay PFRDA Rs 10 lakh a year as marketing expenses. There was 
aggressive bidding from private parties who feel that the corpus would be large as the scheme is  494 Mallavarapu  Ramaiah 
 
Table 3 









Government securities and mutual funds dedicated to 
government securities, regulated by the Securities 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
up to 55%  minimum 40% 
Debit securities (issued by corporate bodies, 
including banks and public financial institutions); 
term deposit receipts (issued by scheduled 
commercial banks) and rupee bonds 
up to 40%  minimum 25% 
 Money market instruments, including units of money 
market mutual funds 
up to 5%  previously not 
allowed 
Equities  up to 15%  up to 5% 
Equity-linked schemes of mutual funds regulated by 
the SEBI 
up to 15%  up to 10% 
 
open to all. Analysts, however, think it may not be the case, going by the investor response to some 
of the existing pension schemes. Private sector entities were barred from bidding for the New 
Pension System for government employees launched last year. However, they were allowed to bid 
when it came to managing funds for citizens other than government employees. The NPS for the 
government employees is currently managed by three public sector institutions – LIC, SBI and 
UTI. Under the new NPS – which is a voluntary scheme – an individual can join any one of the 
funds and would have a permanent Retirement Account Number (PRAN). The records of 
subscribers are run by a central record keeping agency. 
 
3  Recent policy initiatives 
As a sign of increasing confidence in the expansion of private pension systems in India, the 
Ministry of Finance had increased the flexibility in the pattern of investment. This would be 
effective from 1 April 2009 for non-governmental provident funds, superannuation and gratuity 
funds. In line with the practice in many developing countries, there have always been significant 
restrictions on how these funds could be invested, with a considerable bias toward local 
investments and toward government securities. The latest revision to the investment pattern 
provides an avenue of investment options and will give more flexibility for investment 
management within the revised ceilings available for different categories of investment (Table 3).  
Within the above instruments, it should be noted that investment in equities is limited to 
shares of companies for which derivatives are available on the Bombay Stock Exchange or the 
National Stock Exchange. However, this does cover more than 250 stocks, which would now be 
available. Concerning debt securities, these should have a duration of at least three years, and at 
least 75 per cent of investments need to be investment grade. Bonds denominated in Indian 
currency and issued by multilateral agencies such as the International Finance Corporation, a 
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least three years. The required duration for term deposit receipts has been changed from a 
maximum of three years to a minimum of one year. Overall, this is a significant extension of 
flexibility in creating a range of bond portfolios. 
Apart from a specific limit on exposure to mutual funds, which is not to be more than 
5 per cent of the portfolio at any time, there are some further significant relaxations around trading 
and the monitoring of the investment pattern. While the investment pattern must be in place at the 
end of each year, movement is allowed during the year provided that each category does not exceed 
the investment pattern limit by more than 10 per cent. Also, the entire portfolio can be treated as 
tradable and exposed to active management. Rather than the old limit of 10 per cent of the portfolio 
being tradable, the only limit now is that the overall turnover ratio (that is, the value of securities 
traded during the year divided by the average value of the portfolio during the year) should not be 
more than 2 per cent. 
 
3.1  Investment guidelines for pension funds in informal sector 
PFRDA had constituted an Expert Group (Chairman: Shri Deepak Parekh) to recommend 
investment norms for the New Pension System for all citizens other than Government employees 
covered by NPS. The Report submitted by the Group to PFRDA on February 17, 2009. The 
recommendations of the Group have been considered by PFRDA. Comments/views of the public 
on the recommendations of the Expert Group and modifications proposed to be made in the 
investment norms by PFRDA are invited. The major recommendations of the Group and the 
modifications proposed to be carried are shown in Table 4. A set of questions raised for evaluation 
relate to administrative choices were made at PFRDA as features of NPS. These are: how 
frequently ought a contributor be allowed to change his investment allocation? What are the 
valuation guidelines to be adopted to calculate the NAV of the funds under management? How are 
the PFMs to be evaluated on their fund management performance? What would be the frequency of 
NAV disclosure to PFRDA and to the contributors? What is the action to be taken on evaluating 
their performance? How are the “auto choice” funds to be allocated for fund management? Also 
see Annex 1 for investment guidelines for pension funds in the informal sector submitted by the 
Expert Group to the PFRDA. 
 
3.2  Valuation guidelines to calculate the NPS funds NAV 
Pension funds are invested for long-horizon, it is important that there is no ambiguity about 
the NAV or the assets that the funds are invested in. In addition, the NPS is a new pension system . 
In order to build the credibility of the system, it is even more important to have clarity on what the 
NAV is with as much accuracy as possible. Thus, it would be commendable to have the NAV at 
each PFM reported to the PFRDA on a daily basis. However, a problem with the NPS funds is that 
the three proposed asset classes “E” , “G” , “C” have very different characteristics in terms of their 
frequent valuation. “E”, the index funds have an extremely high level of valuation accuracy – these 
are the most liquid stocks traded on electronic exchanges showing as accurate a price as possible 
from minute to the next. “G” contain some ambiguity in valuation (on the older Government of 
India bonds, which are hardly traded and thus , is very difficult to find a recent market price for). 
Both E and G are not problems when it comes to standardised valuation guidelines, as described 
above. The problem lies in valuing funds invested in “C”: here, there is very little trading of these 
securities; most of them are bought in over the counter trades; and often are held to maturity. 496 Mallavarapu  Ramaiah 
Table 4 
Suggestions on Investment Pattern for NPS for All Citizens 
 
Schemes Expert  Group  PFRDA 
“E”  100% 100% 
“G”  100% 100% 
“C”  100% 100% 
Auto Choice 
(till 35 years of age) 
  
“E”  65% 60% 
“G”  10% 10% 
“C”  25% 30% 
at age  60 Years  55 Years 
“E”  10% 0% 
“G”  80% 80% 
“C”  10% 20% 
Asset Class/Scheme  Expert Group  PFRDA 
“E”  Nifty 50  Index Funds that replicate the portfolio of a 
particular index such as BSE Sensitive index, 
NSE 50 index, etc. These schemes invest in the 
securities in the same weightage comprising of an 
Index. 
“G”  Government of India bonds 
Liquid Funds of Asset Management 
Companies with following filters: 
-  AMCs are SEBI regulated, with Average 
total assets under management (AUM) for 
the most recent six-month period of, at least, 
Rs 5,000 crores. 
-  All assets that are permitted for investment 
into liquid funds by SEBI. Fixed Deposits of 
banks with following filters: 
-  Net worth of at least Rs 500 crores and a 
track record of profitability in the last three 
years, 
-  Capital adequacy ratio which is not less than 
9% in the last three years, 
-  Net NPA of under 5% as a percentage of net 
advances in the last year, 
-  Be a participant in the RTGS system, 
-  The price-to-book ratio of the bank 
Must exceed 1.25 
Government of India bonds 
State Government Bonds 
 
“C”  Govt. bonds/Credit rated State Govt. bonds 
Credit rated Public Financial 
Institutions/PSU bonds 
Credit rated Municipal 
bonds/infrastructure bonds 
Bonds of all firms (including PSU/PSE) that 
have shares listed on a stock exchange with 
nation-wide terminals, and: 
1  Have a market capitalisation of over 
Rs 5,000 crore (as on 31st March), 
2  Which have been traded for at least three 
years, 
3  Whose shares have an average trading 
frequency of at least 95% for a period of the 
last one year on the exchange, 
4  Whose top management as well as the board 
of directors of the company have no 
legal/regulatory charges against them 
Liquid Funds of AMCs regulated by SEBI 
with filters suggested by the Expert Group. 
Fixed Deposits of scheduled commercial banks 
with following filters: 
-  Net worth of at least Rs 500 crores and a track 
record of profitability in the last three years, 
-  Capital adequacy ratio of not less than 9% in 
the last three years, 
-  Net NPA of under 5% as a percentage of net 
advances in the last year. 
Debt securities with maturity of not less than 
three years tenure issued by Bodies Corporate, 
including scheduled commercial banks and 
public financial institutions [as defined in 
Section 4 (A) of the Companies Act] 
Provided that at least 75% of the investment in 
this category is made in instruments having an 
investment grade rating from at least one credit 
rating agency. 
Other categories/requirements as 
recommended by the Expert Group 
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4  Emerging challenges and issues 
There are certain policy issues which need to be addressed for the success of New Pension 
System. The voluntary nature of NPS along with poor financial literacy and attitude of households 
towards financial savings pose challenge to achieving optimum coverage of NPS. Designing an 
effective, efficient and accessible system, which caters to the heterogeneous workforce should be 
priority in the success of NPS in India (See Annex 2). According to ADB survey, there is transition 
from family support to self-support in retirement. Therefore corrective measures are essential at an 
appropriate time. A major challenge in the new pension system is to provide the individual 
subscriber with an adequate retirement income. Public sector pension schemes involve policy risk 
in as much as the Government of the day may not be able to accommodate required pension outlays 
leading to delays in pension payment. The DC system does involve capital-market risk during the 
accumulations phase when contributions and returns on investment build up in the fund. 
NPS architecture for Government employees has already started functioning in terms of 
investment of NPS corpus and the CRA started functioning from June 1, 2008. The real challenge 
will be in seeing that the entire system functions smoothly. In this regard, issues relating to safety 
and high returns, extending coverage to as many people as possible would be important. It is only 
when the system is made available to all citizens that its full potential will be realized in terms of 
economies of scale and the subscribers will gain substantially in terms of even lower fees and 
charges and high returns. Pension savings would provide the much needed funds for infrastructure 
development. NPS would provide an opportunity to every citizen to save for retirement in a 
regulated environment and thus help in promoting inclusive growth. In order to address the issue of 
investment of pension contributions under NPS through a mechanism of consensus, a conference of 
Chief Ministers on pension reform was held in January 2007, which was chaired by the Prime 
Minister. Except three state governments, all were in favour of the guidelines applicable to 
non-government PF prescribed by the Ministry of Finance for investing accumulations under NPS. 
India has the world’s youngest and fastest growing working-age population. In contrast to 
the rise in the median age of population in the industrialised countries from early 30s to early 40s 
over the last two decades, the median age in India has increased from 20 in 1980 to 24 in 2005. 
According to the projections made by the United Nations, the median age in India would cross 30, 
only by 2025 and would remain around 35 till 2040. In 2020, the average Indian will be only 
29 years old, compared with the average age of 37 years in China and the US, 45 in West Europe 
and 48 in Japan. The demographic process would create a large labour force. However, the window 
of opportunity provided by a relatively large and young workforce in India needs a conducive 
social policy environment for getting realised. Therefore, to reap the rewards of demographic 
dividend, public-policy has a critical role to play. The evolving demographic characteristics, in 
view of the coverage of pension to the mainly to organised sector efforts need to be made in 
bringing the unorganised sector into purview of pension system in the coming years. 
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ANNEX 1 
INVESTMENT REGULATIONS FOR THE NEW PENSION SYSTEM 
FOR THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
What assets classes should be offered in NPS investment choices? 
Recommendation: The simpler structure of the “E”, “G”, “C” investment choices is easier to 
understand, provides clear choices to the contributors and lowers the cost to the contributor, the 
regulator as well as the CRA. Thus, the Group recommend that investment choices offered in NPS 
be the “E”, “C” , “G” asset classes. 
 
Asset Class “E” 
Given the need for prudence and simplicity in the initial stages of NPS, the Group argue that equity 
participation be done through a standardised portfolio across all PFMs, implemented through an 
index fund only (Nifty index fund). This should be approach adopted in the first stage of the NPS 
implementation. This can be expanded to include a wider set of alternative index funds after the 
first five years of the NPS to allow more choices to the fund managers to deliver better returns. As 
regulatory experience with NPS increases and regulatory capacity expands, NPS equity funds may 
even include active management of equity portfolios. This should include more sophisticated 
products such as derivative portfolios, hedge funds, and international investments as the capacity of 
both the contributor and regulator expand to accommodate these. 
 
Asset Class “G” 
All investments into asset class G assets should be either in Central Government bonds or the 
securities/instruments listed as follows: 
1) liquid funds of mutual fund companies funds, where the AMCs satisfy the criteria of: having 
AMCs that are regulated by SEBI, with, average total assets under management (AUM) for the 
recent six-month period of , at least, Rs 5,000 crore; 
2)  all assets that are permitted for investment into liquid assets by SEBI. If this channel is used, the 
fees and expenses of the liquid fund do not become an issue; 
3)  fixed deposits of certain specified banks, where the banks must satisfy the following criteria: net 
worth of at least Rs 500 crore and a track record of profitability in the last three years; CAR of 
not less than 9 per cent in the last three years; net NPA of under 5 per cent as percetange of 
advances in the last year; be a participant in the RTGS system; the price to book ratio of the 
Bank must exceed 1.25; 
4)  NPS funds invested by any PFM in a liquid fund or FD of a bank should be under 10 per cent of 
the total “G” funds held by the PFM. 
5) the total NPS funds invested in any single asset management company ought to be under 
5 per cent of the total AUM of the AMC; 
Limits on funds invested in any single FD or liquid fund should not exceed 5 per cent of the 
total funds invested in asset class “G”. 
 
Asset class “C” 
1)  all State Government bonds that are explicitly guaranteed by the state government;   Some Reflections on Pension Reforms in India  499 
2) all State Government bonds that are rated by a rating agency. There is no restriction on an 
acceptable minimum credit quality – the choice of investment is left up to the PFM to decide; 
3) all bonds/securities of: 1. public financial institutions as specified under Section 4 (A) of the 
Companies Act, and 2. public sector companies as defined in Section 2 (36-A) of the Income 
Tax Act, 1961; the principal whereof and whereon is fully and unconditionally guaranteed by 
the Central Government that have credit rating; 
4) all municipal bodies/infrastructure funds bonds that are rated by a credit rating agency. There is 
no restriction on an acceptable minimum credit quality in the case of municipal bonds as well – 
investment choice is left up to the PFM to decide; 
5) bonds be permitted for NPS investment of all firms (including PSU/PSE) that have shares listed 
on a stock exchange with nationwide terminals, and: 1) have market capitalization of over 
Rs 5,000 crore (as on 31
st March); 2) which have been traded for at least three years; 3) whose 
shares have an average trading frequency of at least 95 per cent for a period of the last one year 
on the exchange; 4) whose top management as well as the board of directors of the company 
have no legal/regulatory charges against them. 
The stock market-based filters for selection of corporate bonds for NPS “C” asset investment 
also implies that the stock market indicators can be used for valuation of the “C” assets. This will 
be an improvement in the current valuation framework that is based on credit rating downgrade 
since the stock market price can be a more real-time measure of credit quality compared to the 
credit rating. 
•  Besides, exposure to any single bond of an entity should not exceed more than 5 per cent of the 
total funds invested by the PFM in asset class “C”. 
•  The total exposure to bonds by any single entity should not exceed more than 10 per cent of the 
total funds invested by the PFM in asset class “C”. 
•  The total credit exposure of all the NPS funds invested in the debt of any permitted entity 
should be limited to a concentration of less than 5 per cent of the total debt of the company. 
 
Limits on an individual contribution in a specific asset class 
Recommendation: Contributors making an active choice of NPS investment 9Class A 
contributors) can choose how much they wish to invest in “E”, “G” and “C” asset classes. The se 
contributors have no limits on what fraction of their investment can go into any of the asset 
choices. Class A contributors have to choose their PFM. As well. NPS contributors who do not 
actively choose their NPS investment (Class S contributors) are invested into the “auto choice” 
scheme. Class S contributors do not have to choose their PFM. 
 
The auto choice investment scheme 
Recommendation: The auto choice investment is made in the form of a life cycle fund. Here, 
the fraction of funds invested across “E”, “G” “C” are determined by eth age of the contributor. In 
this scheme the maximum amount permitted for investment in the “E” asset class is proposed to be 
set at 65 per cent of the contributions. The maximum amount permitted for investment in the “C” 
asset class is proposed to be set at 25 per cent of the contributions. There will be the choice of “E” 
and “C” investment for any auto choice contributor whose age is under 35 years. 
As the contributors grow older, the amount invested in “E” and “C” start being draw down 
automatically to reduce the amount of risk exposure in the contribution portfolio. This will also 500 Mallavarapu  Ramaiah 
automatically reduce the expected return to the contributors portfolio. The risk of the portfolio 
becomes the lowest when the person nears retirement at age 60. The lowest risk of the portfolio is 
proposed to be set for an 80 per cent investment in “G” , 10 per cent in “E” and 10 per cent in “C” 
assets. 
 
What are the valuation guidelines to calculate the NPS funds NAV? 
Recommendation: Since the “E” class has components that are actively traded on the 
exchange, valuing AUM invested in “E” is not a problem. However, PFMs must have a third party 
valuation of the AUM in “G” and “C” investments. Given the difficulty with valuation , the Group 
recommend that the “G” and “C” AUM should be valued and reported to the PFRDA quarterly. 
 
How frequently should the contributor be allowed to change investment choice, or PFM 
choice? 
Recommendation: Contributors have to hold their choice of investment and PFM constant 
for the period of a year during the initial stages of NPS. 
 
What is the framework to use for evaluating the performance of NPS PFMs? 
Recommendation: If more than 605 of the NPS AUM is in “E” assets, PFRDA might 
consider the tracking error of the AUM invested in index funds for the different PFMs as a relative 
measure of their performance. Since costs of fund management is strongly related to the AUM,, it 
is recommended that NPS starts with a small group of PFMs. 
 
How should the selection of the “auto choice” funds in PFM be done? 
Recommendation: The auto choice funds should be split equally among all PFMs who offer 
to manage these funds at the cost quoted by the lowest bid in the PFM auction. 
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ANNEX 2 
APPOINTMENT OF POINTS OF PRESENCE AND SPONSORS OF PENSION 
FUNDS/PENSIONS FUNDS UNDER THE NEW PENSION SYSTEM FOR ALL CITIZENS 
OTHER THAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES COVERED UNDER THE NPS 
I. The following entities have been approved by PFRDA for appointment as Sponsor(s) of Pension 
Fund/Pension Fund under the New Pension System for all citizens other than Government 
employees covered under NPS: 
1)  ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Company Limited 
2)  IDFC Asset Management Asset Management Company Limited 
3)  Kotak Mahindra Asset Management Company Limited 
4)  Reliance Capital Asset Management Company Limited 
5)  SBI Pension Funds Limited 
6)  UTI Retirement Solutions Limited 
 
II. The following entities have been approved by PFRDA for appointment as Points of Presence 
(POPs) under the New Pension System for all citizens other than Government employees covered 
under NPS: 
1) Allahabad  Bank 
2)  Axis Bank Limited 
3)  Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co Limited 
4)  Central Bank of India 
5) Citibank  N.A. 
6)  Computer Age Management Services Private Limited 
7)  ICICI Bank Limited 
8)  IDBI Bank Limited 
9)  IL&FS Securities Services Limited 
10)  Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited 
11)  LIC of India 
12)  Oriental Bank of Commerce 
13)  Reliance Capital Limited 
14)  State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 
15)  State Bank of Hyderabad 
16)  State Bank of India 
17)  State Bank of Indore 
18)  State Bank of Mysore 
19)  State Bank of Patiala 
20)  State Bank of Travancore 
21)  The South Indian Bank Limited 
22)  Union Bank of India 
23)  UTI Asset Management Company Limited 502 Mallavarapu  Ramaiah 
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 MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PENSION REFORM 
OR 
HOW TO PAY FOR THE CRISIS 
Ray Barrell,
* Ian Hurst
* and Simon Kirby
* 
The national debt stocks of the Euro Area countries and the UK are rising sharply as a result 
of the economic crisis, and equilibrium output is falling, with the capital stock contracting. Both 
problems could be alleviated by the rapid introduction (but slow implementation) of a policy to 
extend working lives. The paper analyses a delayed extension of working lives in the Euro Area 
and the UK. A distinction is drawn between the impacts of these changes on output (GDP) and 
income (GNP) in open economies with capital mobility. Increasing working lives will in 
equilibrium raise consumption and tax revenues and reduce pension spending. These gains by the 
government can be used to improve services, cut taxes or pay off debts. 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper looks at the effects of changes in retirement ages on tax rates and the national 
debt stock which is rising sharply as a result of the economic crisis. At the same time equilibrium 
output is falling because risk premia are being permanently re-evaluated and as a result of an 
increase in these premia the equilibrium capital stock is contracting. Both problems could be 
alleviated by the rapid introduction of a policy to extend working lives. Increasing working lives 
will, in equilibrium, raise consumption and the equilibrium capital stock. If consumers and firms 
were aware that they would work longer and hence have higher incomes then consumption and 
investment would be increased now, helping to offset the impact of the current recession. In 
addition tax revenues would be higher and pension spending reduced. These gains by the 
government can be used to improve services, cut taxes or pay off debts. We advocate the policy of 
paying down government debt. It is of course difficult to implement this strategy. Society could 
choose to have everybody work longer and this would enable governments to cut taxes. However, 
as individuals we have less of an incentive to choose to extend our working lives, but this act 
would actually require us to pay more in tax in order to contribute to the pensions of others. Even if 
retirement decisions are personal the state can encourage later retirement by changing the state 
pension age, where there is significant bunching of retirements. A coordinated increase in working 
lives of one effective year (18 months on the age of retirement) could increase tax revenues and 
lower retirement spending by enough to reduce the government deficit by 1 per cent of GDP 
permanently. 
Analysing individual optimising decisions in relation to working lives in a macro economic 
context is difficult, especially as the most commonly used overlapping generations models do not 
easily aggregate. We discuss the implications of a change in expected life in a growing economy 
where people save for retirement. The supply side of the model is the most important feature 
structuring the outcomes of the simulations, and the next section looks at the importance of the 
assumption that the economy is open with mobile capital. There is a discussion of the model of the 
public sector, where tax receipts and government spending are described. The major focus of the 
paper is on the impact of extending working lives on output, incomes and saving in the UK and the 
————— 
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Euro Area using NiGEM with fully forward-looking consumers. Extending productive working 
lives means that a lower stock of saving is needed, and in a growing economy the saving rate will 
therefore be reduced marginally. The implications for incomes depend in part on the rate of return 
on assets, and especially on foreign assets. Increasing the work force will require that capital 
accumulates and domestic investment as a per cent of GDP will rise for a period. In a closed 
economy the increase in desired capital and the fall in saving would mean the rate of return on 
assets would rise, whilst in a small open economy it means that the stock of net foreign assets will 
decumulate. 
 
2  The modelling framework 
We utilise the NiGEM model in a version that has similar long run properties to the dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models in use by institutions such as the Bank of England.
1 In this 
paper we focus on results from the UK and from the Euro Area country models for Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Ireland, all of which 
have a similar structure.
2 Output (Y) is determined in the long run by supply factors, and the 
economy is open and has perfect capital mobility. The production function is CES, where output 
depends on capital (K) and on labour services (L) which is a combination of the number of person 
in work and the average hours of those persons. Technical progress (tech) is assumed to be labour 
augmenting and independent of the policy innovations considered here: 
 
ρ ρ λ ρ δ δ α
/ 1 ) ) )( 1 ( ) ( (
− − − − + =
tech L Le K Q  
We assume forward-looking behaviour in production and because of “time to build” issues 
investment depends on expected trend output four years ahead and the forward-looking user cost of 
capital. However, the capital stock does not adjust instantly, as there are costs involved in doing so 
that are represented by estimated speeds of adjustment. The equilibrium level of unemployment is 
the outcome of the bargaining process in the labour market, as discussed in Barrell and Dury 
(2003), and the speed of adjustment depends on (rational) expectations of future inflation. Financial 
markets follow arbitrage conditions and they are forward-looking. The exchange rate, the long rate 
and the equity price will all “jump” in response to news about future events. Fiscal policy involves 
gradually adjusting direct taxes to maintain the deficit on target, but we assume that this has no 
direct effect on the labour supply decision. We investigate different fiscal responses to extending 
working lives and spell out the impact on the budget deficit. Monetary policy involves targeting 
inflation with an integral control from the price level, as discussed in Barrell, Hall and Hurst (2006) 
and inflation settles at its target in all our simulations. 
Perhaps the most important feature of the model for our discussion is that consumers react to 
the present discounted value of their future income streams which we may call total wealth (TW), 
although borrowing constraints may limit their consumption to their personal disposable income in 
the short run. Total wealth is defined as: 
  )) 1 )( 1 /(( 1 t t t t t t my rr TW T Y TW + + + − = +  
where TW is real total wealth, Y is real income, T are real taxes, and the suffix t+1 indicates an 
expected variable which is discounted by the real interest rate rrt and by the myopia premium used 
————— 
1  The Bank of England Quarterly model is discussed in Bank of England (2005). NiGEM is discussed in Barrell (2007) and Barrell 
et al. (2007) and in other papers at www.niesr.ac.uk. NiGEM does not impose maximising equilibrium conditions in the same way 
as DSGE models, but has the same steady state equilibrium properties. 
2  Greece has a similar model, but we do not find the assumption of forward-looking consumers useful in that country. The models of 
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by consumers, myt. The equation represents an infinite forward-recursion, and permanent income is 
the sustainable flow from this stock. Total wealth and permanent (PI) income can be linked by the 
stock flow relationship where γ is the rate of return on TW: 
  t t TW PI * γ =  
Although consumers know their total wealth and hence their permanent income, they may 
not consume it all as they are either risk averse or face a probability of death (ρ) in each time period 
and also a probability (τ) that they will not make the transition from working to not working. If life 
span is uncertain, then consumers will have precautionary saving as discussed in Blanchard and 
Fisher (1989). If the length of working life is also uncertain then they may pay a small premium to 
insure themselves against early retirement. This premium falls with an increase in working lives. 
During their working years consumers save and then use their interest income and run down assets 
in retirement. The saving rate will depend, amongst other things, on the proportion of life that they 
expect to work, the level of consumption they prefer in retirement and on their desire to leave 
bequests. In a stationary economy consumption will equal permanent income. The gross stock of 
financial wealth will depend on the saving rate and on the number of years they expect to be 
retired.
3 Given that there is an optimal wealth to income ratio, WR, in an economy growing at a rate 
g the saving rate will be g*WR higher to sustain the equilibrium ratio; consumption will be lower 
than permanent income. 
Total wealth will also change when asset prices change or when accumulation changes. 
Non-human wealth may rise when, for instance house prices increase, and this may raise 
consumption in the short term, even though real output may not have risen. We assume that 
consumption is determined by forward-looking behaviour in the long term, but that short term 
adjustment depends upon a number of factors. As Barrell and Davis (2007) show, changes in 
financial (dlnNW) and especially housing wealth (dlnHW) will affect consumption. Their estimates 
suggest that short-run impact on consumption from changes in housing wealth is five times the 
impact from changes in financial wealth. They also show that the adjustment to the long run 
equilibrium shows some inertia as well. Al-Eyd and Barrell (2005) discuss borrowing constraints, 
and investigate the role of changes in the number of borrowing constrained households. It is 
common to associate the severity of borrowing constraints with the coefficient on changes in 
current income (dlnRPDI) in the equilibrium correction equation for consumption, where d is the 
change operator and ln is natural log. We may write our equation for dlnC as: 
  dlnCt = λ(lnCt–1 – b0 – lnPIt–1) + b1dlnRPDIt + b2dlnNWt + b3dlnHWt 
where the long run relationship between lnC and lnPI depends upon the equilibrium saving rate, 
and this relationship forms the long run attractor in an equilibrium correction relationship. We 
should note that permanent income, PI, is a forward-looking variable based on the infinite forward 
recursion of total wealth. The log approximation is explained in Barrell and Davis (2007). 
Policy reactions are important in the determination of speeds of adjustment. Nominal short 
term interest rates are set in relation to a standard forward-looking feedback rule as described in 
Barrell, Hall and Hurst (2006). These feedback rules are known to be in place in the future and 
hence we can describe the path of future interest rates. Forward-looking long rates should be 
related to expected future short term rates: 
 (1  +  LRt) = Π 
T
j=1          (1 + SRt+j)
1/T 
————— 
3  In a stationary world with no risk, no interest rates, a constant level of consumption and no bequests, the saving rate will the 
proportion of life in retirement (τ) and the number of years in retirement. For instance if one third of adult life is in retirement and 
there are 60 years of adult life then the equilibrium wealth to income ratio will be 6.666. It will be lower if interest rates are positive 
or desired consumption in retirement is lower than in work. 506  Ray Barrell, Ian Hurst and Simon Kirby 
 
The exchange rate and the equity market are also assumed to be forward-looking, with 
exchange rates following the open arbitrage path and equity prices moving in line with the 
discounted future value of expected net of tax profits. 
In order to evaluate the effects of extending working lives on the public finances we need a 
reasonably disaggregated description of both spending and tax receipts. We model corporate 
(CTAX) and personal (TAX) direct taxes and indirect taxes (MTAX) on spending, along with 
government spending on investment and on current consumption, and separately identify transfers 
and government interest payments. Each source of taxes has an equation applying a tax rate (TAXR) 
to a tax base (profits, personal incomes or consumption). As a default we have government 
spending on investment (GI) and consumption (GC) rising in line with trend output in the long run, 
with delayed adjustment to changes in the trend. They are re-valued in line with the consumers’ 
expenditure deflator (CED). Government interest payments (GIP) are driven by a perpetual 
inventory of accumulated debts. Transfers (TRAN) to individual are composed of three elements, 
with those for the inactive of working age and the retired depending upon observed replacement 
rates. Spending minus receipts give us the budget deficit (BUD), and this flows onto the debt stock. 
  BUD = CED*(GC+GI) + TRAN + GIP – TAX – CTAX – MTAX 
We have to consider how the government deficit (BUD) is financed. We allow either money (M) or 
bond finance (DEBT): 
 BUD = ΔM + ΔDEBT 
Rearranging, that gives: 
  DEBT= DEBTt–1 – BUD – ΔM 
In all policy analyses we use a tax rule to ensure that Governments remain solvent in the 
long run. This ensures that the deficit and debt stock return to sustainable levels after any shock, as 
is discussed in Blanchard and Fisher (1989). A debt stock target can also be implemented. The tax 
rate equation is of the form: 
  TAXR = f(target deficit ratio – actual deficit ratio) 
If the Government budget deficit is greater than the target, (e.g. –3 per cent of GDP and 
target is –1 per cent of GDP) then the income tax rate is increased. However, it is possible to turn 
off the tax rule and allow deficits to decline in response to increased tax revenues. However, debt 
stocks cannot expand or contract without bound, and hence in some analyses below we have to put 
a ceiling on the improvement in the deficit. 
 
3  Extending working lives 
We analyse the impact of a one year increase in effective working life in all the Euro Area 
countries together. Obviously, it might be wise to raise expected working lives by more, the effects 
of which can be extrapolated from our results. We assume that the working age population begins 
to increase five years after the start of the scenario and that it takes 5 years to increase the length of 
working lives by one year. Workers know that they will work longer and hence they need to save 
less now, and consumption will rise ahead of the increase in incomes. As the availability of 
increased labour is fully anticipated and comes through slowly in this simulation, the market 
adjusts and in our simulation there is little impact on the unemployment rate, which is determined 
by the wage bargain. Employers have enough time to raise investment in advance of the anticipated 
increase in labour supply so that the capital stock can grow approximately in line with employment. 
The business sector capital stock is assumed to be determined by the underlying production   Macroeconomic Implications of Pension Reform or How To Pay for the Crisis  507 
 
 function and hence rises 
in line with employment 
given any changes in real 
wages relative to the user 
cost of capital. If all 
capital did the same, then 
output should rise in 
exactly in line with 
labour input in the long 
run, as we would expect 
from the production 
function. 
In Figure 1, GDP 
rises less than labour 
input in the long run, and 
continues adjusting. 
However, in the short run 
output rises ahead of 
labour input as demand 
increased. We also plot 
capital inputs, if these 
were to adjust more 
rapidly output would rise 
 
more quickly. These marginal changes could be smoothed if we assumed the government capital 
stock moved at the same pace as private sector capital, but we consider it useful to demonstrate the 
effects of budget rules. We assume that government investment rises with expected capacity 
output, and hence the government capital stock increases more slowly than business sector capital 
but eventually adjusts. All private sector investment plans are assumed to depend on capacity 
output anticipated for 4 years ahead as well as the forward-looking user cost of capital. As a result 
of these assumptions the capital stock rises less than the workforce, as we can see from Figure 1. 
Private sector capital rises less than employment as the increase in demand for capital, and hence 
the reduction in net saving, puts marginal upward pressure on long term real interest rates. 
The need to finance capital inflows that go with an increased labour force require current 
account deficits and hence a build up of foreign liabilities. This will put a wedge between GNP and 
GDP and net property income from abroad will decline, as we can see from Figure 2. We could see 
a reduction of around 0.1 percentage points in the household saving rate of the Euro Area in the 
long run for every extra years working life we add. In the short term an expected (or anticipated) 
increase in working lives will immediately reduce the saving rate by around 0.3 percentage points. 
Total wealth rises as people anticipate higher future incomes and the effects are brought forward by 
rational optimising consumers. In the short run consumption rises ahead of incomes, as we can see 
in Figure 3. 
 
4  Giving the Government options 
The effects on the economy of extending working lives depend upon the assumptions made 
about government reaction. We consider three possible government reactions. Our main case leaves 
government investment and consumption rising in line with, but not ahead of trend output. 
Government transfers to the elderly (pensions and other social security payments) would be 
reduced because the number of retired people would fall relative to baseline. The scale of the 
Figure 1 
Impacts of a One-year Increase 
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reduction would depend 
upon the numbers 
involved and the 
replacement ratio. Hence 
it is possible to cut taxes 
or reduce borrowing. In 
this scenario we allow 
taxes to fall in order to 
meet the government 
budget deficit target. The 
second case assumes 
taxes are kept fixed at 
base levels and 
government spending an 
investment rise with 
GDP. The failure to cut 
taxes allows the deficit to 
be reduced. Our third 
case keeps government 
investment and 
consumption at their 
baseline trajectory with 
tax rates fixed, at least 
initially, allowing more 
debt to be paid off with 
the increased revenue 
from higher incomes 
along with the reduction 
in spending. Once the 
improvement in the 
deficit reaches one per 
cent of GDP taxes are 
allowed to fall and the 
deficit improvement 
stays at that level. 
Figure 4 plots possible 
paths for direct taxes.  
If tax rates are 
fixed but spending rises 
then the government 
deficit will be reduced by 
around 0.4 per cent of 
Euro Area GDP, as we 
can see from Figure 5. 
The government debt 
stock falls, and after 30 
years the debt stock will 
have fallen by 6 per cent 
of (the value in 2043 of) 
GDP. With spending and 
Figure 2 
Current Account Effect of a One-year Increase 
in Working Lives in the Euro Area 
Figure 3 
Impacts of a One-year Increase 
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investment fixed, the 
budget deficit improves 
by 1 per cent of GDP 
after 20 years and stays 
higher in part because we 
impose the target at this 
level in all countries once 
the begin to reach it. 
Hence taxes are cut in 
order to ensure the 
budget deficit is kept 
different from base by a 
constant one per cent of 
GDP. As a result the 
government debt stock 
falls more rapidly and 
after 30 years it is 
14 per cent  of  GDP 
lower. The choices 
available to the 
government are clear. 
Extending working lives 
can be absorbed into 
lower taxes, or it can 
finance higher spending, 
or it can be utilised to 
pay off the government 
debt accumulated in the 
recession. 
 
5 Modelling  Europe 
NiGEM has a 
model of each of the 12 
main European countries, 
and each has a complete 
supply side and rational 
expectations. The 
forward projection of 
population depends on 
Eurostat data both for the 
total population and the 
breakdown into the 
population of working 
age, the retired and those 
below working age. In 
each country government 
transfers to individuals 
depend on three factors: 
 
Figure 4 
Impacts on Direct Tax Rate 
Figure 5 
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  Transfers = a*ytrend + inactive*replacement rate + pensioners*pension replacement rate 
where ytrend is capacity output in nominal terms since transfers are also nominal. 
The replacement ratios are uprated with trend output in nominal terms. As a result of the 
uprating rule and the increase in the dependent population transfers rise as a share of GDP, and 
taxes rise to finance this in order that governments are solvent. If the retirement age is raised then 
transfers for pensions are reduced but initially unemployment rises, and the net effect on 
government spending depends on the two replacement ratios. We assume that over the first five 
years of the scenario working lives are raised progressively to be 2½ per cent longer than on the 
baseline. This is equivalent to an additional year of working life. The increase in the workforce is 
relatively quickly absorbed, and output rises in all cases.  
The impact on interest rates in the rest of the world depends in large part on the projected 
change in the current account, and in the first case we can expect it to deteriorate. Figure 7 plots the 
output effects, whilst Figure 8 plots the impact on long term real interest rates in the steady state. 
We report numbers for the Euro Area, but similar changes take place in the US and the UK because 
the model allows for complete capital mobility and world real interest rates change approximately 
together. In Barrell, Hurst and Kirby (2009) we discuss similar policy initiatives in the UK, which 
is a small open economy, and hence global real interest rates are little affected. However, the Euro 
Area, like the US is not a small open economy, but a large one, and when it changes its saving and 
investment balance would real interest rates will change. If the increase in working lives were to be 
associated with higher government spending and lower taxes, and hence a similar government 
budget deficit, then world real interest rates would rise. Saving in the Euro Area would fall and the 
demand for capital would rise, and the market would have to find a new equilibrium. The larger the 
share of increased income that is used to pay down debt, the smaller is the increase (or larger the 
fall) in steady state real interest rates. 
In each country we have details on the effects on output and direct tax rates, and these are 
plotted in Figures 9 and 10 for the base case where spending rises and the budget deficit is fixed, 
and hence taxes are cut. The increases in labour input are similar across countries in the long run 
but in the short run depend on how quickly labour markets adjust to increased labour input. 
 
The more forward-
looking the wage 
bargain, the faster the 
increase in the supply of 
labour is absorbed. The 
effects on output vary 
more across countries, 
especially in the short 
run, where the dynamics 
of the trade equations 
will also have an impact. 
In the long run the 
effects depend mainly on 
the parameters of the 
production function (and 
the impact on the user 
cost which feeds into the 
production function). 
The effects on tax 
rates will depend in the   
Figure 6 
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long run on the 
generosity of the state in 
the amount of transfers to 
households in relation to 
average incomes. The 
effects are least in the 
less generous countries 
such as Italy, but also in 
Germany. There is a 
correlation of –0.38 
between our estimates of 
replacement ratios and 
the impact on tax rates, 
with higher ratios giving 
larger negative tax cuts. 
The short run effects 
depend on the relative 
generosity of state aid to 
the unemployed as an 
increase in the labour 
force might take a short 
while to absorb into 
increased employment. 
The speed of absorption 
of the retained workers 
depends on the degree of 
labour market flexibility. 
A shift to a more flexible 
labour market should 




It is widely 
acknowledged that the 
many countries have a 
shortfall of savings and 
an accumulation of 
government debt. The 
natural consequence is a 
shortfall in the resources 
available to cover 
retirement incomes. 
Extending working lives 
can be used to address 
this issue. Fewer assets 
are needed in order to 
provide an income 
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Figure 8 
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Table 1 
Replacement Rates and Tax Changes with Extended Working Lives 
 
   Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Neths  Austria  Portugal Spain 
Replacement rate  0.119  0.138  0.167 0.152  0.1225  0.1032  0.1621 0.076  0.245  0.1861 0.1391 
Change in direct tax rate                       
Fixed spending  –0.0075  –0.016  –0.0127  –0.0084  –0.0092  –0.0104  –0.0118 –0.0087  –0.0105  –0.0175  –0.0115
Increased spending  –0.002  –0.0095  –0.0061  –0.003  –0.0038  –0.0063  –0.0066 –0.0019  –0.0063  –0.0098  –0.005 
 
Source: Eurostat social spending data, NiGEM simulations. 
 
Figure 9 
























reducing the necessary level of saving. Extending working lives gives governments a number of 
options for taxes and spending. It reduces transfer payments to pensioners without need to reduce 
their generosity, a policy option which may be politically easier than the alternatives of reducing 
the generosity of state contributions or raising taxes on the employed. It also increases tax revenues 
through increased incomes and consumption. These increased net revenues can be used to actually 
reduce the tax burden, increase spending or both together. It is also possible they could be used to 
pay down the national debt. Increased working lives raises output and hence the demand for capital 
to accompany more workers. Forward-looking consumers will adjust both their consumption 
patterns and their saving at the same time, with those who anticipate working longer increasing 
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Figure 10 























both increased output and a reduced the need to save for retirement. In a small open economy 
increasing working lives reduces net saving and hence reduces the current account surplus and 
foreign assets de-cumulate. In a large open economy such as Europe, an increase in the demand for 
capital and a reduction in saving will impact on the price of saving – the steady state real interest 
rate. Extending working lives in Europe by one year could raise the steady state real interest rate by 
0.1 percentage points. 
Increasing spending and cutting taxes are not the only options available to governments. If 
tax rates and spending plans were kept constant but working lives were to increase by one year then 
European general government budget deficits would, on average, improve by 1 per cent of GDP 
after 15 years. If this were maintained, in around 30 years national debt would be reduced by the 
equivalent of 16-20 per cent of GDP. Given the enormous increase in government debt induced by 
the banking crisis and the subsequent severe global recession policy options to reverse this 
accumulation of government debt need to be implemented. Extending working lives is a practical 
and feasible solution to this issue. We argue that the extension of working lives by 2 years in 
Europe would be enough to pay off government debt equivalent to around 40 per cent of GDP, 
which is what we expect the current crisis to have cost. If government debt were to be run down 
real interest rates would not rise by as much as we suggest. This is the case even if consumers are 
forward-looking, since they use a higher discount factor in their decision making than that observed 
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Two considerations impinge on the issue of what constitutes adequacy of pension income. 
How does the income of the current generation of older people fare in comparison to that of the 
current generation of working age population? And, how do older people fare in retirement in 
comparison to their living standards during working lives? Regarding the former consideration, two 
indicators that can be reliably measured are used in this paper: relative poverty and relative income 
of older people. For the latter consideration, the indicators of prospective replacement rates of 
workers who enter into labour force during 2004 are derived using micro-simulation analysis, and 
they are presented and analysed in detail elsewhere (see, e.g., Martin and Whitehouse, 2008; 
Queisser and Whitehouse, 2007). 
The other critical issue is what constitutes poverty? For the purpose of international 
comparisons across developed countries, poverty is almost always a relative concept. A widely 
accepted measurement approach is to use household income as the measure of well-being, to 
“equivalise” household income for differences in household size and define the poverty threshold 
as one-half of national median household income. This approach is adopted in OECD’s recent 
report on poverty and inequality Growing Unequal? (OECD, 2008). Under this approach, people 
are considered poor if they live in households whose equivalised disposable income is less than 
50 per cent of the national median disposable income. 
For the purpose of a good interpretation of results presented in this paper, two important 
implications of the measurement approach need to be kept in mind: 
•  poverty thresholds in use are country-specific as they use the national median income as its 
basis. Thus, the purchasing power of these poverty lines differs across countries, with the 
implication that some poor persons will be better off in one country than some non-poor persons 
in another country; 
•  poverty rates among older people for some countries will be high because the income of their 
working age populations have observed an unprecedented growth in the recent past. This 
situation arises in particular for Ireland and Spain in the recent past. 
The Annex provides further discussion on the measurement methods used, their strengths 
and limitations, and differences in the poverty thresholds across countries. These issues are 
discussed at a greater length in Zaidi (2008). 
The paper makes use of data available in the OECD Income Distribution Database – itself 
the basis of OECD (2008). The discussion below is presented in five parts. First, results on patterns 
of poverty among older people are analysed. Second, income of older people, levels relative to the 
rest of the population and its composition, are analysed. Third, the distributional role of public 
pension benefits and taxes is investigated. Fourth, the analysis included explores the impact of 
————— 
*  Asghar Zaidi was a Senior Economist at the OECD, Paris, at the time of completion of this work. He is currently Director Research 
at the European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research in Vienna. 
  The views expressed in the paper are those of the author, and neither the OECD nor the other organisations with which the author is 
affiliated carry any responsibility with regard to data used and interpretations made. The author takes full responsibility for any 
remaining errors and omissions. 516 Asghar  Zaidi 
 
Figure 1 



















































Note: Poverty rates are defined as the proportion of individuals with disposable income less than 50 per cent of the national median. 
Countries are ranked, from left to right, in increasing order of income poverty rates of people of retirement age. The income concept 
used is that of household disposable income adjusted for household size. 
Source: Computations from OECD Income Distribution Questionnaire. 
 
recent pension reforms on the future value of pension entitlements. Finally, some recommendations 
are made in view of conclusions drawn from this paper. 
 
2  Patterns of poverty among older people in OECD countries 
2.1  Key findings on older people poverty 
Using the definitions mentioned above, results for the years around 2005 show that about 
13 per cent of all older people in OECD countries are counted as “poor”. In the context of this 
study, an older person is someone who is aged 66 or more, for the fact that these people have 
reached the most usual statutory retirement age of 65 as observed across many OECD countries. 
Figure 1 highlights the variations observed across countries. Results are brought together so 
as to allow the poverty rates for three population groups – older people, working age people and the 
overall population – to be presented and contrasted. The country-by-country variations observed 
are broadly captured by the following three groupings of countries: 
•  low poverty rates (<6 per cent): Nine countries fall in this category: the Slovak Republic, 
































































































































































































































































Age 66+ Age 18-65 All  Poverty and Income of Older People in OECD Countries  517 
•  lower-than-average poverty rates (between 7-13 per cent): Ten other countries show older 
person poverty rates lower than the OECD average of 13.3 per cent: Belgium, Italy, Finland, the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, Norway, France, Sweden and Austria; 
•  higher-than-average poverty rates (>15 per cent): This cluster of countries has 11 countries, 
with Korea standing out among the OECD countries with the highest poverty rate for older 
people (45 per cent). Other countries with a higher-than-average poverty rate for older people 
are Ireland (30.6 per cent), Mexico (28 per cent), Australia (26.9 per cent), the United States 
(23.6 per cent), Greece (22.7 per cent), Japan (22 per cent), Switzerland (17.6 per cent), 
Portugal (16.6 per cent), Spain (16.6 per cent) and Turkey (15.1 per cent). 
In countries with higher-than-average poverty rates among older people, the corresponding 
rates for the working age population (age 18-65) are considerably lower. For example, working age 
poverty rates in Korea, Ireland, Australia, Greece and Switzerland are less than half of poverty 
rates observed for older people. In contrast, in countries where older people poverty rates are low, 
the poverty rates for working age people are generally higher. This result is observed in particular 
for Poland and New Zealand. Among many of the countries with high poverty rates for older 
persons, a gap of notable magnitude is observed in the poverty rates between these two age groups. 
The differential is highest in Korea, in excess of 30 percentage points, followed by five other 
countries (Ireland, Australia, Greece, Mexico and Switzerland) where it is in excess of 
10 percentage points. 
Other perspectives on the profile of older people poverty are dealt with by the data available 
in the OECD Income Distribution Survey, and the following analytical questions are relevant: 
•  how do poverty rates differ across older men and women? 
•  how do the younger cohorts of older persons (aged 66-74) fare in comparison to the oldest 
cohorts (75 or more)? 
•  what is the impact on the poverty rate for older households with someone in the household 
working? 
•  how do different living arrangements of older households, specifically living as a single person 
or a couple, affect poverty rates? 
•  what are the underlying trends in the poverty rate for older persons? 
These issues are addressed in more detail in the rest of this section. 
 
2.2  The gender dimension 
The different experiences of poverty for older men and women are captured by Figures 2a 
and 2b. The following patterns emerge from these results: 
•  older women in general have a much higher poverty rate compared to older men. On average, 
older women have a poverty rate of about 15 per cent as compared to older men poverty rate of 
about 10 per cent (see Figure 2a). The exception to this result is observed only in four countries 
with low overall poverty rates for older persons (New Zealand, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
and Iceland); 
•  the above result is all the more striking when they are compared with the corresponding poverty 
rates for the equivalent working age cohorts. Female poverty rates are in most cases broadly 
equivalent with those of the males (see Figure 2b). Obviously, the two groups of men and 
women belong to different generations, but it also reflects the fact that the relative risk of 
poverty for older women increases in their old age. 
Partly mirroring the above results is the fact that the oldest age cohorts, aged 75+, have a 
higher poverty rate than those aged 65-74. This is principally because women dominate the oldest 518 Asghar  Zaidi 
 
Figure 2a 
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age cohort, as – on average – women live longer than men. Another compositional effect, 
contrasting in nature, arises because richer people tend to live longer than poorer people.
1 
Further analysis between older men and women within each of the two age cohorts draws 
attention to the result that older women in the age group of 75+ stand out as the poorest subgroup 
(see Figure 3a and 3b). On average, almost 18 per cent of all women aged 75+ have a risk of falling 
in poverty. In the majority of countries with higher-than-average poverty rates for older persons, 
the risk for poverty for the oldest women cohort is strikingly high (in excess of 25 per cent). 
 
2.3  The impact of earnings and living arrangements on older people poverty 
Many OECD countries now offer pension income bonuses to those who delay their 
retirement and continue to work beyond the statutory retirement age. Although the opportunities of 
older people to adjust their labour supply behaviour may be restricted for the reasons of seniority 
wages and employers’ age discrimination (see OECD 2006), it is nonetheless useful to analyse how 
the poverty risk of older people is affected when they are able to work beyond the retirement age. 
The living arrangements dimension of households is also an important dimension in 
determining income. Couple households benefit from pooling and sharing their pension income 
resources and also enjoy economies of scale. However, their lives are affected by events common 
to old age, such as widowhood, and this has a detrimental impact on income, which varies across 
countries depending upon the systems of social insurance and social assistance provision. Thus, it 
is of importance to analyse how households with different living arrangements fare in terms of 
risks of poverty in old age. 
In many OECD countries, the effective retirement age has been rising (approximating one 
year for women and almost half year for men during the decade ending in 2007). Nevertheless, at 
27 per cent, the share of elderly people who work (or live with persons who work) has remained 
remarkably stable over the past ten years. Where members of such older households continue to 
work, the poverty rates are much lower. On average, across the OECD, poverty rate is 7 per cent 
when someone in older households works as opposed to 17 per cent for others (see Table 1). The 
decrease in poverty due to the working status a household member is most noticeable in Australia, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The effect on 
the poverty rate is lower in Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Poland. Turkey 
offers the only exception where non-working older households have lower poverty rates than 
working ones. 
Different living arrangements also affect the poverty rates of older people. Two broad 
categories are covered here: (a) older persons living alone as single persons, and (b) older persons 
living as a couple. Older persons living alone – very often widowed women – face a much higher 
risk of falling into poverty than older persons living as a couple (see Table 1). However, during 
the decade spanning the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, in many OECD countries the poverty rates 
for single elderly persons have declined more than the equivalent rates for older couples. This 
decline in the poverty rates for single elderly persons is most notable in the Czech Republic 
(–19.1 percentage points), followed by Norway (–13.8) and Austria (–11.6). A contrasting result is 
obtained for seven countries, in particular for Spain and Finland where poverty rates for the single 
elderly persons increased considerably during the same period, by 32.7 and 12.5 percentage points 
respectively. 
————— 
1  See Whitehouse and Zaidi (2008) for a survey of the literature and new evidence on socio-economic differences in mortality of 
older people in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. 520 Asghar  Zaidi 
Figure 3a 
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Table 1 
Poverty among People of Retirement Age and in Households with a Head of Retirement Age, 
Subdivided by Working Status of Members and by Household Type, 






























Note: Poverty definition is the same as described for Figure 1. Data for mid-2000s refer to around 2000 for Japan and Switzerland. Data 
for changes refer to the period from the mid-1990s to around 2000 for Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain (where 2005 data, based on EU-SILC, are not comparable with those for earlier years). 
[..] indicates that the sample size is too small. 


























































































































































































Australia 27 4.6 27 5.6 4 3.2 32 5.4 50 –4.8 18 9.8
Austria 7 –5.7 8 –6.0 7 5.3 9 –7.6 16 –11.6 4 0.2
B e l g i u m 1 3– 3 . 51 2– 2 . 3 4 – 0 . 61 3– 3 . 71 7– 6 . 81 0 0 . 1
C a n a d a 41 . 573 . 220 . 7 1 0 4 . 8 1 6 7 . 341 . 8
Czech Republic 2 –6.5 3 –5.8 [..] [..] 3 –6.2 6 –19.1 2 0.5
Denmark 10 –2.1 10 –2.2 2 0.6 12 –2.3 17 –4.4 4 0.3
Finland 13 5.3 14 5.9 11 7.7 14 5.5 28 12.5 4 2.3
France 9 –3.0 9 –2.1 1 –5.9 9 –1.4 16 0.2 4 –2.4
Germany 10 –0.6 8 –1.6 2 –4.7 9 –1.2 15 0.2 5 –1.8
Greece 23 –6.6 21 –7.0 7 –10.5 31 –3.1 34 –4.5 18 –7.1
Hungary 5 –2.5 5 –2.9 [..] [..] 5 –5.2 11 –6.9 1 –2.7
Iceland 5 .. 5 .. 3 .. 7 .. 10 .. 2 ..
Ireland 31 18.8 25 .. 5 .. 36 .. 65 .. 9 ..
Italy 13 –2.3 13 –2.1 3 0.4 17 –4.5 25 –7.5 9 –1.2
J a p a n 2 2– 1 . 02 1– 1 . 11 3– 1 . 83 0– 7 . 64 8– 7 . 91 7– 1 . 5
K o r e a 4 5. .4 9. .3 5. .6 9. .7 7. .4 1. .
Luxembourg 3 –1.8 3 –1.6 [..] [..] 4 –5.4 4 –5.6 3 –6.4
Mexico 28 –4.6 23 –8.6 19 –9.1 39 –7.9 45 –5.9 21 –9.2
N e t h e r l a n d s 20 . 920 . 821 . 120 . 73 – 0 . 1 21 . 3
New Zealand 2 0.2 4 2.5 1 –3.8 2 1.6 3 2.1 1 –0.1
Norway 9 –6.8 9 –7.1 1 –1.1 10 –7.9 20 –13.8 1 –2.1
P o l a n d 5. .6. .6. .6. .6. .6. .
Portugal 17 –1.1 20 –2.2 5 –4.6 25 –1.0 35 –4.8 16 –2.0
Slovak Republic 6 .. 4 .. [..] [..] 7 .. 10 .. 3 ..
S p a i n 1 7– 1 . 12 71 6 . 81 2– 4 . 33 22 3 . 33 93 2 . 72 41 2 . 6
Sweden 8 4 6 2.7 3 1.1 7 3.2 13 5.8 1 0.5
Switzerland 18 4.3 18 –1.8 [..] [..] [..] [..] 24 6.1 15 3.4
Turkey 15 –8.1 18 –4.1 20 0.6 16 –16.4 38 –6.2 17 –4.0
United Kingdom 10 –2.1 10 –0.8 1 0.1 12 –2.5 17 –0.9 7 –1.3
United States 24 2.9 24 3.2 9 1.4 34 5 41 3 17 3.2
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Poverty differences between single elderly persons and elderly couples are most notable in 
Ireland: a full 56 percentage points separates the poverty experience of single elderly persons and 
elderly couples. Korea, Australia, and Japan show a poverty differential in excess of 30 points. 
Mexico, the United States, Finland, Turkey, Portugal and Norway had differences in the 
19-24  point range. Note that the above countries are generally those with higher-than-average 
poverty rate for older people (see Section 2.1 above). In contrast, countries with relatively low 
levels of overall poverty rate for older people show smaller differences in the poverty rates for 
single elderly persons and elderly couples. This is observed particularly in Poland, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg. 
 
2.4  Trends in older people poverty 
The rate of poverty increase or decrease for older persons over time clearly adds important 
detail to the body of knowledge on the poverty risk of older persons. The OECD Income 
Distribution Database provides information on longer term trends (since the mid-1970s) for seven 
countries: Canada, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Results for other 23 OECD countries are available for a somewhat shorter period: since 
mid-1980s. 
There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that older people poverty rates in OECD 
countries contrast favourably with those for younger age groups. This result is summarised in 
Figure 4, which provides poverty rates for seven age groups (from the age group “below 18” to the 
age group “above 75”) as a proportion of the poverty rate for the entire population. These results 
provided for time periods for which data are available. 
•  On average – across the 23 OECD countries covered by the left-hand panel of Figure 4 – the 
poverty rates of people aged 75 and over has fallen from a level almost twice as high as that of 
the population average in the mid-1980s to 1.5 times by the mid-2000s. For people aged 66 to 
74 this risk is now lower than for children and young adults. 
•  Results for a smaller number of OECD countries, as shown by the right-hand panel of Figure 4, 
indicate that the reduction of relative poverty rates for elderly people is even larger when 
looking at changes since the mid-1970s. 
•  In general, poverty rates for all age groups above 50 have declined, while those for people 
below that age have risen. By mid-2000s, children and young adults had poverty rates about 
25 per cent above the population average, while they were close to and below that average, 
respectively, 20 years ago.
2 
Figure 5 highlights the differences across country experiences for trends in poverty rates for 
older persons during two periods: between mid-1980s and mid-1990s (the left panel) and between 
mid-1990s and mid-2000s (the centre panel). The findings can be summarised as: 
•  from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the un-weighted average of older people poverty rates 
across 24 OECD countries decreased by 0.2 percentage points. Canada, Denmark and 
Luxembourg observed larger decreases in poverty (5-8 points), while in Ireland and Mexico 
older people poverty rates increased by 10.9 and 4.6 points respectively; 
•  in the decade from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, poverty rates for older people decreased 
again in a majority of countries, with the average rate across 24 OECD countries declined again 
by 0.7 points. In six countries – Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Mexico, Norway and  
————— 
2  In some countries, however, the opposite pattern prevails. In particular, the poverty rate of children and/or young adults fell during 
the most recent decade in Australia, Spain and the United States while that of elderly people increased.   Poverty and Income of Older People in OECD Countries  523 
 
Figure 4 
Risk of Relative Poverty by Age of Individuals, Mid-1970s to Mid-2000s, OECD Average 
(poverty rate of the entire population in each year = 100) 
 







































Note: Relative poverty risk is the age-specific poverty rate divided by the poverty rate for the entire population times 100. The poverty 
definition is the same as used for Figure 1. OECD-7 is the average for Canada, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, and OECD-23 is the average poverty rates across all the remaining OECD countries Data for mid-1980s 
refer to around 1990 for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Portugal; those for mid-2000s refer to 2000 for Austria, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (where 2005 data, based on EU-SILC, are not comparable with those for earlier years). 
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  Turkey – the decrease in poverty was particularly pronounced (at 5+ points), while sizeable 
poverty increases were recorded in Australia, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and particularly in 
Ireland; 
•  for Norway, the decline in the poverty rate is a continuation of a trend from the previous period, 
whereas for Mexico the decline in this later period offsets the increase observed in the previous 
period; 
•  only seven countries observed a significant rise in older people poverty during this period. The 
most notable among them is Ireland: the poverty for older people rose by a large 18.8 points, 
making the cumulative change between mid-1980s and mid-2000s close to 30 percentage 
points. 
 
3  Pension income patterns 
3.1  Income patterns across age groups and household types 
This section describes how average income varies across age groups and across different 
types of household. Average disposable income varies with the age of individuals in very similar 
ways across OECD countries (see Figure 6 for results in a selected group of countries). In all 
countries, average income rises with age until the end of working life and then declines, although 
there are differences across countries in the age at which the highest level is reached. 
Similar results are observed when looking at people living in different household types that 
are a reflection of different life cycle stages (see Figure 7). Average income rises when comparing 
single-parent households to single working age persons without children, and is at its maximum for 
working age couples with no children. Average income are lower for two-adult households with 
children (with a head of working age), for couples with a head of retirement age and for older 
persons living alone. The income patterns by household type is generally more varied than that by 
age, and there is also greater variations across countries. 
 
3.2 Income  composition 
Pension systems in many OECD countries have been reformed in the last 10-15 years, and 
they underpin a trend towards a greater diversification of the pension income portfolio in the 
majority of countries. In general, there has been a move away from the public provision of pension 
income and towards greater reliance on capital income in the form of private personal and 
occupational pension income. Below, results from the OECD Income Distribution Database are 
presented so as to shed further light on these income developments for older persons. 
Table 2 illustrates the share of various components of income for households of retirement 
age. These components include capital income as well as social security cash benefits and 
household taxes. These results are provided for two time periods: for mid-1990s and mid-2000s. 
The following results stand out when looking at the share of the social security cash benefits, which 
contains universal, income-related as well as contributory components of public pensions. 
•  Not surprisingly, social security cash benefits are the most significant part of income for the 
population of retirement age. On average, this amounts to two thirds of their income, and to 
more than 90 per cent in Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden and Austria. 
•  In contrast, social security cash benefits account for only around half of the household income 
of the elderly in Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, and they are least significant in Korea, and Mexico. 526 Asghar  Zaidi 
 
 
•  Out of 17 countries 
for which trend data is 
available, eight 
countries exhibit a 
decline in the share of 
social security cash 
transfers in retirement 
income. Two Nordic 
countries, Finland and 
Denmark, and 
Australia show a large 
decline (8+ share 
points) in the size of 
this component in 
retirement income. 
• Retirement income 
saw a rise in the 
importance of the 
social security cash 
income in only three 
countries: Japan 
(18 share  points), 
Portugal (13) and 
Italy (9). 
Capital income, 
which contains private 
occupational and 
personal pensions and 
other private transfers, is 
the second most 
important component of 
income for older people 
in the majority of 
countries. Results show 
that: 
•  the share of capital 
income is particularly 
high in Australia, 
Denmark, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and 
the United States, as 
these countries have 




3  The apparently high level of capital income for the retirement age population in Finland reflects the fact that, in the income 
questionnaire used by the OECD, mandatory occupational pensions are counted as a private transfer (hence included in capital 
income) rather than as government cash transfers. 
Figure 6 
Relative Income by Age of Individual in Selected OECD Countries 
Equivalised Household Disposable Income, Mid-2000s 
(persons aged 41-50 = 1) 
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•  in Finland, Denmark 
and Australia, the rise 
in the share of the 
capital income offsets 
almost exactly the fall 
observed in the share 
of the social security 
cash income. The rise 
in the capital income 
share in Ireland 
comes largely at the 
expense of a fall in 
the share of earnings 
and self-employment 
income. 
The role of 
taxation for older 
households also varies 
widely across countries. 
Household taxes account 
for more than 40 per cent 
of household disposable 
income in Sweden and 
more than 50 per cent in 
Denmark and Iceland. 
The share of household 
taxes has decreased in 
Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, 
Japan, the Netherlands, 
and New Zealand over 
the period mid-1990s and 
mid-2000s. 
It is also clear that 
the relationship between 
measured taxes and 
transfers differs across 
countries. For example, 
in the United States – 
based on the household 
survey data used – 
household taxes (at 
26 per cent of household 
income) are nearly three 
times higher than public 
cash transfers. At the 
other extreme, in the 
Czech Republic, France, 
Luxembourg and the 
Slovak Republic, 
Figure 7 
Relative Income by Household Type in Selected OECD Countries 
Equivalised Household Disposable Income, Mid-2000s 
(two or more adults without children and working-age head = 1) 
Note:  WASACH = working-age head, single adult with children; 
  WASANC = working-age head, single adult without children; 
  WATACH = working-age head, two or more adults with children; 
  WATANC = working-age head, two or more adults without children; 
  RATA = retirement age head, two or more adults; 
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measured transfers account for a larger share of household disposable income than measured taxes. 
A major factor behind these variations is the fact that employer social security contributions – 
which finance a large part of the welfare state in these and some other countries – are paid by 
employers directly to the government, and since they do not pass through the household sector they 
are not recorded in household income surveys. 
 
4  Redistributive role of public cash benefits and household taxes 
4.1  Public cash benefits 
Table 3 provides information for OECD countries on how public cash benefits are 
distributed across income groups. The measure used for summarising this information is the 
“Concentration coefficient” as defined at the foot of Table 3. The key message drawn from the 
measure of concentration coefficient is to see how poorer income groups benefit more from a 
higher share of public cash benefits than their share in the overall disposable income.
4 Results show 
that: 
•  cash benefits are more progressively distributed than market income in all countries, thus they 
contribute to reducing inequality; 
•  the distribution of cash benefits for retirement age households is most progressive in Finland, 
followed by Australia and Denmark, while it is least progressive in Mexico, Turkey, Korea, 
Portugal, Poland and France; 
•  with the exceptions of Portugal and Turkey, transfers to people of working age are more 
progressively distributed than those to people of retirement age, although the differences are 
small in Greece, Iceland, Poland and Portugal, as well as in Italy, Luxembourg and Spain; 
•  the ranking of countries is broadly similar for transfers to people of retirement age and of 
working age, although Finland (not Australia) has the most progressive distribution of transfers 
to people of retirement age. 
 
4.2 Household  taxes 
The second panel of Table 3 shows the distribution of household taxes (income taxes and 
employee social security contributions). Because taxes are deducted from household income, 
higher values of the concentration coefficient imply a more progressive distribution of household 
taxes. Results show that: 
•  overall, there is less variation in the progressivity of taxes across countries than in the case of 
transfers. For the retirement age households, taxation is most progressively distributed in 
Australia, Ireland and the Czech Republic. This is followed by the Slovak Republic, the 
Netherlands and the United States; 
•  taxes tend to be least progressive in the retirement age households of the Nordic countries, 
Poland and Switzerland; 
•  in most but not all countries taxes are more progressive for the retirement-age population than 
for the working-age population, reflecting the existence of various tax concessions that exist for 
low-income retired people. 
————— 
4  For greater details on the definition and suitability of the concentration coefficient, see discussion in OECD (2008), pp. 104-6. Note 
in particular that the concentration coefficient of transfers can be negative in the case where poorer income groups receive a higher 




Progressivity of Cash Benefits and Household Taxes 





























Note: The concentration coefficient is computed in the same way as the Gini coefficient of household income, so that a value of zero 
means that all income groups receive an equal share of household transfers or pay an equal share of taxes. However, individuals are 
ranked by their equivalised household disposable income. 
1 Data on public cash benefits are reported net of taxes (i.e., household taxes are not separately identified). 
2 Average of the 24 OECD countries with data on both gross public cash transfers and household taxes (i.e. all countries shown in the 
table except Greece, Hungary, Mexico, Portugal, Spain and Turkey). 











Australia –0.431 –0.080 –0.400 0.492 0.816 0.533
Austria 0.130 0.256 0.157 0.365 0.464 0.381
Belgium –0.141 0.169 –0.120 0.363 0.420 0.398
Canada –0.173 –0.006 –0.152 0.472 0.586 0.492
Czech Republic –0.151 0.037 –0.154 0.424 0.789 0.471
Denmark –0.303 –0.054 –0.316 0.332 0.336 0.349
Finland –0.258 –0.138 –0.219 0.419 0.444 0.428
France 0.098 0.285 0.136 0.354 0.474 0.374
Germany –0.066 0.175 0.013 0.439 0.485 0.468
Greece
1 0.176 0.202 0.115 .. .. ..
Hungary
1 –0.025 0.119 –0.016 .. .. ..
Iceland 0.018 0.037 –0.041 0.257 0.296 0.267
Ireland –0.205 –0.001 –0.214 0.531 0.782 0.570
Italy 0.158 0.225 0.135 0.512 0.623 0.546
Japan 0.020 0.121 0.010 0.356 0.429 0.378
Korea 0.040 0.282 –0.012 0.363 0.462 0.380
Luxembourg 0.075 0.145 0.085 0.404 0.430 0.420
Mexico
1 0.407 0.518 0.373 .. .. ..
Netherlands –0.223 –0.014 –0.198 0.436 0.705 0.471
New Zealand –0.331 –0.011 –0.345 0.485 0.249 0.498
Norway –0.177 0.074 –0.183 0.355 0.433 0.376
Poland
1 0.173 0.198 0.185 0.382 0.325 0.379
Portugal
1 0.315 0.295 0.247 .. .. ..
Slovak Republic –0.030 0.104 –0.056 0.388 0.726 0.422
Spain
1 0.102 0.175 0.063 .. .. ..
Sweden –0.153 0.090 –0.145 0.330 0.312 0.337
Switzerland –0.176 0.015 –0.170 0.211 0.202 0.223
Turkey
1 0.320 0.288 0.347 .. .. ..
United Kingdom –0.347 0.035 –0.275 0.486 0.614 0.533
United States –0.115 0.105 –0.089 0.549 0.658 0.586
OECD-24
2 –0.107 0.085 –0.099 0.404 0.502 0.428
Public Cash Benefits Household Taxes
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5  Recent pension reforms and their impact 
Figure 8 presents results for 13 OECD countries on the impact of recent pension reforms on 
the future value of pension entitlements.
5 It simulates the impact of reforms for those workers who 
entered the labour market in 2004.
6 It compares the situation for a person who spent a full career 
under the reformed pension system with the benefits that would have been received had the system 
not been changed. 
The results shown are reported in terms of net replacement rates: that is, the value of the 
pension in retirement, after taxes, compared with the level of earnings when working, after taxes 
and contributions. In each case, the left-hand chart shows the position of low earners: people 
earning 50 per cent of the economy-wide average each year of their entire working life. At the 
right-hand side are the net replacement rates for average earners. 
In view of the effect of pension reforms on retirement income of workers at different 
earnings levels, countries are divided into three groups depending on the effect of their reforms on 
the retirement income of workers at different earnings levels. 
•  In the top panel (Figure 8a) are countries that protected low earners from the impact of the 
reforms. In France and Sweden, for example, the benefits for average earners will be about 
20 per cent lower as a result of the reforms while those of low earners are scarcely changed. In 
Mexico and Portugal, the reduction in benefits for average earners are around 50 and 40 per cent 
respectively. The reduction for low earners is only around half this level in both cases. In the 
United Kingdom, recent reforms left the pensions of average earners unchanged, but they 
increased the benefits for low earners by nearly 25 per cent. All of these reforms, therefore, 
increased the targeting of the pension system on people who had low income when working. 
•  The middle panel (Figure 8b) shows four countries in which reforms will result in a similar 
impact on benefits for both low earners and average earners. Germany and Austria observe the 
highest decline in net replacement rates, followed by Japan, and this is observed for both low 
wage and average wage earners. No changes in net replacement rates are observed for Korea 
and Finland, for both low and average earners. 
•  The bottom panel (Figure 8c) shows countries with reforms that worked in the opposite way to 
the first group of countries. In Poland, for example, benefits for average earners will change 
very little as a result of the reform while for low earners they will fall by over 20 per cent. 
Similarly, average earners are expected to lose around 5 per cent of benefits in the Slovak 
Republic, compared with 13 per cent for low earners. These countries explicitly wanted to 
strengthen the link between pensions in retirement and earnings when working in the belief that 
this was fairer than a redistributive system and that it would reduce work disincentive 
distortions in the labour market. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Results presented in this paper provide a robust evidence that OECD countries differ 
significantly in terms of older people poverty rates. Using a relative country-specific poverty line, 
almost 13 per cent of all older people (aged 66 or above) living in OECD member countries are 
identified as “poor”. Three country groupings are distinguished on the basis of poverty rates for 
older people: nine countries with low poverty rates for older people (<6 per cent), ten countries 
————— 
5  These results are drawn from Martin and Whiteford (2008) and OECD (2007). 




Impact of Pension Reforms on Net Replacement Rates by Earnings Level 
 
a) Reforms that Protected Low Earners 


















































b) Across-the-Board Cuts in Benefits 
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Figure 8 (continued) 
Impact of Pension Reforms on Net Replacement Rates by Earnings Level 
 
c) Reforms that Strengthened the Link Between Contributions and Earnings 

















































Source: Martin and Whitehouse (2008). 
 
with lower-than-average poverty rates (7-13 per cent) and eleven countries with 
higher-than-average poverty rates (>15 per cent). No single explanation can be meaningfully 
provided to explain this differentiation across the three groupings of countries. Countries with low 
poverty rates for older people generally have a good social safety net in the form of a basic pension 
(e.g. the Netherlands, New Zealand and Canada) and/or they offer strong redistribution in the 
earnings-related contributory pension schemes in the form of minimum guaranteed pensions. 
The overlapping group of single elderly women and the oldest age cohort 75+ have, in 
general, a much higher poverty rate compared to other subgroups of older people. The low pension 
income for older women is mainly due to the fact that their working lives experienced patterns of 
employment which has generally low coverage of pension scheme affiliation, and also they had 
childcare related gaps in their employment record. One reason for the high risk of poverty for the 
oldest age cohort is that this group has not enjoyed a pension coverage in many countries during 
the earlier part of their working career. When pension systems matured, they gradually offered 
greater opportunities to a larger group of working age people to be affiliated with a formal 
mechanism to save for their pensions. Another explanation is that in many countries the indexation 
of pension benefits with prices only led to pension benefits lagging behind the general evolution of 
income. 
There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that older people poverty rates in OECD 
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age groups above 50 have declined, while those for people below that age have risen. The decline 
in the poverty of retirees is indeed a reflection of the success story of past pension policies in 
providing for adequate pension benefits. However, in view of financial sustainability concerns 
linked with such pension generosity in many countries, recent pension reforms have scaled down 
the level of pension benefits. Thus, in the absence of extending working careers, it is likely that 
future generations of older persons will be more often poor than the rest of the population. The 
evidence presented in this paper show that reforms in some countries will make their systems less 
redistributive whereas other countries (such as the United Kingdom and France) have strengthened 
the protection of low earners in their reformed system. 
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ANNEX 
A SYNOPSIS OF POVERTY DEFINITION AND ITS MEASUREMENT 
The poverty definition adopted in this study is the relative country-specific poverty measure: 
this views poverty in a nationally defined social and economic context. It is commonly measured as 
the percentage of population with cash income less than some fixed proportion (say, 50 per cent) of 
national median income. Such relative poverty measures are now commonly used as the official 
poverty rate in several OECD countries. The measurements are usually based on a household’s 
yearly cash income and frequently take no account of household wealth, or inequality of resource 
distribution that may exist within a household. 
The main poverty line used in the OECD’s report Growing Unequal? (OECD, 2008) is based 
on a level of income that is set at 50 per cent of the median household income. Household income 
includes earnings, transfers and income from capital, and is measured here net of direct taxes and 
social security contributions paid by households. 
The data reported here are collected through a network of OECD’s national experts, who 
apply common conventions and definitions to the unit record data from different national data 
sources and supply detailed cross-tabulations to the OECD. Years of reference vary slightly across 
countries. For the mid-2000s, most data concern the year 2004, except for Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States for which data 
belong to 2005; and the Netherlands for which data belong to 2003. For the mid-1990s, most data 
concern the year 1995, except for Austria for which data belong to 1993; Ireland, Japan, Mexico 
and Turkey for which data belong to 1994; and the Czech Republic, France and Luxembourg for 
which data refer to 1996. 
Some qualifications for results presented in this report are in order. The estimates of the 
elderly poverty rates are very sensitive to some of the measurement methods adopted. 
•  First, the cash income definition used here exaggerates the poverty rates of the elderly 
compared to other groups because no account is taken of the value of services drawn from 
owner-occupied accommodations. In Denmark, for example, the inclusion of imputed rents in 
the income definition lowers the poverty headcount of the elderly from around 10 per cent to 
around 4 per cent, as compared to a reduction from 5.3 to 4.7 per cent for the entire population. 
•  Second, as the old age pension is often the main (or only) income source for the elderly, their 
cash income is typically clustered around the prevailing pension rates. This leads to the high 
sensitivity of poverty estimates to small changes in the income threshold used: in Australia, for 
example, the income-poverty rate falls from 26 per cent for a threshold of 50 per cent of median 
income, to 18 per cent for a threshold of 47 per cent. 
•  Third, estimates are very sensitive to the equivalence scale used: in Australia, the elderly 
poverty rate at 50 per cent of median income falls from 26 per cent based on the 0.5 equivalence 
scale used in this report, to 17 per cent based on the “modified OECD equivalence scale” 
(where the first adult has a weight of 1.0, the second and subsequent adults a weight of 0.5, and 
dependent children a weight of 0.3, which is closely approximated by an equivalence scale of 
0.6) conventionally used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
Household income data have other limitations as well. They do not include consumption 
value of durables or additional costs such as health insurance. Moreover, the income of current 
generation of older people reflects the pension rules of the past, and much has changed recently. 
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 THE OUTLOOK FOR PENSION SPENDING AND THE ROLE OF A RESERVE FUND 
Falilou Fall
* and Nicolas Ferrari
* 
Thanks to the abundant baby boom generations, for the past several decades demographics 
have been highly favourable to pensions funding. This benign situation is coming to an end as these 
generations reach retirement. Much of the attendant increase in pension spending is set to last, 
thanks notably to the durable rise in life expectancy. 
This is because the baby boom initially increased the proportion of children in the French 
population, and then, from the 1970s onwards, that of people of working age able to contribute. 
The increasing generosity of the French pension system was based on this highly propitious 
demographic situation. However, these favourable demographics partially hid the underlying 
ageing of the population and began to dwindle starting in 2006, as the first baby boomers took 
retirement. It will fade completely after 2030. After that date, the baby boom will no longer have 
any impact on the population’s age structure, which will revert to its long-term trend. 
To smooth the 
temporary baby boom 
shock, a reserve fund 
ought to have been put in 
place starting in the 
1970s, in order to build 
up surpluses during the 
entire period of 
favourable demographics. 
Instead, the system 
became increasingly 
generous, in proportions 
well above the leeway 
provided by the 
demographic situation, 
leading to the emergence 
of deficits. Consequently, 
even if it is unable to 
smooth the baby boom 
shock, the Fonds de 
Réserve pour les 
Retraites (FRR or 
Pension Reserve Fund) 
put in place in 2000 can 
help to smooth the rise in 
spending as these more 
abundant generations 
reach retirement (i.e., 
smooth the necessary   
————— 
*  Ministère de l’Economie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi, France. 
  This study was prepared under the authority of the Treasury and Economic Policy General Directorate and does not necessarily 
reflect the position of the Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment. 
  It was published for the first time in June 2008 for Trésor-Economics as No. 39. 
Sources: INSEE, INED, DGTPE calculations. 
Figure 1 
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adjustments); alternatively, it could serve as a long-term fund to finance pensions, or it could cushion 
the shock brought about by the temporary drop in the birth rate at the end of the 20th century. 
The Fonds de Réserve pour les Retraites (FRR or Pension Reserve Fund) was set up by the 
Social Security Finance Act in 1999. The intention was to build up a sizeable financial reserve 
from which it would be possible to draw down later in order to finance higher pension spending 
due to population ageing. At a time when public finances were briefly recovering, the aim was to 
spread the additional ageing-related charges over a longer period of time, notably drawing 
inspiration from other countries (Box 2). Under the 1999 Social Security Finance Act, amounts 
paid into the fund were placed in a reserve until 2020 for the benefit of the Caisse Nationale 
d’Assurance Vieillesse (CNAV or National Old Age Insurance Fund) and the pension schemes 
aligned with it.
1 The stated aim was to accumulate 1,000 billion francs (150 billion euros) by 2020 
in order to cope with the imbalances over the period 2020-40 (see Box 3). 
The FRR originated in the acknowledgment that old-age insurance spending was set to surge 
with the retirement of the baby boom generations. This has indeed has been happening since 2006, 
and the number of people subject to the CNAV scheme retiring has risen from a rate of 500,000 a 
year to 750,000. 
 
1  After three especially favourable decades, the demographics underlying pension 
funding are reverting to long-term trend 
1.1  Demographic shocks are modifying the conditions governing the funding of pensions systems 
In a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, contributions paid out of the income of the working 
population serve immediately to pay retirees’ pensions. A pay-as-you-go pension scheme is in 
balance each year if total contributions paid in equal total benefits paid out. This balance is 
achieved when the contribution rate is equal to the product of the average replacement rate 
(average pension relative to average wage) and of the economic dependency ratio (number of 
pensioners relative to the number of contributors). 
All other things being equal, population trends affect the dependency ratio, thereby 
modifying the pension systems’ financial situation. If the trends are structural, the parameters of the 
pension systems will need to be modified. Thus population ageing connected with the underlying 
rise in life expectancy is leading to an increase in economic dependency ratio. Accordingly, there 
are three “levers” that can help to keep the pensions systems solvent: 
•  raising contributions (or other receipts); 
•  reducing the replacement rate; 
•  lengthening the effective period of contribution, thereby reducing the economic dependency 
ratio by postponing the average age at which people retire and by increasing economic activity 
rates. 
In the event of a transitory demographic shock (as for example with the surplus of births in 
the baby boom), it is possible to let the pay-as-you-go system move temporarily away from 
equilibrium, either by accumulating reserves (in the event of a positive shock), or by borrowing (in 
————— 
1 The  CNAV  is the old-age pension sector of the “general (pension) scheme”, the equivalent schemes being the ORGANIC 
(Organisation Autonome Nationale de l’Industrie et du Commerce – Autonomous National Organisation for Industry and Trade), 
the CANCAVA (Caisse Autonome Nationale de Compensation d’Assurance Vieillesse des Artisans – National Autonomous Old-age 
Insurance Compensation Fund for Crafts and Tradespeople) and the employees’ scheme with the Mutualité Sociale Agricole (MSA – 
Farmers’ Mutual Welfare Fund).   The Outlook for Pension Spending and the Role of a Reserve Fund  539 
the case of a negative shock). In that sense, a reserve fund could be seen as a fourth additional lever 
for the funding of the pay-as-you-go retirement system. 
 
1.2  The deteriorating demographic dependency ratio is a long-term trend 
Future variations in the economic dependency ratio can be foreseen based on projections of 
the demographic dependency ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the population aged 55 and over 
(i.e., the population liable to be retired) to the population aged 15-64 (the population liable to be 
economically active). This is expected to rise sharply in the coming decades. Between 1960 and 
2005, the ratio rose by only 5 percentage points, from 37 to 42 per cent. According to the latest 
INSEE projections, this ratio is expected to increase by 23 percentage points between 2005 and 
2050, rising to 65 per cent (see Figure 1). 
Three factors allow us to break down trends in the population structure, namely: mortality 
rates, birth rates, and migration. These three factors have very different impacts on the 
demographic dependency ratio. 
Over the very long period, the change in the dependency ratio is very powerfully affected by 
the sharp gains in life expectancy achieved in the 19th and 20th centuries: lower mortality rates are 
leading to a larger proportion of elderly people in the population. This long-term trend has 
nevertheless experienced a number of upsets due to war (the Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870, and the First and Second World Wars, see Figure 5a and b), which sharply increased 
the mortality rate. 
 
Box 1 
Modelling the long-term trend 
Central scenario 
The demographic projections presented here are taken from the central scenario in the 
latest INSEE projections (July 2006). The scenario’s main assumptions are: 
•  the mortality rate continues to fall at the pace observed over the past 15 years, bringing 
with it a life expectancy at birth of 89.0 years for women and 83.8 years for men in 2050; 
•  the cyclical index of fertility is 1.9 children per woman, 
•  the migratory balance is +100,000 people per year. 
INSEE projections are available only until 2050. They have been extended beyond 
that date using these assumptions.
2 
The trend demographic dependency ratio (i.e., the number of people aged 55 and over 
relative to those aged 15-64, excluding demographic shocks) was calculated projecting a 
fictitious population with the aid of long-term trends in mortality rates, birth rates and 
migration. 
•  Actual mortality quotients have been used for the past, except in the case of wars, when 
they have been smoothed. For projection purposes, the INSEE mortality rate scenario has 
been applied (Figure 5a and b); 
————— 
2  More precisely, fertility by age remains at the level picked by INSEE from 2010 onwards. The profile of the migratory balance by 
age and sex remains at its level projected by INSEE. The rate of migratory increase remains at its 2050 level. Finally, the reduction 
in the mortality quotients predicted by INSEE is extended beyond 2050 (log-linear decline). 540  Falilou Fall and Nicolas Ferrari 
 
•  Fertility has come 
down from 5.4 
children per 
woman in 1740 to 
1.9 from 1980 on 
(Figure 4); 
• The  migratory 
replacement rate is 
maintained constant 
at a level 
consistent with a 
net migratory 
inflow of 100,000 
people per year. 
It should be 
noted that the 
migratory assumption 
has little impact on 
the demographic 
dependency ratio: the 
gaps between the 
observed (and then 
projected) ratio and 
this trend ratio stems 
primarily from the 
birth-rate shocks. 
 
Birth rate variant 
scenarios 
The birth-rate 
assumption plays a 
dual role here: 
•  it serves to project 
the age structure; 
• it leads to the 
definition of the 
long-term birth 
rate equilibrium 
and hence to an 
assessment of past 
birth-rate deficits. 
In the central 
scenario, we have 
assumed that the trend 
and project birth rates 
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Figure 2 
Dependency Ratio Depending on the Actual Birth Rate 
Figure 3 
Actual and Trend Ratio in the High-birth Rate Scenario 
Scope: Metropolitan France. 
Source: INSEE, INED, DGTPE calculations. 
Scope: Metropolitan France. 
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  in fact these rates 
can vary. Two 
types of birth-rate 
variants are 
therefore necessary, 
in answer to two 
distinct questions: 
1) What would be the 
gap between the 




woman) and the 
actual ratio with a 
projected birth rate 
different from 1.9?  
2) What are the birth 
rate shocks that 
need to be made 
good if the very 
long-term birth 
rate equilibrium is 
higher (2.1 children 
per woman) or   
 
  lower (1.7 children per woman) than the assumption of 1.9 children per woman? 
a) If the long-term trend is 1.9 children per woman, but the actual birth rate for the time 
frame considered is higher (2.1 children), the demographic ratio would never be lower 
than the currently envisaged trend ratio (Figure 2). Conversely, if the birth rate was lower 
(at 1.7 child), the ratio would be durably lower than the initially envisaged trend. 
b) If one assumes that the very long-term birth rate is 2.1 children per woman, the past 
birth-rate deficits are very large, resulting in a significantly lower demographic 
dependency ratio in relation to its trend under the 1.9 children per woman assumption 
(see Figure 3). Conversely, if we adopt a very long-term birth-rate equilibrium 
assumption of 1.7 children per woman, there would be no past birth rate deficit to be 
made good (see Figure 4). 
 
 
The specific baby boom shock comes on top of this long-term trend, consisting of a 
pronounced upturn in births from the end of the Second World War until the end of the 1960s 
(Figure 6). Far from being specific to France, the majority of industrialised countries experienced a 
similar shock. Whereas a continuation of the trend would have led rather to a cyclical fertility index 
of around 2 children per woman, the index approached 3 children per woman in the course of this 
period. The consequence of the demographic shock was to reduce the dependency ratio (Figure 1). 
Conversely, during the 1980s and 1990s, the birth rate was slightly lower than its level 
observed since 2000 (the level retained in the projections). Assuming a long-term birth rate of 
Figure 4 
Actual and Trend Ratio in the Low Birth-rate Scenario 
Scope: Metropolitan France. 









1.7 children per woman
long-term trend
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1.9 children per woman 
(the assumption adopted 
in the central scenario for 
the 2006 INSEE 
projections), this 
transitory birth deficit 
would lead to a 
worsening of the 
dependency ratio for the 
year 2006, sending it 
above its long-term trend 
between 2032 and 2062.  
Migratory flows 
are the third factor in 
demographic trends. This 
factor has little 
long-term impact on 
the dependency ratio. 
This is because growth in 
the immigrant population 
increases both the 
working population and 
the retired population, in 
the long term. On the 
other hand, migratory 
flows can temporarily 
“rejuvenate” or “age” the 
resident population 
depending on the relative 
ages of the migrants and 
residents. Immigration 
primarily concerns 
people of working age, 
so that it tends to reduce 
the dependency ratio 
temporarily (Figure 7). 
Overall, the 
demographic dependency 
ratio trend is essentially 
determined by long-term 
birth and mortality rate 
trends. The ratio itself 
may diverge from its 
trend primarily due to 
temporary birth-rate 
shocks and, secondarily, 
due to shocks resulting 
from migration and 
mortality (such as wars). 
Figure 5 
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Scope: Metropolitan France. 
Note: Life expectancy at birth is calculated on the basis of mortality by age group recorded for 
the current year. The projected trend reflects mortality trends in the central scenario for INSEE 
projections in 2006. This scenario has been extended here from 2050 to 2070. 
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  Figure 6
3  1.3  For more than 30 
years, the baby 
boom contributed 
positively to the 
financial balance of 
the pension system 
The baby boom was 
a massive shock in 
France, reducing the 
demographic dependency 
ratio for more than half a 
century (see Figure 1), 
which facilitated funding 
of the pension system. 
The expansion of the 
old-age insurance schemes 
between 1945 and 1983 
consequently took place 
in exceptionally 
favourable demographic 
conditions in the years 
following 1970. 
Advantage was taken of 
these conditions not to 
build up reserves (see 
next section), but to 
increase the generosity of 
the pension system. Its 
parameters were altered 
as if this particularly 
benign transitory 
situation was in fact 
permanent. 
The retirement of 
the first baby boom 
generations has 
prompted a sharp 
acceleration in pension 
spending. This 
phenomenon marks only 
the beginning of the 
dependency ratio’s 
return to long-term 
trend, the return being 
completed in the 2030s. 
————— 
3  The cyclical fertility index measures the number of children a woman would have had throughout her life if the observed birth rate 
for the year considered at each age had remained unchanged. The fertility rate at a given age is the number of live births for women 
at that age in the course of the year relative to the average population of women of the same age in that. 
Cyclical Fertility Index 
Scope: Metropolitan France. 
Source: INSEE and INED, DGTPE calculations for the trend. 
Figure 7 
Age Structures, 2004-05 
Scope: Metropolitan France. 
Source: INSEE, INED, DGTPE calculations. 
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Beyond 2030, the baby boom is roughly neutral in its effect on the demographic dependency 
ratio, the abundant retired baby boom generations being matched by equally abundant generations 
of working age. That is because the large cohorts of baby boomers proportionally increased the size 
of the following generations once their fertility rate reverted to a level close to the long term, 
permitting a renewal of generations. The trend will nevertheless be to a deterioration of the 
dependency ratio entailing a need to adapt the parameters of the pension system, notably by means 
of a lengthening of contribution periods. 
 
1.4  Demographics are slightly less benign than the trend line around 2040 
Beyond 2030, the dependency ratio is expected to worsen slightly relative to the long-term 
trend, for around 20 years. This is because the birth rate was lower in the last quarter of the 20th 
century, below the long-term target of 1.9 children per woman, thus reducing the size of the 
working age population at that time horizon. 
However, the uncertainty at this time horizon is considerable. In particular, the long-term 
demographic trend is highly dependent on the target birth rate adopted (here as in the INSEE 
projections) of 1.9 children per woman (see Box 1 for the impact of a change of assumption on the 
fertility rate). 
 
2  The possible aims of a reserve fund will determine its size and its horizon 
In the light of the foregoing demographic developments, the “smoothing” objective assigned 
to the Pension Reserve Fund set up in 1999 is ambiguous, since the expected rise in pension 
spending over the coming decades is not transitory. Below we review the different functions that 
could be assigned to the FRR. 
 
2.1  A fund to smooth demographic shocks 
2.1.1  The principle of a demographic shock smoothing fund 
In a pure pay-as-you-go system, pensions in a given year are funded exclusively by 
contributions for that year. In the case of temporary demographic shocks (such as a transitory drop 
in the birth rate, for example), it may be desirable to adapt the financial equilibrium constraint at 
each date by introducing reserves (or, conversely, by accepting a transitory debt). In that sense, a 
reserve fund is a means of smoothing the effects of temporary demographic shocks, fertility shocks 
in particular, via a form of collective capital funding. More precisely, it would serve to balance the 
system year by year, without permanently adjusting the three parameters, namely the contribution 
rate, the level of pensions, and the retirement age. It is out of purpose here to try to compensate for 
a permanent shock such as deterioration in the demographic dependency ratio. This will call for a 
gradual adjustment of the three aforementioned parameters, in particular lengthening the 
contribution period in order to avoid an undue deterioration in the economic dependency ratio. 
 
2.1.2  Smoothing the baby boom demographic shock? 
As explained in Section 1, a positive transitory birth-rate shock like the baby boom reduces 
the demographic dependency ratio for a few decades. As the smaller age groups preceding the baby 
boom die, the dependency ratio reverts to its long-term trend: the abundant retired baby boom 






















population having proportionally increased the size of the following generations). 
Consequently, to smooth the baby boom demographic shock (as defined in 2.1.1) it would 
have been necessary to build up reserves during the period in which this shock made the 
demographic dependency ratio more benign, i.e. over the entire period 1970-2030. This would have 
made it possible to cope with any eventual negative shock thereafter or to cushion the necessary 
tightening of the system as implied by the reversion to trend. Therefore, and given the high level of 
current and past pension system deficits, any smoothing of the baby boom shock that the FRR 
might provide is inherently very limited, even though the demographic context is still highly favourable. 
 
2.1.3  The FRR could smooth the temporary shock due to the drop in the fertility rate the end of the 
20th century 
In the present circumstances, the FRR could serve to compensate during the period 2030-60 
for the rise in the dependency ratio above its long-term trend due to fewer births in 1980-90 
compared with the rebound since 2000, now considered to be in line with the long term trend. 
Additional or top-up payments into the Fund should be relatively easy to make thanks to the baby 
boom, which will continue to improve the demographic situation until the end of the 2020s. 
This approach will entail spreading the top-up payments until around 2030. Until that date 
the baby boom will still imply a more favourable demographic dependency ratio than the trend. 
Beyond that, the ratio is expected to deteriorate relative to trend owing to the shock needing to be  
 
smoothed (namely the 
smaller size of 
contributing generations). 
In that case the Fund 
could drawdown from its 
reserves until around 2060. 
This approach would 
entail envisaging the 
Fund’s extinction beyond 
2060, a priori. However, 
this deadline could be 
revised in the light of any 
new shocks emerging, or 
if the very long-term 
outlook were to change. 
By limiting 
qualifying pensions 
schemes to those 
provided for by law (i.e., 
the “general scheme” and 
schemes aligned with it), 
and by assuming a long-
term trend of 1.9 children 
per woman, the current 
top-ups would be 
sufficient to avoid an 
increase in contributions 
between 2030 and 2060 
relative to the long-term trend. 
Figure 8 
Using the FRR to Smooth Demographic Shocks 
projections top-ups (+) or disbursements (-)
lefthand scale
2006 € Bn
actual demographic dependency  ratio 
(righthand scale)
trend demographic dependency ratio 
(righthand scale)
observed
Scope: Metropolitan France. 
Note: Assumption of a real return of 3 per cent, a potential growth scenario in projections, 
derived from 5th Report of the Commission d’orientation des retraites (French Pensions 
Commission). In the trend population growth scenario, the share of GDP devoted to covered 
pension schemes is constant. 
Source: INSEE, INED, DGTPE calculations. 

























2.2  A fund to smooth the rise in baby boom-linked spending 
The FRR is often defined as a fund to smooth, not the baby boom shock, but simply the 
“hump” in spending resulting from this generation’s arrival at retirement age. In its 3rd report, the 
Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites
4 proposed a smoothing function taking as its point of departure, 
not population trends, but future funding needs directly. The FRR was presented here as a means to 
accompany the pace of expected adjustments. In this case, the smoothing function was no longer 
linked to the gap relative to the long-term trend, but corresponds to a “linearization” of the 
necessary adjustments to balance the accounts of the pension schemes.
5 Thus conceived, the fund 
would naturally fall to zero once the shock had been smoothed. 
In this approach, calibrating the FRR’s smoothing function depends not only on the 
accelerating growth in spending resulting from the baby boom, but also from the changing 
parameters of the pension schemes. In addition, the date at which the Fund falls to zero is a matter 
of arbitrary choice, the size of the reserves required being heavily dependent on that choice. 
By setting this date at 2050 (as an illustration), this approach would lead to a linearization of 
the necessary adjustments between 2020 and 2050: top-ups would continue at their current rate 
until 2020 (i.e., 65 per cent of the 2 per cent “social levy” on investment income). The accumulated 
 
reserves would serve to 
smooth funding needs 
beyond that date: top-ups 
would progressively 
decline until 2025, after 
which disbursements 
from the fund would help 
to accompany the 
necessary adjustments to 
keep the Fund in balance. 
The current rate of top-ups 
would be sufficient for a 
scenario like this. It 
should be noted that this 
scenario is very fragile; it 
requires extending the 
COR’s pension spending 
projections beyond 2050. 
This scenario is 
illustrated in Figure 9, 
which notably represents 
the changes in the 
average equilibrium 
contribution rate, defined 
as the relationship 
between benefits paid by 
the different pension 
 
————— 
4 The  Conseil d’orientation des retraites (Pensions Steering Commission), founded in 2000, comprises members of both chambers of 
parliament, representatives of the social partners, experts, and government representatives. Its purpose is to continuously monitor 
and perform concerted expert appraisals of the old-age insurance system and to make proposals. 
5  By convention, these adjustments are generally expressed in terms of “additional contribution points” required to bring accounts 
into balance. But they can just as easily result from a reduction in spending or a broadening of the revenue base. 
Figure 9 
Using the FRR to Smooth Spending Growth 
Scope: Metropolitan France. 
Note: this figure schematically illustrates the use of the FRR in this approach. The 
equilibrium contribution rates cannot be seen as a result of projections. 
Source: INSEE, INED, CCSS, DGTPE calculations. 
observed      projections
SCHEMATIC ILLUSTRATION
top-ups (+) or disbursements (–)
(lefthand scale) 
equilibrium average contribution rate
excluding FRR (righthand scale)
equilibrium average contribution rate 
including FRR (righthand scale) 
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BOX 2 
Reserve funds in other countries 
The United States and Sweden pioneered the concept of pension reserve funds in 1944 
and 1960 respectively. Subsequently, growing realisation of the effects of the demographic 
shock led to the creation of similar funds in most of the rich countries almost simultaneously 
in the 1990s. While most of these funds are smoothing funds, they differ in terms of their 
size, forms of governance, and sources of funding and methods of control. 
Norway: The Government Pension Fund – Global was set up in 1990 and began to be 
built up from 1996. This fund is managed by the Central Bank of Norway and has no legal 
autonomy, being under the supervision of the Ministry of Financed and controlled by 
parliament. Its assets were equivalent to 83 per cent of GDP in 2006 (around 278 billion 
USD). It is funded mainly out of oil and gas revenues. 
Its assets are invested in equities (40 per cent) and bonds (60 per cent) (in 2006), and 
entirely outside Norway. The aim of the fund is to ensure inter-generational equity in the 
sharing of the financial windfall generated by the country’s oil and gas resources. 
The United States: The Social Security Trust Fund was set up in 1940. It is an integral 
part of the pension system and the Board of Trustees consists of members of the Federal 
Government and Congress. It submits an annual report to Congress. Its funds stem mainly 
from pension system surpluses, employers’ and employees’ contributions, and additional 
payments by government. Its assets were equivalent to more than 15 per cent of GDP, or 
2,048 billion USD in 2006, and must be invested in Treasury bonds (currently entirely in US 
Treasury bonds). This fund has a smoothing function but is not intended to fall to zero. 
Sweden: The AP-Fonden were set up in 1960 and reorganised in 2001. These are five 
Independent bodies each with its own board of directors, some of whose members are 
appointed by the government. Their assets were equivalent to 31 per cent of GDP in 2006 or 
117 billion USD, and are invested in equities (60 per cent) bonds (6 per cent) and other asset 
classes (4 per cent). Their aim is to smooth the pension system’s expenditures and revenues. 
Japan: The National Reserve Fund was set up in 1959 and was progressively 
transformed into an independent agency between 2001 and 2006, run by Ministry of Finance 
experts. Its assets were equivalent to 28 per cent of GDP in 2006, or 1,217 billion USD, 
invested in equities (22 per cent) and bonds (52 per cent). Although this fund has no explicit 
aim, it may be considered as a half-way house between a smoothing fund and a permanent fund. 
 
 
schemes and the total wage bill of contributors to those schemes. It should be noted that this 
scenario is based on the assumption of a lengthening of the duration of contributions in order to 
qualify for a full pension to 164 quarters in 2012 and 166 in 2020, the assumption used in the 
COR’s updated projections in November 2007. 
 
2.3  A permanent additional pension fund 
Finally, a pension reserve fund can be designed as a permanent means of additional funding 
for the old-age insurance system. After the fund’s build-up phase, its capital is preserved and its 
investment income contributes to the financing of pension spending. The fund is then akin to a 548  Falilou Fall and Nicolas Ferrari 
“collective pension fund”. In that case, the pension system stands in a middle position between a 
pure pay-as-you-go system and a funded system. 
This kind of fund needs a substantial capital base in order to play a significant role in the 
system’s financing. For example, the Charpin Report in April 1999 envisaged a reserve equivalent 
to a minimum of 10 per cent of GDP (at the end of 2007, the FRR was equivalent to around 
1.5 per cent of GDP). This approach calls for a substantial and durable process of accumulation. 
Given today’s very limited financial leeway, this would imply a major financial effort. It would 
have been possible and less costly to implement this, had the advantage of the benign baby boom 
demographic shock been taken several decades ago. 
Few countries have followed this path. The only countries with reserves representing 
10 per cent or more of GDP in 2006 were Norway (83 per cent of GDP), Jordan (46 per cent), 
Sweden (31  per cent), Japan (28 per cent), South Korea (21 per cent), the United States 
(16 per cent) and Ireland (11 per cent) (Box 2). Either these funds were set up a long time ago, as in 
the cases of Jordan, Japan, Sweden, South Korea and the United States, or they have benefited from 
an oil and gas “windfall” as in Norway’s case, or again from particularly robust economic growth 
as in Ireland’s case. 
 
2.4  A fund for the short-term smoothing of economic shocks 
A possible variant scenario might be a fund for the short-term smoothing of economic 
shocks. This would have a short horizon, corresponding to 5 to 10-year economic cycles, requiring 
smaller reserves. On this view, the fund would be intended to be permanent. 
 
3 Conclusions 
The main purpose of this study was to analyse the demographic factors and their impact on 
pension systems, and to consider the role a reserve fund can play in the context of the divergence 
from the long-term equilibrium. The study deliberately does not deal with the question of the 
financial management of the reserves. In particular, in the projections presented in Section 2, a 
purely normative assumption has been used for the return on reserves, corresponding to the average 
return on bonds over the long period (namely a 3 per cent real return). 
Actually, a reserve fund’s investments may be more profitable than repayment of 
Government debt, thereby generating leverage. This is because, despite a substantial short- and 
medium-term risk, asset prices exhibit a reversion to a trend over the long period. Consequently, a 
reserve fund can go overweight in risky (and hence high-yield) asset classes for as long as the 
disbursement horizon is distant, thus benefiting from attractive returns combined with limited 
long-term risk. By defining its schedule of income and disbursements, the FRR can optimise its 
returns for a given level of risk. However, even with a distant and well defined disbursement 
horizon, investment in the FRR would still be riskier than paying down the public debt. 
Leverage is obviously not contradictory with the Fund’s assigned objective (see above). But 
this leverage cannot be taken as the prime function of a reserve fund, and its size cannot be 
precisely calibrated on this basis. 
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BOX 3 
The history of the FRR 
Taking its cue from foreign examples and the report of the Conseil d’Analyse Economique 
(Council for Economic Analysis),
6 the French Government decided in September 1998 to set 
up a reserve fund for the pay-as-you-go pension system. This fund was meant to be 
constituted “without additional (employer and employee) contributions” out of exceptional 
resources and the surpluses of welfare schemes and those of the Caisses d’Épargne savings 
banks. It was thus expected to go “a long way towards” solving the pension system shortfall 
looking to 2005-2010. Consisting of “several tens of billions of francs”, the fund was 
required to invest primarily in French government securities and bonds. It was to be 
established and administered in consultation with the social partners. 
The FRR was set up by the 1999 Social Security Funding Act within the Fonds de 
Solidarité Vieillesse (FSV Old Age Solidarity Fund). The bill’s preamble stated that this 
reserve fund was being set up in order to preserve the future of the pay-as-you-go pension 
system. Three categories of income could be allocated to it, namely available surpluses from 
the Contribution Sociale de Solidarité des Sociétés (social solidarity contributions paid by 
companies), the surplus on the “solidarity section” of the Fonds de Solidarité Vieillesse, and 
any other resources designated by law or regulations. The Government planned to allocate 
2 billion francs in 1999 under the first of these categories, with the possibility of allocating 
additional resources in the course of the year. 
In April 1999, the Charpin Report raised a number of questions regarding this 
newly-created fund, namely: what was its objective, between “smoothing the expected 
increase in contribution rates” and permanently supplementing the pension schemes’ 
resources? How to replenish this fund on the basis of this objective? What type of investment 
should the fund favour? And what should be the fund’s form of governance? 
The Government announced its intention to strengthen the reserve fund in 2000. Based 
on the financial projections contained in the Charpin Report, the time horizon for the fund’s 
utilisation was put back, with disbursements starting no longer in 2005 but in 2020. The plan 
was to finance the fund thanks to the maintenance of a benign demographic situation until 
2006, and thanks to a return to growth and full employment. The intended resources were 
spelled out: 500 billion francs from CNAV, FSV and CSSS surpluses were to be added to the 
fund’s 20 billion francs at the end of 2000; of the additional 500 billion, 150 billion would be 
drawn from the social levies on investment income, and 330 billion from these reserves’ own 
interest and investment income. Overall, the Fund was expected to exceed 1,000 billion 
francs looking to 2020. It should be noted that the Fund was set up at a time when the public 
finances were recovering (even though the general government financial balance has been 
continuously negative), notably on the strength of the robust economic growth in the late-
1990s. The FRR became autonomous on 1 January 2002, taking the form of a Government 
administrative public institution (établissement public de l’État à caractère administratif) 
under State supervision, with a Management Board and a Supervisory Board. The 
20-member Supervisory Board is made up of 4 members of parliament, five representatives 
of social security “insureds” designated by the five trade union confederations, five   
————— 
6  Davanne, O. (1998), “Eléments d’analyse sur le système de retraite français” (Elements for an Analysis of the French Pension 
System), Retraites et épargne, CAE, July. 550  Falilou Fall and Nicolas Ferrari 
 
representatives of employers and self-employed workers (two designated by the 
Medef-employers’ federation, one by the CGPME-federation of SMEs, and one by the 
UPA-crafts and trades people’s federation), four State representatives, and two qualified 
personalities. 
•  The Supervisory Board is responsible for setting broad guidelines for the Fund’s 
investment policy, appointing the Statutory Auditors, controlling the Fund’s performance, 
closing the financial statements, and drawing up a public annual report on its 
management. 
•  The Management Board of the Pensions Reserve Fund consists of three members and is 
chaired by the Chief Executive of the Caisse des dépôts et consignations. The 
Management Board manages the institution and is “accountable for its proper 
functioning”. It is notably responsible for submitting broad guidelines for the Fund’s 
investment policy to the Supervisory Board and for implementing the said guidelines, 
drafting specifications for invitations to tender to manage the assets of the FRR 
(via mandates entrusted to investment firms). 
In 2003, the Supervisory Board of the Fund laid down the broad guidelines for the 
Fund’s investment policy, appointed the asset managers’ selection committee, and issued the 
first invitation to tender for asset management mandates. The strategic allocation is 
diversified, with both Eurozone and non-Eurozone equities and bonds. The predominance of 
equities serves to achieve high returns, the associated risk being smoothed by the distant 
horizon for disbursements. The process of investment gathered momentum in 2004. 
The strategic allocation formulated in 2003 was refined in 2006, based on an 
assumption of constant disbursements over the period 2020-2040. This change of objective 
and the lengthening of the disbursement period has led to a shift in the strategic allocation in 
the direction of greater risk, an increase in the equity weighting (from 55 to 60 per cent), 
greater diversification, with an increase in the proportion of non-Eurozone investments and 
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The two papers on which I was asked to comment – “Macroeconomic Implications of 
Pension Reform” by Ray Barrell, Ian Hurst, and Simon Kirby; and “Poverty and Income of Older 
People in OECD Countries” by Asghar Zaidi – cover quite different topics and I will have to take 
them up in turn. 
 
1  Comments on “Macroeconomic Implications of Pension Reform or How to Pay for the 
Crisis” by Ray Barrell, Ian Hurst and Simon Kirby 
The paper by Ray Barrel and others uses the global macro model of the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research to assess the macroeconomic effect of pension reform and, more 
specifically, of increases in the perception of expected life, and of increases in working life. 
This is a very useful paper. The National Institute model, has many features that make it 
useful for the purpose of assessing the macroeconomic effects of the pension reforms, including 
being a general equilibrium model, its possible use for assessing the behavior of small but also 
large open economies, and, last but not least, the fact that its parameters have been estimated not 
imposed, unlike other general equilibrium dynamic models. 
This said, I have some observations to offer, and some related questions. 
First, as underscored by the website of the National Institute, the National Institute model 
(NiGEM) is “designed to be a flexible model, where assumptions on behavior and policy can be 
changed. Hence, there is no such thing as “the NiGEM simulation results suggest” but rather, 
“under these assumptions, the NiGEM simulation results suggest”. In this respect, the paper does 
clarify what the assumptions are for the various scenarios, but the authors could have underscored 
better where some results depend on certain assumptions. More to the point, I  would suggest 
undertaking more sensitivity analysis with respect to the various assumptions, including the speed 
through which agents respond to reforms. I will come back to this. 
Second, the paper explores the macroeconomic effect of an increase in the perception of 
expected life. It argues that raising the retirement age will increase people’s perception of their life 
expectancy. The question is whether there are any empirical studies to support this assumption. 
Third, the paper looks first at the effect of an increase in expected life, for a given working 
life, then at an increase in working life, given expected life, but it does not look at a combination of 
the two, which would have been interesting. 
Fourth, I am a bit skeptical about the quantitative results achieved for the euro area. For 
example, the equation describing the transfers to the population for pensions and unemployment 
benefits is the same across all countries and, therefore, does not take into account country-specific 
features of the pension system. So, I am not sure I can trust the key numerical result of the paper, 
namely that raising the retirement age by 2 years in the euro area would save 40 percentage points 
of GDP in the long run. More work is needed here. 
————— 
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Fifth, it would have been interesting to assess some of the results in light of the current crisis. 
For example, the paper assumes that the availability of increased labor following an increase in the 
retirement age is fully anticipated, which will provide the market enough time to adjust. In practice, 
however, how fast markets will adjust would depend on the state of the macro economy. For 
instance, it would be difficult to raise capital investment in the current global economic slowdown 
to accommodate the increased labor supply. 
This raises my last and more general point, a point that is of key policy relevance. I am 
referring to the fiscal costs of the current crisis. I fully agree with the authors that pension reform, 
to be implemented gradually but legislated quickly, should be a key component of a strategy to 
finance the fiscal costs of the crisis, or, in other words, to allow governments to run in the short run 
expansionary policies while maintaining credibility in the long run solvency of public finances. 
However, from a purely accounting/budgetary perspective, saying that the cost of the crisis will be 
40 per cent and that we can finance this by increasing the retirement age by 2 years is a bit 
misleading, because even before the crisis, increasing the retirement age by 2 years or more was 
necessary to ensure debt stability in the long run in European countries. 
This said, I think the policy message remains appropriate. We should worry less about an 
increase in public debt, even as large as the one that we are experiencing now in all advanced 
countries, if, at the same time, these countries can show the ability to undertake reforms that will 
address the unresolved long-term pension problem. The paper recently prepared by the Fiscal 
Affairs Department of the IMF on “The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term 
Policies After the 2008 Crisis” (http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/030609.pdf – 
published on our website on March 6 and forthcoming as an IMF Occasional Paper) includes an 
interesting statistic. In NPV terms, the fiscal cost of the crisis is about 10 per cent of the future cost 
arising from aging for advanced G-20 countries. So you can go a long way in strengthening the 
perception of long-term solvency, in spite of the short-term costs of the crisis, by reforming the 
entitlement system. 
 
2  Comments on “Poverty and Income of Older People in OECD Countries” by Asghar 
Zaidi 
The paper is mostly descriptive. It does includes some interesting statistics on poverty across 
OECD countries. However, my general comment is that its findings  could potentially be  very 
sensitive  to the measurement methods and  the definition of poverty adopted. Therefore, some 
sensitivity analysis would be required to strengthen the robustness of the results. 
The most relevant case in point is that the paper should acknowledge that the discussion of 
absolute versus relative poverty concepts is not settled, and take this into account by showing how 
sensitive the  results are with respect to the  use of alternative measures of absolute 
poverty. Important drawbacks of relative poverty measures, some of them particularly relevant in 
the case of pensioners, include: 
•  first, the fact that the purchasing power of the poor is obviously very different across countries. 
It would be, therefore, useful to define a consumption basket that could be considered as the 
minimum standard. The concept of a consumption basket is also more in line with the fact that 
individuals derive utility from consumption rather than from income; 
• second, the focus on relative poverty can lead to misleading  representations of 
poverty developments. Examples are mentioned in the text of the paper but mentioning them is 
not a solution. For example, in countries that experienced sharp growth spurts in recent years, 
where  the income of the working  population increases significantly while  not affecting the   Comments on Session 3: Pension Reform, Redistribution, Macroeconomic Impact  553 
 
income of the  old by the same extent, the use of the relative poverty indicators results in 
concluding that poverty in old age has increased; 
•  the focus on relative poverty could also lead to justify redistribution in favor of individuals who 
may hold sufficient assets or income to live comfortably; 
•  in this connection, the fact that measurements of poverty in this paper do not take into account 
household wealth should be highlighted. With growing household access to financial markets in 
many OECD countries in the sample, people in retirement could potentially receive significant 
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I, too, want to thank and congratulate Daniele Franco and his team for putting together this 
wonderful conference. I hope that my remarks will be as helpful as those of the earlier speakers. I 
was asked to comment in particular on Adi Brender’s piece on the “Distributive Effects of Israel’s 
Pension System” and Mallavarapu Ramaiah’s “Some Reflections on Pension Reforms in India”. 
These papers demonstrate the complexities of actual pension systems and the importance of the 
details in designing such programs. Because these design features depend on the goals of the 
pension system, it is critical to begin by outlining the principal goals of pensions and pension 
policies. 
Let me posit the objectives for government pension policy. Of course, the overarching aim of 
pension programs is to provide financial well-being during retirement. Policymakers evaluate this 
goal by paying particular attention to several criteria: 1) the system’s ability to alleviate poverty 
among the elderly, 2) the adequacy of retirement income relative to income during the working 
years, 3) the distribution of income within and across cohorts, and 4) the distribution of risk bearing 
and risk sharing within and across cohorts. Risk can come from various sources, including shocks 
to labor market and household composition, the variability of investment returns while working, 
and the risk from inflation and outliving ones assets when retired. As we have seen in the earlier 
sessions, the trick in designing a pension system is to meet these goals without distorting labor 
supply or savings decisions while maintaining solid public finances. This has proved difficult and 
has led to much reform of the pension sector. I think that most recent reforms have been driven by 
the desire to reduce government budget imbalances. 
The design of each country’s pension system and the reforms undertaken depend in large 
part on the relative importance of each of these goals. One canonical design is the three pillars. The 
three pillars are: 
1)  a universal poverty-level pension that is government-provided by nature. 
2) a mandatory earnings-related pension, which could be either a defined benefit (DB) or defined 
contribution (DC) plan and which is funded by the individual, employer, or government. 
3) voluntary retirement savings, where the government role may include fomenting reliable 
financial institutions with suitable investment products, introducing dedicated individual 
retirement accounts with restrictions on withdrawals and favorable tax treatment of 
contributions, investment returns, and/or disbursements. 
With respect to the goals I outlined above, the first pillar protects the elderly from absolute 
poverty, but does not protect them from a large decline in their standard of living relative to their 
working years. It also provides some redistribution of income and risk sharing. The second pillar is 
in place to ensure adequate retirement income, the second goal. The design choices of how it is 
funded and whether it is a DB or DC plan has important implications for the distribution of income 
and risk sharing. Policymakers use the third pillar if the first two pillars do not generate enough 
retirement income or to offset distortions or incentives elsewhere. Israel has adopted a version of 
the three pillars. In contrast, India’s structure appears to lack the first pillar, the second pillar is not 
————— 
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completely formed as it has very low coverage across workers, and the third pillar is also under 
construction. Looking at the choices made by India and Israel, it appears that India puts relatively 
less weight on the goals of old-age poverty prevention and income redistribution than does Israel. 
 
2  Comments on “Distributive Effects of Israel’s Pension System” by Adi Brender 
Let me turn to Adi Brender’s paper on Israel. It clearly laid out the key parameters of the 
pension system and the simulations of the combined Old-age Allowances (OAA) and pension 
program were quite instructive. Israel has shifted from a DB plan to a somewhat smaller DB plan 
(the OAA) augmented by a DC plan with tax benefits. The DC plan is now mandatory. Thus, the 
plan resembles the three pillars. Brender uses 10 household types to examine the distribution of net 
benefits of the pension system and adequacy of retirement income. He simulates retirement income 
and taxes for households assuming that the DC plan is utilized up to the limit by all households and 
the real rate of return on the portfolio is 3.5 per cent. The simulations were quite helpful in 
understanding the working of the system. That said, the simulated households should be linked up 
with the quintile measures shown in many of the tables. For example, I think it might be helpful to 
reorganize the 10 types of households into 9 types with three levels of income and three types of 
family structures: first quintile, middle quintile and top quintile; single, married one-worker, 
married two-earner. This would allow the reader to link the simulations to the quintile-based 
analysis. 
His first conclusion is that gross OAA benefits are distributed fairly evenly across 
households. As shown in Table 11, the complex formula for OAA benefits essentially boils down 
to $7 million NIS for single households and $1.1 million in benefits for couples. Given that 
$1.1 million NIS, when annuitized, is equivalent to 94 per cent of the wages of a continuously 
employed manual worker, it appears that the OAA is effective at providing poverty protection for 
low-income couples. Indeed, even for single households, where the benefit is only $0.7 million 
NIS, the replacement rate is 50 per cent of wages and the benefit is roughly equal to the poverty 
line. According to these calculations, the first pillar is well designed at preventing poverty among 
the elderly. That said, these stylized households may not capture all the variation in work and 
household formation experiences. For example, the paper on pension adequacy in Belgium, Italy 
and Germany (Dekkers et al.) suggests that the “messiness” of real life sometimes ends in poverty 
in old age – with systems that appear to be more generous than the Israeli system. Thus, I would 
like to know more about the adequacy of the OAA at poverty prevention for low- and 
moderate-income families for a wider range of work/marriage histories. I understand how 
challenging this would be and that it may be beyond the scope of this work; however, this is critical 
for judging whether the OAA is sufficient, a key determination of the paper. 
The second major conclusion of the paper is that the mandatory DC program is too large for 
many households as it will deliver too much income in the retirement years and result in too little 
disposable income during working years. For example, because the OAA delivers benefits equal to 
94 per cent of earnings (Table 12), low-income couples do not need additional pension income 
beyond the OAA to maintain their working years’ standard of living (see type 1). By contrast, 
low-income singles (type 6), with only a 50 per cent replacement rate, will need additional income. 
In addition, OAA benefits for middle- and upper-income households are insufficient for adequate 
retirement income. For middle-income households, it appears that the OAA replacement rates are 
similar to those delivered by the U.S. social security system and that a second pillar is clearly 
needed for the middle-income group. However, the mandatory DC plan will generate too much   Comments on Session 3: Pension Reform, Redistribution, Macroeconomic Impact  557 
saving for most households as is shown by column 2 of Table 12, particularly for low-income 
households.
1 
As a result, Brender recommends that the DC plan not be made mandatory because doing so 
will cause lower income groups to save too much. This would not be a problem if households could 
offset the over-saving elsewhere. However, I suspect that over-saving in the retirement accounts 
will be difficult to offset by lower saving elsewhere – e.g., less precautionary saving or less 
housing wealth. Therefore, with saving too high during working years, households may adjust by 
reducing labor supply as workers near the retirement age, thus creating a material distortion in 
labor supply. 
But is a voluntary DC plan the best solution? In the U.S., voluntary savings plans such as 
IRAs and 401(k)s have only 60 per cent take up rate and fairly low levels of asset accumulation. 
This suggests that if the pension plan were voluntary, then many households would enter retirement 
with too little saving because they would rely only on the OAA. Brender presents evidence that 
indicates that many Israeli households do save in voluntary accounts, but that contributions rates 
are low for low-income employees. My reading of his evidence is that it is consistent with the U.S. 
experience and thus that a voluntary plan would lead to too little retirement income for many 
households. 
An alternative response to the over-saving problem would be to make several adjustments to 
the parameters of the OAA and DC programs. First, since overall replacement rates are too high, 
the mandatory pension program could be scaled back significantly, perhaps by a third. This would 
reduce the amount of over-saving at the low end but would not eliminate it. Second, the relative 
importance of the OAA and the pension plans could be shifted towards pensions – which are 
proportional to income – and away from the flat benefit. In itself, this would help flatten the net 
replacement rate and reduce the tendency for over-saving at the bottom end of the distribution. 
Third, because shifting from the OAA to pensions would shift the net tax burden towards lower 
income families, that aspect could be undone by subsidizing a portion of the pension savings. With 
these three changes, the two pillars could be adjusted to largely eliminate the over-saving problem 
without creating an under-saving problem. 
The third major contribution by Brender is his examination of the distributional aspects of 
the combined OAA/pension programs. He concludes that net benefits (gross benefits plus tax 
benefits, net of contributions) are distributed fairly evenly across households in terms of shekels 
per adult. Brender makes an important point that one needs to look at the whole tax system to make 
a judgment on progressivity, especially since it is not self-financing. 
One extension to Brender’s paper would be to examine the adequacy of the new pension 
system under different assumptions about rates of return. The new system also shifts investment 
risk to workers, which will create more variation in replacement rates than shown here where the 
real return is assumed to be constant. This also may affect desired target replacement rates as actual 
replacement rates will vary. 
 
3  Comments on “Some Reflections on Pension Reforms in India” by Mallavarapu 
Ramaiah 
————— 
1  The replacement rates reported by Brender exclude any income or assets outside the OAA and DC plans. Thus actual resources 
available at retirement would be even higher. However, Brender’s calculations exclude simulated mortgage payments from income 
during working years. By comparing post-retirement income to pre-retirement income excluding mortgage payments, he implicitly 
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Turning to Ramaiah’s “Some Reflections on Pension Reforms in India,” my first suggestion 
is that Ramaiah should include a short description of the goals of the pension reform and which 
features of the reforms addressed these goals. Before the recent reforms, India essentially had a 
defined benefit plan with low coverage – civil servants and a portion of those in the formal 
economy, only 12 per cent of the workforce – which was seen as unsustainable. The new system is 
a defined contribution plan that is mandatory for civil servants and those in the formal workforce. 
The only subsidy/transfer from the government is in the form of tax benefits for the DC program. 
According to the paper, the key benefits from recent reforms include: a more sustainable pension 
system, a unified regulatory framework, improved system parameters such as portability across 
employers, and the creation of pension institutions that can be expanded into other sectors. 
However, coverage has not been expanded, and risk, in many dimensions, has been shifted from 
the government/taxpayer to the household. The net benefits, as they come from tax preferences, are 
probably regressive, but one also has to account for the other taxes to finance the system to make a 
judgment on the overall progressivity of the pension reforms.  
This description leads me to several questions. As noted in the paper, India’s demographics 
are very favorable. Over what horizon was the former system putting pressure on government 
finances? How much improvement in public finances was accomplished as a result of the reforms? 
Shifting from pay-as-you-go to funded systems for new entrants leaves a financing hole for the 
pay-as-you-go system. How was that filled? According to U.S. experience, preferential tax 
treatment may not boost voluntary saving for retirement significantly. What options are being 
contemplated to expand coverage in the private sector? 
Turning to the design of the DC plan, the paper lacks some of the key parameters of the DC 
plan, such as size of contributions, expected replacement rates, and the type of disbursement at 
retirement (nominal annuity, real annuity, lump sum). DC plans for low-income workers tend to 
have relatively high administrative costs. It is asserted that the Indian system has low costs 
compared to prevalent charges in the Indian mutual fund industry, but no data are provided. How 
do the administrative costs for the Indian plan compare to other countries’ experiences? Are the 
centralized recordkeeping and administration costs subsidized by the government, and does 
centralization materially reduce costs? According to the paper, individuals choose fund managers, 
and these funds have limited amount of flexibility over portfolio choice. 
Ramaiah provides a substantial discussion concerning the composition of portfolios 
(between equities and bonds) and the creation of an “auto choice” plan with an age-varying 
portfolio. Given the relatively low limits contemplated for equity investments, it appears to me that 
the riskiness of bond portfolios may be under-appreciated in this discussion. For example, Shiller 
(2005) shows the rates of return are much higher for equity portfolios than for bond portfolios and 
the riskiness between the two is little different when examined over long periods of time.
2 The 
recommendations are heavily weighted towards bonds, but bond portfolios may have significant 
inflation risk. Are inflation–protected securities available for the investment funds, or is the 
government contemplating issuing them? Moreover, there is no discussion about whether the 
pension benefits will be delivered as a real or nominal annuity. Inflation protection of the benefit 
during retirement may be as an important element of risk for the household as is the portfolio return 




2  Shiller, R. (2005), “The Life-cycle Personal Accounts Proposal for Social Security: An Evaluation”, NBER, Working Paper, 
No. 11300, April. The equity portfolio exhibited a wider range of returns, but the lowest outcome was higher than the 25
th percentile 
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Israel has adopted a three pillar structure for its pension system. The new system should 
provide good protection against poverty, more than adequate income security, and an adequate 
amount of risk sharing via the minimum benefit. Brender shows that the combined program may be 
too large and that better integration of the two systems is needed. India has adopted the second 
pillar via a mandatory DC plan (for some sectors) and is trying to improve the third pillar by 
improving financial institutions and by giving retirement savings favorable tax treatment. Its 
challenges will be to complete the roll-out of the current program, to extend the quite limited 
coverage, and to create a first pillar. Both papers indicate that the changes improve public finances, 
but the magnitude of the adjustment should be indicated. Also, it is unclear whether imbalances 
still remain. 
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First and foremost, let me express my gratitude to Daniele and his colleagues at the Banca 
d’Italia for their warm welcome and the wonderful organization of this Perugia symposium. 
Economists, in my view, forget too easily that the ultimate objective of economic policy is 
not price stability or the soundness of public finances but poverty reduction. Therefore I am happy 
to be asked to comment two articles that deal with that issue. 
The article by Franco et al. uses micro data to illustrate disparities existing across European 
countries in terms of level of poverty. Its main conclusions are: (1) poverty rates differ significantly 
among countries and across categories (children, adults and elderly); (2) the highest poverty rates 
for children and the elderly are found in the group of Anglo Saxon and Southern European 
countries; and (3) but, whatever the group of countries, it highlights a pro-old bias in the design of 
public policies which seems to give more assistance to the elderly compared to children. 
The article by Dekker et al. aims at assessing, thanks to a micro simulation model and on the 
basis of the Ageing Working Group (AWG) projections, the foreseeable impact on pensioner’s 
income of the recent reforms of PAYG schemes implemented in three countries: Belgium, 
Germany and Italy. Its main conclusions are not surprising for fiscal experts: (1) a large decline of 
pension levels and replacement rates must be expected; (2) demographic ageing has a significant 
impact on the future adequacy of pensions. Indeed, the risk of poverty pertaining to pension benefit 
recipients strongly increases by 2020 and then tends to decrease a bit; and (3) impact of parametric 
reforms (Belgium, Germany) and systemic reforms (Italy) on redistribution and poverty go into the 
same direction but the magnitude differs (it is higher in the case of Italy). 
If we attempt to make a synthesis, we can say that both articles have a common feature. They 
deal with the impact of public policies on the poverty rate. It is true that poverty is also sensitive to 
factors like demography, economic, social or cultural conditions, and its level and distribution 
across the age categories are to a large extent dependent on the design of public policies. Thus, the 
two articles raise important converging questions: 
•  how can we account for the pro old bias and should it be corrected? 
•  do the reforms aimed at curbing the rise in pension expenditure endanger the necessary 
solidarity between generations? 
The first issue raised by the two articles is the definition of poverty. The answer is not 
evident as poverty is a multi-dimensional concept which can be captured with different indicators: 
•  the easiest way to define poverty is to consider monetary indicators as Franco et al. do. In 
Europe, Eurostat computes for each country a poverty threshold equal to 60 per cent of the 
median income in the country under review. This indicator is easy to monitor and series are 
available on a long period. But the measure of poverty is relative as the indicator is based on the 
living standards of households in each country; 
•  there are also composite indicators on human development computed by the United Nations or 
the World Bank and which take into account different parameters like life expectancy, housing 
conditions, access to medical care, education, drinking water, etc…; 
————— 
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•  then, there exists subjective poverty indicators aimed at capturing the way people assess their 
own living standards. Indeed, how living conditions are felt can be significantly different from 
the picture given by statistics taking into account your environment. 
Obviously no indicator is able to describe the whole reality. In addition, you must keep in 
mind that poverty has always some national specificity. First, each society is more or less tolerant 
towards poverty, which will define the level of public redistribution; Furthermore, redistribution 
can go through other channels than public intervention. Last when you examine the poverty rate 
today, you always have to find its main origins in the past, as poverty remains to a large extent an 
inheritance of history. 
To illustrate the impact of public policies, I inserted in my discussion the figure above about 
the distribution of poverty across the age for France in 2007. 
The figure is consistent with the general conclusions of the Franco et al. article. Poverty rates 
are higher for the younger It is a little surprising in the case of France as the country developed a 
very generous family allowance scheme (which partly explains why France kept a relatively high 
fertility rate). But family allowances are not means-tested and are therefore insufficiently targeted 
on families with low revenue. An additional problem is the very high rate recorded for young 
adults between 18 and 24. In France young adults are especially hit by poverty because of high 
unemployment for those leaving the education system without any diploma and also because of the 
existence of a hole in the nest of public benefits. Indeed, young adults are no more eligible to 
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starts at the age of 25. This illustrates how the design of public policies can play a very important 
role to explain the distribution of poverty in the population. 
The article by Franco et al. draws a very comprehensive picture of the state of poverty in the 
European Union 27 countries. Furthermore, it raises very relevant issues on the stance of public 
policies aimed at reducing poverty and their apparent pro old bias. 
My first comment is about the limits inherent to monetary poverty indicators. First, they are 
relative indicators that give a picture of poverty rates for each country but say nothing about 
poverty levels. Thus comparisons between countries are made more difficult (better to be poor in 
Sweden than in Romania). Moreover these indicators are computed on a national basis which let 
room to huge disparities across regions within a single country (e.g., North and South of Italy). 
Lastly they are based on the official data and they do not take into account the informal economy, 
self consumption or the extent of family support, all phenomenon’s that can greatly reduce poverty. 
Conversely, drop outs such as illegal migrant workers are beyond the scope of official indicators. 
Moreover, although I do not question the existence of a pro old bias as reflected by the 
distribution of public expenditure across the age, I wonder whether this bias should be corrected by 
the fact that young people, even if they get less direct benefits from the public administrations 
compared with the elderly, do get indirect assistance through the allowances received by their 
parents. Thus, children poverty could be partly overestimated. 
At the end, the article by Franco et al. raises a very important question for the European 
countries. Should social policies be reoriented in favour of the young people? At first thought, I 
would be tempted to say yes for the two following reasons. First, we need to increase potential 
growth in Europe. And to reach that objective one instrument is to help active or future active 
people in order they improve their contribution to the labour force. Then there is the argument of 
effectiveness: reducing children poverty should contribute to contain the elderly poverty in the 
future because poverty is frequently received in inheritance. 
In addition, I think that understanding the roots of poverty cannot be based only on a picture 
of poverty rates at a given date. What is also very important is to assess why the persons have been 
trapped in this situation. It can be done through comparative studies over time and microeconomic 
analysis aimed at finding if poverty traps are existing or which trajectories fuel the population in 
poverty state in each country. 
The article by Dekkers et al. takes a prospective view centred on the impact of recent 
reforms of pension regimes on the income level of retirees. Indeed this issue is crucial. Taking the 
example of France, although the same trend was observed in most of European countries, the 
elderly poverty continually receded as from 1945 thanks to several factors (extension of the 
coverage of pension systems, more generous pensions, and an increase in the women participation 
rate). Today, the poverty rate is lower than that of the working population but a reversal risks 
occurring under the impact of the rise of unemployment which makes it difficult to get full pension 
benefits and population ageing which threatens the financial balance of pay as you go pension 
systems. 
As a preliminary remark, the AWG cannot be criticized for having disregarded the issue of 
poverty as its mandate is to assess the foreseeable development of the financial balance of pension 
regimes and not the adequacy of pension benefits; 
I will not comment the results of the MIDAS model but I think we should be cautions with 
their interpretation. 
First, one should keep in mind that the model does not thake into account income other that 
pensions in the framework of public systems. Capital income is not in the scope of this study nor 564 Laurent  Paul 
 
capitalization funded schemes developed as a replacement to the lesser generosity of PAYG 
systems. 
Also the model is based on Gini coefficients which feature the development over time of 
pension distribution. This constitutes a relative value analysis which does not necessarily imply a 
rise in poverty but merely an increase in the risk of poverty. Indeed, you can record at the same 
time a reduction of poverty if a system of minimum pension is implemented by the government. At 
last, like any long term projection, adjustments even very small in the parameters related to 
demography and economic growth may substantially change the results. 
A very important question is raised by the paper. Should the objectives of current pension 
regime reforms be twofold: sustainability and reduction of poverty?  
The main problem in my view is the insurance logics inherent to a pension scheme and the 
need for solidarity is difficult to mix. PAYG schemes or funded schemes as well imply a close link 
between the financial effort of contributors and the benefits they will be entitled when they retire. 
Certain specifics risks (spouse survival, disability) may be covered within these schemes through 
risk pooling. However, for those who have not contributed at all or too little, a specific financing 
has to be found to guarantee a minimum pension which can be brought only through the State 
budget. 
The article by Dekkers et al. gives relevant simulations on the foreseeable development in 
pension income compared to income received during working life. Within this framework, I would 
suggest the authors some ways to go further by testing additional variables which could produce a 
substantial impact on the central scenario: 
•  an increase in women participation rates; 
•  changes in migration flows; 
•  an extension of the number of retirees holding simultaneously an activity. 
At last, I wonder whether it is possible to extend the model in order to take into account 
other factors that can interfere in the elderly poverty rate such as the household capital and the 
impact of public policies. 
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PENSION REFORM AND FISCAL POLICY 
   
  
CHOOSING A PENSION REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE SOCIAL PLANNER 
Frédéric Gonand
 * 
This paper investigates the issue of which reform of the pay-as-you-go pension system a 
social planner should choose given its aversion to intergenerational inequality and its discount 
rate of the welfare of future generations. For this purpose, an applied normative economics 
methodology is develops which uses as a starting point the results of a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with overlapping generations (GE-OLG). This model simulates the economic 
impact of different PAYG pension reforms in the United States, Japan, France and Germany. 
It shows that a social planner can hardly decide for one pension reform or another on the 
exclusive basis of the GDP criterion (except in the case of tax hikes balancing the regime which 
have sizeable detrimental effects on the growth rate). 
Taking account of the intergenerational redistributive effects of the reforms thus becomes 
crucial for the social planner because it allows for discriminating between different possible 
scenarios. Freezing the age of retirement in an ageing context triggers strong intergenerational 
redistributive effects, whereas reforms incorporating a rise in the average age of retirement limit 
strongly these intergenerational redistributive influences. However, in the four countries 
considered here, no pension reform is found to be Pareto-improving. Compared to a no-reform, 
baseline tax hikes scenario, PAYG pension reforms weigh down more or less on the intertemporal 
welfare of the baby-boomers and increase the welfare of their children and of future generations. 
Social welfare functionals encapsulating a variable degree of aversion to intergenerational 
inequality and a variable discount rate of the welfare of future generations show that the social 
planner in the United States and Japan is likely to favor reforms bolstering private savings at 
unchanged age of retirement. In Germany and France, the social choice favors scenarios 
increasing the age of retirement. In all countries, the status quo corresponding to tax hikes 
balancing the pension regime characterizes a social planner with rawlsian preferences. 
 
1  Introduction and main results 
1  This paper investigates the issue of which reform of the pay-as-you-go pension system a 
social planner should choose given its aversion to intergenerational inequality and its discount rate 
of the welfare of future generations. 
2  With population ageing, reforms of PAYG systems have become of paramount importance 
in most OECD countries. They typically involve either a rise in the contribution rate, a decline in 
the replacement rate and/or an increase in the average age of retirement – otherwise public debt 
would follow an unsustainable path in most cases.
1 Such reforms can have a significant impact on 
capital accumulation and labor supply, thus on economic growth and aggregate welfare. From a 
microeconomic point of view, the impact of pension reforms on households’ welfare also depends 
on their age when the reform is announced. Accordingly, pension reforms bring about 
intergenerational equity issues. Overall, the choice for a pension reform by a social planner caring 
about growth as well as intergenerational equity is not trivial a priori and deserves investigation. 
————— 
*  Laboratoire d’économétrie - Ecole Polytechnique (France). E-mail: frederic.gonand@polytechnique.edu 
  The author is indebted to Pierre Pestieau, Philippe Mongin, Florence Legros, David de la Croix, Bertrand Wigniolle, Didier 
Blanchet and Boris Cournède for their comments and useful inputs in this study. Remaining errors and/or omissions are mine. The 
views expressed here are mine. 
1  See European Commission (2006) for long-term projections of debt levels on unchanged policy settings. 568 Frédéric  Gonand 
3  In this paper, the simulations of the effects of pension reforms on macroeconomic variables, 
growth, households’ intertemporal utility and social welfare rely on results from a computable, 
dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations (GE-OLG) parameterised on data 
available for 4 countries with different demographic patterns (the United States, Japan, France and 
Germany). Such a modelling framework fits well with the need to measure the impact of ageing on 
growth since it encapsulates a production function, and with the need to address intergenerational 
issues thanks to overlapping generations. The available empirical literature shows that the 
dynamics of GE-OLG models and, accordingly, the associated policy recommendations, are robust 
for reasonable values of its parameters. 
4  This paper focuses on the issues related with the modelling of the social planner’s decision. 
It is mainly an exercise of applied normative economics. Accordingly, it provides with only a brief 
and non-technical presentation of the modelling characteristics of the GE-OLG model used. The 
interested reader is referred to Cournède and Gonand (2006) which presents a GE-OLG model with 
endogenous labour market. The version of the model used in this paper does not include, however, 
any health-care regime, public debt and non-ageing-related public spending, as in Cournède and 
Gonand (2006). In other words, this paper is concerned with the decision of the social planner as 
concerns pension reforms only, not the decision of a government trying to restore the sustainability 
of the finances of the whole public sector as in the referred paper. 
5  Four standard scenarios of PAYG pension reforms are considered in this exercise. The 
average retirement age is unchanged in a first pair of scenarios where the pension system remains 
balanced each year during the next decades thanks to either higher tax rates (scenario 1) or lower 
replacement rates for future retirees (scenario 2). Scenario 1 can be thought of as a no-reform, 
reference scenario. A second pair of scenarios incorporates increases in the effective average age of 
retirement by one year and a quarter every ten years from 2005 until 2045, in line with forecasts of 
future life expectancy increases.
2 The small residual imbalances of the PAYG regime are covered 
either by adjusting the pension tax rate (scenario 3) or the replacement rate (scenario 4). 
6  Results obtained from the GE-OLG model show that the GDP growth rate is higher in 
scenarios 2, 3 or 4 than in scenario 1 by around +0.2 per cent per year on average. Pension reforms 
indeed bolster labour supply and/or capital accumulation whereas raising taxes to balance the 
regime, as in scenario 1, fosters neither the former nor the latter. Since the favourable impacts of 
reforms on growth are very comparable, a social planner can hardly decide for one pension reform 
or another on the exclusive basis of the GDP criterion. Taking account of the intergenerational 
redistributive effects of the reforms thus becomes crucial for determining the social choice. 
7  If the age of retirement is unchanged, as in scenario 2, the pension reform triggers strong 
intergenerational redistributive effects compared to the baseline, with many baby-boomers bearing 
most of the welfare cost associated with lower pensions while younger generations clearly benefit 
during their whole active life from much lower tax rates than in the baseline scenario 1. Scenarios 
incorporating a rise in the average age of retirement (scenarios 3 and 4) strongly smooth the 
intergenerational redistributive effects associated with the pension reform. The loss of leisure over 
the life cycle is shared among all cohorts of active age when the reform is announced. 
8  However, no pension reform is Pareto-improving in the four countries considered in this 
exercise. Compared to the baseline scenario 1, PAYG pension reforms all tend to weigh down 
more or less on the intertemporal welfare of the baby-boomers and to increase more or less the 
welfare of their children and of future generations. In the absence of any Pareto-improvement, the 
social choice is not trivial and the use of a social welfare function is required. 
————— 
2  In these scenarios, age-specific participation rates of older workers are assumed to increase in line with the changes in the retirement 
age.   Choosing a Pension Reform: A Framework for the Social Planner  569 
9  Two types of social welfare functions are considered here which both aggregate 
intertemporal utilities of the households and encapsulate a variable degree of aversion of the social 
planner to intergenerational inequality and a variable discount rate of the welfare of future 
generations. A first type of function ranks intertemporal utilities by decreasing order and then 
weights the utility of a cohort the more as it is lower (Gini generalised function). A second type 
applies an increasing and concave transformation when aggregating the utilities of the cohorts 
(Kolm Pollack function). Depending on the value of the parameter measuring the degree of 
aversion of the social planner to intergenerational inequality, social preferences tend to the 
utilitarianism of the mean, the maximin or lie in-between. 
10  Overall, the social planner in the United States and Japan is likely to implement a PAYG 
pension scenario diminishing the replacement rate for future retirees while leaving the age of 
retirement unchanged (scenario 2). In Germany, the social choice favors scenario 3 which 
encapsulates a rising age of retirement and a slightly higher tax rate. In France, a social planner 
which does not care about the welfare of future generations but is reasonably averse to 
intergenerational inequality among living cohorts, increases the average age of retirement and 
slightly diminishes the replacement rate (scenario 4). In all countries, the status quo – defined here 
as scenario 1 with only tax hikes balancing the regime – can only be implemented by a social 
planner with rawlsian preferences. 
11  This paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 briefly presents the GE-OLG model 
which provides with the data used in Sections 3 and 4. Section 3. analyzes the intra-generational 
redistributive effects of the four scenarios considered here. Section 4. develops a normative 
economics analysis aiming at determining the conditions of the social choice when reforming 
PAYG pension systems. Section 5 concludes by summing up the main results. 
 
2  A short presentation of the model providing the data 
12  This paper uses the results of a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations 
(GE-OLG) and endogenous labour market which is a modified version of Cournède and Gonand 
(2006). Contrary to the latter paper, the version used here does not include any health-care regime, 
public debt and non-ageing-related public spending. In other words, this paper is concerned with 
the decision of the social planner as concerns pension reforms only, not the decision of a 
government trying to restore the sustainability of the finances of the whole public sector as in the 
referred paper. 
13  The dynamics of the GE-OLG model are exclusively driven by demographics, the pension 
reforms and the behavioural responses of economic agents. In line with most of the literature on 
dynamic GE-OLG models, the model used here does not account explicitly for effects stemming 
from the external side of the economy. Accounting for external linkages would smooth the 
dynamics of the variables but only to a limited extent. Home bias (the “Feldstein-Horioka puzzle”), 
exchange rate risks, financial systemic risk and the fact that many countries in the world are also 
ageing and thus competing for the same limited pool of capital all suggest that the possible 
overestimation of the impact of ageing on capital markets due to the closed economy assumption is 
small, especially for the United States. 
14  The model embodies around 60 cohorts each year (depending on the average life 
expectancy), thus capturing in a detailed way changes in the population structure. Demographic 
projections are obtained from a specific simulation model (Gonand, 2005) and rely on official 
demographic assumptions. Participation and unemployment rates by age-groups are frozen from 570 Frédéric  Gonand 
2000 onwards, unless in scenarios with rising retirement ages which include corresponding changes 
in the participation rate of older workers.
3 
15  The household sector is modelled by a standard, separable, time-additive utility function and 
an intertemporal budget constraint. The instantaneous utility function has two arguments, 
consumption and leisure. The average individual of a given cohort decides how much to work, 
consume and save so as to maximise the discounted value of his/her lifetime utility subject to 
his/her intertemporal budget constraint. Households endogenously choose how long they work, but 
their decision to participate in the labour force is exogenous. In other words, the intensive margin 
of labour supply is endogenous in the model while the extensive margin is exogenous. Households 
receive wage and pension income and pay proportional taxes on labour income to finance the 
PAYG pension regime. The pension income depends on the age of the individual and the age at 
which he/she is entitled to obtain a full pension.
4 The pensions are not wage-indexed. The annual 
saving is invested in the capital market and the interest payments are capitalised into individual 
wealth.
5 
16  Production is modelled through a standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function 
with two inputs: capital and efficient labour. Exogenous technical progress drives the variation of 
multi-factor productivity (MFP) over time (+1.5 per cent per annum). As mentioned above, 
working time – thus the stock of hours worked – is endogenous and results from households’ 
optimising behaviour. Accordingly, the labour force, defined as the total stock of hours worked in 
the economy, is endogenous in the model. 
17  The intertemporal equilibrium of the model is obtained through a simple numerical 
convergence applying to the intertemporal vectors of demand and supply of capital per unit of 
efficient labour. The convergence process begins with an educated guess for the demand of capital 
per unit of efficient labour, from which the model derives a supply of capital by households per 
unit of efficient labour. A Gauss-Seidel algorithm is used so that both vectors converge. 
18  Four scenarios of reform of PAYG pension systems are considered: 
•  in a first pair of scenarios, the average retirement age is unchanged. In scenario 1, the PAYG 
pension regime is balanced each year through higher contribution rates while the replacement 
rate and retirement age remain unchanged. Scenario 1 is used as a no-reform, reference 
scenario. In scenario 2, the tax rate financing pensions is frozen from 2005 on and the PAYG 
system is balanced thereafter by gradually decreasing replacement rates for new retirees. As 
households anticipate future cuts in the replacement rate, they rethink their labour supply, 
consumption and saving plans accordingly. More specifically, lower replacement rates motivate 
agents to increase savings in order to sustain consumption levels upon retirement; 
•  a second pair of scenarios incorporates increases in the effective average age of retirement by 
one year and a quarter every ten years from 2005 until 2045, in line with forecasts of future life 
expectancy increases. Age-specific participation rates of older workers are assumed to increase 
in line with the changes in the retirement age. The (small) residual imbalances of the PAYG 
regime are covered by adjustments in the pension tax rate in Scenario 3 or the replacement rate 
for new retirees in Scenario 4. 
————— 
3  The year 2000 is used as a starting point for participation and unemployment rates because the unemployment gap was then close to 
nil in OECD countries. 
4  If he/she is over 50 but below the full-right retirement age, he/she receives a pension reduced by a penalty. 
5  The life-cycle framework used here introduces a link between saving and demographics. In such a setting, aggregate saving rate is 
positively correlated with the fraction of older employees in total population, and negatively with the fraction of retirees. When 
baby-boom cohorts get older but remain active, aging increases the saving rate. When these large cohorts retire, the saving rate 
declines.   Choosing a Pension Reform: A Framework for the Social Planner  571 
19  Table 1 shows some results obtained for the four pension reform scenarios in the GE-OLG 
model. It suggests that ageing weighs down significantly on the GDP per capita annual growth rate. 
However, the GDP per capita growth rate is also higher in scenarios 2, 3 or 4 than in scenario 1 by 
around +0.2 per cent per year on average. Pension reforms indeed bolster labour supply and/or 
capital accumulation whereas raising taxes to balance the regime fosters neither the former nor the 
latter. 
20  However, the differences between scenarios 2, 3 and 4 as regards economic growth and 
aggregate welfare are very small. Scenario 2 performs slightly better on both accounts in the United 
States and Japan and scenario 3 in Germany. Results on French data are completely indecisive. 
21  The differences between pension reforms as concerns economic growth and aggregate 
welfare are too small to allow for delivering strong normative conclusions and policy 
recommendations. Accordingly, a social planner can hardly decide for one pension reform or 
another on the exclusive basis of the GDP criterion. Taking account of the intergenerational 
redistributive effects of the pension reforms thus becomes crucial for determining the social choice. 
 
3  Analysing the intergenerational redistributive effects of pension reforms with Lexis 
surfaces and intertemporal utilities  
22  A first look at the losers and winners in the pension reforms modelled here is possible by 
computing Lexis surfaces. A Lexis surface represents in 3 dimensions the level of a variable 
associated with a cohort of a given at a given year. The variable considered here is the gain (or 
loss) of current welfare of a cohort in a scenario relative to its current welfare in the baseline 
scenario 1.
6 
23  A few notations are in order here. Let’s define a function Φ 
SCi (a, t) such that: 







, , − = Φ
SC a t a t
SCi a t a t
SCi l c U
l c U
t a  
where ΦSCi(a, t) stands for the gain (or loss) of current welfare of a cohort aged a at year t in a 
scenario i (with i ∈{1,2,3,4}) relative to its current welfare in the baseline scenario 1. [U (ct,a , lt,a)] 
stands for the current utility level of the cohort aged a at year t in scenario i, which depends on the 
optimal level of consumption (ct,a ) and the optimal level of leisure (lt,a ) both computed in the 
GE-OLG model. By definition, the graph of this function is a Lexis surface. 
24  Figures 1 to 3 show the Lexis surfaces obtained on French data in scenario 2, 3 and 4 
respectively. Lexis surfaces for the United States, Japan and Germany (which are not shown here) 
display similar patterns with only orders of magnitude changing (see below). Before the reform is 
implemented in 2005, ΦSCi (a, t)  is zero for every cohort because the informational set of the 
households before 2005 is assumed to correspond to the one of the baseline scenario 1. From 2005 
on, the deformations of the Lexis record the intergenerational redistributive effects triggered by the 
reforms: 
•  a declining replacement rate for new retirees after 2005 (scenario 2) at unchanged age of 
retirement entails sizeable intergenerational effects. It weighs down on current welfare for 
cohorts aged 37 or more while younger cohorts and future generations are favoured as   
 
————— 
6  Current welfare refers here to the instantaneous welfare of a cohort, or equivalently its welfare at a given year, which is computed 
from the instantaneous utility function of a household in the GE model.  
 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Gain (or Loss) of Current Welfare of a Cohort in 
Scenario 2 (Lower Replacement Rate, Unchanged Age of Retirement) Compared to 

















French data. Similar patterns on US, Japanese or German data with only orders of magnitude changing, see main text. 
 
 
  compared to the baseline. For active cohorts, scenario 2 involves a lower tax rate and a lower 
replacement rate from 2005.
7 For active cohorts about to retire, the discounted, unfavourable 
effect of a replacement rate that is lower over the remaining lifetime than in scenario 1 
dominates the discounted, favourable impact of a tax rate lower over only a few remaining 
working years before retiring. The associated loss of permanent income entails lower 
consumption for older active generations. For young active generations, the net effect of the 
reform on current welfare is reversed and thus favorable, bolstering consumption as well as 
leisure. For future generation, the favorable influence on welfare is still bigger; 
•  intergenerational redistributive effects are far more limited in scenario 3 where the age of 
retirement is increased by 1.25 year per decade from 2005 on and the tax rate is marginally 
adjusted to balance the pension system. This reform enhances current welfare for many cohorts 
and over most of the simulation period. Compared to scenario 1, the welfare cost of the reform 
is borne by the cohorts aged between 50 and 70 each year. Their future current welfare is indeed 
lower than in the baseline scenario 1, reflecting lower leisure for cohorts which would have 
been retired had scenario 3 not been implemented; 
•  in scenario 4 – which encapsulates a rising age of retirement as in scenario 3 and where the 
pension regime is balanced by adjusting the replacement rate and not the tax rate – the 
intergenerational redistributive effects are qualitatively similar to those observed in scenario 2 
but quantitatively far more limited, in particular for future generations. 
————— 
7  For individuals already retired in 2005, the reform has a small detrimental effect on welfare. Since capital deepening is stronger in 

























Gain (or Loss) of Current Welfare of a Cohort in 
Scenario 3 (Increasing Age of Retirement, Adjusted Tax Rate) Compared to 





















Gain (or Loss) of Current Welfare of a Cohort in 
Scenario 4 (Increasing Age of Retirement, Adjusted Replacement Rate) Compared to 
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25  The Lexis surfaces for the United States, Japan and Germany –which are not shown here –
display similar patterns but orders of magnitude differ: 
•  in the United States, the intergenerational redistributive effects in all scenarios are far more 
limited than in France. For instance, the welfare gain of the cohort aged 20 in 2030 compared to 
scenario 1 is 7 per cent in the US whereas it is above 20 per cent on French data. This difference 
illustrates divergent demographic dynamics between the two countries, with an ageing problem 
less acute in the US than in France and therefore smaller adjustments needed in the PAYG 
pension system; 
•  in Japan and Germany, welfare gains in scenarios 2, 3 and 4 are slightly more limited than in 
France. In Japan, welfare gains in case of a reform increasing the age of retirement are smaller 
than in France because the age of retirement in Japan is already high at the beginning of the 
simulation period (i.e., 66 years) and because the GE-OLG model encapsulates a declining labor 
productivity of individuals above 60. 
26  Overall, Lexis surfaces show that increasing the age of retirement allows for smoothing the 
intergenerational redistributive effects associated with pension reforms. However, from a 
normative point of view, they hardly help determining whether a Pareto-improving reform exists 
among the scenarios considered here. Comparing intertemporal utilities among different scenarios 
– and not current utility as in Lexis surfaces – proves to be more useful on this issue (see below). 
27  In contrast with the Lexis surfaces, intertemporal utilities take account of all the influences 
on households’ welfare over his/her entire lifespan. Let’s Wt
intertemp stand for the intertemporal 
utility of the representative individual of a cohort born in t in the GE-OLG model. Figure 4 shows 
the levels of the intertemporal utility for the cohorts born between 1940 and 2000 in the United 
States, Japan, France and Germany respectively, and in the four scenarios of pension reform 
modeled here. 
28  Figure 4 clearly shows that the level of the intertemporal utility of a representative individual 
tends to increase with its year of birth.
8 This trend comes from strictly positive gains of multifactor 
productivity (MFP) in the GE-OLG model. Technical progress indeed increases the level of the real 
wage over time and thus pushes up optimal consumption and leisure. Thus the intertemporal utility 
of a household is all the higher as this household is younger, ceteris paribus. 
29  Many common features emerge from the profiles of intertemporal utilities in the four 
countries considered here, in particular as concerns the intergenerational redistributive effects of 
pension reforms: 
•  A reform bolstering private saving (as scenario 2 and, to a lesser extent, scenario 4) is always 
more favorable to younger cohorts and future generations than other scenarios, and weighs 
down relatively more on the intertemporal welfare of the baby-boomers. 
•  An increase in the age of retirement (as in scenarios 3 and 4) moderates the intergenerational 
redistributive effects of the reform as compared to scenario 2, because they are simultaneously 
less detrimental to the welfare of the baby-boomers and less favorable to younger and future 
cohorts. 
•  In all countries a group of cohorts exists for which the social choice for one reform or another is 
almost neutral as concerns their intertemporal welfare. This group encompasses cohorts born 
between 1970 and 1975. 
————— 
8  In some exceptional cases, the intertemporal utility of a cohort is slightly lower than the one of the immediately preceding cohort, 
due to the influence on welfare of pension reforms which depends on age.   Choosing a Pension Reform: A Framework for the Social Planner  577 
 
Scenario 1: increasing tax rate, unchanged age of retirement 
Scenario 2: decreasing replacement rate, unchanged age of retirement 
Scenario 3: increasing age of retirement + adjusted tax rate 
Scenario 4: increasing age of retirement + adjusted replacement rate 




































































Intertemporal Utilities of the Representative Individuals 









































































































Scenario 1: increasing tax rate, unchanged age of retirement 
Scenario 2: decreasing replacement rate, unchanged age of retirement 
Scenario 3: increasing age of retirement + adjusted tax rate 


















Figure 4 (continued) 
Intertemporal Utilities of the Representative Individuals 







































year of birth 
Scenario 1: increasing tax rate, unchanged age of retirement 
Scenario 2: decreasing replacement rate, unchanged age of retirement 
Scenario 3: increasing age of retirement + adjusted tax rate 



































































Scenario 1: increasing tax rate, unchanged age of retirement 
Scenario 2: decreasing replacement rate, unchanged age of retirement 
Scenario 3: increasing age of retirement + adjusted tax rate 
Scenario 4: increasing age of retirement + adjusted replacement rate 
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30  However, significant differences appear among the different scenarios in each country as 
concerns intertemporal utilities: 
•  in the United States, the differences between the scenarios are relatively limited, in line with a 
relatively slow ageing of the population; 
•  on Japanese data, the respective influences of the reforms on intertemporal utility are very 
limited for cohorts born before the mid-1980’s. This reflects a demographic context 
characterized by an ageing process already advanced, in which the upward effect on savings of a 
declining replacement rate remains small and increasing the age of retirement is of little impact 
when the initial age of retiring is already high (66 years). For the intertemporal welfare of 
cohorts born after the 1980’s, scenario 2 is relatively more favorable; 
•  in France and Germany, differences among intertemporal utilities are coherent with the results 
obtained with Lexis surfaces and reflect the same mechanisms. 
31 Most  importantly,  intertemporal utilities in Figure 4 shows that no reform scenario is 
Paret-improving  compared to any other scenario, and especially compared to the baseline, 
no-reform scenario 1. This result holds in the four countries considered here. PAYG pension 
reforms all tend to weight down more or less on the intertemporal welfare of the baby-boomers and 
to increase more or less the welfare of their children and of future generations. In this context, the 
social choice is not trivial and the use of a social welfare functional is required. 
 
4  Modelling the social choice for a pension reform: an applied normative analysis 
32  Among possible welfarist social choice functionals, the criterion of the maximin has brought 
about a large and controversial literature. In the modelling context of our GE model with 
overlapping generations which involves a strictly positive technical progress, the use of the 
maximin raises serious and interesting problems that were first formulated in Arrow’s (1973) 
criticism of Rawls’ (1971) Theory of Justice. 
33  By definition, the maximin requires that the decision of a welfarist social planner among a 
set of possible choices should be the one which maximizes the welfare of the most detrimentally 
affected social unit (Rawls, 1971). However, Arrow (1973) shows that applying this maximin 
criterion in an intertemporal environment with strictly positive technological progress amounts to 
selecting the reform maximising the welfare of the oldest cohort alive, which corresponds in our 
model to the group of survivors dying in 2005 when the reform is announced. Figure 4 clearly 
illustrates Arrow’s point. Reforming pensions on the exclusive basis of their impact on the 
intertemporal welfare of the oldest individual of a society seems hard enough to advocate for. 
34  Arrow’s criticism can be extended to social welfare functionals taking account of the welfare 
of future generations.
9 The issue of whether the welfare of future generations should be discounted 
in the social planner’s function has been bringing about difficult issues in normative economics. 
Welfarism requires the social choice to depend only on information about well-being, disregarding 
all other information – such as, for instance, the year of birth of a cohort. This implies not 
discounting the welfare of future cohorts. Such a proposal usually appears problematic since, for 
instance, it can call for large sacrifices from current generations for the benefit of cohorts appearing 
far in the future. 
————— 
9  In one paragraph, Arrow (1973) advocates for discounting the welfare of future cohorts mainly because it is common sense; 
however, when criticising the use of the maximin in an intertemporal environment, he implicitly assumes that the welfare of future 
generations is not discounted. 580 Frédéric  Gonand 
 
35  Discounting the well-being of future generations is not without drawbacks either. If the 
number of future generations whose well-being is discounted is not finite, applying the maximin in 
an intertemporal modelling environment does not allow for defining a solution to the social choice 
problem. Indeed, the further the cohorts in time, the lower their discounted intertemporal utility. 
Thus if the number of future cohorts taken into account is not finite, applying the maximin criterion 
does not yield a defined result. If the number of future generations whose well-being is discounted 
is finite, then applying the maximin in an intertemporal modelling environment amounts to 
selecting the reform maximizing the welfare of either the further cohort in time or the oldest living 
cohort (the latter case corresponding to Arrow’s critique), depending on the values of the social 
discount rate and the number of future cohorts taken into account. 
36  From a more empirical point of view, it seems reasonable to take account of the welfare of a 
finite number of future generations. Determining this number is unavoidably arbitrary but the 
implications are all the more limited as the value of the social discount rate is higher. In what 
follows, the analysis takes account of the welfare of the cohorts born before or in 2030. Thus, our 
applied normative economics analysis does not abide by strict welfarist standards which would 
have required not discounting the well-being of an infinite number of future generations – an 
empirically non-tractable requirement here. 
37  Arrow’s criticism of the maximin criterion in an intertemporal context with positive 
technical progress applies to any social welfare functional aggregating intertemporal utilities. The 
following paragraphs dig deeper into this issue. 
38  Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005) distinguish two types of social welfare functionals 
which both encapsulate a variable parameter measuring the degree of aversion of the social planner 
to intergenerational inequality. A first category of functionals ranks intertemporal utilities by 
decreasing order and then weights the utility of a cohort the more as it is lower (Gini generalised 
function). A second category applies an increasing and concave transformation when aggregating 
the intertemporal utilities of the cohorts (Kolm Pollack function). Depending on the value of the 
parameter measuring the aversion of the social planner to intergenerational inequality, social 
preferences tend to the utilitarianism of the mean, the maximin or lie between these polar cases. 
39  A few notations can be helpful. The Gini generalised social welfare functional in a given 
scenario and for a given country can be written as: 



































Gini stands for the Gini generalised social welfare functional. Its arguments are the 
intertemporal utilities Wt
intertemp of the representative individuals of each cohort born in 
t ∈T where T is the set of cohorts alive in 2005 when the reform is announced and/or born 
before or in 2030. Nt stands for the number of individuals in a cohort in 2005.
10 The 
expression (1+ρs)
–c(t) refers to the social rate discounting the welfare of future generations 
in the social welfare functional.
11 The parameter θ ≥ 1 stands for the degree of aversion of 
the social planner to intergenerational inequality. The parameter i refers to the rank order 
of Wt
intertemp – the intertemporal utility of the representative individual of the cohort born in 
t – after applying a rank-ordered permutation such that: 
————— 
10 If    t∈(2005;2030], then Nt equals the initial number of individuals of the cohort. 
11 with  ρ
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40  These specification and notations rely on simple intuitions. The ∆
Gini function aggregates the 
intertemporal utilities of the cohorts weighting them all the more as their level is lower and 
associating them with increasing values of i. If θ = 1, then ∆
Gini corresponds to the utilitarism of the 
mean. For θ → ∞, ∆
Gini tends to the maximin because the weight of the lowest intertemporal utility 
is increasingly higher that the other weights. Between these two polar cases, the degree of aversion 
of the social planner to intergenerational inequality can vary in a continuous fashion. 
41  Such a specification assumes cardinal comparability of the preferences since the utilities are 
weighted by the number of individuals in each cohort (i.e., by Nt). Incidentally, it avoids Parfit’s 
(1982 and 1984) repugnant conclusion by taking account of the size of the total population – as it 
clearly appears, for instance, when θ = 1. 
42  This standard Gini-generalised social welfare functional is biased in favor of the well-being 
of the oldest cohorts alive, however. In our intertemporal context with positive technical progress, 
the intertemporal utility of the representative individual of a cohort (Wt
intertemp) increases with the 
year of birth. Accordingly, permuting the intertemporal utilities in the Gini function amounts 
basically to classifying these utilities by decreasing order of date of birth. For θ → ∞ which models 
Rawls’ maximin criterion, Arrow’s critique thus still fully applies because the social choice takes 
only account of the welfare of the oldest cohort alive. 
43  The same problem arises with social welfare functionals applying an increasing and concave 
transformation when aggregating the utilities of the cohorts. Blackorby et al. (2005) present a 
so-called Kolm Pollack function in which the transformation is logarithmic, such as: 









































Kolm stands for the Kolm Pollack social welfare functional. Its arguments are the 
intertemporal utilities Wt
intertemp of the representative individuals of each cohort born in t∈T (see 
above). Nt stands for the number of individuals in a cohort in 2005.
12 The expression (1+ρs)
–c(t) 
refers to the social rate discounting the welfare of future generations in the social welfare 
functional (see above). The parameter γ stands for the degree of aversion of the social planner to 
intergenerational inequality. For γ → 0, social preferences tend to the utilitarism. For γ → ∞, they 
tend to the maximin. 
44  Given the intertemporal context of modelling with positive technological progress and the 
increasingness of the exponential function, applying the maximin criterion for the social choice in 
the Kolm Pollack function (γ →∞) still favors the well-being of the oldest cohort alive, which again 
is in line with Arrow’s critique. 
45  Non-biased results can nevertheless be obtained by slightly modifying the specification of 
the social welfare functionals and using, as arguments, the differences between the intertemporal 
utilities in a given scenario and the same utility in the baseline, no-reform scenario 1, such that: 






































12  If t∈(2005;2030], then Nt equals the initial number of individuals of the cohort. 582 Frédéric  Gonand 
 
for the Gini-generalised function where stands for the intertemporal utility of the Wt,SCi
intertemp stands 
for the intertemporal utility of the representative individual of the cohort born in t in scenario i with 
i∈{1,2,3,4}), and 











































for the Kolm Pollack function. These specifications of the social welfare functionals model the 
social preferences of a government comparing the intertemporal utilities of the cohorts in different 
scenarios of pension reforms with the same utilities in the no-reform, baseline scenario 1. 
46  These specifications avoid the problems stemming from associated with the positive 
correlation between the intertemporal utilities of the representative individual of a cohort and 
his/her year of birth. Computing the difference between Wt,SCi
intertemp  and  Wt,SC1
intertemp  indeed 
mechanically cancels out the trend since it is common to both Wt,SCi
intertemp and Wt,SC1
intertemp. 
47  Interestingly, applying the maximin becomes meaningful with these modified specifications. 
The rawlsian social planner always prefers the status quo and chooses to implement scenario 1, in 
which the welfare of the most detrimentally affected cohort is maximised – indeed, it is nil by 
construction. Since no scenario is Pareto-improving, some cohort are loosing from the reform in all 
the other scenarios. Thus a rawlsian social planner chooses to increase taxes in our model. 
48  Figures 5 to 8 depict the pay-as-you-go pension system reform which the social planner 
chooses given its degree of aversion to intergenerational inequality and its discount rate of the 
welfare of future generations, in the four countries analysed and with the two social welfare 
functionals used in this paper (Gini generalised and Kolm Pollack). These results provide with a 
synthetic policy recommendation which takes account of the impact of pension reforms on growth 
as well as the intergenerational redistributive effect. 
49  Since results as concerns the impact of reforms on growth were especially indecisive on 
French data (see section 2), the case for France is examined first. For an infinite degree of aversion 
to intergenerational inequality (i.e., θ → ∞ or γ → ∞), the social planner always select scenario 1 
(with tax hikes and unchanged age of retirement) (see above).
13 In the case of a purely utilitarist 
social planner with no aversion to intergenerational inequality (i.e., θ = 1 or γ → 0), the selected 
reform depends on the value of the social discount rate. If it is low, the social planner implements 
scenario 2 (with cuts in the replacement rate and unchanged age of retirement). If it is higher than 
24 per cent in the Gini function and 19 per cent in the Kolm Pollack case, the government chooses 
scenario 4 (which incorporates a rise in the age of retirement and slightly diminishes the 
replacement rate). 
50  From an empirical point of view, the social planner can reasonably be thought of as being 
relatively averse to intergenerational inequality but not taking much care for the welfare of future 
cohorts. Different cases can be distinguished here. For increasing values of θ ≥ 1 (or γ > 1), the 
social planner in France selects firstly scenario 4, then – for still higher aversion to 
intergenerational inequality – scenario 3 and ends up, for Rawlsian preferences, selecting 
scenario 1 (see above). 
51  In order to yield clear normative results, threshold levels for θ and γ have to be determined. 
On French data, values of θ = 1.6 or γ = 2.6 characterize a government weighting the welfare of a 
baby-boomer born in 1950 50 per cent more than the well-being of an individual born in 1985. 
Values of 2.0 and 4.4, respectively, correspond to a social planner taking account of the welfare of 
————— 
































































































a baby-boomer born in 1950 twice as much as the well-being of someone born in 1985. We 
consider (θ = 1.6, γ = 2.6) as characterizing a social planner moderately averse to intergenerational 
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52  Four types of social preferences, each defined by a pair (θ, ρs) (or (γ, ρs)
 ), can be defined: 
•  a utilitarist social planner with moderate aversion to intergenerational inequality and not caring 
about future cohorts (θ = 1.6 or γ = 2.6 and ρs =100 per cent) implements, on French data, 
scenario 4 (rising age of retirement and slight decline in the replacement rate) in the Gini 
function as well as in the Kolm Pollack function; 
•  a utilitarist social planner with moderate aversion to intergenerational inequality and caring 
about future cohorts (θ = 1.6 or γ = 2.6 and ρs = 5 per cent) implements, on French data, 
scenario 3 (rising age of retirement and slight adjustment of the tax rate) in the Gini function 
and scenario 4 in the Kolm Pollack function; 
•  a utilitarist social planner with strong aversion to intergenerational inequality and not caring 
about future cohorts (θ = 2.0 or γ = 4.4 and ρs =100 per cent) implements, on French data, 
scenario 3 (rising age of retirement and slight adjustment of the tax rate) in the Gini function 
and scenario 4 in the Kolm Pollack function; 
•  a utilitarist social planner with strong aversion to intergenerational inequality and caring about 
future cohorts (θ = 2.0 or γ = 4.4 and ρs =100 per cent) implements, on French data, scenario 3 
(rising age of retirement and slight decline in the replacement rate) in the Gini function and 
scenario 4 in the Kolm Pollack function. 
53  In a democratic system, the social planner is most probably moderately averse to 
intergenerational inequality. Indeed, its aversion to inequality is not nil and is strictly positive 
(Tocqueville, 1840). However it can not be too high because favoring a limited number of cohorts 
in the social choice could end up alienating the vote of many cohorts in a one-man-one-vote system 
and lead to defeat in democratic elections. As regards the plausible value of the social discount rate, 
democratic government usually does not care much of the welfare of future generations. 
54  In our model parameterized on French data, such a standard democratic social planner 
chooses to implement scenario 4 (rising age of retirement and slight decline in the replacement 
rate) in the Gini function as well as in the Kolm Pollack function. 
55  The normative results as concerns the United States, Japan and Germany confirm and 
complement the results obtained in Section 2 in a positive fashion: 
•  in the United States and Japan, the social planner chooses to implement, in most cases, the 
reform scenario 2 where the replacement rate is diminished and the age of retirement 
unchanged. If its aversion to intergenerational inequality is strong, the social planner selects 
scenario 3 in the US and scenario 4 in Japan, which both incorporate a rise in the age of 
retirement. In the US, if the social planner does not care of the welfare of future generations (so 
if the value of the social discount rate is high), it may favor scenario 3 (rising age of retirement 
and slight decline in the tax rate); 
•  in Germany, the social planner almost always select scenario 3 (rise in the age of retirement and 
slight adjustment of the tax rate) in line with the demographic structure of this country 
characterized by relatively very large cohorts born in the 1950’s. In this demographic context, 
the favourable effect on growth of increasing the age of retirement is sizeable and adjusting 
slightly the tax rate rather than the replacement rate weighs down less on the intertemporal 
welfare of older workers. 
56  Overall, these results suggest that taking account of the intergenerational redistributive 
effects of the reform helps discriminating between scenario 2, 3 and 4 whereas this is not possible 



































































































57  This paper has investigated the issue of which reform of the pay-as-you-go pension systems 
a social planner should choose given its aversion to intergenerational inequality and its discount 
rate of the welfare of future generations. 
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Figure 7 






























































































58  Four scenarios of PAYG pension reforms have been considered. The average retirement age 
is unchanged in a first pair of scenarios where the pension system remains balanced each year 
during the next decades thanks to either higher tax rates (scenario 1) or lower replacement rates for 
future retirees (scenario 2). A second pair of scenarios incorporates increases in the effective 
average age of retirement by one year and a quarter every ten years from 2005 until 2045 with 
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age-specific participation rates of older workers assumed to increase in line with the changes in the 
retirement age. The small residual imbalances of the PAYG regime are covered either by adjusting 
the pension tax rate (scenario 3) or the replacement rate (scenario 4). 
59  Using the results of a computable, dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping 
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applied normative economics methodology has been developed yielding the following main results: 
•  the GDP growth rate is higher in scenarios 2, 3 or 4 than in scenario 1 by around +0.2 per cent 
per year on average in the next decades. Pension reforms indeed bolster labour supply and/or 
capital accumulation whereas raising taxes to balance the regime, as in scenario 1, fosters 
neither the former nor the latter; 
•  however, since the favourable impacts of reforms on growth are very comparable, a social 
planner can hardly decide for one pension reform or another on the exclusive basis of the GDP 
criterion. Taking account of the intergenerational redistributive effects of the reforms thus 
becomes crucial for determining the social choice; 
•  If the age of retirement is unchanged, as in scenario 2, the pension reform triggers strong inter-
generational redistributive effects compared to the baseline, with many baby-boomers bearing 
most of the welfare cost of the reform while younger generations clearly benefit from it. 
Scenarios incorporating a rise in the average age of retirement (scenarios 3 and 4) strongly 
smooth the intergenerational redistributive effects associated with the pension reform; 
•  no pension reform is Pareto-improving in the four countries considered here. Compared to the 
baseline scenario 1, they all tend to weigh down more or less on the intertemporal welfare of the 
baby-boomers and to increase more or less the welfare of their children and of future 
generations; 
•  social welfare functionals aggregating the households’ intertemporal utilities and encapsulating 
a variable degree of aversion of the social planner to intergenerational inequality and a variable 
discount rate of the welfare of future generations show that the social planner in the United 
States and Japan is likely to implement scenario 2. In Germany, the social choice favors 
scenario 3 in most cases. On French data, a social planner which does not care about the welfare 
of future generations but is reasonably averse to intergenerational inequality among living 
cohorts, chooses to implement scenario 4; 
•  in all countries, the scenario 1, which corresponds to tax hikes balancing the pension regime, 
characterizes a social planner with rawlsian preferences. 
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 ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF PENSION REFORMS 
IN EU MEMBER STATES 
Giuseppe Carone
* and Per Eckefeldt
* 
1 Introduction 
The key challenge for policy-makers in the EU over the medium-term will be to transform 
the European social models such that the implications arising from an ageing population will 
become manageable for the European societies. There are many examples in the recent past of 
successful reforms that deliver in terms of enhancing fiscal sustainability without any major 
sacrifice in terms of deteriorating standards of living or access to basic necessities provided for by 
the society. Notwithstanding these encouraging policy steps in the right direction in the EU, more 
remains to be done on the structural reform front. 
On top of this, the financial and economic crisis taking hold since last year has drastically 
changes the economic and fiscal landscape in the EU – and, indeed, globally. At the current 
juncture characterized by very subdued economic activity and exceptional uncertainty as to the 
prospects, there is a strong need to put in place all necessary policies to avoid that the financial and 
economic crisis will have a lasting adverse impact on the supply side. It will be particularly 
important to firstly ensure that there is no backtrack of the recent progress on the structural reform 
front and secondly to not only maintain, but to intensify the reform agenda in view of the 
longer-term challenges so as to come out stronger from the current economic crisis, and get the 
European economies back on the path of decent and stable long-term growth. For this to 
materialize, a comprehensive exit strategy built on structural reforms across the board will be 
necessary to restore credibility and confidence in the public finances. This will provide the best 
possible chances for successfully resuming on the path towards more sustainable public finances. 
The revision of the joint European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (Ageing 
Working Group) (henceforth EC-EPC) budgetary projection exercise carried out in 2009 provides 
the opportunity for assessing the economic and budgetary impact of recent pension reforms.
1 For 
these projections, national pension models have been used given their capacity to capture important 
institutional characteristics of national pension systems. In order to make sure that the degree of the 
challenge posed by population ageing is comparable across the EU Member States, a commonly 
agreed set of underlying macroeconomic assumptions is used.
2 Moreover, the different approaches 
to modelling pension spending have been scrutinized in a series of peer reviews, so as to ensure a 
high degree of comparability of the projection results. 
————— 
*  The authors are economists working in the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
  They would like to thank Nuria Diez Guardia, Kamil Dybczak, Bartosz Przywara, Etienne Sail and other DG ECFIN colleagues for 
valuable input, suggestions and comments. 
  Finally, as customary, the views expressed in this paper are the responsibility of the authors alone and should not be attributed to the 
European Commission. 
1  The results reported in the paper are preliminary results. The final results are released in May 2009. See European Commission – 
Economic Policy Committee (2009), “2009 Ageing Report”, European Economy. 
2  The core of the projection exercise is government expenditure on pensions for both the private and public sectors, as in the 2006 
pension projection exercise. The EPC agreed to provide pension projections for the following items: gross pension expenditure, 
number of pensions/pensioners, number of contributors, contributions to public pension schemes, assets accumulated by public 
pension schemes. In addition, Member States covered, as in the 2006 exercise, on a voluntary basis: occupational and private 
(mandatory) pension expenditures. Moreover, the EPC decided that for the 2009 pension projection exercise Member States can 
provide projections on a voluntary basis on the following items: replacement rates and benefit ratios, taxes on pensions and net 
pension expenditures, private (non-mandatory) pension expenditures. 592  Giuseppe Carone and Per Eckefeldt 
 
 
2  Pension systems in the EU: current setup and recent trends 
Pension arrangements are very diverse in the EU Member States, due to both different 
traditions historically on how to provide retirement income, and Member States being in different 
phases of the reform process of pension systems. 
However, all countries have a strong public sector involvement in the pension system 
through their social security systems, while the importance of occupational and private pension 
provisions varies. In most countries, the core of the social security pension system is a statutory 
earnings-related old-age pension scheme, either a common scheme for all employees or several 
parallel schemes in different sectors or occupational groups. In addition, the social security pension 
system often provides a minimum guaranteed pension to those who have not qualified for the 
earnings-related scheme or have accrued only a small earnings-related pension. Usually, such 
minimum guarantee pensions are means-tested and provided either by a specific minimum pension 
scheme or through a general social assistance scheme. In a few Member States, notably in 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom, however, the social security pension 
system provides in the first instance a flat-rate pension, which is supplemented by earnings-related 
private occupational pension schemes (in the UK, also by a public earnings-related pension scheme 
(State Second Pension) and in Ireland by an earnings-related pension scheme for public sector 
employees). In these countries, the occupational pension provision is equivalent to the 
earnings-related social security pension schemes in most of the EU countries. 
A number of Member States, including Sweden and some new Member States such as 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, have switched a part of their social 
security pension schemes into private funded schemes. Usually, this provision is statutory but the 
insurance policy is made between the individual and the pension fund. Participation in a funded 
scheme is conditional on participation in the public pension scheme and is mandatory for new 
entrants to the labour market (in Sweden for all employees), while it is voluntary for older workers 
(in Lithuania it is voluntary for all people). 
Social security pension systems diverge from each other as regards the type of benefits 
provided by the pension system. Most pension schemes provide not only old-age pensions but also 
early retirement pensions, disability and survivors’ pensions. Some countries, however, have 
specific schemes for some of these benefit types, in particular, some countries do not consider 
disability benefits as pensions, despite the fact that they are granted for long periods, and may be 
covered by the sickness insurance scheme. 
Furthermore, pension systems differ across countries regarding the financing method of the 
schemes. Most social security schemes are financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, indicating 
that the contribution revenues are used for the payments of current pensions. In addition, there is a 
considerable variation between countries regarding the extent to which the contribution revenues 
cover all pension expenditure. In most countries, minimum guarantee pensions are covered by 
general taxes. 
However, it is also common that earnings-related schemes are subsidised to varying degrees 
from general government funds or some specific schemes (notably public sector employees’ 
pensions) do not constitute a clear scheme but, instead, pensions appear directly as expenditure in 
the government budget. On the other hand, some predominantly PAYG pension schemes have 
statutory requirements for partial pre-funding and, in view of the increasing pension expenditure, 
many governments have started to collect reserve funds for their public pension schemes. 
Occupational and private pension schemes are usually funded. However, the degree of funding 
relative to the pension promises may differ due to the fact that benefits can be defined either on the 











































































































Source: Average Exit age (Eurostat), information provided by AWG delegates. 
Joint Commission-Council report on SPSI (2009). 
Note: 
* represents 2006 and 
** represents 2005. 
Male Female
2001 2007 2001 2007 2001 2007 2008 2008
BE 56.8 61.6 57.8 61.2 55.9 61.9 65 64
BG 58.4 61.2 62.5 64.1 56.8 59.7 63 59y 6m
CZ 58.9 60.7 60.7 62 57.3 59.4 61y 10m 56-60
DK 61.6 60.6 62.1 61.4 61 59.7 65 65
DE 60.6 62 60.9 62.6 60.4 61.5 65 65
EE 61.1 62.5 63 60y 6m
IE 63.2 64.1* 63.4 63.5* 63 64.7* 66 66
EL 61 61.6 60.5 65 60
ES 60.3 62.1 60.6 61.8 60 62.4 65 65
FR 58.1 59.4 58.2 59.5 58 59.4 60 60
IT 59.8 60.4 59.9 61 59.8 59.8 65 60
CY 62.3 63.5 65 65
LV 62.4 63.3 62 62
LT 58.9 59.9* 62y 6m 60
LU 56.8 65 65
HU 57.6 59.8** 58.4 61.2** 57 58.7** 62 62
MT 57.6 58.5* 61 60
NL 60.9 63.9 61.1 64.2 60.8 63.6 65 65
AT 59.2 60.9 59.9 62.6 58.5 59.4 65 60
PL 56.6 59.3 57.8 61.4 55.5 57.5 65 60
PT 61.9 62.6 62.3 62.9 61.6 62.3 65 65
RO 59.8 64.3* 60.5 65.5* 59.2 63.2* 63 58
SI 59.8* 63 61
SK 57.5 58.7 59.3 59.7 56 57.8 62 55-59
FI 61.4 61.6 61.5 62 61.3 61.3 62-68 62-68
SE 62.1 63.9 62.3 64.2 61.9 63.6 61-67 61-67
UK 62 62.6 63 63.6 61 61.7 65 60
NO 63.3 64.4 63 64.1 63.6 64.7 62 62
EU27 59.9 61.2 60.4 61.9 59.4 60.5 : :
EA 59.9 61.3 60.2 61.6 59.6 60.9 : :
EA12 59.9 61.3 60.2 61.6 59.6 60.9 : :
EU15 60.3 61.5 60.7 62 59.9 61.1 : :
EU10 57.6 59.6 58.8 61.3 56.6 58.3 : :
EU25 59.9 61.2 60.4 61.9 59.4 60.6 : :
Country
Exit Age Statutory Retirement Age




Average Wage and Average Pension Benefit in 2007 









































Table 1 shows the statutory retirement age in 2008 and the effective exit age from the labour 
market in 2001 and in 2007. In the large majority of countries, the average exit age is lower than 
the statutory retirement age. In many cases, this is due to the existence of early retirement schemes 
and/or other government programmes that provide income support to older people before they 
reach the official retirement age. Also, in a number of countries (like FI, SE) the retirement age is 
flexible, with built-in incentives to remain active in the labour market. For instance, retiring at say 
age 62 would lead to a reduction of a certain amount compared with a typical case of 65, while 
continuing working until say 68 would lead to an increase of a certain amount. The comparison 
between the average exit age in 2001 and 2007 already shows one of the main effects of recent 
pension reforms in many MSs: people retire relatively later than they used to do. 
In 2007, there was a wide difference in the average public pension benefit, ranging from less 
than 3,000 euros or less per year (BG, RO, LV, LT and EE) to 14,000 euros or more per year (AT, 
SE, DK, FR, NO and LU). These wide differences reflect that average wage income levels are very 
different, ranging from less than 5,000 euros per year to more than 25,000 euros per year (see 
Figure 1). 
Also at the aggregate level, a very large difference in the level of pension spending can be 
observed in 2007 among MSs. It ranges from 6 per cent of GDP or below in IE, LV and EE to 
14 per cent in IT. In many MSs (DK, FR, HU, IT, MT, NO, PT, RO and SE), pension expenditure 
has increased faster than GDP, but in some others (BE, BG, CZ, DE, ES, FI, LT, LU, LV, NL, PL, 
SI) it has increased at a slower pace (see Figure 2). 
Despite the generally higher effective retirement age in 2007 as compared with 2001, the 
public pension expenditure has continued to grow unabated during 2000 and 2007 in many 
countries (RO, NO, MT, PT, DK, SE, FR and IT) over this period, but there are also countries that 
have succeeded to keep it under control, or slightly reduce pension expenditure as percentage 






































Gross Social Security Pension Expenditure in 2000 and 2007 























Note: The figure presents only the countries which provided information in both years. 
 
A number of countries have implemented systemic pension reforms, shifting part of the 
previously public pillar to a mandatory funded private pillar (BG, EE, LV, LT, HU, PL, SK and 
SE). At present, these private pillars are making very small disbursements, but their importance 
will increase in the future. Private pensions are generally small today. 
 
3  Assessing the economic impact of recent pension reforms 
3.1  Recent pension reforms in some EU Member States 
An important feature of the EC-EPC (AWG) projections is that they take into account the 
potential effects of recently enacted pension reforms (in the 20 EU Member States that have 
implemented it since 2000), including measures to be phased in gradually, on the participation rates 
of older workers. Some countries have enacted legislation to increase the statutory retirement age 
for females or for both males and females. Others have changed some provisions of social security 
programmes (and sometimes of other transfer programmes used as alternative early retirement 
paths) that provided strong incentives to leave the labour force at an early age. The findings of a 
recent international research project based on micro-estimation results (based on a sample of 
individuals and the matching of individual retirement decisions and retirement incentives) are clear: 
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The following pension reforms
4 are incorporated in the baseline scenario: 
 
Box 1 
Pension reforms enacted in the Member States 
 
Belgium 
The standard retirement age for women will increase gradually from 63 in 2003 to 64 
in 2006 and 65 in 2009. Retirement age remains flexible from the age of 60 for men and 
women, provided that a 35-year career condition is satisfied. The “older unemployment 
scheme”, reformed in 2002, will keep having an impact on participation rates between 50 
and 58. 
The law concerning the “Solidarity Pact between Generations” has come into force in 
2006. It provided a series of measures to increase participation in the labour market. The 
statutory age for the early retirement (“prépension”) scheme embedded in the unemployment 
insurance has been raised from 58 to 60 and the eligibility conditions (career length) have 
been made more restrictive. Conditions for entering this scheme before the statutory age 
(“prépensions” for labour market reasons) have also become tighter. Staying at work after 
the age of 62 is now rewarded by a specific supplement in the pension formula (“pension 
bonus”). Finally, a structural mechanism for linking benefits to prosperity has been introduced. 
 
Czech Republic 
Before the pension reform in 2003, men retired at the age of 60 and women at 53-57, 
depending on the number of children (one year less per child). Since January 2004 with 
modification of the retirement age from August 2008, the age of retirement is increased 
constantly over time (2 months per year for men and 4 months per year for women) to reach 
65 years for men and 62-65 for women (still depending on the number of children) born in 
1968 and later. Bonus for later retirement is 1.5 per cent of person’s calculation base for 
every additional completed 90 calendar days. Early retirements are subject to penalization, 
which is 0.9 per cent of person’s calculation base for every period of 90 calendar days before 
the statutory retirement age up to 720 days and 1.5 per cent from the 721st day. But resulting 
earnings related component must not be lower than 770 CZK (approximately 28 euros). 
 
Denmark 
Denmark introduced in 2006 a major reform package known as the “Welfare 
Agreement”. This reform package affects mainly younger than age 48 at the end of 2006. It 
reverses the 2004 decision to lower retirement age from 67 to 65. It also increases early 
retirement (VERB) from age 60 to age 62 between 2019 and 2022 with a minimum 
contribution period of 30 years instead of 25 for taking a VERB. The normal retirement age 
is increased from age 65 to 67 between 2024 and 2027. Finally it indexes the retirement ages 
to the average life expectancy of 60 years old from 2025. 
 
————— 
4  The information was provided by the Members of the EPC and AWG. Detailed information on the national pension models are 
envisaged to be published in European Economy (2009), “2009 Ageing Report: Pension Models in EU Member States and 
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Germany 
Since the early nineties a series of major reforms have been passed, aiming at the 
financial and social sustainability of the public pension scheme. Highlighting the most 
important reform steps, the reform process began in the mid of the nineties with the increase 
of the statutory retirement age to the age of 65 years and the introduction of deductions on 
early retirement (3.6 per cent per year) accompanied with a bonus for deferred retirement 
(6.0 per cent per year). Secondly, at the beginning of this decade, a comprehensive 
promotion of second and third pillar pension schemes (Riester pension) by subsidising 
voluntary contributions was introduced. The aim of those reforms was to compensate the 
envisaged reduction of benefits in the statutory pension scheme by second and third pillar 
pensions. Thirdly, in 2005 the pension adjustment formula was augmented by a 
sustainability factor, which adjusts statutory pension payments to population dynamics, 
whereby the extent of the adjustment is determined by the change in the relation of the 
workforce to the number of retirees. 
The most recent major reform took place in 2007. Though the transition process of 
increasing the retirement age to 65 years is not yet fully completed, a further increase of the 
statutory retirement age to the age of 67 was legislated (the age of retirement will be put back 
one month each year from 2012 on to 2024, then 2 months each year until the age of 67 years 
will be reached by 2029). The first aim of this reform was postponing the retirement age and thus 
decreasing the future financial burden. Secondly, the reform will partially compensate the 
expected decline of the workforce due to population ageing. Therefore, the increase of the 
retirement age is accompanied by the so-called “Initiative 50 plus” which aims to increase 
participation rates of older workers by a large range of different measures such as the 
extension of vocational training and the reduction of employment barriers for older workers. 
 
Estonia 
Changes in the PAYG system include raising the retirement age for females to 63 by 
2016 and revising the benefit formula. Legislation passed in mid-September 2001 set up 
mandatory individual accounts in the second tier (starting operations in mid-2002), while 
voluntary accounts became the new third tier. 
 
Spain 
The latest reform of the pension system in 2002 (Law 35/2002) abolished mandatory 
retirement age (65) in the private sector. Workers remaining active after 65 will increase 
their pension benefit by 2 per cent per year, and both employers and employees’ are 
exempted from paying most social security contributions. For workers age at least 60, social 
contributions are reduced by 50 per cent, and this amount is increased by 10 per cent to reach 
100 per cent for those aged 65. Early retirement is possible from 61 year old, with at least 
30 years of paid contributions and registered as unemployed for at least 6 months, but with a 
high penalty, from 6 to 8 per cent per year (8 per cent for those with only 30 years of 
contribution, 6 per cent for those with at least 40 years of contribution). Pensions became 
compatible with part-time work (but the pension benefit was reduced according to the length 
of the working day). 
A new law on Social Security measures was enacted in 2007. This package of reforms 
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retirement pension; partial retirement from age 61 instead of 60 for people entering the 
system after 1967 (and a minimum of 30 years of contribution instead of 15); incentives for 
people working after age 65; more restrictive rules to get an invalidity pension. 
 
France 
The standard retirement age remains 60. Since 2004, gradual alignment of public 
sector with private sector by increasing the number of contribution years for entitlement to a 
full pension (from 37.5 to 40 years between 2004 and 2008). Since 2009, the numbers of 
contribution years will increase following the increase in life expectancy through a rule 
keeping constant the ratio of the number of contribution years and the number of years in 
pension to the level of 1.79 as in 2003. The number of contribution years will be increased to 
41 in 2012 and 41.50 in 2020 due to the expected gains in life expectancy (by 1.5 years each 
10 years). Introduction of a bonus (3 per cent per year) in case of postponement of 
retirement. The penalty for early retirement (before 40 years of contributions) will be 
changed. Since 2006, the amount of the penalty (la décote) will decrease gradually from 
10 to 5 per cent of pension per year of anticipation in 2015 for the private sector and will 
increase from 0.5 to 5 per cent for civil servants). 
 
Italy 
Since 2006, the major changes to pension legislation concern the implementation of 
the 23
rd July Agreement on welfare state between government and social partners 
(Law  127/2007 and Law  247/2007) and Law 133/2008) improving the possibility of 
accumulating pension and labour income. 
A. Law 127/2007: increase of lower amount pensions through an additional lump sum of 
420 euros per year from 2008 (327 euro in 2007) acknowledged to pensioners of 64 and over 
with an income lower than 1.5 times the minimum pension (8,504.73 euros per year in 
2007). Such an increase is reduced or augmented by 20 per cent for contribution careers 
inferior to 15 years or superior to 25, respectively (18 and 28, for the self-employed). 
Additional increases are also foreseen for social assistance pensions, starting from 2008, by 
way of the so-called “social assistance additional lump sums” (“maggiorazioni sociali”). 
B. Law 247/2007 foresees the following: 
•  a slowdown of the process of elevating the minimum requirements for early retirement, 
keeping unchanged the phased-in values foreseen by Law 243/2004. In particular, in 2008 
the age requirement, with 35 years of contribution, is 58 for the employees and 59 for the 
self-employed instead of 60 and 61. Starting from 2013 (it was 2014, according to 
Law  243/2004) the age requirement, with 35 years of contribution, is 62 for the 
employees and 63 for the self-employed. In addition, starting from July 2009, workers 
may access early retirement at an age lower by 1 year, provided that they possess at least 
36 years of contributions. The age requirement may be reduced by at most 3 years (but 
never below the age of 57) for specific categories of workers involved in hard and stressful 
jobs (“lavori usuranti”), within a given amount of resources assigned to a specific fund; 
•  the application in 2010 of the transformation coefficients, revised on the basis of the 
procedure foreseen by Law 335/95. The subsequent revisions will be made every three 
years, instead of every ten years, through a simplified procedure falling entirely under the 
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•  an increase of the contribution rate of the atypical workers by 3 percentage points (up to 
26 per cent in 2010) in order to improve pension adequacy for this category of workers. 
C. Law 133/2008 states that old age and seniority pensions may be fully cumulated with 
labour income. The new legislation improves upon the previous one which foresaw some 
restrictions in the possibility of cumulating, especially in the case of employees. 
 
Latvia 
Under the new three-pillar system with a defined contribution PAYG based on 
notional accounts, set up in 1996, the standard age requirement for women (59.5 years in 2003) 
will increase by 6 months each year to reach 62 by 2008. Those for men reached 62 in 2003. 
 
Lithuania 
The standard minimum retirement age for women (55 years and 4 months in 1995, 
58.5 years in 2003) will increase by 6 months each year to reach 60 years in 2006. The 
retirement age for men was gradually increased (2 months per year) from 60 years and 
2 months (in 1995) up to 62.5 in 2003. 
 
Hungary 
The standard retirement age for women will increase to 60 by 2005, 61 by 2007 and 
62 by 2009 (before the reform it was 57). 
In 2006-07, the Hungarian Parliament adopted (by two regulations) a package of 
reforms which specifies that the early retirement is allowed only 2 years before normal 
retirement instead of 3 before. Thus from 2013 the early retirement is possible from age 60 
both for women and men. From 2013 all early pensions will be subject to a reduction. The 
rate of reduction, depending on the time remaining until retirement age, would be 0.3 per 
cent per month for the 61-62 age group and 0.4 per cent per month below the age of 61. It 
introduces also changes in the calculation of the benefits, a minimum contribution from 
40-41 for early retirement and some favourable retirement conditions for those working in 
potentially health-damaging occupations. Finally, it includes also: a new pension benefits 
system that will reduce the replacement rate; the retirement benefits will be available only 
for the difference between earnings of the year and minimum wage for the first year of an 
early retirement; the pension contribution increases for early retirees; some measures to 
increase employment of persons with reduced working capacity; pensions and earnings are 
no more cumulated in early retirement if earnings > minimum wage; changes in contribution 
levels payable by the employer and by the employee. 
 
Malta 
In December 2006, the Maltese Government completed the legislative process 
associated with the enactment of the pensions reform bill. Among the most important 
elements of the reform there is a staggered rise in pension age from 60 years for females and 
61 years for males to 65 years for both by 2026 and the gradual lengthening of the 
contribution period for full entitlement to the two-thirds pension from 30 years to 40 years. 
Meanwhile, the calculation of pensionable income will reflect the yearly average income 
during the best 10 calendar years within the last forty years, as opposed to the previous 600  Giuseppe Carone and Per Eckefeldt 
 
 
regime which consisted of the best 3 years of the last ten years for employed persons and the 
average of the best ten years for self-employed persons. In addition, prior to the reform, the 
maximum pensionable income was fixed by the law though in recent years it was revised in 
line with the cost of living adjustment. Following the reform, maximum pensionable income 
will evolve in a more dynamic fashion and will be increased annually by 70 per cent of the 
national average wage and 30 per cent of the inflation rate as from 1 January 2014 for 
persons born after 1 January 1962. 
 
Austria 
The minimum retirement age for men will increase from 61.5 years to 65 years; for 
women the age will rise from 56.5 to 60 years. The increase will be phased in gradually 
beginning in July 2004 and by 2017 early retirement will be eliminated. Meanwhile, larger 
penalties are imposed on early retirement (4.2 per cent of reduction per year instead of the 
former 3.75 per cent, up to a maximum of 15 per cent), within the age of 62-65. The 
statutory retirement age for women will be increased gradually between 2019 and 2034 to 
reach the retirement age for men at 65. A bonus for later retirement up to the age of 68 years 
(4.2 per cent per year, up to a maximum of 10 per cent) is introduced. From January 2005, 
harmonised guaranteed pension accounts is established (Act on the harmonisation of pension 
system, approved in November 2004). In the new system of individual, transparent pension 
accounts (with a clear reporting of benefits accrued from contributions paid in and other 
credits acquired, such as from active child and elderly care) the key rule will be: 45-65-80 (45 
contribution years, retirement age of 65 and a gross replacement rate of 80 per cent of average 
life earnings). Pension benefits will be adjusted to consumer price index, starting in 2006. 
 
Poland 
All insured persons born after 1948 are covered by the new defined contribution 
PAYG with notional accounts and three-pillar pension system. The standard retirement age 
remains 65 for male and 60 for female. There will be no early pension for those born after 
1948 and retiring after 2006, with the exception of those who worked long enough (20 years) 
in special conditions. 
 
Portugal 
Portugal introduced in 2007 a “sustainability factor” linking initial benefits to average 
life expectancy when the worker retires (at 65, which is the legal retirement age). Individuals 
have the option of postponing retirement beyond legal retirement age to compensate (at least 
partially) the financial penalty given by the sustainability factor. They introduced also a 
“national strategy for the promotion of active ageing” which is a package of measures that 
encourages older workers to remain in the labour force (trainings, improvement of older 
workers employment, higher penalty in case of early retirement and benefits granted in case 
of long contributive careers). 
 
Slovenia 
Under the new Pension and Disability Insurance Act entered into force on 1 January 
2000 (a three-pillar modernised defined benefit PAYG system plus compulsory and 
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is now possible to retire between 58 and 63 for men and 61 for women (the minimum 
retirement age was 53 for women and 58 for men before the reform). Women that worked 
before the age of 18 can retire earlier (but not before the age of 55). Special regulations 
reduce the age of retirement to 55 in certain cases (before the reform it was possible even 
below 50). The minimum retirement age is raised from 53 to 58 for women (the same level 
for men). The accrual rate was reduced by 2 to 1.5 per cent since 2000. Later retirement has 
been encouraged: a person who fulfils the requirement for pension but continues to work 
beyond the age 63/61 will receive an additional pension increase (3.6 per cent the first 
additional year, 2.4 per cent the second year and 1.2 per cent in the third, plus the normal 
rate of accrual, 1.5 per cent per year). 
 
Slovakia 
Under the reformed (from 2004) three-pillar pension system, the standard retirement 
age will increase from 60 to 62 for men (9 month per year) by 2007 and from the former 57 
(reduced by 1 year per child, to reach age 53) to 62 for women by 2016. A worker can still 
retire earlier if the combined benefit from the first and the newly introduced second pillar 
equal at least 60 per cent of the minimum living standard determined by the government. In 
this case, the pension is reduced by 6 per cent per year, while a bonus of 6 per cent is 




Since 2005, flexible old-age retirement (63 to 68 years) with an increase of the accrual 
rate to 4.5 per cent for those continuing to work beyond the age of 63. The ceiling on the 
maximum pension is abolished. A new early retirement scheme is introduced with a 
minimum age of 62 and an actuarial reduction of 0.6 per cent per month prior to 63. Those 
borne after 1949 are not eligible for the unemployment pension scheme, which is replaced by 
an extended period of unemployment benefit (the so-called “unemployment pipeline to 
retirement” (currently 57-65). 
 
Sweden 
The pension reform was approved by Parliament in 1999. Under the new notional 
defined contribution system is possible to retire from age 61 onwards, with an actuarially fair 
compensation for those who stay on in the labour force. Every year of contributions is 
important for the pension benefit. A person with an average wage will increase his yearly 
pension benefit by nearly 60 per cent if he postpones his retirement decision till age 67 
compared to leaving at age 61. Yearly “statement of account” informs the individual of costs 
and benefits of retirement. The new system is phased in gradually for generations born 
between 1938 and 1953, and will affect generations born after 1953 fully. 
 
United Kingdom 
Between 2010 and 2020, women’s pensionable age will gradually rise from 60 to 65, 
as for men. The Pension Act 2007 adds also several measures in which we have the gradual 
increase of the state pension age between 2024 and 2046 to 68 for men and women (instead 
of 65 before). 
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3.2  Impact of pension reforms in the baseline labour force projection 
Pension reforms are modelled by considering the likely impact of reforms on the probability 
of withdrawing from the labour market when ageing due to changes in the statutory “normal” age 
of retirement, or “early-retirement age” (that is the age at which benefits are first available), or in 
the rules governing pension rights. This likely impact is incorporated in the baseline labour force 
projection by means of the probabilistic model already used by the European Commission for the 
calculation of the average exit age from the labour force, using estimated cumulative probabilities 
of exit from the labour market.
5 
More specifically, the analysis of the distribution of the probability of retiring at different 
ages (from age 50 to 71, separately for males and females) is done for the period 1998 to 2007 for 
the 20 EU Member States concerned. Then, the relationship between changes in the parameters of 
the pension systems and the retiring behaviour of older workers is examined. Existing empirical 
evidence is also taken into account, such as econometric estimates of the impact of changes in the 
implicit tax rate on continuing to work and retirement behaviour.
6 
As a starting point, the probability of retirement and the cumulative distribution function (the 
cumulated distribution of probability of retirement) observed in 2007 are analysed, along with the 
calculated average exit age, see Figure 4. While the age profiles of the probability of retirement 
vary across countries, because of differences in the pension system, a common feature is that the 
distribution is clearly skewed towards the earliest possible retirement age. The distribution of the 
retirement age presents evidence of spikes at both the minimum age for an early retirement and the 
normal/ average retirement age, which is either 60 (especially for women) or 65. 
 
3.3  Simulating the impact of the pension reforms on the participation rate of older workers 
The impact of pension reforms on the participation rate of older workers is simulated by 
calculating the impact of reforms that have either increased the statutory retirement age or removed 
early retirement schemes on the participation rates. This is made as follows: 
•  first, by changing the probability of retiring according to our considered judgement about the 
factors that affect the retirement decision.
7 More specifically, the distribution of the frequency 
(density function and cumulative distribution function) observed in 2007 is shifted. For 
example, let us assume that in a given country a concentration of the probability of retiring is 
observed at age 58 over the last 5 to 6 years, while a reform removes early retirement schemes 
or increases the minimum years of contribution. To calculate the impact of this reform, we shift 
the peak of the retirement probability away from the previously observed peak at 58 years and 
closer to the statutory average age (usually 65 for men and 60 for women).
8 Within the same 
————— 
5  For details on the methodology used, see Carone (2005). 
6  See Börsch-Supan (2003), Duval (2003), Gruber and Wise (2005). 
7  As regards the impact of delay in eligibility ages, recent estimates by Gruber and Wise (2002) for France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands suggest for example that in these three countries a three-year delay in eligibility ages to old-age and early retirement 
schemes could raise the labour force participation of the 55-64 age group by about 20 percentage points. According to Duval (2003), 
“past experience suggests a more moderate outcome”. For instance, the five-year increase in eligibility ages in New Zealand 
throughout the 1990s led to a 15 percentage point increase in labour force participation”. 
8  Technically speaking, the shift in the distribution function of retirement probability can be done rather mechanically in this way. 
The retirement probability for a generic cohort of people is given by a density function f(x). The cumulated probability is given by a 
cumulative distribution function F(x). Any time a reform of the pension system (such as changes in the statutory retirement age) has 
an effect on the age of retirement, it has an effect on the density function. Thus, for example, if the possibility of retirement at age 
57 (x = 57) is no longer possible and the new age of statutory retirement become n = 60 than f(x) = 0 for x < n. To calculate the new 
density function d(x) one can use a shift in the cumulative distribution function of f(x). The new density function d(x) is s*f(x), 


































Source: Commission services, EPC. 
 
  methodological framework, another simulation is done, by applying a progressive shift of the 
probability distribution of retiring for females. This is done for Member States that have 
recently legislated a progressive increase of the statutory retirement age of females to that of 
males (usually from 60 to 65), such as Belgium, the United Kingdom and some others, 
especially among the new Member States; 
•  secondly, the new probabilities of retirement resulting from the simulation are converted into a 
change in exit rates (following the algorithm presented in Annex 2.1); 
•  finally, the observed exit rates (the average over the period 1998-2007) are replaced (at a 
different time for each country, in line with the timing of reform implementation) with the new 
estimated exit rates in the cohort-based projection model. Consequently, the participation rates 
initially estimated, without taking into account the impact of pension reforms, have changed. 
The magnitude of the expected impact of pension reforms can be inferred by comparing the 
participation rates calculated with and without the effect of reforms. 
 
3.4  Estimates of the impact of pension reforms 
The expected postponement of retirement is summarised by the difference in the average exit 
age from the labour force in 2060. As a result of recently enacted pension reforms, the effective 
retirement age for males is expected to increase by as much as three years or more in Germany, 
Italy, Malta and Poland and by between two and three years in Denmark, Spain, Austria, and 
Slovakia. The expected postponement of retirement for females is similar, or even higher than for 
males, reflecting in several cases a progressive alignment of the retirement age of females to that of 
males. 
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Given that changes in overall participation rates are mainly driven by changes in the labour 
force attachment of prime-age workers, as this group accounts for more than 70 per cent of the total 
labour force, even such high projected increases in the participation rates of older workers will only 
have a rather limited impact on the overall participation rate. For example, the 18 percentage point 
increase in the participation rate of workers aged 55 to 64 years projected in Germany will lead to 
an increase in the overall participation rate (workers aged 15 to 64 years) of about 4 percentage 
points by 2060. 
Table 7 shows the estimated impact of pension reforms on participation rates. Pension 
reforms are projected to have a sizeable impact on the labour market participation of older workers 
(aged 55 to 64) in most of the EU Member States in which future implementation of already 
enacted pension reforms is planned. A stronger impact is expected from changes in the parameters 
affecting the statutory age of retirement. For example, the labour participation in the group aged 55 
to 64 in Italy is projected to record an additional increase of 14 percentage points by 2030. This is 
the estimated impact of the recent reform postponing the statutory age of retirement and the gradual 
move towards a notional defined contribution pension system.
9 In Germany, Finland, Hungary, 
Slovenia the impact is estimated to be more than 10 per cent by 2020. In the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, the impact is estimated to be higher than 15 per cent by 2020. Overall, in the EU, the 
participation rate of older people (55-64) is estimated to be about 8 percentage points higher in 
2020 and 13 percentage points higher in 2060 due to the estimated impact of pension reforms. In 
the euro area, the impact is estimated to be slightly larger, at about 9 percentage points in 2020 and 
13.5 percentage points 2060, respectively. 
 
4  Pension expenditure projections: 2009 results 
The updated projections suggest that considerable challenges will come from a higher share 
of the total population in older age cohorts and a decline in the share of the population that is 
economically active. The fiscal impact of ageing is projected to be substantial in almost all Member 
States, with the effects becoming apparent already during the next decade in the EU (see Figure 4). 
Overall, on the basis of current policies, pension expenditures are projected to increase on average 
by about 2¾ percentage points of GDP by 2060 in the EU and by about 2¾ percentage points in the 
euro area.
10 
There is a very large diversity across Member States as regards the projected change in 
public pension expenditure, ranging from a decline of –3.5 per cent of GDP (PL) to an increase of 
15.2 per cent of GDP (LU): 
•  The projected increase in public pension spending is very significant in seven EU Member 
States (IE, EL, ES, CY, LU, MT, RO and SI) with a projected increase of 5 per cent of GDP or 
more (and of more than 10 per cent of GDP in EL, CY and LU). These countries have so far 
made only limited progress in reforming their pension systems or are experiencing maturing 
pension systems. For them there is an urgent need for a modernisation of pension to start to 
bend the curve of long-term costs. 
•  For a second group of countries – BE, BG, CZ, DE, LT, HU, NL, PT, SK, FI and the UK – the 
cost of ageing is more limited, but still high, ranging from 2 to 5 per cent of GDP. Several of 
————— 
9  For an empirical analysis on the retirement decision of Italian employees see Brugiavini and Peracchi (2003). According to their 
prediction of retirement probabilities under alternative policies that change social security wealth and derived incentive measures, 
the male employment rate at age 55 are projected to be 84.3 under the Dini/Prodi pension regime (1995 and 1997 reforms) as 
compared to 65.6 under the pre-1992 reform regime, see also Brugiavini and Peracchi (2005). 




Old-age and Other Public Pension Expenditure in 2007 and 2060 























Note: HU: the projection of old-age and early pensions include an estimation of the old-age allowance (a minimum pension in HU), 
which is not a part of Hungarian authorities pension model at this stage. This projection contributes with 0.4 per cent of GDP to the 
increase in old-age and early pensions ratio over the period 2007-60. 
 
  these countries have taken some steps in reforming pensions that contribute to limit the increase 
in public expenditure, but much more needs to be done. 
•  Finally, the increase is more moderate, 2 per cent of GDP or less, in DK, EE, FR, IT, LV, AT, 
PL and SE. Most of these countries have implemented substantial pension reforms, in several 
cases also involving a partial switch to private pension schemes (BG, EE, LV, HU, PL, SK and 
SE). 
Old-age and early pensions are projected to increase by 2.4 per cent of GDP between 2007 
and 2060 in the EU. In the euro area, the increase is projected to be slightly higher at 2.6 per cent of 
GDP. A smaller increase is projected for other pension expenditure, mainly disability and survivor 
pensions, increasing only slightly by 0.1. per cent of GDP in the euro area. 
It should be stressed that the ratio has been pushed downwards due to a shift from public 
scheme towards private mandatory scheme in BG, EE, LV, LT, HU, PL, SK and SE.
11 
As regards spending on disability and survivor pensions, they are projected to decrease in the 
majority of countries. Only in 8 Member States (PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE, UK and NO) is it 
projected to increase, although only slightly. 
————— 
11  In the case of LU, the pension projection is affected by the considerable number of cross border workers who will in the future years 
receive a pension from the LU social security scheme, but at the same time will not be registered as LU inhabitants. Due to this 
peculiar circumstance, LU can not be, in same cases, strictly compared with other MS. Thus, in some of our analysis LU is treated 
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Occupational, Private Mandatory and Non-mandatory Pension Expenditure 
























Note: The figure presents only the countries which provided data for other pension schemes and its value is non-zero. 
 
In brief, a majority of EU Member States have: (i) reduced the generosity of public pension 
schemes so as to make these programmes financially more sustainable in view of the demographic 
trends; (ii) pushed up the statutory retirement age in a gradually phased way over the long-term for 
old-age pensions; (iii) restricted the access to early retirement schemes by strengthening the 
incentives to prolong working lives, which leads to a containment of the increase in old-age and 
early pensions spending. Also, the projections show no increase in disability and survivor pensions, 
embodying an assumption of lower take-up rates of these transfers over the projection period. 
 
4.1 Private  pensions 
A number of countries have implemented systemic pension reforms, shifting part of the 
previously public pillar to a mandatory funded private pillar (BG, EE, LV, LT, HU, PL, SK and 
SE). At present, these private pillars are making very small disbursements, but their importance 
will increase in the future. Some countries have provided projections of 2
nd pillar occupational 
pension expenditure and 3
rd pillar non-mandatory pensions. 
Figure 5 shows the private pension projections by pillar (provided only by very few member 
States).
12 It should be pointed out that the figure is not comprehensive; private pensions may exist 
in a country, but it was not possible to provide a projection (see the note to the figure for detailed 
information). Indeed, for occupational pension expenditure, only 6 MSs (DK, IE, ES, NL, PT and 
SE) provided projections, while 13 MSs (DK, GR, IE, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, MT, PL, SK, BG and 
RO) have indicated that occupational pension does not exist. For private mandatory pension 
expenditure, 8 MSs (BG, EE, LV, LT, HU, PL, SK and SE ) have provided projections and 9 MSs 
————— 
12  Annex: “Assets in All Pension Schemes as a Share of GDP” presents the current and projected value of assets in all public, 
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(BE, DK, GR, ES, IE, NL, PT, CZ and MT) report that such pension do not exist, while for private 
non-mandatory pension expenditure, only 3 MS (ES, SI and SE) have provided projections and 
7 MSs (DK, DE, IE, LV, MT, PL and BG ) report that they do not exist. 
For only a few countries (LV, SK, HU, LT, PL, EE, BG and SE), the mandatory private 
pensions are projected to provide a considerable top-up of the public pensions. Also, the presence 
of a high coverage of 2
nd pillar pensions since a long time (e.g., SE, DK, NL and IE) also provides 
for a sizable topping-up of the public pillar. 
 
5  Drivers of pension expenditure trends over the period 2007-60 
5.1  Main drivers of projected pension expenditure 
In order to shed light on the main drivers behind these dynamics, a decomposition of pension 
expenditure to GDP into its main our components can be very helpful:
13 
•  a dependency effect (or a population ageing effect), which measures the changes in the 
dependency ratio over the projection period as the ratio of persons aged 65 and over to the 
population aged 15 to 64; 
•  an employment effect which measures changes in the share of the population of working age 
(15 to 64) relative to the number of the employed, i.e. an inverse employment rate; 
•  a coverage effect of pensions,
14 which measures changes in the share of pensioners relative to 
the population aged 65 and over. In effect, it measures the take-up of pensions relative to the 
number of old people; 
•  a benefit effect, which captures changes in the average pension relative to income; output per 
employed person.
15 
The decomposition of the overall change (see Figure 6) in the social security pension 
spending to GDP ratio over period 2007-60 is provided in Table 2. In particular, the table 
demonstrates the contribution of each of the four main factors to the change in the pension/GDP 
————— 
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  In particular, we analyse the percentage change in the public pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio. The overall percentage change can 
be expressed as a sum of the contribution of the four main factors, i.e. the dependency ratio contribution, the coverage ratio 
contribution, the employment rate contribution and the benefit ratio contribution. 
14  This effect is also commonly referred to as the “eligibility effect” in the literature. 
15  Average pension and output per worker, approximating the average wage, are measured each year of the projection exercise for the 
total population of pensioners and employees. Thus, the benefit ratio also captures changes in the structure of the respective 
population groups, in addition to the assumed increases in pensions due to the indexation rules, the maturation of the pension system 
and longer contribution periods as well as in wages due to the assumptions of labour productivity growth rates. In particular, it 
should be noted that the benefit ratio does not measure the level of the pension for any individual relative to his/her own wage and, 




Change in Public Pension Expenditure over the Period 2007-60 
















ratio. As already stressed, the main contributor to the increasing in the ratio of pension to GDP is 
represented by demographic factors (captured by the old age dependency ratio), ranging from 
+4.2 to +13.7 per cent in the case of UK and SI respectively. It is worthwhile stressing that for 
many MS, a significant worsening of demographic factors is only partly offset by higher 
employment, lower coverage rate and lower benefit rate. Indeed, the increase in the old age 
dependency ratio is the only factor pushing upward the pension to GDP ratio, while the evolution 
of the other three factors are expected to contribute to dampening, but only to a limited degree in 
the majority of MSs, the evolution in the pension/GDP ratio. 
In general, the downward pressure on pension spending of the projected increase in the 
employment rate is very small in the majority of MSs,
16 being less that 1 per cent in absolute terms 
over the projection period (0.6 per cent for the EU27). 
On the contrary, the contributions of the fall in both the coverage rate and the benefit rate are 
more pronounced, although generally not large enough to stabilise the pension to GDP ratio in the 
long run at the initial level. The overall EU27 effect of these two factors seems to be comparable, 
reaching about –2.5 per cent. But variation among countries tends to be noticeable. An increase in 
the coverage ratio will contribute to increase the pension/GDP ratio in LU (+5.2 per cent) and 
CY  (+1.6  per cent). On the contrary, large falls are projected to contribute to put downward 
pressure on pension in PL (–6.2 per cent) and RO (–5.9 per cent). 
Concerning the contribution of changes in the benefit ratio, one can observe both negative as 
well as positive values. Only in 5 MS (UK, IE, GR, LU and RO), the change in the benefit ratio is 
————— 
16  This is mainly due to the assumptions behind the macroeconomic projection and a development of aggregate employment, in 















































































Decomposition of the Public Pension Expenditure over the Period 2007-60 




















































BE 10.0 7.4 –0.9 –0.5 –1.0 –0.3 14.7
BG 8.3 9.1 –3.0 –0.5 –1.8 –0.8 11.3
CZ 7.8 9.5 –3.5 –0.5 –1.2 –1.1 11.0
DK 9.1 6.5 –4.9 –0.1 –0.5 –0.7 9.2
DE 10.4 7.9 –1.9 –0.8 –2.2 –0.8 12.8
EE 5.6 4.6 –1.6 –0.2 –3.1 –0.4 4.9
IE 4.0 5.9 –1.5 –0.2 0.7 –0.3 8.6
EL 11.7 12.7 –0.4 –0.6 0.8 –0.1 24.1
ES 8.4 10.7 –0.9 –0.9 –1.7 –0.5 15.1
FR 13.0 8.4 –2.2 –0.5 –4.0 –0.7 14.0
IT 14.0 10.4 –3.2 –1.1 –5.5 –1.0 13.6
CY 6.3 10.8 1.6 –0.5 –0.3 –0.2 17.7
LV 5.4 5.7 –1.6 –0.2 –3.9 –0.4 5.1
LT 6.8 9.6 –2.4 –0.0 –1.8 –0.8 11.4
LU 8.7 8.4 5.2 0.0 1.2 0.3 23.9
HU 10.9 11.3 –5.4 –0.7 –1.1 –1.0 13.8
MT 7.2 11.3 –3.1 –0.7 –0.5 –0.8 13.4
NL 6.6 6.6 –1.5 –0.2 –0.6 –0.4 10.5
AT 12.8 9.9 –2.6 –0.5 –5.0 –1.0 13.6
PL 11.6 13.4 –6.3 –1.0 –7.1 –1.8 8.8
PT 11.4 9.8 –1.7 –0.6 –4.5 –0.9 13.4
RO 6.6 13.6 –4.9 0.3 1.7 –1.5 15.8
SI 9.9 13.7 –3.5 –0.1 –0.7 –0.7 18.6
SK 6.8 11.7 –3.9 –0.6 –2.4 –1.4 10.2
FI 10.0 8.7 –3.1 –0.6 –0.9 –0.7 13.4
SE 9.5 5.6 –0.4 –0.4 –4.3 –0.6 9.4
UK 6.6 4.2 –1.4 –0.3 0.5 –0.3 9.3
NO 8.8 8.2 –1.2 0.3 –2.3 –0.2 13.6
EU27 10.1 8.7 –2.6 –0.7 –2.5 –0.6 12.5
EA16 11.0 9.0 –2.0 –0.7 –2.9 –0.7 13.8
EA12 11.1 8.8 –1.9 –0.7 –2.9 –0.7 13.8
EU15 10.2 7.7 –1.8 –0.6 –2.3 –0.6 12.6
EU10 9.7 11.8 –4.9 –0.7 –3.9 –1.3 10.7
EU25 10.2 8.5 –2.4 –0.7 –2.5 –0.6 12.5610  Giuseppe Carone and Per Eckefeldt 
 
envisaged to be positive, thus contributing to push up pension spending. In the rest of the countries, 
a reduction in the relative value of social security benefits (compared to the gross average wage) is 
projected. In the following 8 MS (PL, IT, AT, PT, SE, FR, LV and EE) the contribution of a 
decreasing benefit ratio is in absolute terms quite significant (above 3 per cent). The mentioned 
differences among countries are mainly due to different degree of reforms affecting both access to 
pensions and generosity of future pension benefits. 
To sum up, in the upcoming decades, demographic factors are projected to be the main 
driver of the future pension expenditure. For all countries, except CY and LU, the contribution of 
the old-age dependency ratio is bigger that the total change in the social security pension to GDP. It 
is evident that envisaged demographic transition will affect future pensions to a remarkable extent. 
Hopefully, recent pension reforms have strengthened the counterbalancing impact of other factors 
(increase in employment rate, especially of older workers, decline in the coverage ratio, through 
postponement of retirement age, less generous public pension transfers). However, since the effect 
of population ageing is expected to be really a substantial one, additional appropriate reforms are 
needed in order for the other main determinants of pension spending to fully countervail its effect. 
Contrary to the labour market reforms, changes of the pension schemes tend to have an 
impact on economic variables rather in the long run. Usually, the impact of the reforms affecting 
the value of pension benefits will become visible only in future years, as currently working 
individuals will retire under different conditions in the future. This circumstance is clearly visible 
in Table 3 where the contribution of falling benefit ratios at the EU27 level is the strongest from 
2020 to 2050. 
Focusing on development at the EU27 level, the first sub period 2007-20 is characterised by 
a relatively low contribution of a change in the benefit ratio (–0.1 per cent). Still, a large divergence 
is observed across countries, ranging from the largest positive contribution in RO (+3.3 per cent) 
and the largest negative contribution registered in SE (–1.5 per cent), LU and CZ (–1.4 per cent 
for both). As already noted, the effect of the pension system reforms is expected to materialise over 
longer horizon. Thus, not surprisingly, the EU27 average benefit contribution to keep pension 
spending under control increases over time, starting from 2020-30. The largest positive 
contribution falls down reaching 1.3 per cent in case of EL. The largest negative benefit 
contribution remains unchanged at –1.4 per cent this time registered by PT. As the current pension 
reforms adjusting adequacy of individual pension benefits will affect primarily individuals retiring 
in thirty to forty years, the largest contribution of the fall in benefit ratios is projected to show up 
over the period 2030-40 (–0.7 per cent in the EU27). 
 
5.2  Is there a risk of pensions becoming “too small”? 
We have seen that sizable decreases in benefit ratios are projected over coming decades. It is 
very difficult to assess to what extent future pension benefits will be “adequate” in the future. 
Comprehensive pension reforms have aimed at strengthening fiscal sustainability by generally 
including measures aimed at both tightening of eligibility for pension benefits and reducing the 
growth of the pension benefits in relation to income growth in the economy. 
Table 4 shows the benefit ratio (the ratio between the average pension benefit and the 
economy-wide average wage) and the replacement rate (the average first pension as a share of the 
economy-wide average wage). 
The decline in the public pension benefit ratio over the period 2008-60 is substantial, 
20 per cent or more in 11 MSs (FR, IT, AT, PT, SE, EE, LV, LT, PL, SK, BG). However, taking 
into consideration also the projected support from pension benefits from the 2
nd and 3
rd pillars, the 




Contribution of the Benefit Ratio to the Change 
in the Ratio of Social Security Pension Expenditure 







































































































Country 2007-20 2020-30 2030-40 2040-50 2050-60 2007-60
BE 0.5 –0.1 –0.5 –0.5 –0.5 –1.0
BG 0.1 –0.8 –0.7 –0.4 0.0 –1.8
CZ –1.4 –0.3 0.2 0.3 0.0 –1.2
DK –0.4 0.0 –0.2 –0.1 0.1 –0.5
DE –0.5 –0.9 –0.8 –0.1 0.0 –2.2
EE 0.1 –0.9 –0.7 –0.9 –0.8 –3.1
IE 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7
EL 1.0 1.3 0.2 –0.8 –0.9 0.8
ES 1.0 –0.7 –0.7 –0.7 –0.7 –1.7
FR –1.4 –1.1 –0.7 –0.5 –0.2 –4.0
IT 0.3 –1.3 –1.6 –1.5 –1.3 –5.5
CY 0.5 –0.4 0.3 –0.2 –0.5 –0.3
LV –0.1 –0.4 –0.6 –1.6 –1.3 –3.9
LT –0.3 –0.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.5 –1.8
LU –1.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 1.2
HU 0.5 –0.7 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –1.1
MT –0.6 –0.6 0.6 0.3 –0.3 –0.5
NL –0.5 –0.1 0.0 0.1 –0.0 –0.6
AT –0.9 –0.6 –0.9 –1.1 –1.4 –5.0
PL –0.8 –1.3 –1.6 –1.9 –1.5 –7.1
PT 0.0 –1.4 –1.7 –0.7 –0.7 –4.5
RO 2.8 0.1 –0.3 –0.5 –0.3 1.7
SI –0.6 –0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 –0.7
SK –0.3 –0.4 –0.6 –0.7 –0.5 –2.4
FI 0.6 –0.1 –0.4 –0.5 –0.4 –0.9
SE –1.5 –1.1 –0.8 –0.6 –0.4 –4.3
UK 0.0 –0.1 –0.0 0.4 0.3 0.5
NO –0.1 –0.5 –0.7 –0.5 –0.5 –2.3
EU27 –0.1 –0.6 –0.7 –0.6 –0.4 –2.5
EA16 –0.2 –0.8 –0.8 –0.6 –0.5 –2.9
EA12 –0.2 –0.8 –0.8 –0.6 –0.5 –2.9
EU15 –0.2 –0.7 –0.7 –0.4 –0.3 –2.3
EU10 –0.6 –0.8 –0.8 –1.0 –0.8 –3.9
EU25 –0.2 –0.7 –0.7 –0.6 –0.4 –2.5 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































these countries (SE, EE, HU, LV, LT, PL, SK, BG), see also Table 5.
17 Notwithstanding this boost, 
it still declines by 20 per cent or more in FR, IT, AT, PT, SE, EE, PL. 
In the case of a declining benefit ratio over time, the replacement rates at retirement provides 
information on whether the reduction in average pension benefit over time is due to a decline over 
time in newly awarded pensions (as reflected in the replacement rate at retirement), or due to a 
decline in previously awarded “old” pensions, the latter being influenced by the pension indexation 
rule employed. 
Only about half of the EU MSs have reported replacement rates, which hampers a mapping 
of the situation across the EU. Nonetheless, in a number of countries, the decline in the public 
pension replacement rate between 2007 and 2060 is substantial, being 15 per cent or more in IT, 
AT, SE, EE, HU, LV, and PL. This suggests that the valorisation of the average first pension is 
lagging behind the average wage growth quite significantly (in some cases partly reflecting the 
impact of increases in life expectancy in the calculation of the pension benefit – through some kind 
of “adjustment coefficient” or “sustainability factor”). In a number of countries the decline in the 
————— 
17  It should be noted that not all MSs were in a position to provide projection for 2
nd and 3
rd pillars even if they exist, indicating that 
















BG 8.3 9.1 –3.2 –0.5 –1.8 1.2 13.0
DK 14.7 6.5 –8.0 –0.2 –0.8 6.0 18.1
EE 5.6 4.6 –1.8 –0.2 –3.6 2.1 6.7
IE 5.2 5.9 –2.1 –0.3 0.9 1.6 11.3
ES 9.0 10.7 –0.9 –1.0 –1.9 0.5 16.4
LV 5.4 5.7 –2.0 –0.2 –5.2 6.3 10.0
LT 6.8 9.6 –2.7 –0.0 –2.0 1.7 13.3
HU 10.9 11.3 –4.5 –0.7 –2.4 1.5 16.0
NL 11.7 6.6 –2.7 –0.3 –1.2 8.4 22.6
PL 11.6 13.4 –6.5 –1.0 –7.6 0.7 10.6
PT 12.0 9.8 –1.6 –0.6 –4.9 -0.7 14.0
RO 6.6 13.6 –5.1 0.3 1.7 0.7 17.7
SI 9.9 13.7 –3.5 –0.1 –0.7 0.0 19.3
SK 6.8 11.7 –4.2 –0.6 –2.7 1.4 12.4
SE 12.2 5.6 –0.5 –0.5 –6.2 3.7 14.4614  Giuseppe Carone and Per Eckefeldt 
 
gross average replacement rate including the contribution from 2nd and 3
rd pillar pensions is 
smaller than concerning public pensions. 
A decline in the replacement rate over time may be an explicit policy target in some cases, 
where the initial replacement is very high and might act as a deterrent on the individual’s attitude 
towards continuing working. Hence, it is informative to look not only at the change in the 
replacement rate over time, but also at the level, see Table 5. If the replacement rate at a future 
point in time is “low”, there is a case for putting in place other sources of income in order to avoid 
potential future issues as regards adequacy of pensions. In countries where the public pension 
replacement rate is low in the future, the potential inadequacy of pensions from public sources may 
therefore be relatively larger and call for proper intervention by governments so as to realign 
contemporary income across different age groups. 
However, as pointed out above, it must be borne in mind that other sources of income for 
older people can make up for the lower initial pension from social security. First, retirement 
income from other pillars can support purchasing power of pensioners (for instance, this is the case 
in SE, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, SK, BG, who have provided projection of these privatized funded 
pillars). Second, other income sources can contribute to retirement income, like drawing down on 
accumulated assets and savings. Third, behavioural change among the population, beyond what is 
already assumed in the baseline projections, to further extend working lives and/or to increase their 
savings to enhance the future pension benefit and/or retirement incomes may occur on the 
assumption that individuals are well-informed of their future prospects and take a (long) 
forward-looking perspective. Clearly, structural reforms that fosters (or forces) the expansion of 
life spent working can affect this change. 
In addition to issues regarding the level of the first pension awarded, as captured by the 
average replacement rate, indexation rules governing the evolution of the pension after retirement 
is an important determinant of the pension income after retirement. As noted above, pinpointing a 
level below which a pension may be “too low”, is a difficult task. Nonetheless, the lower the first 
pension benefit, the higher the reliance of price indexation (as opposed to wage indexation) after 
retirement is, the higher is the probability that the pension benefit for an individual risks becoming 
inadequate over time. This applies in particular to individuals with the lowest, or minimum, 
pension benefits. 
 
6  Assessing the potential impact of future changes in some of the main drivers of pension 
spending 
In order to verify how sensitive are the different national pension models to changes in key 
variables, and thus to possible future changes in the parameters of the pension schemes, a series of 
sensitivity tests were carried out. Specifically, changes to the demographic (assumptions on life 
expectancy and migration flows) and macroeconomic (productivity growth, employment rates and 
the interest rate) variables were applied in the projection exercise of the EC-EPC.
18 
In particular, given the high uncertainty surrounding assumptions regarding demographic 
and economic outlook over the long-term, it is important to know the impact of changes in these 
factor on pension spending. In order to take such uncertainties into account, a set of projections 
under alternative assumptions is carried out in addition to the baseline scenario (labour productivity 
growth, employment rate, interest rate and life expectancy). 
————— 
18  For details on the specification of the sensitivity tests, please see European Commission – Economic Policy Committee (2008), 
“2009 Ageing Report: Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies (2007-2060)”, European Economy, No. 7.   Economic and Budgetary Effects of Pension Reforms in EU Member States  615 
 
 
6.1  Pension spending is especially sensitive to life expectancy and assumptions on migration 
Sensitivity tests show that public spending on pensions appears to be particularly sensitive to 
changes in life expectancy and in some countries to the labour productivity growth rate. The 
projected change in public spending on pensions are relatively robust regarding the changes in 
employment rates and the changes in interest rates affect only funded schemes. More specifically: 
 
6.1.1 Life  expectancy 
Higher life expectancy leads to increased public spending in countries with defined-benefit 
schemes, whereas defined-contribution schemes inherently takes into account the length of 
retirement. As part of recent pension reforms, some Member States have introduced a link between 
life expectancy at retirement and pension benefits: the projection results indicate that these 
measures appear to achieve a better sharing of demographic risk. A higher life expectancy (of 
1 year at birth by 2060) would lead to an increase of the pension to GDP ratio in the EU27 of about 
+0.2 per cent. The impact is however not uniform across countries, ranging from +0.1 per cent by 
LV to +0.8 per cent by PL. 
The extent to which the pension schemes react to a change in life expectancy depends on the 
design of the schemes. The impact of longer life expectancy appears to be smaller in countries 
where the annuity explicitly depends on life expectancy at retirement or in countries where 
automatic stabilizers of spending are built into the system to compensate for some fiscal 
imbalances (e.g., the sustainability factors in DE, SI, FI, PT and SE). This type of features 
increases the resilience of pension schemes to longevity risk. By contrast, the impact is larger in 
countries with a large level of pension expenditure in 2050 and where no such automatic stabilizer 
of the pension spending has been put in place (e.g., BE and FR). 
 
6.1.2  Higher labour productivity growth 
A permanent increase of 0.25 per cent in the productivity growth rate would reduce the 
increase in the pension to GDP ratio in the EU27 by –0.5 per cent up to 2060. A larger reduction 
would be the case in GR (–2.0 per cent), AT (–1.1 per cent) and ES (–1.0 per cent), while an 
increase is projected in SI (+0.2 per cent), NO (+0.2 per cent) and PL (+0.3 per cent) thanks to 
indexation of pensions to wages or larger accumulation of pension rights. 
Higher productivity growth increases income, also in per capita terms, and leads to improved 
living standards (also for pensioners) at the aggregate level. However, the main mechanism behind 
the lower increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP is that higher productivity growth 
leads to a faster growth of GDP and hence a faster increase in income than in pensions (a fall in 
benefit ratio). As discussed in above, this change in relative income position between the 
working-age population and the retired may put pressure on governments to adjust retirement 
income policies to avoid potential risks related to relatively inadequate pensions. 
Higher labour productivity growth has a different impact on pension expenditure across 
countries. It will have virtually no impact in countries where the public pension scheme provides a 
flat rate pension whose level is indexed to wage growth. By contrast, it will lead to lower increases 
where pension expenditure trail GDP growth. This will be the case if pensions are not fully indexed 
to wages after retirement. The higher the productivity growth, the higher the gap between the 
average pension and the average wage. If pensions are earnings-related and are calculated over a 
long period of the career, a more dynamic productivity growth will lead to higher wages and 
therefore accumulate higher pension rights. 616  Giuseppe Carone and Per Eckefeldt 
 
 
6.1.3  Higher employment of older workers 
An increase of the total employment rates by 1 percentage point or an increase of the 
employment rates of older workers by 5 percentage points compared to the baseline would reduce 
the upward dynamic in pension expenditure as a share of GDP by 0.2 per cent over 2007-60. This 
would materialize through higher employment growth raising GDP growth in a first phase. 
However, in a second phase it would enable workers to accumulate further pension rights, having a 
moderating upward impact on the pension-to-GDP ratio in the longer term. The employment effect 
is slightly stronger in reducing the increase in the pension ratio if it results from higher employment 
of older workers, since it will mechanically reduce the number of retirees. The impact of a higher 
total employment will depend on the extent to which extending working lives will translate into 
higher pension entitlements. 
 
6.1.4 Higher  total  employment 
The impact of a higher employment for the entire workforce (assuming a reduction of the 
unemployment rate) leads to a reduction of –0.2 per cent in the EU. A stronger impact would occur 
in BG, NO, AT all reaching (–0.3 per cent). On the other hand, in IT, HU, LV, LU, EE with zero 
impact on pension to GDP ratio and PL (+0.6 per cent), the effect is smaller, reflecting in some 
cases the flat-rate character of the public pension scheme. The effect is limited as higher/longer 
employment results in the accumulation of greater pension entitlements. Notwithstanding the 
apparently small impact on public spending, raising the employment rate is welfare enhancing. It 
leads to an improved economic performance, and on the budgetary side it delays somewhat the 
onset of increased public spending on pensions. Moreover, higher employment generates increased 
contributions to pension schemes, and if it is the result of lower unemployment, additional 
budgetary savings may emerge. Finally, longer working lives enable workers to acquire greater 
pension entitlements offsetting some of the impact of less generous public pensions. 
 
6.1.5 Interest  rates 
Interest rates affect the pension spending only in countries where funding is important. 
Moreover, Changing the assumption on the interest rate has an impact on public expenditure 
only in a few countries with funded components in the public pension schemes such as SE 
(–0.02 per cent) and FI (+0.14 per cent). The effect comes through a higher rate of return and its 
impact will depend on the extent to which assets have been accumulated. The effect of this test is 
generally stronger for private pension and in particular for countries that have large pensions 
scheme funds, such as NL, DK, FI and SE. 
Changes in interest rates affects the contribution rate and asset accumulation of funded 
schemes, albeit in opposite directions in defined-benefit and defined-contribution schemes. In 
defined-benefit schemes, with a higher interest rate, the contribution rate can be lowered to cover 
the targeted benefit, whereas in a defined-contribution scheme, the contribution rate remains 
unchanged but results in a higher accumulation of assets. 
 
6.1.6 Zero  migration 
The zero migration scenario assumes the absence of both immigration and emigration 
between domestic economy and the rest of the world. The assumptions of this scenario seem to be 
very strong and even unrealistic for some of the countries. As a result, the outcomes of this 
scenario have to be interpreted only as indication of the potentially very different role that 
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Figure 7 (continued) 
Sensitivity Tests: 
Difference between Pension Spending in the Alternative and the Baseline Scenarios 
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migration scenarios is the largest one among all of the sensitivity tests for majority of the Member 
States. In general, due to the net zero migration assumption, the pension to GDP ratio increases. 
This is the case in all of the MSs except a very limited negative change in case of LT. The EU27 
average increase in pension to GDP ratio is projected to be +1.7 per cent above the baseline change 
over the projection horizon. An increase in the pension to GDP ratio mainly results from an impact 
of the smaller labour force and lower GDP over the projection period. At the same time, the 
number of pensioners is generally less affected by the net zero migration assumption over the 
projection horizon, i.e. 2007-60.
19 
 
7  Assessing the budgetary impact of pension reforms: comparison with the previous 
pension projection exercise 
An additional way to assess the budgetary impact of recent pension reforms is to compare 
the changes in public pension expenditure as a share of GDP up to 2050 in the current projection 
exercises with those projected in 2006 (see Figure 8). For most countries, the change in pension 
expenditure as a share of GDP has been revised over time, sometimes significantly (as reflected by 
the distance from the 45 degree line in Figure 8). Compared with the 2006 pension projection 
————— 
19  Beyond 2060, the number of pensioners will be affected by the assumptions of the net zero migration scenario. As the current and 
future (up to 2060) level of employment is lower due to lower inflow of immigrants, the number of pensioner is expected to fall in 
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exercise, pension expenditure is now projected to be fairly similar for the EU25 (rising by 
2.3 per cent of GDP, compared with 2.2 per cent of GDP in the 2006 Ageing Report).
20 
Pension expenditure is now projected to increase more (or decrease less) in EE, IT, LV, LT, 
LU, MT, AT, PL, SI, SK, with large upward revisions of 1.5 per cent of GDP or more in EE, LV, 
LT, LU, MT, AT, PL. By contrast, a lower increase (or higher decrease) is now projected in BE, 
CZ, DK, IE, FR, CY, HU, NL, PT, FI, SE, UK, with significant downward revisions of 1.5 per cent 
of GDP or more in CZ, DK, IE, CY, HU, PT, SE. 
The revisions of projected changes in pension expenditure over the long-term are due to 
several factors, notably but not exclusively due to reforms of pension systems. Also other factors 
are playing a role, such as changes in the demographic and macroeconomic assumptions, changes 
in modelling pension expenditure over the long-term and changes in the coverage of the projection 
(data on pension schemes covered in the projection). 
In order to shed light on the reasons behind these revisions, a comparison of a decomposition 
of the change in public pension expenditure between the 2006 Ageing Report and the current 
projection exercise into four factors is conducted. This decomposition comparison was also used in 
the country fiches on the pension projections when analyzing the reasons behind the change in the 
projection results. 
Table 6 presents a decomposition of the public pension to GDP ratio in 2006 and 2009 
projections.
21 An in-depth analysis of the reasons behind the revisions for each country is provided 
in the country fiches on the pension projection and results envisaged for release in the latter half of 
2009. 
The main points may be summarized as follows: 
•  the main factor behind the projected increase in pension expenditure is the demographic 
transition to an older population. The dependency effect has decreased in a majority of countries 
PT, IE, CY, CZ, AT, ES, UK, IT, HU, DK, BE, FI, FR, SI, DE and SE, and it has increase only 
in few NL, LU, SK, EE, PL, LV, LT and MT; 
•  the other factors are in general offsetting the increase that follows from the larger number and 
share of older people. In the 2009 projection exercise, the fall in coverage is more accentuated, 
thus offsetting the dependency effect to a greater extent in a majority of countries. These reflect 
changes in pension policies that have aimed at increasing the effective retirement age either 
through increases in the statutory retirement age and/or through tightening access to early and 
disability pension schemes. Compared with the 2006 projection exercise, the largest reductions 
in the coverage ratio are projected in PT, IE and CY. By contrast, it slightly increases in ES, LU 
and AT. An increase in the coverage effect may be due to a higher take-up of pensions by 
women thanks to their increasing participation in the labour market even if there is a lower 
take-up of pensions by men due to reforms undertaken; 
•  the employment effect contributes to offset the dependency effect too. As already seen before, 
the effect is rather small in most countries and it generally offsets less in the current exercise 
compared with the 2006 projection. This partly follows from the fact that employment rates 
have generally risen in the period since the previous projection was carried out and that the 
structural unemployment rates have not been reduced to the same extent. This leads to lower 
————— 
20  It should be noted that the projection for Greece is included in the current projection exercise, which was not the case in the 2006 
Ageing Report. Excluding Greece from the EU25, the aggregate would lead to a lower increase in the current projection, of 
1.9 percentage points of GDP. 
21  A small discrepancy between the changes in the consecutive projection exercises may be due to different starting year used; for the 
2006 projection, the change is calculated over the period 2004-50 and in the current projection it is calculated over the period 




Decomposition of the Public Pension in 2006 and 2009 Projections 




















































BE 2006 7.7 –0.4 –0.9 –1.2 5.1
2009 6.7 –0.7 –0.5 –0.6 4.8
BG 2006
2009 7.5 –2.2 –0.3 –1.8 2.5
CZ 2006 10.5 –3.5 –0.3 –0.6 5.6
2009 8.3 –3.2 –0.5 –1.2 2.4
DK 2006 7.2 –2.8 –0.4 –0.5 3.2
2009 6.2 –4.2 –0.2 –0.6 0.5
DE 2006 7.5 –0.6 –1.1 –3.5 1.9
2009 7.3 –1.8 –0.7 –2.2 1.9
EE 2006 3.1 –1.5 –0.6 –3.8 –3.0
2009 3.7 –1.3 –0.1 –2.3 –0.3
IE 2006 7.9 –1.4 –0.5 0.8 6.5
2009 5.3 –1.4 –0.2 0.6 4.0
EL 2006
2009 12.7 –1.2 –0.7 1.8 12.3
ES 2006 12.4 –2.3 –1.8 –0.8 7.0
2009 10.6 –1.0 –0.9 –1.1 7.0
FR 2006 8.7 –1.8 –0.9 –3.5 2.0
2009 8.2 –2.1 –0.5 –3.8 1.2
IT 2006 11.5 –3.2 –2.0 –5.3 0.4
2009 10.4 –3.3 –1.2 –4.2 0.7
CY 2006 10.2 1.2 –1.2 2.5 12.8
2009 8.0 1.6 –0.5 0.2 9.2
LV 2006 3.4 –1.3 –0.7 –2.3 –0.9
2009 4.3 –1.1 0.0 –2.6 0.4
LT 2006 5.4 –2.1 –1.0 –0.2 1.9
2009 6.8 –1.4 0.1 –1.3 3.6
LU 2006 7.2 2.5 –4.4 2.1 7.4
2009 7.6 4.9 –0.0 0.6 13.4
HU 2006 10.5 –4.5 –1.1 2.0 6.4
2009 9.5 –4.7 –0.7 –0.8 2.4
MT 2006 7.3 –1.0 –1.2 –5.0 –0.5
2009 9.1 –2.8 –0.7 –0.2 4.8
NL 2006 6.3 –1.6 –0.2 –0.4 3.8
2009 6.3 –1.5 –0.2 –0.5 3.7
AT 2006 11.3 –5.8 –1.3 –4.3 –1.0
2009 9.3 –3.1 –0.5 –3.6 1.2
PL 2006 10.4 –5.7 –3.2 –6.3 –5.7
2009 11.3 –5.7 –0.9 –5.6 –2.5
PT 2006 13.7 –0.9 –0.2 –3.0 9.3
2009 9.4 –1.9 –0.7 –3.8 2.0
RO 2006
2009 10.6 –3.5 0.5 2.0 8.3
SI 2006 13.3 –3.6 –1.0 –0.9 7.3
2009 12.9 –3.0 –0.1 –0.7 8.3
SK 2006 9.0 –2.5 –1.3 –3.1 1.5
2009 9.6 –3.3 –0.4 –1.9 2.6
FI 2006 8.8 –3.1 –0.9 –0.8 3.3
2009 7.9 –2.9 –0.6 –0.5 3.2
SE 2006 4.8 –0.2 –0.6 –2.8 0.9
2009 4.6 –0.2 –0.4 –4.0 –0.5
UK 2006 4.7 0.0 –0.1 0.0 1.9
2009 3.4 –1.5 –0.3 0.2 1.5
NO 2006




•  gains in employment rates over the projection period compared with the situation at the time of 
the previous projection; 
•  the benefit effect shows the extent to which average pensions increase at a different pace than 
average income (proxied by output per worker). The benefit effect can offset the dependency 
effect if: (i) the determination of the value of (future) accrued pension rights – eventually 
becoming pension benefits – is changed; (ii) the evolution of the pension after retirement is 
slower than average income (pension indexation below wage growth). It helps to offset the 
dependency effect in almost all countries, reflecting in many cases reforms that have been 
introduced so as to make the public pension systems more robust to demographic changes. In 
CZ, DK, IE, ES, FR, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, NL, PT, SE, the offsetting impact of the relative 
benefit reduction has increased compared with the previous 2006 projection and in particular for 
HU, CY, LU, SE, LT, PT and CZ. A common feature for some of these latter set of countries 
(HU, PT, CZ) is that they have introduced strong pension reforms since the completion of the 
2006 Ageing Report. As a result, the overall increase in the public pension ratio is now 
projected to be considerably smaller. 
This decomposition comparison was also used in the country fiches on the pension 
projections when analyzing the reasons behind the change in the projection results. For countries 
where pension reforms have been implemented since the completion of the 2006 projections (e.g., 
DK, CZ, HU and PT), the effect of these reforms primarily comes via the coverage effect and the 




The analysis of reforms in the Member States shows that the role of public pension benefits 
in overall pension provision is being reduced. This will happen gradually and through many 
mechanisms, including changes in the indexation of benefits which in some countries cause 
benefits to rise slower than wages. 
The EC-EPC2009 projections show that, while the main driver behind the expected increase 
in pension spending to GDP ratio is the transition to an older population. This effect alone would 
push up expenditures very significantly in all Member States. However, there are several mitigating 
factors counteracting these daunting developments owing to important reforms steps taken by EU 
Member States. 
A tightening of the eligibility to receiving a public pension (higher retirement age, reduced 
access to early retirement) is expected to act as a constraint on public pension expenditure in nearly 
every MS. This reflects implemented pension reforms, often phased-in over a long period, that lead 
to higher participation rates of older workers during the projection period. Pension reforms as well 
as trend increases in female labour force participation are assumed to lead to an increase in the 
effective retirement age in a large majority of countries. For instance, pension reforms that have 
strengthened the link between pension benefits and pension contributions (or raised the threshold 
for qualifying for a “full” pension) will also contribute to raising the retirement age. Achieving the 
necessary extension in working lives will prove challenging as adjustment will also be needed in 
the expectations and behaviour of citizens. 
There are currently many hard and soft barriers that limit the extent to which the older 
generations can participate in society, and notably so in working life. Despite considerable 
————— 
22  See European Economy (2009), “2009 Ageing Report: Pension Models and Projection Results in EU Member States” 
(forthcoming).   Economic and Budgetary Effects of Pension Reforms in EU Member States  623 
 
progress, e.g., pension reforms implemented in recent years in some Member States (most recently 
in CZ, HU, DK and PT), more policy action is necessary. In some countries, the scale of reforms to 
public pension systems has been insufficient and there is a critical need for ensuring that retirement 
behaviour takes due account of future increases in life expectancy, otherwise the pension bill will 
simply become unbearable. 
Higher participation and employment rates are projected to occur as structural 
unemployment rates in a number of countries are projected to fall, brought about by reforms, 
including the flexicurity approach, that provide stronger work incentives. High unemployment rates 
are an enormous waste of potential resources, acting as a drag on the prosperity for society as a 
whole and especially for the individuals concerned as it adds to social exclusion. Also, high 
unemployment clearly constitutes a burden on public budgets. There is therefore a need to not only 
achieve the Lisbon targets, but also to surpass them and to work in a longer time horizon. The 
employment rate for women still lags behind that of men, despite recent progress. This represents a 
huge untapped resource for the European economy, and reflects an unacceptable level of inequality 
in terms of participation. Higher employment rates can lead to very large welfare gains. Higher 
employment does not, per se, lead to lower public spending on pensions as a share of GDP over the 
long run as higher/longer employment can result in the accumulation of greater and more adequate 
pension entitlements, thus contributing to social sustainability. However, measures which raise 
employment do strengthen the financial sustainability of pension systems by delaying the onset of 
expenditure rises and through increased contributions. 
Increasing the employment rate of older workers is another area where progress has been 
made, but where much more can and needs be done. Employment of older workers has increased 
considerably in recent years. Yet, only around 50 per cent of people are still in employment by the 
age of 60. This represents a huge untapped potential and raising the employment rates of older 
workers, including those aged over 65 in the future, will remain a key policy objective for EU 
Member States. 
Achieving the necessary extension in working lives will not be easy. It not only requires that 
tax/benefit and wage systems provide financial incentives for people to remain economically active 
and invest in building their own human capital, but it also means that there must be job 
opportunities for older people with appropriate skill sets. Policies to tackle age-discrimination and 
to promote life-long learning, flexible retirement pathways and healthy work conditions also need 
to be considered. Perhaps the most challenging aspect of efforts to rise effective retirement ages is 
the need to change the expectations and behaviour of employers and employees alike. Moreover, 
the concept of ageing is evolving, and with life expectancy projected to continue rising, retirement 
behaviour may also need to adjust continuously. 
Reduced generosity of public pensions is also expected to contribute to keeping pension 
spending under control. The analysis shows that in the EU public pension benefits are rising slower 
than wages, implying that on average pensioners will experience a relative deterioration in living 
standards  vis-à-vis workers in the future. The recent EC-EPC projections along with analysis 
carried out within the framework of Open Method of Coordination in Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion suggests that future relative pensioners’ income will decline substantially in the number 
of Member States.
23 The 2006 report on sustainability of public finances considers the risk of 
inadequate pensions which may result in unforeseen pressure for ad hoc increases of pensions or 
higher demand for other benefits.
24 Thus the issues of pension adequacy, sustainability and 
modernisation need to be considered jointly. 
 
————— 
23  COM (2009) 58 final. 
24  COM (2006) 574 final.  
 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Trends differ widely across the EU. In a few Member Sates (DK, IE, EL, CY, RO, UK), 
average pensions relative to wages remain unchanged or even increase over the projection period, 
while in most others (especially in BG, EE, FR, IT, LV, AT, PL, PT, SK, SE) it is projected to 
decrease up to 2060. The decrease in the generosity of public pensions is due to necessary pension 
reforms introduced in the majority of Member Sates in order to contribute to the sustainability of 
public finances over the long-term. In order to secure that retirement income is also adequate, many 
countries have introduced supplementary (private) pension schemes. 
Additional pensions from private pillars, to compensate for the relatively lower pension 
income from public sources, are expected in a number of Member States. A number of countries 
have implemented systemic pension reforms, shifting part of the previously public pillar to a 
mandatory funded private pillar (BG, EE, LV, LT, HU, PL, SK and SE). At present, these private 
pillars are making very small disbursements since they have been set up mainly during the previous 
decade, but their importance will increase in the future. Some countries (e.g., SE, DK, and NL) also 
rely on 2
nd pillar occupational pensions to a certain extent. Also, 3
rd pillar non-mandatory pension 
schemes are increasingly being introduced, but their importance is generally small. 
“Privatizing pensions” also entail important policy issues, as exemplified by the current 
financial crisis where assets invested in stock markets worldwide have tumbled. While moving 
towards more private sector pension provision can help reduce explicit public finance liabilities and 
improve (potentially) the sustainability of public finances, it also creates new challenges and forms 
of risks for policy makers. In particular, the importance of appropriate regulation of private pension 
funds and of careful surveillance of their performance for securing adequate retirement income 
need to be addressed, as the current financial and economic crisis have made adamantly clear. 
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SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS IN COLOMBIA: 
STRIKING DEMOGRAPHIC AND FISCAL BALANCES 
Sergio Clavijo
* 
This paper analyzes the economic rationale for adopting parametric pension reforms and 
reforms broadening the coverage of public health care in Colombia during 1993-2008. Parametric 
pension reforms have focused on increasing the retirement age and moderating replacement rates. 
The health system reforms aimed at reaching universal coverage by 2012, while providing a more 
homogenous level of services. Our results indicate that the Net Present Value of the debt of the 
social security system in Colombia is roughly 160  per cent of GDP for pensions and about 
97 per cent of GDP for the health system. 
 
1 Introduction 
The literature on labor economics identifies three salient stages regarding social security 
developments at the global level. The first era was born in Germany in 1883, when Chancellor 
Bismarck had the visionary idea that initiated a compulsory savings system allowing the State to 
guarantee universal pension benefits. 
In the second stage, this system expanded throughout Europe with minor idiosyncratic 
differences and even reached across the Atlantic to the United States, where several labor 
compensation packages were developed over the years  1901-28. With the arrival of the Great 
Depression in 1929-31, the desire to enlarge and secure these labor benefits grew substantially, 
leading to the well-known New Deal initiated in 1935-36. For enterprises, the expansion of the 
formal system was beneficial, as it allowed workers to receive a pension benefits package (not 
subject to taxes) that would help attract highly sought-after skilled labor. This was deemed 
preferable to an open “wage war”, especially in an environment in which union affiliations had 
increased from 10 to nearly 30 per cent between 1930 and 1947 (Krugman, 2007, p. 35). With 
contribution rates initially set at low levels, the benefits of the system, for the enterprise sector, 
outweighed its costs. 
However, with global competition reaching new heights in the 1980s and 1990s, the balance 
sheets of US firms were hamstrung by massive social security costs (Bernanke, 2008). This change 
in the competitive landscape compelled the rise of a third stage in social security development, 
which could well be termed the era of outsourcing and off-shoring. This stage has resulted in 
increasing labor informality and the loss of prized social security protection in both developed 
economies and the so-called emerging markets, which had attempted to replicate the successful 
path followed by the US in the golden period of 1935-50. 
The social security path followed by many Latin America countries resembled many features 
of the social security history of the United States. In the specific case of Colombia, compulsory 
wage increases came first with the movement toward unionization (1940-50), as related by Urrutia 
(1969) and Bushnell (1993). Later came the establishment of pension benefits in 1967, through the 
————— 
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creation of the public Pay-as-You-Go System (Paygo), administered by the Instituto de los Seguros 
Sociales (ISS). 
However, this system quickly dissolved into a crisis as a result of low participation rates – 
only 23-25 per cent of the labor market contributed. In response, the government carried out Law 
100 of 1993, creating a dual public-private competitive system in which new generations were 
given the opportunity to migrate to a “defined contribution” scheme run by the Administradoras de 
Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs).  This private system mimicked several elements of the Chilean 
reform of the early 1980s (Clavijo, 1995). 
The aforementioned Law 100 of 1993 also ambitiously set the goal of attaining universal 
health coverage in Colombia, based on a very complex system of cross subsidies. Paradoxically, 
what has taken the advanced countries more than a century to accomplish is now being pursued by 
Colombia in just four decades, albeit at a much higher fiscal cost. 
In what follows, we analyze the economic rationale for adopting parametric pension reforms 
and reforms broadening the coverage of public health care in Colombia during  1993-2008. 
Parametric pension reforms have focused on increasing retirement age (with disappointing results) 
and moderating replacement rates (with a fairly good balance between acquired rights of the 
old-age cohorts and new demographic challenges stemming from young cohorts with longer life 
expectancies). The health system reforms aimed at reaching universal coverage by 2012 (currently 
at 86 per cent), while providing a more homogenous level of services across different social strata. 
The latter reflected the effects of increased “judicial activism,” with potentially substantial fiscal 
consequences. 
We use official simulations regarding the public sector financial gap stemming from current 
pensions arrangements and run our own simulations regarding the health system financial gap. 
Based on these results, we compute the Net Present Value (NPV) of the debt of the social security 
system in Colombia, which currently hovers around 160 per cent of GDP for pensions and about 
97 per cent of GDP for the health system (over the period 2007-50).
1 
After this introduction, we focus in Section 2 on the parametric pension reforms carried out 
in Colombia over 1993-2008 and its fiscal effects. Section 3 is devoted to analyzing health care 
reforms, which have been pursued in tandem with the pension reforms. Conclusions are provided in 
Section 4. 
 
2  Pension reforms in Colombia 
We analyze pensions reforms in Colombia according to parameters related to: a) retirement 
age and b) replacement rates (equivalent to the ratio of pension to the wage upon which 
contributions were made). The first generation of such pension reforms took place during the 
Gaviria Administration (1990-94), as reflected in Law 100 of 1993, and the second generation 
reforms occurred under the first Uribe Administration (2002-06), as instituted by Laws 797 and 
860 of 2003 and the Constitutional Reform of 2005. 
 
2.1 Retirement  age 
Before Law 100 of 1993, the bulk of public sector workers were covered by Law 33 of 1985 
————— 
1  All ratios to GDP used in this document are based on GDP estimates of the Colombian National Statistical Institute (DANE) before 
the historical revision undertaken in 2008, which resulted in upward revisions to GDP. For example, 2007 GDP is approximately 
18 per cent higher under the new estimates.   Social Security Reforms in Colombia: Striking Demographic and Fiscal Balances  631 
 
Figure 1 
Retirement Age Gap 
 





















Source: author’s computations based on data from DANE. 
 
regarding retirement conditions in terms of time of service and age. The age of retirement was as 
low as 50/55 (female/male) after only 20 years of service. Private sector retirement ages were five 
years higher at 55/60 (female/male). 
The retirement age requirements of the mid-1980s in Colombia were rather low when 
compared to life expectancy figures of 66 at birth or 70 when computed at the age of retirement. In 
this regard, it is possible to establish what we could term the Retirement Age Gap (RAG). The 
RAG can be computed in gross terms, such that RAG-Gross = Life expectancy at birth minus the 
official retirement age; and also in net terms, such that RAG-Net = Life expectancy at retirement 
age minus the official retirement age. The relevant concept for measuring the fiscal impact of 
pension subsidies is given by the RAG-Net, since it provides the time span during which pensions 
will be paid. The magnitude of such pension subsidies will be given by the rate of return on 
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Figure  1 depicts the path followed by the RAG-Net during the mid-1980s through the 
mid-1990s for females, beginning at 29 years of age and declining to 26 as retirement age increased 
from 50 to 57. But this reduction in the net burden of pensions evaporated as life expectancy, 
measured at retirement age, continued to rise while maintaining constant the retirement age at 57. 
Hence, the age of retirement plus life expectancy at retirement age increased from 79 to 84 over the 
last four decades. 
In the case of males, the level of RAG-Net is lower at 21 years, although its trajectory is 
similar to that of females, declining later to 19 as retirement age increased from 55 to 60. But 
again, such fiscal relief has narrowed as the retirement age has been fixed at 62 (instead of 65, as 
initially proposed to Congress in 1993) and life expectancy at the age of retirement, plus the age of 
retirement, has continued to rise from 76 to 82. 
Unless the parameter of retirement age is increased to 60/65 (female/male) in the near future, 
the RAG-Net will continue to expand to 29/21 (female/male), leading to the need for additional 
financing of pension expenditures from general tax revenues by 2015. By then, these figures on the 
RAG-Net would be above the levels prevalent when adopting the 1993 reform. 
Given the political difficulties in adjusting these parameters of retirement age (as life 
expectancy increases), it would be useful to link them through a formula that aims at maintaining 
the RAG-Net constant and (preferably) below the historical mark of 26/19 (female/male), which is 
equivalent to using an approach that indexes retirement age to life expectancy, as being discussed 
in Hungary. In the case of Colombia, this would imply retirement ages be increased to 
64/67 (female/male). This would still be below the 69 benchmark envisioned for the United States 
in the coming decades (see Advisory Council on Social Security, 1997; Jousten, 2007). 
These parametric reforms need to be tackled decades before they become effective in order 
to better prepare the population for such changes and also to avoid judicial set-backs. It is worth 
noting, for example, that the Colombian Constitutional Court ruled unlawful article 4 of Law 860 
of  2003, which sought to bring forward (to  2008) the retirement age increase (from 60 to 62) 
approved for 2014 under Law 100 of 1993. In this case, the Court argued that pension plan 
participants had “acquired rights” regarding expected retirement ages, which could not be negated. 
In practice, changing key pension parameters in Colombia has required Constitutional 
amendments, as occurred in 2005, while fixing the date at which old-age pension parameters would 
cease to apply (July 31st of 2010), except for the military and teachers. For these reasons, the 
“transitional pension period,” in which exaggerated pension benefits prevail, has extended for more 
than 20 years (1993-2014), instead of adopting reforms on a pari-passu basis from the early 1990s, 
as was implemented in Spain under the so-called Pacto de Toledo. 
 
2.2 Replacement  rates 
Replacement rates are defined as the ratio of the pension to wage earnings (upon which 
pension contributions were made). As it is well known, this variable is crucial for determining 
financial equilibrium in the paygo-system. If contributions plus (imputed) interest are enough to 
fund annuity payments over a determined horizon, the system will be in equilibrium. For instance, 
contributions of about 10 per cent of payroll over 30 years could assure a replacement rate of about 
60  per cent over  20 years of pension benefits, if such savings yield a compound real rate of 
6 per cent per annum. 
In general, paygo-systems in Latin America have promised replacement rates above those 
that maintain the system’s equilibrium, implying that additional taxes and/or public debt would be 
used to finance these outlays (Arenas and Llanes, 2006). In the case of Colombia, replacement rates   Social Security Reforms in Colombia: Striking Demographic and Fiscal Balances  633 
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hovered around 75-90 per cent during the 1980s and early 1990s (see Figure 2). These rates were 
clearly above the equilibrium for a paygo-system that allowed for easy access (with eligibility for 
pensions after only 10 years of contribution) and a low level of contributions (6-8 per cent of 
wages). Furthermore, in several cases, public employees had access to replacement rates of 100 per 
cent (e.g., for workers in the petroleum sector, education, or legislative branch). 
By contrast, Severinson (2008) reports that average replacement rates in the OECD are close 
to 68 per cent, while contributions are in the range of 10-15 per cent. In the United States, the mode 
value of replacement rates under the paygo-system has been around 45 per cent (Advisory Council 
on Social Security, 1997). 
Given easy conditions to qualify for a pension, the Colombian paygo-system quickly moved 
from a position of surplus (close to 1-2 per cent of GDP) over the 1970s-1980s into a position of 
deficit in the mid-2000s. Since then, the central government has been forced to use incremental tax 
support (from 2 per cent of GDP in 1998 up to 4.6 per cent of 2008, equivalent to one-third of tax 
collections) in order to comply with public pension obligations. 
Aiming to contain these fiscal pressures in Colombia, Law 100 of 1993 and Law 797 of 2003 
moderated replacement rates by means of increasing contributions: a) in terms of years of service 
(from a minimum of 10 years up to 20 years) and b) in amount (from 6-8 up to 10-12 per cent of 
wage earnings). Additionally, the constitutional amendment of 2005 dismantled, for newcomers, 
the extra-payment of about 8 per cent resulting from the so-called “Mesada 14”, generalized by the 
constitutional court rulings over the years 1994-2004 (Clavijo, 2007).
2 
————— 
2  Legal wages in Colombia amount to 13 monthly payments, including a one-month obligatory bonus payment. An additional 
monthly payment (called “Mesada 14”) had been ordered by Art. 142 of Law 100 of 1993, seeking to level off wages and pensions 
among public workers. However, the “Mesada 14” continued to be extended to all public and private pensioners during 1994-2004. 
The constitutional amendment of 2005 put an end to granting “Mesada 14” for people retiring after that year. 
Public service 
Private pensions regime 
before Law 100 634 Sergio  Clavijo 
 
Figure 2 depicts 
the change in 
replacement rates 
resulting from these 
reforms, which point to 
an average replacement 
rate in the range of 
65-70  per cent for new 
pensioners starting 
in 2014. Here we assume 
that the historical low 
density contributions (of 
about 50 per cent of labor 
time) and low wage 
contributions (below 2 
minimum legal wages for 
nearly 70  per  cent of 
contributors) will 
continue to be the norm, 
as a result of high labor 
market informality. An 
over-regulated labor 
market and high payroll 
 
taxes (of about 55 per cent on behalf of the firm, including earmarked taxes) would have to be 
corrected in order to increase labor formality in the future, as will be discussed further. 
These replacement rates under the paygo system differed markedly with those of the private 
system instituted under Law 100 of  1993. The average return on portfolios managed through 
Colombian AFPs during 1995-2007 was close to 10 per cent per-year in real terms. This means that 
a worker contributing for 30 years (full density) could obtain replacement rates close to 60 per cent, 
which is about ten percentage points below the expected value under the new paygo rules (see 
Figure 3). 
However, high informality is also affecting private sector contributions, so it is very likely 
that contributions would be closer to the range of 20-25 years (instead of 30-35) and that annual 
real returns continue to converge to 6 per cent (as has happened in Chile after 25 years under the 
private-accounts of the AFPs). Under this scenario, replacement rates under the AFPs would be 
much lower, in the range 40-50 per cent (instead of 60-70 per cent), implying an increasing gap 
with respect to the expected return under the reformed paygo system. Note that currently about 
70 per cent of contributors are with the AFPs and 30 per cent remain with the paygo system. 
Hence, even the reformed paygo system provides implicit fiscal subsidies, which could lead 
to a substantial burden on the fiscal accounts of Colombia if workers revert to the public system. In 
both systems, contributions need to improve in density (by means of increasing labor formality) 
and in amount (increasing the share of earnings that are channeled into the system). 
In order to contain the fiscal risks owing to a possible increase in participation in the public 
paygo system, the Colombian government recently enacted decree 2765 of 2007. Under this decree, 
the public fund of financial guarantees (FOGAFIN) could provide resources to avoid (cumulative) 
negative real returns on any AFP account at the moment of retirement (following Art. 99 of Law 
100 of 1993). Additionally, Law 797 of 2003 has limited the time period for switching between the 
public and private regimes to 10 years before retirement age, seeking to contain “last-minute” 
financial arbitrage between regimes. 
Figure 3 
Expected Replacement Rates under the Private AFP’s System 
(sensitivity to portfolio’s real returns) 
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Further complications among public-private system movements have emerged from disputes 
regarding the value of the exit-bond for high wage contributors (above 10 minimum wages) granted 
under Law 100 of 1993. Decree-Law 1299 of 1994 allowed the value of this bond to reach 20 
minimum wages but the constitutional court (C-734 of 2005) reduced it to 10 minimum wages for 
those moving from the public into the private AFPs after year  2006 (T-147 of  2006). This 
exit-bond reduction could represent a reduction of about  20  percentage points in terms of 
replacement rates for those moving from the public into the private system. This means that high 
wage-earners are likely to remain in the public paygo system due to the double effect of secular 
declines in the return to private pension portfolios and the capping of exit bonds. 
In this light, the rate of return on the private accounts of the AFPs needs to be improved in 
order to reduce the risk of reversals toward the public paygo system. The world financial crises 
of 2007-08 caused record-low returns on Colombian-AFP assets (now averaging –2 per cent in real 
terms over the last 36 months). This difficult financial juncture could exacerbate reversals toward 
the public system in Colombia. 
The approval of the financial reform (currently under discussion in the Colombian 
Congress), proposing “multifunds” or generational portfolios, is key to improving long-term 
returns. The reforms are similar in spirit to those implemented in Chile (2002), Mexico (2005), and 
Peru (2005). As discussed by Conrads (2008), these generational portfolios have the potential of 
improving the return/risk ratios and avoiding artificial investment “ceilings” that can lead to 
sub-optimal allocation of portfolio assets. The nationalization of the AFPs by the government of 
Argentina in late 2008 represents a warning for the region about the need to strike a good balance 
in terms of coverage and satisfactory replacement rates in private pension systems. 
 
2.3  Coverage and labor informality 
Solving the problem of low coverage of the pension system in Colombia (currently at only 
25-27  per  cent of the active labor force) requires simultaneous efforts on several fronts: 1) a 
reduction in payroll taxes and 2) restructuring the share of contributions between workers and 
firms. As shown by Kugler and Kugler (2008), the Colombian social security reforms have 
increased payroll taxes and only about one fifth of the increase in taxes has been shifted to workers 
as lower wages. Furthermore, they found that in Colombia a 10 per cent increase in payroll taxes 
reduces formal employment by between 4 and 5 per cent. 
Regarding payroll taxes paid by firms, there is a need for substituting the “pure tax” 
components through increases in the VAT rate from 16  per  cent to 17  per  cent. Hence, social 
expenditures related to child-support programs (ICBF) and labor-training programs (Sena), which 
currently represent 3  and 2  per  cent of payrolls (respectively), would be made through regular 
budgetary channels. The subsidy given to quasi-public entities known as Co-Familiares (4 per cent 
on payrolls) should be dismantled, taking into account that they are now able to run social 
programs based on their asset accumulation over the last four decades. Taken together, this would 
allow for a potential reduction of 9 percentage points on firm payrolls, boosting their international 
competitiveness without affecting key-social programs of the ICBF and Sena (Clavijo and 
Lozano, 2001; Cárdenas and Bernal, 2003). 
As for options to achieve a more desirable sharing of the burden of contributions between 
firms and workers, it is worth highlighting that in Colombia the firms absorb nearly 66-75 per cent 
of social security costs. This high cost sharing is aggravating labor informality as firms avoid such 
labor related-costs by out-sourcing and off-shoring. The social drawback of such out-sourcing is 
that many self-employed workers are left out of the system of social protection, given weaknesses 
in enforcing mandatory participation for these workers. 
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While Chile totally 
dismantled payments on 
behalf of the firm in the 
early 1980s (which 
amounted to 27  per  cent 
of the payroll), Colombia 
has increased them to 
nearly 55  per  cent (of 
which 10  percentage 
points were increased 
during 1993-2008). 
Figure 4  compares  the 
cost-sharing between 
firms/workers in Chile 
and Colombia regarding 
pension payments. In 
Chile the worker pays the 
entire  13.5 per cent  of 
payroll contribution, 
where  10.5 per cent  of 
payrolls (78  per  cent of 
the total) goes into 
his/her account and the 
remaining 3  percentage 
points pays for insurance 
and administrative fees. 
By contrast, in Colombia low-wage workers (up to 4 minimum wages) contribute to social 
security with 16.5 per cent of payroll, where the firm puts up 75 per cent of such contributions. Of 
these contributions, only 11.5  percentage points (72  per  cent) go into the private account (see 
Figure 4). For high wage workers, the “pure tax” component increases as the share going into the 
private account falls from 72 to 64 per cent. 
In short, the structure of pension contributions in Colombia presents a double misalignment 
of incentives. Firms face high labor-related costs through their high share of social security 
contributions (75  per  cent) and, second, through extra quasi-fiscal payments (ICBF, Sena, 
Co-Familiares) that finance nonpension social assistance benefits. Workers also face implicit taxes 
on their social security payments, where only 64-72  per  cent of such payments go into their 
personal accounts, compared with the 78 per cent observed in Chile. 
As mentioned earlier, it is likely that higher contributions feeding directly workers’ accounts 
will be needed to support replacement rates above 50 per cent, especially in light of the secular 
decline in the rate of return on private pension portfolios. In the case of Colombia, the system 
should target contributions into workers’ accounts of 15-20 per cent, with an even sharing of this 
burden between workers and firms. Furthermore, the payroll tax should not be used to finance 
redistributive social assistance programs, which should instead be financed out of general tax 
revenues. 
 
2.4  Fiscal impact of pension reforms 
Pension reforms in Colombia have focused on increasing the retirement age and moderating 
replacement rates. Fifteen years have elapsed since Law 100 of 1993, providing an appropriate 
Figure 4 
Pension Contributions: Worker/Firm Share 
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juncture to take stock of these parametric changes, their effects on the fiscal accounts, and the 
remaining contingent liabilities of the pension system envisaged for the next 30-50 years. 
There are two salient issues regarding social security coverage and fiscal costs in Colombia. 
The first issue involves the early warnings provided by Colombian economists in the mid-1990s 
about the forthcoming exhaustion of cash reserves of the paygo system, as younger generations 
migrated toward the private system of the AFPs. In fact, the public system began using general 
taxes to pay for pension benefits as early as  2004 (less than four decades after launching the 
paygo-system and two years before the predicted date). Because the system continues to involve 
only 25-27 per cent of the labor market, under a dual private-public regressive scheme, the central 
government has been forced to allocate about a third of total tax revenues (nearly 5 per cent of 
GDP) to cover pension benefits of a population representing just 6 per cent (about one million 
retirees) of the total population (43 million). 
The second issue involves the computation of contingent liabilities. This entails: 1) an 
estimate of legal claims for higher pensions (under the paygo system); and 2) additional costs 
stemming from longer life expectancies, under a fixed retirement age (resulting in larger 
RAG-Net). The population census conducted in  2005-06 indicates that, by the year  2050, 
the percentage of the population over 60 years of age will have tripled to 18 per cent and years of 
pension benefits (per retiree) are likely to continue expanding. 
The cash flows required to honor pension benefits under the paygo-system were masked by 
the cash reserves managed by the ISS between  1967 and  2004 (when they were exhausted). 
In 1996, the stock of the ISS’s pension reserves peaked at 2 per cent of GDP and afterwards began 
to decline as pension contributions were insufficient to honor pension benefits. The lack of 
significant new entrants under the new paygo system (1993 onwards) and the long delay in 
applying parametric corrections (until 2014) has yielded an onerous fiscal transition for Colombia, 
where the long-term deficit of the central government hovers around 2-3 per cent of GDP. 
The rest of the public sector has been unable to compensate for this fiscal strain, unlike the 
case of Chile. The only significant efforts amount to 0.2 per cent of GDP retained by the central 
government to help territorial entities pay for their own pension liabilities (under the FONPET) and 
the funding of pension liabilities of the public oil (ECOPETROL) and telecom sectors resulting 
from capitalizations and/or privatizations. Taxing pension benefits and reducing the minimum 
pension guarantee (from 100 to 75 per cent of the minimum wage) were also attempted during the 
years 2003-06, but without any success in Congress. 
According to official figures of the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Department (DNP) 
of Colombia, pension expenditure (on a cash basis) has increased over the period 2000-08, reaching 
4.6 per cent of GDP in 2008. It is likely that such pension payments will peak at 5.2 per cent of 
GDP by 2010 (see Figure 5). This use of about a third of total central government tax collections to 
honor pension benefits has burdened the fiscal accounts during the last decade. 
In the meantime, most of the new pension contributions have gone to the AFPs. Their 
portfolios have increased from nearly 2 per cent of GDP in 1995 up to 17 per cent of GDP by 
end-2008, where obligatory savings stand at 14 per cent of GDP, voluntary savings at 2 per cent of 
GDP, and unemployment insurance-payments (cesantias) at 1 per cent of GDP. 
Official computations indicate that the Net Present Value (NPV) of pension liabilities over 
the years 2007-50, under the new rules, would amount to nearly 160 per cent of 2007 GDP (see 
Figure 6). This figure entails a significant reduction (of about 100 per cent of GDP) with respect to 
the NPV of 260 per cent of GDP estimated under no pension reform (pre-Law 100 of 1993), as 
estimated by Echeverry et al. (2001) and Osorio et al. (2005). 
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About  40 per cent 
of the GDP reduction in 
the NPV of pension 
liabilities can be 
attributed to Law 100 
of  1993, which focused 
on reducing replacement 
rates and raising 
retirement ages. The 
remaining  60 per cent  of 
the GDP reduction stems 
from Laws 797 and 860 
of 2003,  by  further 
reducing replacement 
rates, and from the 
Constitutional reform 
of  2005, which forbade 
the use of special 
regimes into the future. 
If the Constitutional 
Court had not ruled out 
(through C-754) bringing 
forward the effective 
year for the new pension 
parameters (as proposed 
by Art. 4 of Law 860), an 
additional  16 per cent  of 
GDP could have been 
saved in the public 
accounts. The Court 
argued that “expectations 
of retirement dates” 
resulting from Law 100 
of 1993 constituted valid 
“acquired rights” that 
could not be altered in 
subsequent laws. As we 
commented earlier, these 
judicial rulings make it 
imperative to move early 
when attempting to 
change pension 
parameters (retirement 
age and/or replacement 
rates), in order to avoid 
the risk that the courts 
intervene. 
This reduction of 
about  100 per cent  of 
Figure 6 
Estimated NPV of Pension Liabilities 
(percent of GDP) 
Figure 5 
Projected Cash Payments to Support Paygo 

























































































Source: Ministry of Finance and Department of Planning of Colombia. 
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GDP in the NPV of fiscal obligations observed in Colombia is below the 200 per cent of GDP 
accomplished in Chile, where the NPV of pension liabilities was reduced from 300 to 100 per cent 
of GDP (Vial, 2008), as a result of a more expeditious pension transition from the paygo system 
into the private AFP system. 
Low pension coverage (23-25 per cent of the working force) and implicit subsidies in the 
new paygo system rules still represent major challenges. These will need to be tackled through the 
reduction of payroll taxes levied on firms and increases in retirement ages as life expectancy 
continues to increase. 
 
3  Health reforms in Colombia 
3.1  Improving coverage and subsidies allocation: Law 100 of 1993 
Law 100 of  1993 effected fundamental changes in the organization and day-to-day 
functioning of the health care system in Colombia. The main objective was to achieve universal 
health care coverage. At the beginning of the 1990s, just 28 per cent of the population had health 
care coverage, mainly those in upper income groups. In general, the private sector accounted for 
45 per cent of hospital admissions and about 40 per cent of medical appointments. 
Before Law 100, the health system was divided in three sub-systems: 1) a social security 
area, in which the public-entity of the Instituto del Seguro Social (ISS) handled simultaneously the 
insurance and health services; 2) a public network consisting of a complex and inefficient regional 
hospital structure; and 3) a private system, expensive in per capita terms and inclusive of only the 
highest socioeconomic strata. 
Law 100 dismantled this disjointed system and constructed a single insurance system based 
on “cross subsidies” between two components: the Contributive System (CS) and the Subsidized 
System (SS). The CS divides the health-care contributions cost, at 12.5  per  cent of payrolls, 
between the employer (67  per  cent) and the employee (33  per  cent). The SS was designed for 
individuals who lack financial means to pay for health care contributions. 
The insurance component of the health care system is based on the Empresas Promotoras de 
Salud (EPS), offering the mandatory basic health care plan known as Plan Obligatorio de Salud 
(POS). The service component is provided through the Instituciones Prestadoras de Salud (IPS). 
The EPS were permitted to create their own IPS, thereby integrating the insurance and health care 
services process (see Figure 7). 
Fiscal decentralization in the Colombian health care system was implemented by Law 60 
of 1993 and Law 715 of 2003. Each piece of legislation detailed the sources (revenue-sharing) and 
the uses (social expenditure) of territorial transfers. The main objective of Law 715 was to reduce 
volatility regarding territorial transfers, which were linked to tax collection of the central 
government in the previous year. About 85 per cent of such territorial transfers are earmarked for 
social expenditure, with 60 per cent devoted to education and 25 per cent for health services. 
The  Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía ( Fosyga), a public institution affiliated with the 
Ministry of Social Protection, serves as the principal mechanism for distributing funds within the 
health system. Contributions received by the Fosyga through payrolls are re-allocated to each EPS 
according to the wage level of each contributor (at the notional value of the so-called Unidad de 
Pago por Capitacion, UPC) and the basic service insured under the mandatory basic health plan 
(POS). The remaining funds help Fosyga pay for the subsided component (SS). The gap between 
these collected funds and the expenditures of the health system are to be supplied by the central 
government. The POS plan differed among systems and social strata during 1993-2007, but the 640 Sergio  Clavijo 
 
Figure 7 
Colombia: Structure of the Health Care System 











Source: Author’s conception, based on Clavijo (1998) and Barón (2007). 
 
constitutional court recently ordered the harmonization of benefits (T-760 of 2008). More details 
can be found in Carrasquilla (2008), Clavijo and Torrente (2008), and Santa Maria and García 
(2008). 
Law 100 also realigned subsidies from the supply-side to the demand-side. Instead of 
allocating resources to public hospitals, Law 100 directed these resources toward users of health 
care services. The idea was to stimulate competition among the providers of such services and to 
improve the productivity of the health sector as a whole (see Masis-Pinto, 2008). Such a transition 
did not occur as rapidly as hoped. At the local level, some estimates indicate that demand subsidies 
have only increased from 6.4 per cent to just 14.5 per cent of total subsidies during the last decade. 
The regional public health care entities have faced difficulties in learning new billing 
procedures, resulting in a slow transition from the “supply” into the “demand” system. By contrast, 
the private sector has been relatively successful in adopting the demand-driven system and has 
gained efficiency through the vertical integration of health services (EPS-IPS). Vertical integration 
has occurred quickly, estimated currently at 50  per  cent within the system. For this reason, 
Congress recently imposed a limit of 30 per cent on new services contracted through integrated 
EPS-IPS in order to promote larger competition within the health-care system, according to 
Law 1122 of 2007. 
 
3.2  Health care results 
In Colombia, health care coverage has increased significantly, from 28  per  cent of the 
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subsidized system (SS) 
rose from 4.8  million 
(12.4 per cent of the 
population) to nearly 
20 million (46 per cent of 
the population), whereas 
coverage of the 
contributive system (CS) 
tripled from 5  million 
(13  per  cent of the 
population) to almost 
17 million (40 per cent of 
the population). Special 
health care programs 
(including the military) 
account for an additional 
coverage of 2 per cent, so 
total health care coverage 
is currently close to 
88 per cent of the 
Colombian population. 
Unfortunately, this 
gain in coverage has not 
occurred with the 
expected financial 
balance (that is, 
two-thirds of the 
resources from the   
 
contribute system (CS) and one-third from the subsidized system (SS)). The CS is currently 
financing only 55 per cent of the health costs, and the SS the remaining 45 per cent, including both 
public and private services. The public sector comprises the central government services, whose 
scope is being reduced under the new ISS, and the regional hospitals operated at the State level. 
The private sector comprises EPS-IPS services. 
In fact, the ratio of workers actively contributing/labor force has increased slightly from 
30 to 37 per cent during 2002-07 in the area of health services (see Figure 8). The ratio of those 
contributing to pensions remains ten percentage points lower at 27 per cent, given the fact that the 
retired continue to contribute to the health system (albeit at a reduced rate). As we will later 
explain, it is likely that the imbalance between the CS and SS components of the health system will 
be aggravated in the future as problems of labor informality persist, causing additional fiscal stress. 
In 2003, Colombia spent the equivalent of 7.7 per cent of GDP on health care after averaging 
8.5 per cent of GDP from 1998-2002. According to Baron (2007), Colombia has recently witnessed 
one of the most pronounced increases in health care spending, going from 6.2 to 7.7 per cent of 
GDP between 1993 and 2003, mainly as the result of coverage expansion (see Figure 9). 
This level of health care expenditure surpasses Chile (5.9 per cent of GDP) and Mexico 
(5.7 per cent), countries with similar rates of health coverage. Correcting by GDP-per-capita levels, 
Colombia’s health-care expenditure is about 36  per  cent above the world average (Gottret 
et al., 2008). Furthermore, Colombia’s expenditure on health care is also above the average level 
observed in United Kingdom (7.3  per  cent of GDP) and Japan (7.6  per  cent of GDP) 
during 1993-2003, where quasi-universal coverage is the norm. 
Figure 8 
Colombia Health Care and Pension Coverage 
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Oliveira et al. (2006), the 
main drivers of health 






factors (including income 
evolution and 
technological changes). 
In OECD countries, 
health care spending has 
increased at an annual 
rate of 3.6 per cent 
during 1981-2002, where 
the bulk of such changes 
stemmed from income 
factors (2.3 per cent). 
In what follows, we will focus on building up a simple accounting framework that would 
allow us to project the possible evolution of the health-related revenues and expenditures (i.e., 
health accounts) in Colombia. We lack information regarding epidemiological profiles (now being 
surveyed by the Ministry of Protection) or technological changes affecting the health-care sector of 
Colombia, precluding analysis in these areas, as done, for example, by Weisbrod (1991). For these 
reasons, we will concentrate on changes produced by population growth, income, labor 
participation rates, and labor formality rates. 
We will first take stock of the overall situation back in 2006 and compute the (implicit) fiscal 
imbalance. We will then make some projections of the health accounts over the years 2007-50, 
where a key variable will be the evolution of labor formality, which drives the health-care 
contributions into the contributory system (CS). Finally, we will compute the NPV of such 
health-care public obligations. 
In 2006, the total population of Colombia is estimated at 43 million. The rate of population 
expansion has been decelerating 1.5-1.85  per  cent per-year between  1987-93 down to 
1.25-1.5 per cent over the period 1993-2006. In this light, it is reasonable to assume that population 
growth will continue to decelerate, and reach about 1 per cent per-annum in 2020-50 (see Table 1). 
In  2006, the ratio of the working age population (WAP) to total population was about 
78  per  cent, and the ratio employed/WAP was 53  per cent in Colombia. Both ratios have been 
stable over time. However, the open unemployment figure has been very volatile, increasing from a 
long-term average of 10.5 to 14-16  per  cent in the crisis years of  1998-2002. More recently, 
unemployment has been reduced to an average of 11 per cent over 2007-08. All these demographic 
and labor variables play a role in determining the ratio of workers actively contributing to health 
care as a percentage of the labor force, currently at 37 per cent. 
As noted above, Law 100 of 1993 ended up placing the burden of the health system on 
public resources, given the high labor informality and the small share of the population 
Figure 9 
Colombia: Health Care Spending 
(percent of GDP) 
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Table 1 
Colombia: Population, Labor and Health Care Coverage Projections 
(millions of people) 
 
   2006 2020 2050 
Total population  43.2  50.8  68.5 
Working age population (78 per cent)  33.8  39.6  53.4 
Employed population  17.9  21.0  28.3 
Subsidized system members  20.1  26.8  34.3 
Contributive system members  17.0  21.3  32.6 
 
Source: Author’s computations, based on Dane. 
 
participating in the contributory system. The fiscal burden will increase if the government’s 
objective of universal coverage by 2012 is realized. For purposes of the analysis, we assume that 
the government’s objective is achieved by 2011 and that the balance between the SS and the CS 
regime will be determined by the intensity of labor reforms leading to an increase in the ratio of 
active contributors as a share of the labor force. 
Health care coverage will be determined by the family density of each contributor, at the 
ratio of 2.26 persons per contributor (the average of the last five years). The CS component would 
be in equilibrium if the per-capita cost (UPC), recognized by the Fosyga to the EPS, happens to 
cover for all health services claimed by family coverage. Notice that the ratio of an UPC-cost 
should be enough to pay for the average cost of each family, at the ratio of 1-UPC for each 
2.26 persons per family. 
 
3.3.1  Sources and uses of the health care system 
We have classified CS contributors in three wage earning ranges: high, medium, and low. 
The average wage of the high-wage contributors is equivalent to 12 times the Legal Minimum 
Wage (LMW) and represents 1 per cent of total contributors. The medium-wage contributors earn 
on average 6 times the LMW and represent 12  per  cent of the total. Finally, the low-wage 
contributors have an average wage twice the LMW and represent 87 per cent of total contributors. 
The system’s expenditures consist of: 1) the mandatory basic health plan (POS) and 
2) out-of-pocket expenses. We will assume that the cost of the POS will remain in line with the 
share recognized by the Fosyga to the EPS through the CS-UPC value, which equaled $408,000 
in 2006 (or US$203 per beneficiary). The demand subsidies are divided between: a) full subsidies 
(91  per  cent of the SS population is affiliated through this modality); and b) partial subsidies 
(9 per cent of the SS population). The UPC value of the full subsidy represents 4.4 per cent of the 
annual LMW. 
Supplementary health care expenditures are represented by out-of-pocket spending, 
representing 1.3 per cent of the annual LMW for high-wage workers, 2.4 per cent for medium, and 
1.6 per cent for low-wage workers, according to data obtained from the 2001 household survey. 
Studies for the OECD countries (Severinson, 2008) suggest an income elasticity of health care 
expenditures slightly above one. Hence, we will assume a unit income elasticity for out-of-pocket 644 Sergio  Clavijo 
health care spending in our simulations. For the SS component, out-of-pocket health care 
expenditures were approximated by historical data. 
One particular item that is difficult to forecast is supply-driven subsidies, since they occur on 
a discretional basis. We assume that the government maintains its current rate of capital 
contributions to public hospitals and state health enterprises, representing about $100,000 (or 
US$50) per member attended through the ISS (now launched as a New-IPS in association with 
several quasi-public entities, known as Co-Familiares). 
For the purposes of this study, we will focus on the “compensation account” of the Fosyga, 
while maintaining relatively constant the other three accounts (Solidarity, Accident/Catastrophes, 
and Promotion-Prevention, at 0.4  per  cent of the UPC value). The budgetary support for 
populations displaced by violence is here included as a supply-side subsidy administered through 
the Fosyga. 
The fiscal costs of lawsuits presently compose a substantial fraction of health care 
obligations borne by the State (through the Fosyga). Preliminary data suggest that nine of every ten 
lawsuits are resolved in favor of the patient, so Fosyga must reimburse the EPS out of the national 
budget. Following the creation of a technical health board to resolve judicial disputes between the 
EPS and the Fosyga  (Law 1122 of  2007), the Constitutional Court ordered the EPS to fully 
implement the recommendations of this board when requiring reimbursement for expenses that 
were not covered under the health plans (ruling C-463 of 2008). 
Taking into account the evolution of both nondemographic and demographic factors, we 
have constructed three scenarios where the key policy variables are the government’s coverage 
goal and the ratio of active contributors/employed. The baseline scenario assumes: 1) population 
growth beginning at 1.18  per  cent per-year during 2006-10 and ending at 1  per  cent per-year 
over 2020-50); 2) health coverage increasing from 86 to 98 per cent of the population; and 3) the 
contributors/employed ratio increasing from 40 to 50 per cent. 
We use the historical correlation between GDP per capita and labor formality 
over  1979-2003 in order to establish a “target-level” for labor formality in Colombia under 
different scenarios. Figure  10 shows the results for the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico. Depending on the real rate of growth of GDP per-capita and the magnitude of labor 
reforms (previously discussed), Colombia could increase the Contributors/Employed ratio from 
40 (currently) to 60 per cent between 2009 and 2050. 
 
3.3.2  The fiscal impact of the health care sector in 2006 (base-year)  
The baseline estimation corresponds to 2006. The revenue and expenditure balance (CS+SS) 
shows a deficit of 1.9 per cent of GDP, with a small surplus for the CS and large deficit for the SS. 
The high- and medium-wage groups of the CS come out in relative equilibrium, but for low-wage 
workers, the system has a large deficit. 
The private sector produced a slight surplus (0.1 per cent of GDP) in 2006. By contrast, the 
public sector recorded a significant deficit (2.2 per cent of GDP). In revenue terms, the public 
sector makes contributions on behalf of one million employees (6 per cent of all employed 
workers). These contributions, in turn, are divided between regional employees (5 per cent) and 
central government employees (95 per cent), with the latter including teachers and police. The SS 
demand subsidies are funded by either the specific regional institution or through the Fosyga. At 
present, regional or local authorities contribute 15 per cent of the partial subsidy and 60 per cent of 

















































In summary, our 
computations indicate 
that the health care sector 
in Colombia produced a 
deficit close to 
2.1  per  cent of GDP 
in 2006. In that year, the 
fiscal deficit of the entral 
government was 
4.4 per cent of GDP, 
although the consolidated 
fiscal deficit was close to 
1 per cent of GDP. 
 




estimations of the health 
accounts of year 2006 as 
a foundation, we 
simulated changes in 
labor formality that could 
improve the fiscal 




in relative terms. Under the baseline scenario (gradual increase in the contributors/employed ratio 
from 40 to 50 per cent), we find that the public health care deficit increases from 2.1 per cent of 
GDP in 2006 to a peak of 4.3 per cent in 2038. Thereafter, the deficit stabilizes in the range of 
3.0-3.5 per cent of GDP through 2050 (see Table 2 and Figure 11). 
Three important phases over the period  2006-50 can be identified. The first phase, 
covering  2006-10, is characterized by coverage expansion, responsible for the fiscal deficit 
deterioration from 2.1 to 2.8 per cent of GDP. In this stage, the government’s ambitious coverage 
goal (4.7 million additional affiliates to the SS for a total of 24.8 million and 0.5 million to the CS 
for a total of 17.8 million) overwhelms earnings contributions growth (0.7 per cent of GDP in the 
four-year period). 
The second phase relates to the interval 2010-35, in which a steady deterioration in fiscal 
performance is projected, attributed mainly to demographic factors. The health care deficit would 
rise from 2.8 per cent of GDP to a maximum of 3.8 per cent of GDP. This rise in the deficit is 
explained by the estimated growth in the affiliated population, predicted to jump from 42.6 million 
(92 per cent of population) to 56.7 million (96 per cent of population), although total population 
growth is assumed to slow down from 1.1 to 1 per cent. On the revenue side, the relationship 
contributors/employed continues to increase from 40 to 47  per  cent, improving contributions 
marginally. 
Finally, in the years 2036-50, the health deficit declines from 3.8 to 2 per cent of GDP. This 
is explained by the increase in contributors as labor formality helps the ratio contributors/employed 
to further increase from 47 to 50 per cent. This “U”-shaped health care deficit trajectory is driven  
 
Figure 10 
GDP Per Capita and Labor Formality Correlation 
(US$, purchasing power parity) 
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Table 2 
Health Care and Fiscal Cost Projections 
 




    2006  2020  2050  2020  2050  2020  2050 
CS contributors/Employed 
(percent)  40  44  50  40  40  47  60 
(millions)  7.4  9.2  14.2  8.4  11.3  9.8  16.7 
Health coverage (percent)  86  95  98  95  98  95  100 
(millions)  37.1  48.1  67.1  48.1  67.1  48.1  68.2 
Health Care sector deficit 
(percent of GDP) 
–2.1  –3.3  –1.8  –3.8  –6.8  –3.1  +1.9 
 
Source: Author’s computations. 
 
by a better balance between the CS and SS. Indeed, as the population and labor formality grow –
and the contributors/employed ratio increases from 40 to 50 per cent – the fiscal deficit declines. 
However, our model suggests this increase is still insufficient to compensate for health care 
coverage expansion, resulting in a “structural health care” deficit of nearly 2 per cent of GDP by 
year 2050. 
 
3.3.4 Scenario 2: status 
quo in labor 
formality 
Under this 
scenario, we shall 
assume that the ratio 
contributors/employed 
will remain constant at 
40 per cent,  implying  no 
significant labor and/or 
payrolls reforms. This 
means a potential loss of 
about 3  million new 
contributors with respect 
to the previous scenario, 
where labor formality 
induced an increase in 
the contributors/employed 
ratio from 40 to 
50 per cent (see Table 2). 
Under this 
scenario there is a 
significant fiscal 
deterioration as a larger 
Figure 11 
Health Care and Fiscal Cost Projections 
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 share of the population moves to the SS (increasing from 55 to 62 per cent). By year 2020, the 
fiscal deficit of the health care system would reach 3.8 per cent of GDP, about ½ per cent of GDP 
higher than the baseline scenario, and by year  2050 would reach 6.8  per  cent of GDP, almost 
5 percentage points of GDP above the baseline scenario (see Figure 11). 
 
3.3.5  Scenario 3: high labor formality improvement 
This scenario assumes a ratio contributors/employed increasing from 40 to 60  per  cent 
over 2006-50, as a result of significant reforms leading to greater labor flexibility and a reduction 
of payroll taxes on firms (as previously discussed). This means adding about 2.5  million 
contributors with respect to the baseline scenario (see Table 2). As a result, the CS component 
would increase to 45 to 56 per cent and the SS component would decrease in tandem from 55 to 
44 per cent, implying better compliance with respect to the original scheme envisioned under Law 
100 of 1993. 
Under these conditions, the health care deficit would peak at 3.2 per cent of GDP by 2024, 
about ½ per cent of GDP below the baseline scenario By 2034, the health care deficit would have 
eased to 2.6 per cent of GDP (even before ending the “growth phase”) and by 2050, the system 
could reach a surplus of about 1.9 per cent of GDP as a result of increasing the CS to 56 per cent 
and containing the SS at 44 per cent (see Figure 11). The recent progress achieved through better 
surveillance systems (known as PILA), preventing evasion/elusion of health-pension contributions, 
speaks well of the potential to be gained if labor and payroll reforms provide the appropriate 
incentives for compliance. 
 
3.3.6  Health care liabilities: estimating the NPV over 2006-50 
We now turn to estimating the Net Present Value (NPV) of the fiscal obligations projected 
above, where we will concentrate on the baseline scenario over the years  2006-50. The first 
scenario considers a discount interest rate of 4 per cent per year, resulting in an amount of (net) 
fiscal obligations equivalent to 97  per  cent of GDP (see Table  3). The private sector shows a 
surplus of 35 per cent of GDP. Adding the public sector deficit and the private sector surplus yields 
a health care sector NPV equivalent to a deficit of 61.4 per cent of GDP. 
When calculating the health care system’s NPV using a 5  per  cent long-term discount 
interest rate, the net public obligation amounts to about 80  per  cent of GDP. This is about 
17 percentage points of GDP less than the one obtained with the 4 per cent discount rate. 
Of interest at this point is a comparison of these health care liabilities with the pension 
system, and an assessment of the total fiscal burden over the 2006-50 period As indicated earlier, 
the NPV of pension obligations is about 160 per cent of GDP, compared with health obligations of 
about 97 per cent of GDP (discounted at the rate of 4 per cent per year). These liabilities are quite 
sizable, but lower than those in some industrial countries. Follette and Sheiner (2008) have 
calculated that the contingent liability of Medicare in the United States (excluding Medicaid), 
amounts to 90 per cent of GDP. When including Medicaid, the liability increases to 259 per cent of 
GDP (see Figure 12). The NPV of pension obligations in the United States has been estimated at 
117 per cent of GDP. This means that the ratio of pensions/health obligations is about 1.3 times in 
the United States if excluding Medicaid. This ratio, however, is 0.45 when including Medicaid 
costs, meaning that it is more costly to honor jointly Medicare and Medicaid obligations than 
public pensions in the United States. 648 Sergio  Clavijo 
 
Table 3 
Health Care NPV by Type of Obligation 
(percent of GDP of 2007; surplus (+) or deficit (–)) 
 
   Discounted at Interest Rate of: 
   i=4.0%  i=5.0% 
Gross public spending  –107.0  –90.5 
Net public duties (deficit)  –96.9  –80.1 
Net private spending (surplus)  +35.5  +27.2 
Total balance (public+private)  –61.4  –52.8 
 
Source: Author’s computations. 
 
Figure 12 
A Comparison of the NPV of Social Security Public Liabilities 
of Colombia and the United States 









Source: Follette and Sheiner (2008), Echeverry et al. (2001), Osorio et al. (2005), and author’s computations. 
 
4 Conclusions 
We have analyzed how Colombia underwent first generation pension reform (Law 100 
of 1993), in which a dual public-private system was instituted, and also second generation pension 
reforms (Laws 797 and 860 of 2003), focusing on parametric corrections that aimed at reducing the 
fiscal costs of a prolonged “transitional-period”. As a result of such reforms, the NPV of pension 
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However, low pension coverage (23-25 per cent of the working force) and implicit subsidies 
in the new paygo system rules still represent big challenges ahead. These need to be tackled 
through the reduction of payroll taxes levied on firms and increases in retirement age as life 
expectancy continues to increase. Continued reform of the pension system is thus a key challenge 
for Colombia in achieving fiscal sustainability. 
Regarding the health system, we found that under the baseline scenario (with a gradual 
increase in the contributors/employed ratio from 40 to 50 per cent), the public health care deficit 
would increase from 2.1  per  cent of GDP in  2006 and peak at 4.3  per  cent of GDP by  2038. 
Thereafter, this deficit would decline and stabilize in the range of 3.0-3.5  per  cent of GDP 
through  2050. The NPV under this scenario would yield (net) fiscal obligations equivalent to 
97 per cent of GDP over the period 2007-50. Under a more optimistic scenario of significant labor 
reforms, the ratio of contributors/employed could be increased from 40 to 60  per  cent 
over 2006-50, resulting in an addition of about 2.5 million contributors with respect to the baseline 
scenario. As a result, the CS component would increase from 45 to 56  per  cent and the SS 
component would decrease in tandem from 55 to 44 per cent. 
A comparison between the pension obligations of 160  per  cent of GDP and the health 
obligations of about 97 per cent of GDP means pension obligations are about 1.7 times more costly 
to honor than health obligations in Colombia. However, health obligations are likely to increase 
significantly if labor informality problems are not tackled in the near future as a way to improve 
contributions. Looking forward, additional research could incorporate the potential impact of 
epidemiological profiles and technological changes over the health care system as information 
becomes available in the near future. 
The results of this paper underscore that labor market reforms can have important effects on 
the fiscal accounts, through their impact on contributions in formal pension and health systems. 
Thus, moving forward on labor market reforms could provide a welcome boost not only to 
Colombia’s growth and labor market flexibility, but also strengthen the fiscal accounts over the 
longer term. 
 650 Sergio  Clavijo 
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 THE REFORM OF THE PORTUGUESE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ PENSION SYSTEM: 
REASONS AND RESULTS 
Vanda Cunha,
* Ariana Paulo,
* Nuno Sousa Pereira
* and Hélder Reis
* 
In the context of the ageing population and with the Portuguese public social security system 
reaching maturity, pension expenditure recorded a marked upwards trend in the last decade, 
jeopardizing the system’s long-term viability. This paper illustrates how the recent reforms in the 
social security system, in particular in the case of the public employees pension system, are 
expected to contribute to its financial sustainability and, hence, to the country’s overall public 
finance sustainability. In addition, the potential distributive impact of the new rule on pensions 
indexation is analysed. 
 
Introduction 
Ensuring long-term sustainability of public finances has steadily become a main political 
priority in most developed countries. Both technological progress and lower fertility rates have 
increased the ratio of dependants to contributor, while tight budgetary constraints and additional 
pressure to increase spending in areas such as health care, have compelled public authorities in 
many developed countries to reform their social security systems. 
In Portugal, the scenario was even more acute given the generosity of the overall pension 
regime, but in particular of the public employees’ pension system. Until 2005, public employees 
hired until 1993 were entitled to keep their last wage after they retired as long as they had at least 
36 years of contributive payments, and furthermore, pensions were de facto indexed to the 
evolution of public wages, causing pension levels to also increase over the years. When an 
increasing number of public employees entitled to full pension started retiring, the pressure on the 
system became unbearable. 
Therefore, in 2005, a further convergence of the public employees’ pension scheme with the 
private sector’s one occurred and, in 2006, a major overhaul of the system was imposed and an 
agreement was reached based on new rules for the calculation of pensions and for their indexation 
over time. In particular, a sustainability factor was established such that the calculation of the 
pension dynamically reflected changes in life expectancy, while the yearly update of pensions 
became indexed to consumer inflation, depending on the GDP growth and the value of the pension. 
In this context, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we analyse the impact of this set of 
changes on the system’s sustainability, focusing most closely on the most significant changes; 
second, we measure the potential distributive impact of the new indexation rule. The paper 
proceeds as follows. In the following section, we describe the evolution of the Portuguese social 
security system since its inception, both in terms of its major institutional changes and its financial 
commitments; next, we evaluate demographic trends and their implications on pension expenditure; 
in Section 3 we discuss the situation of the pension system before the 2006 reform and in Section 4 we 
analyse the impact on public spending of the reform. We conclude by discussing our main findings. 
————— 
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1  A historical perspective 
The public employees’ pension scheme was the first far-reaching system of social protection 
in Portugal. Until the inception of Caixa Geral de Aposentações (CGA), in 1929, only feeble 
attempts of social protection for few occupational groups had been made, based on the Bismarck’s 
seminal social protection system, as in most other European countries. In the ’30s, the public 
employees’ pension scheme was extended to the descendants and spouses (survivors’ pensions) and 
a general framework of social protection for the private sector workers, financed on a funded basis, 
was defined. 
As in other European countries, during the ’60s and ’70s, the Portuguese social security 
systems progressively became universal and financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. In 1972, 
the public employees’ retirement regime turned into an integrated legal framework, the so-called 
Estatuto da Aposentação, which provided a wider coverage of the scheme to all general 
government subsectors’ employees and stipulated generous conditions to retirement: i) the old-age 
full pension was granted to beneficiaries who were 60 years old and after 40 years of contribution 
to the scheme; ii) the pension value was identical to the last net wage (or the last ten years average 
if higher); and iii) the pensions’ updates followed, in general, the public sector wage growth. The 
system became financed by the employees’ contributions (6 per cent of gross earnings), employers’ 
contributions and State transfers. In 1979, the system became even more generous by only 
requiring 36 years of contribution to give entitlement to a full pension. 
As regards the private sector social security scheme, it was enlarged in the ’70s to 
agricultural workers, the self-employed and homemakers. A social pension for those above 
65 years old and a 13
th month of a pension were also given to retirees. Nevertheless, in 1984, when 
the first Social Security Framework Law was published, the pension system for private sector 
employees was less generous than the public employees’ one: the legal retirement age was 65 for 
men and 62 for women, the reference earnings to the pension value were the average of the best ten 
out of the last fifteen years and the pensions’ updates took into account inflation prospects. The 
financing system was also redefined with the contributive regime financed by employees and 
employers contributions and the non-contributive regime financed by State transfers. In 1986, the 
standard contributory rate for the general scheme of social security was fixed at 35 per cent (of 
which 11 per cent was relative to employees contributions), while in the case of public employees 
their contributory rate was 8 per cent (6.5 per cent for old-age and disability pensions and 
1.5 per cent for survivors pensions). 
Given the growth of pension expenditure compared to contributions revenue in the ’80s, a 
result of the maturing process of the social security systems and the ageing of the population, the 
first reforms in both public pension schemes in Portugal occurred in the ’90s, in the context of 
stricter budgetary discipline (Figure 1). In 1993, the Estatuto da Aposentação was revised and new 
public employees (i.e., those hired from September 1993 on) started having the same pension 
scheme rules than the ones of the private sector. In the following year, the contributory rate of 
public employees rose to 10 per cent (7.5 per cent for old-age and 2.5 per cent for survivors 
pensions), converging to the Social Security rates. 
The Social Security general regime was also revised in 1993, by increasing the legal 
retirement age for women to 65 years (the same as that of men) and rising the minimum entitlement 
contributory period from ten to fifteen years. The employers’ contributory rate also rose to 
24.5 per cent. In 1995, this rate was reduced by 0.75 percentage points but the Social Security 
benefited from the 1 per cent increase of the VAT standard rate that was assigned to this system.   The Reform of the Portuguese Public Employees’ Pension System: Reasons and Results  655 
 
 
From 2000 to 
2005, further measures 
were taken to improve 
the financial 
sustainability of the 
public pension systems. 
In the context of the first 
waves of retirement of 
the individuals with full 
contributive career and, 
hence, entitled to higher 
pensions, the public 
pension expenditure 
increased significantly in 
spite of a not so marked 
growth in the number of 
Social Security’s 
pensions (Figures 2 and 3). 
As to the CGA 
system, this trend was 
strengthened by the 
retirement of a large 
number of public 
employees that were 
hired after the 1974 
Revolution and by the 
fact that public 
employees’ scheme was 
still relatively more 
generous than the Social 
Security scheme 
(Figure  4). The need for 
reforms to the public 
pension systems was felt 
in several European 
countries, where the 
pension systems financed 
on a PAYG basis were 
reaching maturity when 
the large number of 
“baby boomers” was 
retiring and because of 
the ageing population. 
In this context, a 
new Framework Law for 
Social Security was 
established in 2002, 
which revised the rules 
for the pension value. 
These rules took into 
Figure 1 
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account the complete 
contributive career, but 
raised the accrual rate 
from 2 to 2.3 per cent, 
depending on the 
reference earnings. 
However, these rules 
would apply only from 
2017 onwards with a 
transitory period until 
2042, while other 
measures, like the 
convergence of earnings-
related minimum 
pensions to national 
minimum wage until 
2006, put immediate 
pressure on public 
pension expenditure. In 
2005, a second revision 
of the Estatuto da 
Aposentação occurred 
aiming at a further 
convergence of the CGA 
and the Social Security 
pension regimes. From 
2006 onwards, new 
public employees were 
enrolled in the Social 
Security system, and 
it was defined by a 
progressive increase (at a 
pace of 6 months per 
year) in the legal 
retirement age of all 
public employees to 65 
years old in 2015 and in 
the complete career 
length to 40 years in 
2013. In addition, the 
pension formula of 
public employees 
enrolled in CGA until 
August 1993 would also 
converge to the one of 
private sector workers.  
Nevertheless, these 
reforms proved to be 
insufficient to ensure the 
financial sustainability of 
Figure 3 
Number of Pensions (Social Security and CGA) 
(10^3) 
Figure 4 
Pension Expenditure – CGA 
(percent of GDP) 









1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005












The Evolution of the Portuguese Public Pension System 
 
1929  Creation of the public employees old-age pension scheme (Decree No. 16669 of 
27 March) 
1972 Creation  of  Estatuto da Aposentação (Decree-Law No. 498/72 of 9 December): 
integrated legal framework of public employees retirement regime 
1984  First Social Security Framework Law (Law No. 28/84 of 14 August) 
System PAYG: contributive regime financed by employees and employers contributions 
and non-contributive regime financed by State transfers 
1993 Revision  of  Estatuto da Aposentação (Decree-Law No. 277/93 of 10 August and 
others): from September on, the pension scheme of new public employees became 
subject to the rules of the private sector system (Social Security General Regime) 
1993  Reform of the Social Security general regime (Decree-Law No. 329/93 of 
25 September) 
2002  New Framework Law for Social Security (Law No. 32/2002 of 20 December) 
2005 Revision  of  Estatuto da Aposentação (Law No. 60-B/2005 of 29 December) – further 
convergence of CGA and Social Security pension regimes 
2007  Reform of the Social Security pension regime (revision of the Framework Law – 
Law 4/2007 of January 16 and Decree Law 87/2007 of May 10) 
2007  Transposition of Social Security reform measures to CGA from 2008 on, with a 
transitory period until 2015 (Law No. 52/2007 of 31 August) 
 
Note: A more detailed description is presented in Annex A. 
Source: CGA and Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS). 
 
the Portuguese public pension system and, in October 2006, the government and social partners 
agreed on a new social security reform. This agreement turned into a new Social Security 
Framework Law at the beginning of 2007 and the transposition of the reform measures to the CGA 
system in the second half of 2007 and early 2008 (Table 1). This means that the public employees’ 
pension system is now under a transitory period (until 2015) of convergence to the (reformed) 
Social Security system. The main recent measures are: i) the anticipation of the new pension 
formula established in 2002; ii) the introduction of a sustainability factor that links the pension 
value to the evolution of life expectancy at 65 years old; iii) the definition of a rule for pension 
updates; and iv) the promotion of delaying retirement by increasing the financial penalty for early 
retirement and granting bonuses in case of postponing retirement. The detailed description and the 
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2  Implications of demography on pension expenditure 
Portugal, like other European countries, has been deeply affected by ageing population. In 
particular, in the last 30 years, a deteriorating birth rate and gains in life expectancy led to a 
significant shrink in age cohorts below 30 y.o. and an increase in those between 30 and 60 y.o. and 
also in the oldest ones (Figure 5). 
Migration flows have also had a role in the demographic structure: Portugal experienced 
significant net migration flows out of the country in the ’50s and ’60s followed by net migration 
inflows after the former colonies independence in the ’70s. In the last decade, net inflows 
intensified, with emigrants belonging to older age cohorts returning to Portugal and with the 
entrance of immigrants mainly from Eastern European countries, Brazil and former Portuguese 
colonies in Africa. 
The change in the demographic pyramids yields an increasing old-age dependency ratio, 
which has duplicated between 1960 and 2007, while life expectancy at 65 grew around 4 years in 
the same period (Figure 6). 
These developments coupled with productivity and economic growth are major factors that 
influence the dynamics of the Social Security systems financed on a PAYG basis. At the present 
time, the increase in the old-age dependency ratio poses a big challenge to the financial 
sustainability of these systems as it puts into risk the intergenerational income distribution from 
active to inactive population (Figure 6). The projected ageing population according to 
EUROSTAT’s exercise EUROPOP2008 is visible in the following charts, with the patterns for men 
and women. 
As explained in the previous section, social security schemes have revealed a significant 
increase in their pension liabilities as a share of GDP, in particular in the last decade. As shown in 
the chart below, the relationship between pension expenditure as a percent of GDP and the old-age 
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dependency ratio can be 
well approximated for by 
a linear relation.
1 Pension 
expenditure until now 
basically reflect the old-
age pension formation 
rules in force until the 
beginning of the 1990s 
and the annual updates 
that have taken place. 
Without policy changes 
in the social security 
schemes and taking into 
account the observed 
variables till 2007, 
this linear regression 
indicates that pension 
expenditure would 
increase from 11 per cent 
of GDP in 2007 to about 
30 per cent in 2060, 
when the forecast for 
dependency ratio reaches 
close to 55 per cent. 
 
Figure 7 





















Source: EUROSTAT (EUROPOP2008). 
————— 
1  In the linear regression model, both variables are integrated of order one according to the results of Dickey-Fuller tests; the residual 





* Ratio of individuals aged 65 and older over individuals aged between 15 and 64. 








1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060


























Male660  Vanda Cunha, Ariana Paulo, Nuno Sousa Pereira and Hélder Reis 
 
 
These results are 
compatible with other 
studies for Portugal, 
using specific pension 
modelling. Rodrigues 
and Pereira (2007) 
developed a general 
equilibrium model, and 
projected an increase in 
public pension 
expenditure close to 26 
per cent of GDP by 2050 
before taking into 
account the reforms since 
1993, and EPC (2006) 
and Pinheiro and Cunha 
(2007) projected an 
increase of about 20 per 
cent of GDP by 2050 
considering the reform 
measures adopted until 
2005 using accounting 
models (Figure 9). 
These projections 
revealed the measures 
implemented until 2005 
insufficient to ensure the 
financial sustainability of 
the social security 
systems and, therefore, 
justify the need for the 
additional pension 
reform measures taken 
between 2006 and 2008.  
 
3  The need of the 
public pension 
system reform  
The serious 
financial imbalance of 
the Portuguese public 
pension systems by the 
mid-2000s decade was 
in fact revealed by 
several studies and the 
European Commission 
classified Portugal as a 
high risk country in 
Figure 8 
Pension Expenditure and Old-age Dependency Ratio 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 9 
Projections for Pension Expenditure, 2007-60 
(percent of GDP) 
Source: Rodrigues and Pereira (2007), Pinheiro and Cunha (2007) and authors’ calculations. 
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terms of the 
sustainability of public 
finances (DGECFIN 2006). 
Pension system 
reform has been 
widespread throughout 
Europe and other OECD 
countries mainly in the 
last decade. As referred 
to in Sapir (2005), 
“Europe’s labour and 
social institutions need 
urgent reform if we are 
 
to grasp the opportunities offered by globalization and avoid the threats. (…) Critically, the 
‘Continental’ and ‘Mediterranean’ models, which account together for two-thirds of the GDP of the 
entire EU-25 and 90 per cent of the 12-member euro area, are inefficient and unsustainable. These 
models must therefore be reformed, probably by adopting features of the two more efficient models 
[Nordic and Anglo-Saxon]. These reforms may also involve changes towards more or less equity.” 
The author argued that the European institutions were established in the 1950s and 1960s when the 
economic environment was relatively stable and predictable, but that the institutions are no longer 
adequate in a world of rapid changes. He classifies the four European Models according to their 
efficiency (incentives provided to work or employment rates) and equity (probability of escaping 
poverty) (see Table 2) and finds Portugal in the Mediterranean group in terms of equity and in the 
Anglo-Saxons group in terms of efficiency but below the average of these. 
Models that are not efficient are not sustainable in face of the public finance pressure coming 
from globalization, technical change and population ageing. The combination of the latter with low 
employment rates jeopardises the future benefits of the institution. The Mediterranean countries
2 
concentrate their social spending on old-age pensions and generally have high employment 
protection but rather low unemployment benefits. They are also less successful in keeping the 
employment rate for older workers high and the unemployment rate for younger workers low. The 
degree of equity is generally proportional to the level of taxation, but models that are not equitable 
may be financially sustainable. Therefore, increasing the incentives to work without raising the 
poverty risk would be desirable. 
Previously, for instance, Disney (2000) discussed the reform options in OECD countries for 
public pension programmes in difficulties. He analysed the strengths and weaknesses of the reform 
strategies being discussed and implemented in various countries and considered two main 
strategies: i) retaining a strong unfunded component and ii) involving a strong funded private 
component. In the first group, two options are possible: a “parametric” reform or an “actuarially 
fair” programme and in the second group either by “clean break” privatization (i.e., no further 
contributions are made into the existing unfunded programme) or by a partial privatization (only 
certain individuals are allowed to join the funded scheme or allowing individuals the choice of 
joining a funded or unfunded scheme). The strategy of keeping a strong unfunded component was 
presented as a defensible one, in particular the “parametric” reforms by “raising legal retirement 
age, or more specifically linking it explicitly to expected longevity is generally a key policy to the 
problem of financing public pension programmes.” Funded schemes can also be attractive: a 
funded scheme is transparent “in the sense that benefits are explicitly related to contributions and 
capital market performance rather than to some formula of the public programme.” The transition 
————— 
2  Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Table 2 




High  Continentals Nordics 
Low  Mediterraneans Anglo-Saxons 
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issue has to be handled and there is the conflict over who bears the burden of the transition: current 
taxpayers or pensioners or future generations of taxpayers and pensioners. Another drawback 
relates to the fact that it “rules out any explicitly redistributional component to the public pension 
programme and it subject participants to potential investment risk and annuity rates will continue to 
fall as longevity increases”. 
Recent developments in financial markets turned this discussion more pertinent. PAYG 
schemes are relatively robust to the financial crisis. In the case of persistent economic downturn 
and higher public debt it may increase the need for adjustments in the pension schemes in order to 
ensure their long term sustainability. Private pension funds saw their asset value dropping by 
20 per cent on average in the OECD countries between January and October 2008 (OECD 2009). 
Even if long-term investment performance is rather healthy it highlights the need of looking again 
to the best way of dealing with funded schemes. Defined benefit (DB) schemes are the main private 
schemes that are now paying (defined) pensions but the reduction of their assets may imply 
adjustments to indexation or contributions or even to close them to new members. At the same 
time, defined contribution (DC) plans are expected to intensify their growing trend. However, in 
these schemes the beneficiary takes the investment risk and they may not ensure an adequate 
income at retirement. 
Against this background, the reforms of the existing unfunded pension systems reveal to be 
of utmost importance across European/OECD countries. This is equally true for the Portuguese 
public pension system. 
 
4  Recent reform measures 
4.1  Description of the reform 
As previously described, in October 2006 the government and social partners reached an 
agreement on the reform of the social security pension system and the main measures of this reform 
were also applied to the CGA scheme since 2008.
3 The most representative measures are: 
i) Sustainability  factor 
To tackle the considerable impact that the increase in life expectancy has on the social 
security systems, the sustainability factor was introduced. The sustainability factor is the ratio 
between life expectancy in 2006 and life expectancy in the year prior to retirement. It is applied to 















LE is the Average Life Expectancy at the age of 65, published in an annual basis by the INE, and 
t is the year the pension is required. 
It should be stressed that contributors can opt for a combination between two extreme 
alternatives:
4 
•  they can delay their retirement until they completely offset the effect of the sustainability factor; or 
•  they can retire at the statutory age and accept the financial penalty levied on the pension. 
————— 
3  Laws No. 52/2007 and No. 11/2008. 
4  A third possibility is also available. This involves additional voluntary contributions to public or private capitalization schemes. In 




The Sustainability Factor Evolution 
 
   2007  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050  2060 
Sustainability factor  1.00  0.97  0.93  0.88  0.84  0.81  0.77 
 
Source: INE and Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008). 
 
In the model developed for CGA, it was assumed that in order to partly offset the financial 
penalty derived from this factor, CGA contributors tend to postpone the retirement age in line with 
the evolution of the sustainability factor until the legal age limit for retirement (70 years old). 
Taking into account the evolution for the weighted average of (male and female) life 
expectancy at 65 in the EUROPOP2008 scenario, pointing to an increase of around 5 years by 2060 
the projected trend for the sustainability factor is outlined in Table 3.
5 
ii)  The new rule for updating pensions 
This new rule determines that, from 2008 on, the annual increase of pensions is linked to an 
effective change rate of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and also to the effective growth of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), which affects the social security revenue pattern. This means a change 
from recent years, where there have been pension increases significantly higher than inflation, 
above all as a result of the rise in the minimum pension level.
6 The new rule brings pension updates 
within a regulatory framework, removing the discretionary element. The annual increase of all 
types of pensions
7 should be set according to Table 4. 
At this point, it should be mentioned that in order to assure that the National Minimum Wage 
itself constitutes an instrument of Labour Market policy, it was replaced as a reference for the 
indexation of pensions by a new social support index Indexante de Apoios Sociais (IAS). For 2007, 
it was defined as the 2006 mandatory minimum wage updated by the consumer inflation of that 
year (Law 53-B/2006). This Law provides that the rule for IAS updating in the future is to be 
identical with the rule for updating lower pensions (lower bracket), which is independent from the 
annual update set for the National Minimum Wage. 
To determine the reference GDP growth rate it was established that, in the first year of 
implementation of this new rule (2008), the GDP considered should be the real growth rate of GDP 
in the previous year and, thereafter, the consideration of average GDP growth rate of the two 
previous years.
8 The relevant CPI corresponds to the effective average growth rate of CPI (without 
considering housing prices) regarding the last 12 months available on November 30 of the year 
before the pensions update. 
————— 
5  See Annex B. 
6  The main reason for this was the convergence of minimum old age and disability pensions to the mandatory minimum wage until 
2006 as set down in the Social Security Framework Law of 2002 (Law 32/2002). 
7  Including minimum pensions that range from 44.5 per cent to 89 per cent of IAS and are updated according to the first bracket of the 
pensions value. 
8  This average was firstly used for the 2009 update, taking into account the GDP growth in 2008 and 2007. The annual GDP growth 
rates to be considered are the ones ended on the third quarter of the year prior to the pension update or the quarter before if there are 




Rule for Updating Pensions 
 
 
GDP Real Variation Rate
Less than 2% 
GDP Real Variation Rate
From 2% to 3% 
GDP Real Variation Rate 
Equal or Greater than 3% 
Pensions under 1.5 IAS  CPI change rate 
CPI change rate + 
20% GDP real variation rate 
(minimum: CPI change rate 
+ 0.5 percentage points) 
CPI change rate + 20% GDP 
real variation rate 
Pensions 1.5 to 6 IAS 
CPI change rate 
 – 0.5 percentage points 
CPI change rate 
CPI change rate + 12.5% 
GDP real variation rate 
Pensions 6 to 12 IAS 
CPI change rate – 
0.75 percentage points  
CPI change rate 
– 0.25 percentage points 
CPI change rate 
Pensions above 12 IAS  no update  no update  no update 
 
Note: IAS stands for the social support index Indexante de Apoios Sociais. 
Source: MTSS. 
 
In the modelling of CGA pensions it was assumed that this rule corresponds to indexation to 
the consumer price index growth plus 0.1 percentage points (minus 0.4 percentage points), 
depending on the economic growth above (below) 2 per cent. These drifts were obtained by using 
the 2007 distribution for CGA pension amounts and computing a weighted average of the drifts for 
each bracket of pension value, according to the above mentioned rule. In 2007, 32 per cent of the 
pensioners belonged to the first interval, 60 per cent to the second and 8 per cent to the highest one. 
This distribution was held constant throughout the projection horizon. However, the evolution of 
this distribution is somehow undetermined: on the one hand, as the IAS benchmark is updated 
according to the lower bracket, higher pensions tend to steadily move to lower brackets; on the 
other hand, the maturing of the system and incentives to postpone retirement lead new pensions to 
be higher than those that leave the system. If this second effect prevails, the hypothesis considered 
tends to be conservative as future updating will be less generous than assumed. 
According to the CGA legislation, this rule applies from 2008 on only for pensions less than 
1.5 IAS, from 2009 on for pensions between 1.5 and 6 IAS and from 2011 on for pensions above 
6 IAS. However, in the projection exercise, it was assumed that the rule applied to the whole range 
from 2008 on for all pensioners. 
The approved legislation foresees that this rule for updating pension will be reassessed every 
five years, in order to check its adequacy in terms of social security system financial sustainability 
and of the pensions’ real value. However, in the current exercise, under a “no policy change” 
general rule, it was considered to prevail. 
iii)  An early transition to a pension benefit formula that considers contributions over the whole 
career 
The Decree Law 35/2002 set out a formula for calculating the amount of new pensions in the social 
security general regime
9 which differs from the one set out in the Decree Law 329/1993 in 
————— 





Pension Accrual Rate 
 
Contributive Career  Reference Earnings  Accrual Rate 
less than 21 years  -  2.00% 
21 or more years   until 1.1 IAS  2.30% 
  from 1.1 to 2 IAS  2.25% 
  from 2 to 4 IAS  2.20% 
  from 4 to 8 IAS  2.10% 




two fundamental points: it takes the earnings over the whole contributive career (instead of the best 
ten out of the last fifteen years) and sets out different accrual rates, depending on the workers 
compensation (the higher the compensation, the lower the marginal rate, varying between 2.3 and 
2 per cent) and on career length, as presented in Table 5. 
The 2002 decree also established a transition period, during which the pension to be applied 
will be whichever is higher, either the new regime one or as calculated as a weighted average of the 
pension from the last regime and from the new regime, where the weights correspond to the 
number of years of service before and after 2001. The same decree set down 2017 as the start of the 
transitional period, but in 2006 the decision was taken to bring forward the transition to the new 
formula to 2007. As far as the transition to the new pension benefit formula affects the income of 
new pensioners there are transition clauses to the full application of the new rules: 
•  to all contributors registered on Social Security before 2001 and that will retire before 2016, the 
pension is calculated according to a temporary benefit formula that accounts proportionately for 
the length of service before and after 2007 through the application of a formula that takes into 
account both the old and new benefit: 
C
C P C P
Pension
2 2 1 1 × + ×
=
 
 where:  Pension is the monthly amount of statutory pension (before the application of the 
sustainability factor); P1 stands for the pension calculated with the benefit formula that accounts 
for the best ten out of the best fifteen years of wage history
10 (old formula); P2 stands for the 
pension calculated according to the new formula that considers the whole contributory career; C 
is the number of years of contributory career with registered wage; C1 stands for the number of 
years of contributory career with registered wages until the 31st of December 2006; and C2 
stands for the number of years of contributory career with registered wages after the 1st of 
January 2007; 
•  for those registered on Social Security before 2001 but that will retire after 2016, pension will 
be calculated as a weighted average between the pensions that result from the new benefit 
————— 
10  It is set according to the number of calendar years with a contributory density equal to or higher than 120 days (up to the limit 
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formula and the old benefit formula, with reference to the length of service before and after the 
31st of December 2001. 
  In the computation of pensions, the component that takes into account the best ten out of the last 
fifteen years of declared wages will always be based on the effective last years of contributory 
career and not on the last fifteen years before the introduction of the mechanism of transition to 
the new benefit formula; 
•  for all individuals first registered on Social Security after 2002, the pension will be calculated 
with the new rules, accounting the whole contributory career (up to the limit of 40 years). 
In the case of CGA scheme, the anticipation of this transitional period is in force after 2008. 
However, the effects of this change are quite mitigated in this subsystem; for the contributors 
covered by the Estatuto da Aposentação, the only relevant change is higher accrual rates for the 
years of contribution from 2008 on instead of 2017 on. For the other public employees (enrolled 
since September 1993), the new rules also apply what concerns the consideration of the whole 
contributive career instead of the best ten out of the last fifteen years, but the probability of 
contributors retiring before 2016 is quite small and, therefore, the impact is negligible. Table 6 
synthesizes the evolution of pension calculation rules for CGA contributors. 
iv)  Additional penalty for early retirement 
Another of the measures – within the scope of the so-called “promotion of active ageing” – 
consists in introducing a disincentive to early retirement, with a bigger financial penalty for 
retirement prior to the legal retirement age, but computed on a monthly basis (0.5 per cent for each 
month of anticipation) instead of on a yearly basis (4.5 per cent per year). This measure entered 
into force in 2007 for Social Security but, in the case of CGA, it is to be applied to new pensions 
from 2015 on. The current projection exercise includes the additional financial penalty and does 
not consider any changes in the probability of those eligible actually retiring. This assumption is a 
cautious one in what concerns the effects of this reform measure. 
Table 7 compares the evolution of entitlement conditions for full old-age pensions and early 
retirement pensions in the CGA scheme. 
v) Other  measures 
Promoting active ageing 
Aside from the reform measures included in the projections there are other measures aimed 
at promoting active ageing, namely: for long contributory careers, the no-penalty retirement age 
can be reduced one year for each of the three years of the contributory career above 30 years at the 
age of 55 (beneficiaries can retire, without penalty, at the age of 64 with 42 years of contributions, 
at the age of 63 with 44 years of contributions, at the age of 62 with 46 years of contributions and 
so on). 
When claimed after 65 years of age (with more than 15 calendar years of earnings 
registration and, at most, 70 years of age), the pension is increased by applying a monthly rate to 
the number of months of effective work completed between the month the pensioner reaches 65 
years of age and the month of the pension beginning, as presented in Table 8. This means, for 
instance, that an individual with 65 years old that decides to postpone retirement for one year will 
get a 3.96 per cent bonus if he has a career of 20 contributive years or 12 per cent in the case of 
having 40 contributive years. 
Introduction of a ceiling to higher pensions 
In a context of sustainability strengthening of social security and in order to complement the 
professional solidarity embedded in the pension benefit formula, but also safeguarding the   
  


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Entitlement Conditions (Transitory Period) 
A) Full Old-age Pension 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
LRA  60 60.5 61 61.5 62 62.5 63 63.5 64 64.5 65 
Contr.  years  36 36.5 37 37.5 38 38.5 39 39.5 40  40  40 
 
Notes: LRA stands for legal retirement age. 
Special regimes have longer convergence periods to LRA = 65 and 40 contributive years. 
 
B) Early Retirement Pension 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Age  55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Contr.  years  36 36 36 33 30 25 23 21 19 17 15 
 
Note: For each year before LRA there is a 4.5 per cent penalty in the pension value. From 2015 on it increases to 0.5 per cent per month 




Incentives for Postponing Retirement 
 
Contributive Career  Monthly Bonus Rate (percent) 
From 15 to 24  0.33 
From 25 to 34  0.50 
From 35 to 39  0.65 




earning-related principle, it was considered adequate to establish a pension ceiling (at 12 IAS). It 
must be stressed that pensions that result from a benefit formula that accounts the average of 
lifetime wages do not have any ceiling. This way this measure has a temporary effect. In terms of 
the pension ceiling, it was decided: 
•  to introduce a pension ceiling for the new pensions, exclusively for the component that 
considers the best ten out of the last fifteen years of recorded earnings (P1); 
•  when the pension component calculated with the new formula (P2) is higher than the pension 
component calculated with the old formula (P1), no pension ceiling will be applied to P1; 
•  if P1 and P2 are higher than the pension ceiling and P1 is larger than P2, then only the new 
formula will be applied (where there is no pension ceiling); 
•  all existing pensions above the ceiling will not be annually updated. This rule does not apply 




Projected Public Pension Expenditure and Contributions 
(percent of GDP) 
 
   2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2060-07  Peak  Year 
Public pension spending 
after reform  11.4 12.4 12.6 12.5 13.3 13.4  2.1  2053 
Public pension spending 
before reform  11.4 13.3 14.7 15.5 16.9 17.5  6.1  2060 
Contributions after reform  10.7  10.4  9.6  9.2  9.0  9.0  –1.7  2010 
 
Source: MTSS and authors’ calculations. 
 
  previous legislation (considering that the value of P2 is calculated according to the new 
formula). This rule, as the new indexing rules, should be reassessed every five years. 
However, this restriction only applies to a few cases (less than 1 per cent of all pensions). 
 
4.2  Effects of the recent reform measures 
The reform measures that entered into force in 2007 for the Social Security regime and in 
2008 for the CGA scheme are measures that, by their nature, will provide effects essentially in the 
long run. These effects were estimated through projection exercises carried out by authors for the 
CGA scheme and by the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity for the Social Security system. In 
the case of the Social Security system, the reform measures and modelling assumptions are similar 
to those of the CGA scheme, except in the following cases: 
i) regarding the introduction of the sustainability factor, it was assumed that Social Security 
contributors accept the financial penalty retiring at the statutory age, with no changes in the 
behaviour of the economic agents. This assumption makes the projections “conservative”. In 
fact, an increase in the retirement age would lead to a higher participation rate for older workers 
(whose importance is increasing) raising the contributory revenue, which is only partially offset 
by a marginal increase of the new pensions value for those contributors who retire later.
11 
ii) in the new updating rule for Social Security pensioners, it was assumed that it corresponds 
fundamentally to the consumer price indexation plus 0.35 percentage points (minus 
0.15 percentage points), depending on the economic growth above (below) 2 per cent. These 
drifts were obtained from the 2005 distribution for Social Security pension amounts and 
computing a weighted average of the drifts for each bracket of pension value according to the 
above mentioned rule. In 2005, 72 per cent of the pensioners belong to the first bracket, 
24 per cent to the second and 4 per cent to the highest one. 
According to the projection results for both subsystems, those measures will allow for a 
reduction of less than 1 percentage point of GDP in 2020 but around 4 percentage points by 2060
12 
(Table 9). Another important feature is that the peak year for pension expenditure in now within the 
————— 
11  For further details on this issue, see Pinheiro and Cunha (2007). 
12  These projections were made in the context of the Economic Policy Committee Working Group on Ageing Population and 
Sustainability and, therefore, used the common assumptions on demography and macroeconomic developments (EPC 2008). The 
main assumptions used in these projections are presented in Annex B and the CGA model is described in Annex C. 670  Vanda Cunha, Ariana Paulo, Nuno Sousa Pereira and Hélder Reis 
 
 
projection horizon (2053) 
while in the scenario 
before the recent reform, 
measures show that the 
pension expenditure 
trend was continuously 
increasing. Given the 
assumptions regarding 
demography and employ-
ment, which foresee a 
progressively higher 
employment rate for 
older workers as a result 
of the measures designed 
to promote active ageing, 
the contributions revenue 
trend tends to stabilize 
from 2040 onwards.  
The effects of the 
reform measures in 
containing the public 
pension expenditure 
growing trend are quite 
visible when analysing 
its evolution since 1960 
until the horizon of the 
projections (Figure 10). 
In the particular case of CGA, as it is a closed system since 2006, the effect of the more 
recent reforms is more limited in the long run, representing a 0.3 percentage points of GDP 
reduction in the public expenditure by 2060 (Table 10). However its impact increases by 2040, 
while the number of pensioners is still growing. The new rules also anticipate the peak year for 
CGA pension expenditure to be 2009 while the former maximum was reached in the 2020s, when 
the cohorts corresponding to peak admissions in the Public Administration retire. 
In order to better assess the effects of the reform measures on the pension system of all 
public employees, we run the CGA model in the counter factual situation of non-closure of CGA to 
new registrations, assuming that these would come under the rules pertaining to public employees 
registered in the Social Security system. As additional assumptions it was considered that: i) no 
enrolment of non-public employees would take place as has happened in the past, mainly with the 
employees of public-owned or formerly public-owned enterprises that were traditionally registered 
in the CGA; and, ii) the number of new public employees would respect the rule “2 out 1 in” until 
2011, as defined in the December 2007 update of the Portuguese Stability Programme, and the 
share of public employees in total employment would remain stable thereafter. It should be recalled 
that in the context of the Public Administration reform enhanced in 2005, the reduction in the 
number of admissions in public service cut the public employment share from about 15 per cent in 
2005 to 13.5 per cent in 2007 and it is estimated to remain at around 12 per cent after 2011. 
In this scenario, the recent reform measures allow a declining in the pension expenditure 
related to public employees of 0.6 percentage points of GDP by 2060, representing a reduction of 
almost 2 percentage points of GDP from 2007 expenditure (Table 11). 
Figure 10 
Pension Expenditure 
(percent of GDP) 
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Table 10 
Projected CGA Pension Expenditure and Contributions 
“CGA Closed System” 
(percent of GDP) 
 
   2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2060-07  Peak  Year
CGA pension spending 
after reform  4.1 4.0 3.9 2.9 1.8 0.9  –3.2  2009 
CGA pension spending 
before reform  4.1 4.3 4.3 3.4 2.2 1.2  –3.0  2025 
Contributions after 
reform  2.1 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0  –2.1  2007 
 
Source: CGA and authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 11 
Projected Public Employees’ Pension Expenditure and Contributions 
“CGA Open System” 
(percent of GDP) 
 
   2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2060-07  Peak  Year
CGA pension spending 
after reform  4.1 4.0 3.9 3.1 2.4 2.2  –1.9  2009 
CGA pension spending 
before reform  4.1 4.4 4.4 3.7 3.1 2.8  –1.3  2026 
CGA pension spending 
before 1993 reform
(1)  4.1 4.9 5.1 4.9 4.4 4.0  –0.1  2029 
Contributions after 
reform  2.1 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3  –0.8  2007 
 
Note: 
(1) But starting from actual 2007. 
Source: CGA and authors’ calculations. 
 
As a way of evaluating the process of convergence of the CGA to the Social Security regime 
that started in 1993, the estimated effects of the reforms since then are worth a reduction of 
1.8  percentage points of GDP by 2060. It should be noted that this effect is somehow 
underestimated as the exercise takes as a starting point the 2007 pension expenditure value which is 
already affected by the measures adopted in the meantime. In the no convergence scenario, the 
pension expenditure is related only to public employees, and it would rise by 1 percentage points 
by 2030 and afterwards it would decrease reflecting the evolution of public employment until the 
1990s and its reduction in the 2000s. 
How these reductions in public pension expenditure reflect on the pensioners’ welfare is also 







   2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 
Replacement rate        
CGA
(1)  81 75 72 72  -  - 
Social security scheme
(2) 58 53 49 53 54 56 
    Old age
(3)  61 55 51 55 55 58 
Coverage        
    CGA  14  14  14  13  11  8 
    Social Security   83  82  82  83  86  88 
 
Notes: 
(1) Ratio between the average pension of new pensioners (earnings-related old-age and disability pensioners) and the average wage of 
CGA contributors. 
(2) Ratio between the average pension of new pensioners (earnings-related old-age and disability pensioners) and the average declared 
wage of general regime of wage earners. 
(3) Considering only old-age pensions. 
Source: CGA, MTSS and authors’ calculations. 
 
benefit ratio. The first one compares the value of new pensions with the last wages and the second 
one relates the average pension to the average wage of the economy. Table 12 shows the evolution 
of the “average” gross replacement rate, where is considered the average of new gross pensions, 
reflecting a wide range of situations in terms of age of retirement, contributive career length and 
applicable regimes, namely in the transitory period that goes until 2042 in the case of the Social 
Security system. Regarding CGA the last new pensions should occur around 2045, as this system 
was closed at the end of 2005. 
It can be observed that, as expected, the replacement rates in the CGA regime are 
significantly higher than in the Social Security regime. The long-term evolution is similar in both 
systems with a reduction before 2030 reflecting both the less “generous” rules of pension formation 
and higher increases in wages in line with the productivity projections. However, from 2030 
onwards, the average replacement rate is projected to recover to levels similar to the current ones 
due, essentially, to longer contributive careers of new pensioners. In the specific case of CGA, 
before the consideration of the recent reform measures, this “average” replacement rate would 
range from 81 to 76 per cent between 2007 and 2040, as a result of the changeover to the social 
security rules in the convergence period initiated in 1993 and strengthened in 2005. 
The evolution of the replacement rate along with the pension updating formulas reflects on 
the benefit ratio
13 developments. In the case of CGA, the ratio
14 reaches its peak in the late 2020s 
and decreases thereafter. This scheme is only relevant until the 2040s. As regards to Social 
Security, the benefit ratio reduces its value until 2040, recovering afterwards in line with the 
evolution of the replacement rate. 
————— 
13  Computed as the average old-age pension (including early retirement pensions) over the average wage. 







   2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 
Benefit ratio          
CGA  73 74 75 66  -  - 
Social  security  scheme  46 47 43 39 40 42 
 
Source: CGA, MTSS and authors’ calculations. 
 
The models used in these projections do not allow for the computation of individual 
replacement rates, as contributors and pensioners are modelled grouped by age and gender strata. 
However, taking the economy wages evolution and the rules applicable in each year of the 
projection horizon it is possible to calculate “theoretical” replacement rates for individuals entitled 
to a full old-age pension at different points of the earnings distribution (Table 14 A). 
As expected, these replacement rates computed for complete contributive careers are higher 
than the average ones and their evolution mainly reflects the effect of two measures: the 
introduction of the sustainability factor and the new pension formula that differentiates the accrual 
rate according to the reference earnings. This leads to a slightly smaller reduction in the 
replacement rates for lower earners than for higher earners. In these estimates, it is assumed that 
individuals retire as they fulfil the entitlement conditions and do not postpone retirement. If that is 
the case, i.e., labour market conditions and individual choices match favourably in postponing 
retirement, the financial penalty induced by the sustainability factor would be (at least partially) 
offset according to the rules presented in Table 8. 
Excluding the sustainability factor effect, the replacement rates would present a more stable 
pattern, in particular in the Social Security case (Table 14 B). For CGA, the reduction is more 
marked as a result of the convergence effect of the pension formation rules to the ones of the Social 
Security. 
 
4.3  Further analysis on the two main measures 
4.3.1 Sustainability  factor 
Recent reform measures have an estimated effect of reducing public pension expenditure by 
about 4 percentage points of GDP by 2060. More than 50 per cent of this result is explained by the 
introduction of the sustainability factor that accounts for 2.4 percentage points of GDP (Table 15). 
These calculations are somewhat prudent by assuming that CGA contributors postpone 
retirement proportionally to the evolution of the sustainability factor, not accepting the whole 
financial penalty associated with retirement at age 65 as in the case of the Social Security 
beneficiaries. However, CGA new retires will not be relevant from 2045 on as it is a closed system 
since 2006. As discussed in Pinheiro and Cunha (2007), if contributors postpone their retirement 
beyond the legal retirement age, the “saving effect” due to the higher employment rate and the 
reduction of the period during which individuals receive pensions is higher than the marginal 



















Source: CGA, EPC and authors’ calculations. 
2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Individual Reference Earnings 
   50% average earnings 89 78 75 68 - -
   75% average earnings 89 78 75 68 - -
   100% average earnings 89 78 75 67 - -
   200% average earnings 89 77 74 66 - -
   250% average earnings 89 77 73 65 - -
2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Individual Reference Earnings 
   50% average earnings 92 75 63 59 58 58
   75% average earnings 77 66 63 59 58 58
   100% average earnings 77 66 62 59 58 57
   200% average earnings 77 65 62 58 57 56
   250% average earnings 77 65 62 57 57 56
2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Individual Reference Earnings 
   50% average earnings 89 84 85 81 - -
   75% average earnings 89 84 85 81 - -
   100% average earnings 89 84 85 80 - -
   200% average earnings 89 83 83 78 - -
   250% average earnings 89 83 83 77 - -
2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Individual Reference Earnings 
   50% average earnings 92 75 71 70 72 75
   75% average earnings 77 71 71 70 72 74
   100% average earnings 77 71 71 70 72 74
   200% average earnings 77 70 70 69 71 73





Impact of the Sustainability Factor in Pension Expenditure Projections 
(percent of GDP) 
 
    2007  2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 Peak  year 
Projections after reform (1)           
Public  pensions  11.4  12.4 12.6 12.5 13.3 13.4  2053 
           
Projections excluding the 
sustainability factor (2) 
         
Public  pensions  11.4  12.7 13.4 13.8 15.2 15.9  2060 
           
Difference (1)–(2)           
Public  pensions  0.0  –0.4 –0.8 –1.3 –1.9 –2.4     
 
Source: CGA, MTSS and authors’ calculations. 
 
Moreover, with this factor, the uncertainty underlying the demography projections, in 
particular in the expected life expectancy gains, is strongly minimized in the projections of public 
expenditure on pensions.  
 
4.3.2  Pension updating rule and dynamic progressivity 
According to the pensions update rule, presented in Table 4, the annual update rate decreases 
with the pension value. For example, assuming a 2 per cent inflation rate and a 2 per cent real GDP 
growth, pensions below 1.5 IAS are updated 2.5 per cent while pensions above 12 IAS remain 
unchanged. In dynamic terms, this difference reduces the gap between extreme values of pensions 
and therefore decreases the inequality in income distribution of pensioners.
15 However, two factors 
partially offset this effect: on one hand, even the highest pensions will eventually start to be 
updated in the future and, on the other hand, for the higher pensions, tax system progressivity 
combined with updating rates lower for pensions than for tax parameters reduces the average tax 
rate. This turns the net amount of the pension updating higher than before tax in the case of higher 
pensions. 
The first effect is illustrated in the Figure 11. Taking a pension that in the initial period is 
equivalent to 15 IAS (and therefore not updated in the first period), due to IAS annual updating, it 
ends up below the 12 IAS threshold after some periods. In that case, for instance, after 15 years it is 
equal to approximately to 11.3 IAS. 
The second effect may be demonstrated through the example of a pension before tax  B
t p in 
period t. 
After n periods (years), the pension after tax is given by: 
————— 
15  Whitehouse (2009) discusses the effects of “progressive indexation” in four countries, including Portugal, and finds small 



















Note: assumptions – inflation rate of 2%, GDP growth rate of 2% and fiscal parameters annual update of 2%. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 12 

























Note: assumptions – inflation rate of 2%, GDP growth rate of 2% and fiscal parameters annual of 2%. 
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n t tax p p + + − + = ) 1 ( θ  (1) 
where:  n θ is the average annual indexation rate after n periods and   tn tax +  is the tax amount. 
Annual updating rate, as defined in Table 4, depends on: i) the pension value (p), ii) the real 
GDP growth rate (ϕ ) and iii) the inflation rate (π ). Therefore: 
  ) , , ( π ϕ θ p f n = . (2) 
Tax amount ( t tax ) depends, each year, on the pension amount and on the tax parameters. 
As the tax regime for personal income is progressive, average tax rate grows with the 
pension value. However, in dynamic terms, as tax parameters are usually indexed to expected 
inflation rate, for pensions with annual updating rates lower than expected inflation, the average 
actual tax rate decreases over time. Therefore, the actual rate for pensions update after tax is higher 
than before tax (Figure 12). 
To evaluate the effect of the indexation rule and taxation in pensioners’ distribution of 
income, the initial pension distribution is compared with the one several periods later. The 
comparison is made through the evolution of percentile ratios and by using the Gini index. These 
were computed by using the Personal Income Tax database for 2007 (latest information available), 
which includes all pensioners that are legally obliged to declare taxable income and allows for 
simulation modelling.
16 
This database presents, however, some caveats for the purpose we are using it and so they 
should be mentioned: i) sample representativeness – as the lowest pensions are tax exempt, the 
sample is biased to higher pensions; ii) pensions aggregation – pensions are reported in an 
aggregate way, i.e., it is not possible to disentangle the value of each pension for individuals that 
receive more than one pension, which is not neutral in terms of the indexation rule effects; 
iii)  income aggregation for tax purposes leads to an average tax rate and not necessarily to a 
specific tax rate on pensions income. We assumed that pensioners do not receive income from 
other sources, which is somewhat a strong hypothesis. 
The parameters updating between 2007 and 2009 took into account the available information 
on GDP growth, inflation rate, IAS and tax parameters updates. From 2009 onwards, we 
considered the EPC (2008) assumptions for GDP growth and inflation rate (constant at 2 per cent), 
assuming tax parameters to be indexed in line with inflation. 
The results obtained are presented in Table 16. It provides evidence for the pension update 
rule’s progressivity with both the percentile ratio and the Gini Index decreasing in the time period 
considered. Before tax, percentile ratios decline 4.3 per cent over a ten year’s horizon and 
8.9 per cent over twenty years. Also Gini coefficient decreases 2.4 and 5 per cent, respectively. Tax 
effect reinforces these results except in the case of the percentile ratio over twenty years due to the 
tax impact (discussed above) on highest pensions. 
Another important aspect is related to the fact that average pension update before tax is 
lower than 2 per cent, the value considered for inflation rate. However, the rates denote a small 
increase when considering after tax pension values, which reflects a lower growth of tax revenue 
than the one of the average pension. 
————— 






presented above rely 
strongly on the 
demography and 
macroeconomic assump-
tions considered. In order 
to assess the robustness 
of the projections several 
sensitivity tests were 
carried out. Each 
sensitivity scenario was 
computed in relation 
to the baseline scenario 
with the respective 
parameter change, ceteris 
paribus. 
An increase in the 
employment rate of 
1  percentage point does 
not change the results 
significantly, while 
a higher labour 
productivity scenario of 
0.25 percentage points 
induces a decrease in 
total pension expenditure 
by 0.7 percentage points 
in 2060, as pension 
updating is no longer 
linked to wage increases 
(and productivity gains). 
In relation to 
demography, we tested 
both the impact of 
an increase in life 
expectancy of one year 
by 2060 and the extreme 
assumption of zero 
migration. A one 
year increase in life 
expectancy leads to 
a rise in the pension 
expenditure ratio 
of 0.4  percentage points 
by 2060. This 
moderate increase 
reflects the counter   
Table 16 
Pension Distribution Effects 
(unit: average growth rates, percent) 
   Number of Years 
   10 20 
IAS update  2.31  2.36 
Pensions update     
   Before tax  1.90  1.97 
   After tax   1.93  2.00 
Distribution of pensions
*     
   Before tax     
      Percentile ratio (P75/P25)  –4.3  –8.9 
      Gini coefficient  –2.4  –5.0 
   After tax     
      Percentile ratio (P75/P25)  –4.3  –8.7 
      Gini coefficient  –2.6  –5.2 
 
Note: * End-of-period growth rates. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Figure 13 
Pension Expenditure under Different Scenarios 
(percent of GDP) 
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  Baseline
  Zero Migration
  Higher life expectancy
  Higher employment rate
  Higher labour productivity




Effects of a Permanent Economic Downturn 
 
   2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 
Public pension spending          
     Baseline scenario  11.4  12.4  12.6  12.5  13.3  13.4 
     “Permanent shock” effect  0.0  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.9 
             
Public employees’ pension spending              
     Baseline scenario  4.1  4.0  3.9  3.1  2.4  2.2 
     “Permanent shock” effect  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2 
 
Source: CGA, MTSS and authors’ calculations. 
 
effect of the sustainability factor, minimizing the pension expenditure exposure to the uncertainty 
of the evolution of life expectancy. The assumption of zero migration is by far the most extreme 
one, leading to an increase of the pension expenditure ratio by almost 3 percentage points in 2060 
when compared with the baseline scenario. This assumption is associated to a reduction of 
employment and economic growth and, therefore, the GDP “denominator effect” exceeds the 
“numerator effect” of lower pension expenditure in the long term. 
Given the more recent economic developments, which were not incorporated in the 
macroeconomic assumptions underlying the baseline scenario,
17 additional tests were made in order 
to evaluate the impact of the current economic downturn in the long term projections. At this 
juncture, it can be considered that the economic downturn is temporary and there will be a 
convergence to the baseline trend or, alternatively, that there will be a “permanent shock” in the 
terms of productivity growth and employment rate.  
Even considering the “permanent” effects of the economic downturn, assuming a reduction 
of 0.25 percentage points in the productivity rate and an increase of 1 per cent in the unemployment 
rate, the projected expenditure for public pensions would rise by 0.9 percentage points of GDP in 
2060 (Table 17). Considering only the public employees pension expenditure, the increase would 
be of 0.2 percentage points of GDP. 
In case of a temporary shock, the effects on the pension spending projections would be 
minor, in particular in the long run. According to the modelling assumptions used, relatively lower 
productivity (and wages) in the short run would result in relatively lower pensions in the future but 
due to the “denominator effect”, the pension expenditure as a share of GDP should still be higher 
than in the baseline scenario. 
On the basis of the sensitivity tests’ results, changes in the demography scenario may have 
larger effects on the pensions’ projections than different macroeconomic assumptions (not 
considering second-order effects on demography). Pension expenditure revealed particular 
sensitivity to migration flows assumptions. 
————— 
17  The long-term macroeconomic projections were based on the European Commission Spring 2008 prospects for 2008-10. 680  Vanda Cunha, Ariana Paulo, Nuno Sousa Pereira and Hélder Reis 
 
 
6  Public Finance Sustainability 
Before the introduction of the most recent pension reform package (2006-08), the projected 
increase in the age-related public expenditure was extremely high, reaching 10.1 percentage points 
of GDP between 2004 and 2050. Out of this, 9.7 percentage points related to pension spending.
18 In 
its analysis of the long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU, the European Commission 
had classified Portugal as a high risk country in 2006. This assessment depends on the initial 
budgetary position of the Member State (i.e., in the years considered by the annual updates of the 
national stability or convergence programmes), on the long-term projections on age-related 
expenditure, and on a wide range of other quantitative and qualitative indicators, as well. 
One of these indicators is the sustainability gap S2, which measures the size of a permanent 
budgetary adjustment that allows fulfilling the inter-temporal budget constraint over an infinite 
horizon. This indicator may be decomposed into the impact of the initial budgetary position gap to 
debt stabilizing the primary balance (IBP) and the impact of the long-term change in the primary 
balance (LTC), which provides the additional adjustment required to finance the increase in public 
expenditure over an infinite horizon. It is usually computed for two scenarios: the baseline 
scenario, which takes the programme’s first year structural primary balance into account, and the 
programme scenario that assumes that the medium-term programme objectives for the structural 
balances are achieved. 
In the October 2006 Report, the sustainability gap S2 in the programme scenario was 
5.2  percentage points of GDP, significantly above the EU average (1.6 percentage points), 
reflecting the high value of the LTC component (Table 18). Considering the effect of the recent 
reform measures, the value of this component halved, allowing a significant reduction in the 
sustainability gap S2 to 2.0 percentage points of GDP. 
The latest 
sustainability evaluation 
was based on the January 
2009 update of the 
Portuguese stability 
programme. It presents a 
deterioration of the 
structural balance to 
be achieved in 2011 
vis-à-vis the previous 
years’ programme, since 
it was updated due to the 
economic downturn and 
the fiscal stimulus 
package introduced in 
2008/2009. However, it 
still considers the same 
long-term projections 
and the LTC component 
remains basically 
unchanged and S2 
increases slightly to 
2.3 per cent of GDP. 
————— 
18 DGECFIN  (2006). 
Table 18 
Sustainability indicator S2 
Programme Scenario 
Source: European Commission. 
   IBP  LTC  S2 
   (1)  (2)  (3) = (1) + (2) 
October 2006  –1.5  6.7  5.2 
    (2005-2009)          
March 2008  –1.2  3.2  2.0 
    (2007-2011)          
March 2009  –0.9  3.2  2.3 
    (2008-2011)            The Reform of the Portuguese Public Employees’ Pension System: Reasons and Results  681 
 
 
With the consideration of the 2008 demography and macroeconomic assumptions, the 
projected trend for pension expenditure as a share of GDP is even more contained 
(+2.1 percentage points of GDP between 2007 and 2060), which should allow a reduction in the 




In 2006, the projected increase of 10.1 percentage points of GDP in the age-related public 
expenditure between 2004 and 2050 was unsustainable. The need to foster a deep reform of the 
Social Security system and, in particular, of the CGA system, where the underlying conditions to 
determine and update pensions were much more generous, became quite stringent. The reform that 
was implemented relied on a set of structural changes of which we analyze the two most important 
ones: the implementation of a sustainability factor that links the pension value to the evolution of 
life expectancy at 65 years old and a new rule for updating pensions. 
These reform measures have an estimated effect of reducing public pension expenditure by 
about 4 percentage points of GDP by 2060. More than 50 per cent of this result is explained by the 
introduction of the sustainability factor that accounts for 2.4 percentage points of GDP. Equally 
important is the fact that this sustainability factor significantly reduced the systems vulnerability to 
changes in the demographic scenario as increases in life expectancy have a minor impact on future 
pension expenditure. 
We also analyze the distributive impact of the new rule for updating pensions and conclude 
that a significant reduction of the gap between pensions can be forecasted, which may contribute to 
the system stability but have an undetermined effect on the decision of high wage contributors to 
postpone their retirement age: either they prefer an initial higher pension or more “generous” future 
updates. 
The importance of this issue and the more demanding macroeconomic environment require 
further analysis of the impact of the reform measures implemented in 2006. An unexplored 
dimension of the reform is modelling the agents’ reaction to the new system of financial incentives 
related to the decision of whether or not to postpone the retirement age. In reality, while the bonus 
for each year of contributions to the system may lead agents to postpone retirement, the 
sustainability factor may have the opposite effect. Understanding under which conditions each one 
of them prevails should be of interest to both academics and policy makers. 




THE EVOLUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM 
End XIX 
century 
First institutions of social protection for the elderly (state industry employees 
followed by other public and private corporations employees) 
1919  Introduction of mandatory social insurance (first attempt) for employees (some 
sectors) with low income 
1929  Creation of the public employees old-age pension scheme 
(Decree No. 16669 of 27 March) 
Maximum retirement age: 70 years old 
1934  Introduction of survivors pensions for public employees 
(Decree-Law No. 24046 of 21 June) 
1935  Definition of the general framework of social insurance 
Old-age and disability pensions financed on a funded basis 
1962  Social Security reform (Law no. 2115 of 15 June and others) with enlargement 
of social protection for industry, trade and services employees and financed on 
mixed basis (funded and PAYG) 
1972  Definition of the pensions scheme for agricultural workers 
(Decree-Law No. 391/72 of 13 October) 
1972 Creation  of  Estatuto da Aposentação (Decree-Law No.  498/72 of 
9 December), integrated legal framework of public employees retirement 
regime: 
i)  wider coverage of the scheme, including contributors aged 55 or older 
ii)  pension entitlement with 15 years of contributions to public employees 
scheme or private employees 
iii) contributory rate: 6 per cent employees 
iv)  retirement conditions: aged 60 and contributory career 40 years (full 
pension) 
v)  pension amount: last net wage (or average last 10 years if higher) or in 
the proportion of the contributive career if less than 40 years 
vi)  more favourable conditions for military personnel 
vii)  pensions update on a discretionary basis but in practice following 
public sector wages 
1973  Minimum entitlement contributory period: 
5 years for disability pensions and 10 years for old age pensions 
1974  Transition for a unified system of Social Security 
(Decree-Law No. 203/74 of 15 May) 
Introduction of social pension for disabled (above 65) 
Introduction of 13
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1975  First regulation of the State participation in the financing of the Social Security 
pensions system 
Introduction of survivors pensions for agricultural scheme 
1977  New organics of Social Security (Decree-Law No. 549/77) 
Inclusion of self-employed and housewives (or -men) 
Introduction of means-tested social pension for all above 65 
Reduction in the minimum entitlement contributory period: 
3 years for disability pensions and 5 years for old pensions 
1979  Reduces the full pension condition to 36 contributive years and minimum 
period for pension entitlement to 5 years 
(Decree-Law No. 191-A/79 of 25 June) 
1980  Definition of the non-contributory regime of social security 
(Decree-Law No. 160/80 of 27 May) 
1982  Enlargement of the minimum entitlement contributory period: 
5 years for disability pensions and 10 years for old age pensions 
1984  First Social Security Framework Law (Law No. 28/84 of 14 August) 
System PAYG: contributive regime financed by employees and employers 
contributions and non-contributive regime financed by State transfers 
Pensions updates taking into account consumer prices prospects 
1985  Increases the contributory rate of public employees to CGA to 6.5 per cent 
(Decree-Law No. 40-A/85 of 11 February) 
The rate for survivors pensions is 1.5 per cent 
1986  Determines a standard contributory rate for the general regime of Social 
Security: 24 per cent for employers and 11 per cent for employees (lower rates 
for special regimes) 
1988  Extends the CGA coverage to private schools teachers 
(Decree-Law No. 321/88 of 22 September) 
1990 Introduction  of  14
th month for all pensioners 
(Ordinance No. 470/90 of 23 June) 
1993 Revision  of  Estatuto da Aposentação (Decree-Law No. 277/93 of 10 August 
and others): from September on, the pension scheme of new public 
employees became subject to the rules of the private sector system (Social 
Security General Regime) 
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1993  Reform of the Social Security general regime  
(Decree-Law No. 329/93 of 25 September): 
Enlargement of the minimum entitlement contributory period: from 10 to 15 
years for old age pensions 
Gradual increase of legal retirement age of women from 62 to 65 years (the 
same as men) 
Revision of the contributory rate of Social Security to 35.5 per cent 
1994  Increases the contributory rate of public employees to CGA old-age 
pensions to 7.5 per cent and to survivors pensions to 2.5 per cent, similar 
to Social Security contributors (Decree-Law No. 78/94 of 9 March) 
1995  Reduction of the standard contributory rate of Social Security by 0.75 
percentage points to 34.75 (increase of the VAT standard rate by 1 percentage 
point earmarked to Social Security) 
1999  Decomposition of the contributory rate of Social Security (34.75 per cent) 
(Decree-Law No. 200/99 of 8 June) 
2002  New Framework Law for Social Security (Law No. 32/2002 of 20 December) 
Convergence of earnings-related minimum pensions to national minimum wage 
Revision of new pension formula: transitory period for new rules taking into 
account the whole contributive career from 2017 on (Decree-Law No. 35/2002) 
2002  Early retirement (old-age) pension is possible with 36 contributive years 
and a penalty of 4.5 per cent per year earlier than 60 years old 
(Law No. 32-B/2002 of 30 December) 
2005 Revision  of  Estatuto da Aposentação (Law No. 60-B/2005 of 29 December) 
– further convergence of CGA and Social Security pension regimes: 
i)  from 2006 on, new public employees are enrolled in Social Security System 
ii)  progressive increase in legal retirement age to 65 years old (until 2015) 
for all public employees and of career length to 40 years (until 2013) 
iii) convergence of new pensions formula for contributors enrolled in 
CGA until August 1993 
2007  Reform of the Social Security pension regime (revision of the Framework Law 
– Law No. 4/2007 of January 16 and Decree Law No. 87/2007 of May 10) 
2007  Transposition of Social Security reform measures to CGA from 2008 on, 
with a transitory period until 2015 (Law No. 52/2007 of 31 August) 
2008  Convergence (until 2015) of the minimum contributive career from 36 to 
15 years to be entitled to a early retirement pension 
(Law No. 11/2008 of 20 February) 
 
Note: text in bold refers specifically to CGA. 





































Source: EPC (2008). 
 
2008 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Life expectancy
 at birth 78.7 80.6 82.0 83.4 84.7 85.9
     males 75.5 77.6 79.3 80.8 82.3 83.6
     females 82.1 83.7 84.9 86.1 87.3 88.3
 at 65 years old 18.2 19.6 20.7 21.9 23.1 24.1
     males 16.3 17.6 18.7 19.7 20.7 21.6
     females 19.9 21.1 22.1 23.0 23.9 24.8
Population (10^9) 10.599 11.080 11.299 11.443 11.458 11.289
Dependency ratio (DR) (percent)
   young DR –15/15-64 22.8 22.1 20.9 21.6 22.9 22.7
   old-age DR +65/15-64 25.9 30.7 36.6 44.6 53.0 54.8
2008 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Labour productivity growth
(hours worked) (percent)
1.2 1.8 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.7
Labour input growth (15-71) 0.3 0.3 –0.1 –0.4 –0.5 –0.3
GDP growth (real) 1.5 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.2 1.4
Employment rate (15-64) 68.4 71.4 71.6 71.7 71.8 71.6





The pension model used for the CGA projections is an accounting/actuarial model that 
allows a detailed parameterization of the system, including the simulation of different demography 
or macroeconomic assumptions and changes in the reform parameters. However, as it is not a 
general equilibrium model it does not permit endogenous analysis of the changes in supply and 
demand and in the consumption and investment decisions of economic agents stemming from their 
adjustment, for example, to the reforms in social security that were enacted. 
 
1  Assumptions and methodology 
The model has four main modules: the first one relates to input data (including 
macroeconomic and demography data), the second one comprises the dynamics for contributors 
and number of pensions, the third one refers to the dynamics of contributions and pensions and the 
last one provides the outputs. Modules two and three are structured by age and gender strata in 
order to allow more precise results. 
 
2  Module for contributors and pensioners dynamics 
Due to the fact of CGA being a closed system, the dynamics of contributors is quite simple: the 
number of contributors decreases each year due to mortality and to other motives like moving to 
the private sector or exoneration. The number of CGA contributors at the end of year is given by: 
  ( ) np C C g a t g a t g a t g a t g a t , , , , , , , 1 , 1 , , 1 − − − × =
− − π μ  (6) 
where: 
C g a t , , : Number of CGA contributors in year t, for age a and gender g 
μ g a t , , : Mortality rate in year t, for age a  (for those who would complete age a during year t) and 
gender g 
π g a t , , : Contributors rate of exoneration in year t, for age a and gender g 
np
g a t , ,
: Number of new pensioners (includes old-age pensioners and disability pensioners) in year t, 
for age a and gender g. 
In the “open system” variant, the dynamics of contributors was slightly changed in order to 
include entrants from each year. The end-2007 stock was adjusted by the new public employees 
enrolled in 2006 and 2007, and between 2008 and 2011 it was assumed that the number of new 
public employees was around half of the new retirees in each year. The age and gender distribution 
was assumed to be the same as the distribution of new public employees in 2005. From 2012 on it 
was considered that the entries in the public sector were such that allowed to keep the share of 
public in total employment (around 12 per cent). 
The dynamics of pensioners
19 is calculated for old age and disability pensioners together and 
for survivors separately. The stock of pensioners increases with new pensioners and decreases 
————— 
19  More precisely, available data refer to the number of pensions and not the number of pensioners.   The Reform of the Portuguese Public Employees’ Pension System: Reasons and Results  687 
 
according to pensioners’ mortality. In this model, survivor pensioners also depend on a 
“depreciation rate” that applies mainly to when descendents conclude their studies. 
 
2.1  Old age and disability pensioners 
New pensioners (and pensions) are computed according to the legal regime that applies to 
each type of contributors: regime of Estatuto de Aposentação (that applies to public employees 
registered in the CGA until August 1993) and the social security regime that applies to public 
employees registered in the CGA between September 1993 and December 2005. For each legal 
regime, new pensioners are projected with a breakdown by motive: disability, old age (including 
early retirement) or age limit (at 70 years old). 
New pensioners are computed by using “retirement probabilities”. The later are defined as 
the base year ratios of new pensioners over contributors, for those who are aged less than 70. This 
means that new pensions are not determined only as a function of the legal criteria. 






a g t g a t
1 , , 2
1 , , 1
1 , , 1 , ,
− −
− −
− − × =  (7) 
where:  ) (
, t op
a g
: Number of new old-age pensioners during year t for age a and gender g. 
In the case of old age, including early pensioners, the above mentioned ratios move along 
legal retirement age (LRA).
20 It should be recalled that the LRA for CGA contributors is increasing 
from 60 years old in 2005 to 65 years old in 2015, at a pace of 6 months per year, in order to 
achieve convergence to the private sector regime. 
It was assumed that the retirement probabilities for disabled do not change with the 
above-mentioned increase in the LRA. 






g a t g a t
, 1 , 2
, 1 , 1
, , 1 , ,
− −
− −
− × =  (8) 
where: dp
g a t , ,
: Number of new disability pensioners in year t, for age a  and gender g. 
The dynamics for the number of old-age and disability pensioners at the end of year t is 
given by: 
  ( ) dp op Op Op
g a t g a t g a t g a t g a t , , , , , , , 1 , 1 , , 1 + + − × =
− − μ  (9) 
where:  Op
g a t , ,
: Number of old-age and disability pensioners at the end of year t for age a and 
gender g. 
 
2.2 Survivor  pensioners 
New pensioners are a function of old age and disability pensioner’s mortality. In the past, on 
average, 80 per cent of pensioners who died had a survivor entitled to a pension, but this 
————— 
20  For pensioners aged between LRA-10 and 70 (age limit). 688  Vanda Cunha, Ariana Paulo, Nuno Sousa Pereira and Hélder Reis 
 
percentage is expected to decrease (to near 60 per cent), as spouses beneficiaries tend to have their 
own wage/ pension and would not be eligible to a survivor pension and the number of children tend 
to decrease as well. Having the estimate for total new survivors’ pensioners, the age and gender 
distribution is the same of base year. 
It is also considered that the stock of survivor pensioners depend on a “depreciation rate” 
that applies mainly to descendants when conclude their studies. So it is necessary to divide the age 
strata into the following: 
• 18<a<27 
  ( ) sp Sp Sp
g a t g a t g a t g a t g a t , , , , , , , 1 , 1 , , 1 + − − × =
− − χ μ  (10) 
• Other  a 
  ( ) sp Sp Sp
g a t g a t g a t g a t , , , , , 1 , 1 , , 1 + − × =
− − μ  (11) 
where: 
Sp
g a t , ,
: Number of survivor pensioners in year t, for age a  and gender g 
sp
g a t , ,
: Number of new survivor pensioners in year t, for age a  and gender g 
χ g a t , ,
: Depreciation rate of the survivor pensioners stock, unrelated to the death of the beneficiary in 
year t, for age a  and gender g 
 
3  Module for contributions and pensions’ dynamics 
Contributions to CGA are a fixed percentage of employees’ remuneration (10 per cent 
supported by employees and 13.1 per cent by the employer).
21 Therefore, the contributions 
dynamics depends on the remunerations evolution. The data available for 2007 contained average 
values for remunerations of the subscribers by age and gender strata. The actualized and adjusted 
average remuneration is: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) γ γ t g a t t g a t W W W g a t + × + × − − − = 1 ; 1 max , 1 , 1 , , 1 , ,
 (12) 
where: γ t
 is the annual update rate for public sector wage scale. 
Contributions in each year are given by: 
  C W Cont g a t g a t g a t t , , , , , , × = × τ  (13) 
where: τ t is the CGA’s contributory rate. 
The average old-age pension is determined by: 
  () [ ]
Op
npens op Pens op Op
Pens
g a t
g a t g a t t g a t g a t g a t
g a t
, ,
, , , , , 1 , 1 , , , ,
, ,
1 ) ( × + + × × −
=
− − α  (14) 
————— 
21  In practice, only some general government subsectors employers actually contribute to CGA, while in the case of State it makes an 
annual transfer to CGA. However, the contributory rate of 13.1 per cent was considered to all employers (as an imputed one, in the 
case of State) by analogy with the contributory rate to Social Security general regime of new public employees.   The Reform of the Portuguese Public Employees’ Pension System: Reasons and Results  689 
 
where: αt represents annual pension update and npenst,a,g is the new old-age pension in year t, for 
age a and gender g. 
npenst,a,g  is calculated according to the rules presented in Table 6 for the Estatuto da 
Aposentação contributors and for other public employees (rule B) separately. It is assumed that 
public employees hired between September 1993 and 2001 will not retire before 2017. 
Total old-age and disability pensions expenditure is given by: 
  ( ) Op pens TE g a t g a t g a t , , , , , , × =  (15) 
The dynamics of survivor’s pensions follows the old-age pension’s one: 
  () [ ]
Sp
nsurvpens sp SurvPens sp Sp
SurvPens
g a t
g a t g a t t g a t g a t g a t
g a t
, ,
, , , , , 1 , 1 , , , ,
, ,
1 ) ( × + + × × −
=
− − α  (16) 
where αt represents annual pension update (the same of old age pensions) and nsurvpenst,a,g is the 
new survivors pension in year t, for age a and gender g. 
Each new survivor’s pension, according to the law, is equivalent to 50 per cent of the old age 
pension that originate it. In the model, it was assumed the average new survivors pensions to be 
around 40 per cent of the average old age pensions. 
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Japanese fiscal position is the worst among developed countries. One of the main reasons is 
the expansion of social security expenditure due to rapid aging. Social security expenditure 
accounts for almost half of the general expenditure of Japanese budget, and is growing very rapidly 
every year. 
Therefore both Japanese social security reform and fiscal reform are indispensable to 
maintain sustainable social security and fiscal policy. 
In this standpoint I want to discuss following issues: 
1) first point is to show that Japanese fiscal position is very bad and aging progresses very rapidly. 
These two points are big constraints in terms of maintaining Japanese fiscal as well as social 
security sustainability; 
2) second point is to explain the Pension Revision of 2004. The basic idea consists of following 
three points: 
  (1)  fixing future premium level legally to avoid putting too much burden on the future working 
age people, 
  (2)  introducing the system to adjust indexation to respond the aging society as well as decrease 
of the population of working age people, 
  (3)  raising the ratio of state subsidy for Basic Pension from about 1/3 to half to maintain the 
level of the pension. This costs extra 2.5 trillion yen (around 2.5 billion US Dollars);
1 
3) last point is to explain Japanese effort towards fiscal consolidation. Since Japan had to deal with 
the raise of the ratio of state subsidy to the Basic Pension, as well as stimulus package, Japan 
needed fiscal reform including obtaining stable revenue resources. Thus last year Japanese 
government decided “The Medium-term Program” concerning tax reform and social security. 
 
1  Japanese aging society and current fiscal position 
1.1  Japanese aging society 
Figure 1 shows that Japanese aging is progressing faster than any other developed countries. 
The ratio of population older than 65 is already above 20 per cent in 2005, expected to go up to 
30.5 per cent in 2025 and 39.6 per cent in 2050. 
The main causes of the aging are: 
1) continuous decline of the total fertility rate. Total fertility rate is 1.34 in 2008, it was 4.57 in 
1947 and it became less than 2 in 1975.
2 2008 figure was slightly recovered from previous 
year’s 1.32; 
————— 
*  At the time of writing, the author was Director for Social Security Budget, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
  This paper is a compilation of the author’s presentation at the workshop held in Perugia, Italy on March 25-27, 2009. 
  The article is based on the author’s personal view and should not be regarded as reflecting official stance of the Japanese 
government. 



























2) continuous longevity. Average life expectancy in Japan was 79 years for male and 85.81 years 
for female in 2006.
3 In 1947 it was 50 years for male and 54 years for female, so both have 
become almost 30 years longer in 60 years. Main cause of recent longevity is medical 
improvement such as treatment with cancer, heart disease, cerebrovascular. 
Figure 2 shows the Japanese Population Pyramid. As like other countries, there exist two 
baby-boomers generations. 
The first one is the first baby boomers, 6.73 million people in 2007,
4 born just after WW2 
(1947-1949). They are shown in red poles, and beginning to reach retiring age. By 2011 the first 
baby boomers will begin to reach 65 years and receive formal pension. By 2015 all the first baby 
boomers receive pension, and they are beginning to be eligible for the late-stage medical care 
system for the elderly, which covers people more than 75 years old and is financed by tax revenue 
as well as contribution from other generations.
5 
The first baby-boomers are now in the supporting side of the Japanese social security, but by 
2011 or mid-2010s, they are to become being supported by younger generations. This explains why 
Japanese Government fiscal consolidation targets were Year 2011 or mid 2010s. That is, Japan has 
to prepare for the first baby-boomers social security expenditure. 
———————————————————————————————————————————— 
2  Registration of vital statistic in 2008, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. 
3  Life table in 2006, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. 
4  Figures from “National Census” (the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications) and “Population Projections for Japan: 
2006-2055” (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, December 2006). 
5  For the late-stage medical care system for the elderly, the co-payment is 10 per cent, and the rest is financed by; 10 per cent from 











































Figures for Japan from Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications, National Census, and 
National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research (December 2006), Population 
Projections for Japan: 2006-2055. 
Figures for other countries are based on UN 
projections.  
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Figure 3 shows Japanese economy and population of the past and the future. 
In 1961 Japan had implemented universal pension coverage and universal medical care 
coverage system. Those reforms were done during so-called high-growth period, the economy was 
catching up with other developed countries and growth rate was above 10 per cent. The ratio of 
working age people (20-64 years old) against elder people (65 years old~) was very high (in 1965 
9.1 times). High growth rate combined with young population meant plenty room for social 
security improvements at that time. 
Since then growth rate has dropped, the ratio of elder people has increased dramatically, and 
the ratio of working age people decreased. In 2025 every 2 working age persons will have to 
support one elder person and in 2050 almost every single working age person will have to support 
one elder person. 
Take a look at this figure from political side. At the bottom of the figure is the elderly 
people’s share among Japanese voters. 
Generally speaking, the bigger the ratio of elderly population is, the more difficult to 
implement policy change which put burden on, or cut benefit from, elderly people. In 2007 the 
elder people’s ratio among voters is 26 per cent, and already more than a quarter of the voters are 
more than 65 years old. In 2025 the ratio will go up to more than one-third, and in 2050 the ratio 
will be 45 per cent. 
It is said that elderly people tends to have high election turnout. In 2005 general election, 
election turnout of elderly people (more than 65 years old) is 73.5 per cent, on the other hand that 
of working age people (20-64 years old) is 66.4 per cent.
6 If you use these numbers automatically, 
the voting power of elderly people in 2007 was now 28.4 per cent,
7 slightly less than three-tenth. 
Since people begin to think about their post-retirement life when their age is close to 65 years old,
8 
the potential voting power of elderly people might be even bigger than the figures above. 
This political point of view also justifies the fact that Japanese fiscal reform targets were 
2011 or mid 2010s, before First Baby-boomers become supported side. 
 
1.2  Japanese fiscal position 
Figure 4 is the international comparison of fiscal balance to GDP. In 1990s developed 
countries other than Japan succeeded in fiscal consolidation. On the other hand, Japanese fiscal 
balance worsened, suffering from the largest fiscal deficit among the major advanced economies, 
as a result of economic slump and aging society. 
Now the fiscal balance is becoming more and more devastating because of the world 
economic turmoil caused by sub-prime problem. 
The debt was accumulated in the 1990s, which is often called “lost decade” after Japanese 
bubble economy collapsed.  
Figure 5 shows that the ratio of general bonds to GDP has increased from 37 per cent 
(FY1990) to 120 per cent
9 (FY2009), the increase is astounding 83 per cent, and a total of   
 
————— 
6  2005 general election for lower house, figures from the association of promoting fair elections. 
7  The ratio of elderly people (2007) × elderly election turnout (2005) against elderly people (2007) × elderly turnout (2005) + working 
age people (2007) × working age turnout (2005). 
8  According to the questionnaire, 83.3 per cent of 50-59 years old male and 92.5 per cent of 50-59 female think about their old age. 
(Poll about public pension system, Cabinet Office, April 2003). 
9  The ratio drastically worsened from 2008 (105 per cent).  
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Social Security related expenditures: 127 trillion yen (31%)
Other expenditures excluding debt redemption: –24 trillion yen (–6%)
Increase in General Bonds Outstanding from FY1990 to FY2009: 415 trillion yen 
(Ratio to GDP:  FY1990: 37.0%  → FY2009: 120.0%  (+83 percentage points)
Contribution of Expenditures:  165 trillion yen (40%) 
Public works related expenditures:  62 trillion yen (15%)
Effect of decline in tax revenues:  154 trillion yen (37%) 
Other Factors  (e.g. succession of debt from JNR, bad-loan disposal): 46 trillion yen (11%)
Difference in revenue and expenditure in FY1990: 50 trillion yen (12%) 
(component  percentages) 
 
Figure 5 















415 trillion yen, mainly because Japan had to deal with tax revenue decrease, stimulus measures 
and aging society at the same time. 
1)  40 per cent of this increase is due to an increase in expenditures including social security. 
•  Among them, social security expenditure accounts for 31 per cent, almost one-third of the 
deficit making. So pension reform, health care reform and nursing reform were 
indispensable. 
•  15 per cent of the increase is from public works, which was accumulated during successive 
stimulus fiscal measures to boost economy. 
2) 37 per cent, the biggest single cause, is the decline in tax revenues due to the economic 
downturn. Corporate tax revenue dropped sharply, and tax cuts were implemented to boost 
economy. 
3) Other factors such as succession of debt from privatized companies and bad-loan disposal 
occupy 11 per cent of the increase. The drastic drop of the asset prices brought about bad loans 
of the banks, and taxpayer funds were then used. 
4) The difference in revenue and expenditure that already existed in FY1990 shares 12 per cent as 
well. 
Figure 6 shows international comparison of benefit and burden. Upper figure shows social 
security benefit level of each country. You can describe Japanese social security level as 
Medium-size if you compare with U.S. (rather small) and Germany, France (rather big). 
Lower figure shows national burden plus fiscal deficit. If you deduct social security benefit 
from national burden and deficit, the result is ranged from 16.5 per cent (Germany) – to 
24.3  per  cent (Sweden), around 20 per cent. That is, around 20 per cent of NI is used to 
expenditures other than social security benefit. So roughly speaking, social security benefit plus 
20 per cent becomes the size of national burden (and deficit). The level of national burden is   
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry (2006), Projection of Social Security Benefits and Burdens (May). 
 
decided by democratic procedure, thus if you have big national burden, you can have good social 
security benefit. 
In Japanese case, national burden plus fiscal deficit is 47.7 per cent, and 26.2 per cent goes to 
social security benefit, 21.5 per cent goes to other expenditures. Unlike other countries, Japan has 
8.8 per cent deficit. Other countries’ deficit is less than half of Japanese one. In this respect it can 
be said that Japan has medium-size social security, but small-size national burden. 
Since social security accounts for biggest part of expenditure, continues to increase every 
year, and since Japan already have huge deficit, if Japan wants to strengthen social security benefit, 
Japan has to raise national burden either by raising tax or raising premium. 
Figure 7 shows that in line with the rapid aging of the population, social security benefits in 
total are estimated to increase by 60 per cent from FY2006 to FY2025. Especially medical care and 
long-term care (nursing) shows great increases. 
 
2  Japanese Pension Reform 2004 
2.1  Japanese Pension System 
Figure 8 shows current Japanese pension system. Japanese public pension system is a 
combination of inter-generation supporting efforts as well as self-relief efforts made by each 
individual. 





65 trillion yen 
(12.0%) 
Medical Care 
48 trillion yen 
(8.8%)
Welfare, etc. 28 trillion yen (5.3%)













Welfare, etc. 15 trillion yen (4%)
Nursing care 7 trillion yen (1.8%)
National Income  376 trillion yen
FY2006
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The brown part is Basic Pension (National Pension), the 1
st Pillar, in which all of Japanese 
above 20 compulsory join. For the cost of this pillar, half (after 2009) is financed by state subsidy, 
the rest is paid by each insurer according to the number of the insured people (according to the 
ability to pay). 
There are three types of insured people for the National Pension: 
1) category 1 covers self-employed, farmers, not employed etc. The premium is fixed amount, 
mainly because it is hard to grasp their incomes. There are 21 million people in this category; 
2) category 2 covers private company employees and public service employees. These people have 
Second-pillar, Employees’ Pension, and their premiums are paid half by employers, half by 
employees themselves. The premium is certain percentage of the wages. There are 38 million 
people in this category; 
3) category 3 covers spouses of category-2 insured. They don’t pay premium by themselves, the 
cost of this category is shared by Employees’ Pension. There are 11 million people in this 
category. 
There are also Third-pillar for the employees’, not compulsory, financed by premium. 
 
2.2  Basic points of the 2004 pension revision 
The basic idea of the revision is to make Japanese pension system sustainable for the next 
100 years, at the same time not putting too much burden on the working age people, and maintain 
certain benefit level. 
Point 1)  Fixing premium level in order not to put too much burden on working-age people. Before 
revision, premium level was 13.6 per cent, and we set legal premium ceiling of 
18.3  per  cent (as mentioned above, premium is divided equally by employer and 
employee). 
Point 2)  Taking a balance between burdens and benefits by introducing the system to adjust price 
indexation. 
Point 3)  Securing the benefit level to support the basic part of aged people. It is aimed that the 
benefit level is maintained above 50 per cent of average income of the employees. 
Point 4)  In order to achieve points above, the ratio of state subsidy for Basic Pension is to be 
raised from about 1/3 to half. 
Figure 9 shows the basic idea of how the revision tried to take balance of burdens and 
benefits. 
The upper figure shows pension without reform. Because of the rapidly aging society, for the 
burden side we suffered decrease in the work force, and for the benefit side we had to deal with 
increase in the life expectancy. Japanese pension system used to make pension projection every 
5 years, and the total fertility rate drops beyond estimation. 
In order to maintain balance, the lower part of the figure shows, for the burden side, that the 
future premium level is to be fixed, the ratio of state subsidy is to be raised, and the pension reserve 
fund is to be utilized. For the benefit side, the benefit level is to be adjusted, to be deducted 
A (estimated approximately 0.3-1.7 from 2012 to 2030) per cent plus B (fixed 0.3) per cent. 
Japanese pension system is mainly adjusted by CPI, thus for example, if CPI goes up 
1 per cent and A is 0.6 per cent, pension payment rises 1 – 0.9 = 0.1 per cent. 
Figure 10 shows the premium level. Upper graph shows premium for Employees’ Pension 






Premium Rate for the Employee's Pension Insurance
（％）
(year)
Fixed Premium Rate 18.30%
　(9.15% for employee and employer)




13.58% (6.79% for employee and employer)












Fixed Premium Amount 16,900JPY
（FY 2004 Price）
   2005
FY2004
13,300 yen
   1998    2017
29,500 yen
Rapid aging of the population and declining fertility rate
4) Macroeconomic indexation  
(Benefit levels are adjusted depending on 
the decrease in insured persons etc.) 
2004 Pension Plan Revision
A%
B% (0.3)
Decrease in the workforce 
＝  Decrease in premium 
revenue 
Increase in life expectancy 
Increase in aging population 
＝ Increase in benefits 
Imbalance
Benefit levels are adjusted depending 
on total revenues
1) Rise in the premium levels 
2) Rise in the portion of state subsidy  
3) Utilization of pension reserve fund 
Future premium levels 
are fixed 
If we did not revise the pension plan
Adjustment rate = 
A%+  B% (0.9) Balance
 
Figure 9 











































Without Pension Reform 2004: 
→ Premium rate would go up 
      to 25.9% 
Without Pension Reform 2004: 
→ Premium rate would go up 























In the upper graph, without revision case, the premium goes as high as 25.9 per cent. In the 
revision process, avoiding too much future premium rise was put high priority so that future 
generation can maintain vitality. 
Figure 11 is the basic rule of index adjustment. 
For the most beneficiaries, the benefit is adjusted by price indexation. The upper graph 
shows ordinary case. When CPI goes up, pension indexation adjustment rate (decrease of the labor 
force (A, 0.3-1.7 per cent) plus growth of average life expectancy (B, 0.3 per cent)) will be 
deducted. 
The middle graph shows when CPI goes up small percentage. In this case, adjustment rate is 
deducted, but if the result is minus, pension indexation adjustment will work until the result will be 
zero, so that nominal amount of the pension benefit is maintained. 
The lower part shows when the CPI goes down, they don’t deduct adjustment indexation so 
that in this case pension indexation equals the decline of the CPI. 
Figure 12 shows the projection of benefit level against working people’s average income. 
The ratio of 1
st pillar pension for husband and wife plus the 2
nd pillar pension for husband against 
average net-income for active generation has to be more than 50 per cent
10 for the next 100 years, 
Macro-economic adjustment will be applied until taking a balance burdens and benefits. 
————— 
10  2004 Pension Reform Act (2004.6.11 Law No.104), Supplementary provision, Article 2. 
When consumer prices go up to some extent
When consumer prices go up at small rate










CPI increase ≧ Adjustment rate
⇒ Adjustment indexation will function
CPI increase ＜ Adjustment rate
⇒ Adjustment indexation will function
(But nominal amount is the lowest)































Men’s monthly average 
net-income
Pension amount for 
a couple
FY2009 FY2025 FY2038
（end of adjustment indexation）
FY2050
62.3% 55.2% 50.1% 50.1%
Adjustment Indexation （It is the bottom at 50%） Wage (CPI) Indexation
Income-related pension 
benefit for a husband





Benefit Level against Average Working Salary 
Adjustment Indexation and Development of Benefit Level – Employees’ Pension 
2009 Projection 






















The Pension Law obliges that we re-calculate pension projection for every 5 years. 
•  The latest projection was done in 2009, and the premises of this projection are different from 
2004 original projection, Future total fertility rate 1.39(2004 projection)→1.26(2009 projection) 
•  CPI  1% → 1%(unchanged) 
•  Wage Increase 2.1% → 2.5% 
•  Investment Return 3.2% → 4.1% 
According to the projection, benefit level slightly drops from 50.2 to 50.1 per cent, and 
managed to maintain 50 per cent requirement. Adjustment indexation was originally forecasted to 
effective from 2007 to 2023, but under new projection, adjustment indexation will be effective 
from 2012 to 2038. 
There are other points of the 2004 pension revision: 
•  establishing pension plan to meet diversification of lifestyle and working style. In this category 
Japan introduced system to encourage working of the people older than 65 years; 
•  introducing the system which allows division of employees’ pension upon divorce for the first 
time; 
•  trying to make insured people understand how much benefit they can receive after reaching the 
age of 65. 
Pension amount / Net income   Pension Plan Revision and Fiscal Consolidation of Japan  705 
 
 
3  Japanese fiscal consolidation 
3.1  Roadmap and targets for fiscal consolidation in 2006 
The government had launched the basic policy action on integral reform of expenditure and 
revenues in the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform in 
2006, as endorsed by the cabinet in July 2006 (Figure 13). 
In the Basic Policy, the target horizon is divided into three phases, each around 5 years: 
•  phase 1 is from FY2002 to 2006, 
•  phase 2 is from FY2007 to early 2010s, 
•  phase 3 is to mid-2010s. The government tried to gradual fiscal consolidation with surplus in 
the primary balance of the central and local governments combined in phase 2, and decrease in 
the debt-GDP in phase 3. 
In this time schedule, the social security expenditure played important role. In 2009 pension 
subsidy ratio was to be raised, and tax reform was planned to take place, so the deadline of phase 2 
was decided to be FY2007 to early 2010s. 
First baby-Boomers will reach 65 years old and receive formal pension in the mid 2010s and 
eligible for the late-stage medical care system for the elderly, so the phase 3 deadline is mid-2010s. 
As mentioned above, by synchronizing the timing of social security reform and revenue 
reform, the Government tries to maintain fiscal discipline. 
 
Figure 13 
Roadmap and Targets for Fiscal Consolidation 
(basic policies for economic and fiscal management and structural reform 2006, 
endorsed at the Cabinet meeting in July 2006) 
 
Phase I (FY2001-FY2006): Reforms by the Koizumi Cabinet – “No growth without reform” 
•  Make efforts to advance fiscal consolidation under the concept of the integrated reform of 
the economy and public finance 
•  Make steady improvement in the primary balance 
 
Phase II (FY2007-early 2010) 
•  Achieve a surplus in the primary balance as a first step toward fiscal consolidation 
-  Continue fiscal consolidation as in Phase I and ensure a surplus in the primary balance 
of the central and local governments combined by FY2011 
-  Aim to achieve a primary balance for the central government as much as possible 
 
Phase III (early 2010-mid-2010s) 
•  Decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio at a steady pace 
-  Ensure surplus in the primary balance of the central and local governments 
-  Aim at a steady reduction of the central government’s debt-GDP ratio 706 Motonobu  Matsuo 
 
 
The government sets the target of achieving a primary surplus in FY2011 and calculates the 
required adjustment from a baseline projection of expenditures and revenues for each category of 
expenditure. 
This plan progressed rather smoothly until last year, but economic turmoil devastated the 
progress. January projection forecasted, even the world economy recovers moderately, we have 
2.9 per cent deficit in FY 2011. 
 
3.2  Medium-term program for establishing a suitable social security system and its stable 
revenue sources 
Japan had to deal with the economic crisis, and took measures necessary. 
But on the other hand, Japan have to recognize and make preparation for the next fiscal 
consolidation, especially because ratio of state subsidy for Basic Pension was to be raised to 
50 per cent in 2009 (needs extra 2.5 trillion yen, around 2.5 billion US dollars). Furthermore, Japan 
has to strengthen social security system, such as acute medical care, securing nursing labor force. 
Thus in December 2008, the cabinet decided “The Medium-term Program for Establishing a 
Sustainable Social Security System and its Stable Revenue Sources”. 
Basic points of tax reform and social security are as follows: 
1) Tax  Reform 
•  In order to implement the fundamental reform of the tax system including that of 
consumption tax from FY2011, necessary legislative action is to be taken in advance so as to 
establish a sustainable fiscal structure in a stepwise manner by the mid-2010s on the premise 
that an upturn in the Japanese economy will be achieved within next three years starting 
from FY2008. 
•  Specifically, consumption tax revenues are to be allocated in full to social security benefits 
relating to the pension, medical and nursing care programs, and the expense for falling 
birthrate countermeasures that have been established and instituted, thus in effect all being 
returned to the people; not being used for an expansion of government bureaucracy.
11 
2)  The rise of Government’s ratio of state subsidy for Basic Pension to half 
The rise of the ratio of state subsidy for Basic Pension to 50 per cent is to be made permanent 
after securing the required stable revenue sources under the aforementioned fundamental tax 
reform. 
For the fiscal year of 2009 and 2010, the Government’s ratio of state subsidy for Basic Pension 
is to be 50 per cent by allocating temporary revenue sources. 
In the case with the “unexpected economic developments”, the ratio should also be kept to 
50 per cent by allocating temporary revenue sources. 
 
3.3  New targets for fiscal consolidation 
After January’s projection, the economic situation had worsened, and new target was just 
implemented in order to fit in recent developments. 
————— 
11  “If Japan tried to revise tax including consumption tax, for the Japanese people the most convincing and understandable way is to 
have money collected by tax go back to people, by using  for pension, medical care and nursing, falling birthrate countermeasures. 
Without this philosophy it’s hard to deal with consumer tax problem” (Upper House Budget Committee, 2009.1.26 Minister of State 
for Financial Services, Economic and Fiscal Policy Yosano).   Pension Plan Revision and Fiscal Consolidation of Japan  707 
 
On June 24
th 2009, the new target was just decided
12 in this new economic environment. 
The basic concepts of this new target are as follows: 
•  in order to maintain fiscal sustainability, as a basic target for fiscal consolidation, the ratio of 
national and local governments’ debt against GDP is to be at least stabilized towards mid-2010s, 
and stably decreased by early-2020s; 
•  in this respect, national and local governments’ primary balance is to be in surplus within 
10 years; 
•  national and local governments’ primary balance (except for balance from stimulus measures) 
against GDP is to be decreased at least half within 5 years. For this target, considering recent 




12  Basic policies 2009, 2009.6.24 cabinet decision.  
 




*** and Joaquín Vial
**, *** 
In this paper we analyze the short and medium term fiscal costs stemming from structural 
pension reform, taking Chile as workhorse. The Chilean pension system, based on individual 
capital accounts managed by the private sector, has been in operation for almost 30 years, 
providing a rich evidence of the impact of pension systems on public accounts. Besides, a recent 
reform that crucially changes the solidarity pillar is being implemented now. In the paper we argue 
that although much lower than its benefits, fiscal transition costs tend to be high and persistent, so 
a fiscal consolidation prior to the reform is advisable. This also allows filling the coverage holes 
that labour market informality generates, as illustrated for Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
Finally, in more general terms, the exportability of this type of pension reform depends not only on 
its specific design, but on the quality of market and public institutions. 
 
1 Motivation 
The report Averting the old age crisis. Policies to protect the old and to promote growth by 
the World Bank, published in 1994, set the agenda for pension reform, in particular in Latin 
America.
1 The rapid demographic transition, the weakening of informal protection networks, and 
the present and expected financial burden justified the need of setting a multi-pillar pension system, 
with a complementary participation of the public and the private sector. 
“Structural pension reform” (understood as the introduction of a mandatory individual 
capital accounts, managed by the private sector) was also expected to produce various positive 
macroeconomic effects, namely an increase of domestic saving and investment, an increase in 
formal employment, the development of domestic capital and financial markets, and a higher rate 
of potential growth (see World Bank, 1994 and Lindbeck and Persson, 2003 for the pro-growth 
vision, and Barr, 2000, Orszag and Stiglitz, 2001 and Barr and Diamond, 2006 for a critical 
review). 
Evidence on these macroeconomic effects is controversial (see Gill et al., 2005 for a survey 
for Latin America). Even though it might be too early to tell due to the relatively short period of 
time since the reforms (around fifteen years on average, with long lasting transition rules), it seems 
that the incentives to join the formal sector and pay contributions to the new system, and the 
projected increase in potential growth are weaker than expected. However, the general consensus is 
that the long-term fiscal position of reformer economies is significantly more robust. The financial 
burden of pensions has been reduced (at least those corresponding to future pensioners), and most 
of implicit costs have emerged, increasing the transparency of the system as a whole. This process 
————— 
* OECD  Development  Centre. 
**  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), Pension and Insurance. 
***  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), Research Economic Department. 
  We would like to thank the discussion by Teresa Ter-Minassian, and the comments by Glenn Follette, Joaquim Oliveria and Rafael 
Rofman. Jasmina Bjeletic, Carlos Herrera, Soledad Hormazábal and Carolina Romero provided very efficient research assistance. 
  The views expressed herein are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of BBVA, or of the 
OECD Development Centre. 
  Corresponding author: Ángel Melguizo – 2, Rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris CEDEX 16, France. E-mail: angel.melguizo@oecd.org 
1  Peru (1993), Colombia (1994), Argentina (1994, re-reformed in 2008), Uruguay (1996), Mexico and Bolivia (1997), El Salvador 
(1998), Costa Rica and Nicaragua (2000) and Dominican Republic (2003) followed the experience of Chile (1981), introducing 
mandatory individual capital accounts managed by the private sector. 710  Ángel Melguizo, Ángel Muñoz, David Tuesta and Joaquín Vial 
is not easy. Reformers face significant up-front fiscal costs, since pensioners stay under the old 
rules, while some or even all contributors move out to the new system. In addition, all the privately 
managed systems maintain a solidarity pillar. 
The Chilean pension reform represents a useful case study. It has been in operation for 
nearly 30 years and enjoys an extensive political and social support. Besides, the Chilean economy 
exhibits some of the aforementioned macroeconomic effects. As estimated by Corbo and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), the overall impact of pension reform (on savings, investment, labour and 
total factor productivity) could explain almost one-tenth of Chilean economic growth up to 2001. 
The country enjoys a healthy fiscal position and is entering a phase in which fiscal commitments 
due to the transition begin to recede. Finally, the ongoing pension reform enacted in 2008, 
significantly reinforces the structure and size of the solidarity pillar. For these reasons, in this paper 
we analyze the fiscal impact of structural pension reform using the Chilean case as workhorse. 
In a nutshell, the paper concludes that the fiscal impact stemming both from the transition 
costs and the solidarity pillar is high and persistent (as stated in Mesa-Lago, 2004), but in the 
long-term is significantly lower than the one in not reformed systems. Besides, its composition 
should be taken into account, since there are significant heterogeneities within the “transition cost”, 
especially from an international perspective (old-system operational deficit, recognition bonds and 
minimum pensions). Our analysis suggests some economic policy recommendations: fiscal position 
would remain more favourable as long as reform is supported by a good combination of market and 
public institutions, by a gradual development of financial markets, by a fiscal consolidation prior to 
the reform, and by a careful design of pension and labour regulation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we summarize the “promises” of 
pension reform in the fiscal front, and report its main results for Chile. A preliminary assessment of 
the ongoing reform, focused on the minimum pension pillar is presented in section three. In section 
four we expand the geographic span, highlighting the fiscal constraints and some of the main 
characteristics of the solidarity pillars in Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Finally, in section five we 
conclude putting forward some criteria to evaluate the exportability of the Chilean reform. 
 
2  The promise and outcome of pension reform: the fiscal impact 
As Holzmann and Hinz (2005) put it, the main goal of pension reform is to achieve 
“adequate, affordable, sustainable and robust pensions”, while at the same time contributing to 
economic development. The Chilean reform considered closely the fiscal sustainability.
2 
Back in the eighties, Chile was a very young society. The population over 65 years was just 
10 per cent of the working-age population in 1980, compared to 20 per cent for the OECD average, 
according to United Nations data (see Figure 1). In spite of it, there were already serious concerns 
about the fiscal sustainability of pension benefits in the old system at the time of reform in 1981. 
Workers retired very young and the legitimacy of the pension system had been under question for 
more than 20 years due to inequities among different retirement regimes. Estimations by the 
Budget Office in the late 70s foresaw a significant increase of the fiscal burden in the case of no 
reform, due to excessive benefits in some of these regimes, exacerbated ageing pressures. The 
World Bank estimated for a no-reform scenario, that the implicit pension debt of the system would 
have been about 130 per cent of GDP in 2001, the largest in the region after Uruguay’s (Zviniene 
and Packard, 2004). 
————— 
2  For a description of the context and the contents of the reform, see Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones 
(2003), Arenas et al. (2006) and Favre et al. (2006), and more recently Iglesias (2009).   Pension Reform and Fiscal Policy: Some Lessons from Chile  711 
 
Looking backwards, 
the Chilean experience 
shows that pension 
reform is not cheap, but 
it can be affordable if 
fiscal discipline prevails. 
One of the main issues 
when a country replaces 
a traditional defined 
benefit PAYG system by 
a new one based on 
individual capitalization 
accounts is the “pure” 
fiscal cost of the 
transition. Firstly, as 
affiliates move to the 
new system (a move in 
Chile which was 
voluntary for those in the 
labour market before the 
reform, and compulsory 
for new entrants), they 
generate a financial gap 
in the old scheme 
(“operational deficit”), 
since they switch their 
contributions from one to 
the other. This gap is 
augmented if the reform 
takes place at later stages 
of the demographic 
transition, when old-age 
dependency ratio is on 
the ramping slope. In 
Chile this expenditure 
category peaked as a 
percentage of GDP 
in 1984, reaching 
4.7  percentage points, as 
represented in Figure 2. 
The analysis is 
made more complex, 
since a large fraction of 
the pensions paid in the 
old system by the 
Instituto de Normalización 
Previsional (INP) were 
and still are minimum 
pensions to retirees of the 
old system, and their 
Figure 1 
Old-age Dependency Ratio, 1980-2025 
(L +65 / L 15-64) 
Note: LatAm is the simple average of Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. 
Figure 2 
Transition Deficit of the Chilean Civil Pension System 
(percent of GDP) 
Note: Military system would add 1.5 per cent of GDP on average. 
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level depends on political (and not just technical, neither transition-related) decisions, as pointed 
out in Valdés (2006). Secondly, on top of this, the government may compensate workers who 
switch from the old system to the new system for the contributions made in the past, under the 
social implicit contract that characterizes pay-as-you-go pension systems. In Chile this was done by 
issuing a government bond paying an annual real rate of return of 4 per cent to each affiliate with 
contributions to the old system. The size of this “Recognition Bond” depended on the number of 
years and size of contributions to the old system. The bond comes due at the legal retirement age 
(65 for males, 60 for females). Therefore these fiscal costs come later in the case of Chile and they 
could be high, as the Chilean experience shows (see figures from Bennet and Schmidt-Hebbel, 
2001, Arenas and Gana, 2005 and Valdés, 2006). According to official accounts, the expenditure in 
“recognition bonds”
3 has been ever increasing, up to 1.2 per cent of GDP in 2008. 
Finally, another source of fiscal stress, which can coincide in time with the previous two, but 
is independent of the transition itself, stems from the solidarity pillar expenditure. In Chile, this 
pillar was composed by a minimum pension guarantee (MPG, a benefit for those who have 
contributed at least for 20 years), and a non contributory benefit for old-age and disabled lower 
income population (PASIS). As a whole, they added permanently around 0.5 per cent of GDP to 
the total “transition deficit” in 2008. 
On the aggregate, our assessment is that the “transition deficit” has been relatively high 
(around 4.0 per cent of GDP) and persistent,
4 despite the fact that Chile implemented the reform at 
the early stage of ageing. But, it is crucial to identify and explain each of these factors separately. 
What is remarkable in the case of Chile, besides the extraordinary increase in fiscal outlays 
in pensions, is that it took place at the same time that the overall tax burden was falling by about 
10 per cent of GDP. In spite of it, fiscal accounts remained in surplus for most of the time since the 
end of the eighties. The fiscal consolidation process started in the mid-seventies, and by the end of 
the decade a major surplus was projected (see Figure 3).
5 According to Melguizo and Vial (2009), 
the authorities decided to use those resources to fund the pension reform and reduce the tax burden. 
Even though this was made under military rule, the fiscal position remained in surplus after the 
switch to a democratic regime in 1990. This sound fiscal policy may have benefited the credit risk 
rating, since financial markets, and rating agencies in particular, do not significantly weight 
implicit liabilities, focusing on explicit public debt (Cuevas et al., 2008). 
The long-term effects of the replacement of the old system on the fiscal accounts has been 
positive as shown in almost every projection (see Bennett and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001 or 
Favre et al., 2006), as well as in the World Bank estimates of the evolution of the implicit pension 
debt. Using the Pension Reform Options Simulation Toolkit (PROST), the implicit debt may have 
been reduced in the case of Chile from 211 per cent of GDP without pension reform in 2050, to 
zero after the reform (see Zviniene and Packard, 2004 and Gill et al., 2005). These benefits are 
patent even in the short and medium term. According to the same projections, in absence of the 
structural reform, the pension implicit debt in 2010 would have been 1.5 times the Chilean GDP 
(vs. 25 per cent after reform). 
Even though the reform significantly reduced the inequalities of the Chilean pension system 
and strengthened its long-term fiscal position, it did not solve the chronic problem of providing 
proper coverage to all workers, as it stood before the 2008 reform. On one hand, women would  
 
————— 
3  A negative lesson of the Chilean experience, as reported in Vial (2008), is the poor management of recognition bonds due to the 
absence of precise statistics on workers history, and the lack of reliable statistics, even today, to base adequate projections. 
4  An additional category, which is usually included in the “transition cost”, is the military regimen pension deficit, 1.5 percentage 
points of GDP on average since 1980. See Table 3 in the Annex. 
5  The deterioration of fiscal accounts after 1981 was cyclical, driven by the economic crisis of 1982-83, when GDP fell by 17 per cent 
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have had very low 
replacement ratios, 
due to a higher life 
expectancy (but lower 
legal retirement age) and 
to their traditionally 
lower participation rates 
and salaries. On the other 
hand, Chile shares, 
although to a lesser 
extent, a general trend in 
emerging economies: 
many members of the 
labour force have a very 
precarious insertion into 
the labour market, with 
frequent flows between 
the formal sector, the 
informal sector and 
unemployment. As 
shown in Figure 5, 
around 34 per cent of 
men affiliated to the 
privately managed 
pension system have an 
average density of 
contributions under 
20 per cent (that is, they 
pay contributions to 
the pension fund 
administration less than 
three months per year), a 
figure that rises to 
53 per cent in the case of 
women. This means that 
more than one third of 
those in the labour force 
would not have a proper 
income security in old 
age from the mandatory 
pension system. Since 
the MPG is designed to 
provide income 
protection to poor 
workers with 20 or more 
years of contribution 
(about 50 per cent 
density of contributions) 
this also meant that these 
workers had very little 
hope to qualify for that 
Figure 3 
Central Government Net Lending in Chile 
(cash, percent of GDP) 
Figure 4 
Implicit Pension Debt in Chile 
(reform vs. no-reform scenario, percent of GDP) 
Source: Melguizo and Vial (2009). 























  It is important to 
note that not all those 
who do not contribute 
regularly require fiscal 
support: some 
self-employed workers 
have chosen not to 
contribute and invest in 
small business to provide 
for income security in 
old age instead of 




independent workers in 
Chile until the latest set 
of reforms). However, 
there is no doubt that the 
system would not 
provide enough coverage 
for all, especially as the 
move from the formal to 
the informal labour 
market. 
In more general terms, it is clear that in spite of better labour incentives that defined-
contribution pension schemes introduce (based on a full linkage between contributions and 
benefits), pension reform is no substitute for adequate social, labour and macroeconomic 
institutions. 
Based on a macro-actuarial model of the Chilean pensions system,
6 with linkages to United 
Nations demographic projections, and public finances, Favre et al. (2006) projected that more than 
40 per cent of affiliates up to 2025 would accumulate pension rights below the contributory 
minimum pension at the age of retirement (see Figure 6). Among them, only between 20 and 
30 per cent would have been eligible for the contributory minimum pension guarantee, after having 
contributed for 20 years. The problem of no coverage is exacerbated for women, who represent 
three quarters of the affiliates who need, but do not qualify for the contributory benefit. This 
prognosis was widely shared by analysts both from the public and private sectors (see, among 
others, Faulkner-MacDonagh, 2005 and Arenas et al., 2008). In the baseline scenario Berstein et al. 
(2005), from the Chilean supervisor, projected that 55 per cent of affiliates would have pension 
rights below the minimum, and among them, only one tenth would qualify for the MPG. 
At the same time, available projections anticipated a significant fiscal relief from 2020 
onwards. As shown in Figure 7 (and Table 5 for numbers), the overall transition deficit would 
decrease down to 2.3  per  cent in 2020 and 1.5  per  cent in 2025, thanks to the exhaustion of 
————— 
6  The model incorporates 19 cohorts (pensioners, affiliates and future affiliates), disaggregated by four groups of density of 
contributions (see Figure 16 in the Annex), gender and wage. The outcome of the pension system in terms of pension level and 
replacement ratio, coverage and fiscal costs are driven by quasi-official demographic and macroeconomic projections, starting from 
the institutional situation in December 2004. Selected results are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. 
Figure 5 
Density of Contributions by Gender in Chile, 2004-06 
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recognition bonds, and 
the gradual decrease of 
the INP operational 
deficit (the “pure” 
transition cost). Official 
projections by the 
Chilean Ministry of 
Finance (Arenas and 
Gana, 2005 and Arenas 
et al., 2008) are even 
more favourable, 
reducing the transition 
deficit down to 
1.8  per  cent in 2020 and 
1.3 per cent in 2025. 
So, under the old 
rules, those who needed 
the minimum pension 
coverage did not qualify 
for it, while those who 
qualified did not need it. 
Therefore, the social 
protection network in 
Chile was, using the 
World Bank criteria, 
affordable and fiscally 
sustainable, but not 
adequate neither socially 
sustainable. 
 




After more than 25 
years of the onset of a 
new system, at a time in 
which accumulated 
savings in mandatory 
pension accounts have 
reached 60 per cent of 
GDP, and right before 
those switching workers 
begin to approach 
retirement age, a lively 
debate arose in Chile 
about the need to 
introduce additional   
Figure 6 
Projection of Minimum Pension Beneficiaries in Chile 
(no-reform scenario, percentage of pensioners 
Source: Favre et al. (2006). 
Figure 7 
Projection of the Transition Deficit 
of the Chilean Civil Pension System 
(no-reform scenario, percent of GDP 
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Table 1 
Chilean Pension System – Diagnostic and Reform 
 
Diagnostic    Law 20.255 (March 2008) 
Poverty risk at old-age (coverage)    New redistributive pillar (SPS) 
    
Low density of contribution among self-employed    Gradual compulsory contribution 
    Fiscal advantages (same as dependent) 
    
Low projected replacement rates for women    Public contributions in case of maternity 
    
Low competition    Auctioning for new affiliates (based on fees) 
    Join bidding for survivors and diability insurance 
 
adjustments. The design of the transition allowed some leeway in the short-term, since it 
incorporated strong incentives for young workers to move from the PAYG system to the new one, 
while middle-old age stayed in the previous one (the ratio of pensioners of the new system is still 
limited and a large majority of them correspond to high-income early retirees). Besides, there was a 
long discussion about the costs of administration of the private capitalization accounts, and the 
need to introduce more competition to reduce fees. Finally, a third catalyst of the discussion was 
the industry demand for a revision of the investment limits. 
The Chilean government that took power in 2006 appointed a national council (Consejo 
Asesor Presidencial para la Reforma Previsional)
7 to analyze and set the pension reform agenda, 
while preserving its core components. This council was plural in composition and its members 
were widely reputated people, with strong academic background. It was headed by Mario Marcel, a 
much respected economist with strong fiscal credentials. During five weeks, the Council conducted 
an extensive round of hearings, including all major workers and business organizations, 
researchers, international experts, etc. After that, the Council submitted to the government a 
comprehensive report that enjoyed high legitimacy and very strong technical support. This report 
was the basis for the project of law sent to Congress by the government at the end of 2006 and 
approved in early 2008. One major virtue of this process is that provided technical and political 
legitimacy to the new reforms. 
Table 1 compares the main elements of the diagnosis, shared by the Council and analysts, as well 
as the law 20.255 enacted in March 2008. The main conclusion was that the system was sound, was 
working fine, but required upgrades. As the Council report states, “the individual capitalization 
system has not failed as a financing mechanism. Even more, it will generate pensions with 
replacement ratios close to 100 per cent for those workers with formal jobs and a regular history of 
contributions over their work lives”.
8 The Council also concluded that the system has been 
beneficial for the country in terms of economic growth and the development of financial markets. 
————— 
7 See  www.consejoreformaprevisional.cl 
8  Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Reforma Previsional (2006), Vol. I, chapter II, p.31. The translation is ours. This figure is in 
line with the OECD standards, where the theoretical replacement ratio for an average worker is 57 per cent. See Figure 17 in the 
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However, they emphasized the need to act promptly, before the bulk of those who 
transferred from the old system to the new one reached the retirement age. The most pressing 
problems to be addressed, according to the Council, were strengthening the first pillar (minimum 
pensions), raising the coverage of the system and the density of contributions, increasing gender 
equality, improving competition and reducing costs, generating better conditions for investment 
and several other points of a more general nature (better financial education or expanding voluntary 
pension savings).
9 
The first challenge (“strengthening the first pillar”) was considered the priority and the 
government went for a very ambitious reform, establishing a new redistributive pillar, Sistema de 
Pensiones Solidarias (SPS).
10 This pillar will be gradually implemented between 2008 and 2012, 
funded out from general revenues of the government budget. For this objective, a reserve fund is 
created, and will be evaluated every three years. The main goal of the SPS is to cover every 
pensioner (old-age over 65 years and disabled) with incomes in the lowest 60 per cent of the 
population according to national census (starting from 40 per cent in 2008). The SPS would not 
require any contribution at all to the pension system, and would completely replace the existing 
PASIS and MPG by 2023. 
The minimum value of the social benefit for retirees is set by law (75 000 Chilean pesos per 
month in 2009, around 100 euros), the so-called Pensión Básica Solidaria (PBS) for those with no 
contributions to the pension system. As represented in Figure 8, the benefit would decrease 
gradually with the size of the self-financed pension, reaching zero from PMAS (255 000 Chilean 
pesos in 2012, 340 euros per month).
11 In this alternative case, the benefit is labelled Aporte 
Previsional Solidario (APS), as it is a public complementary benefit. In order to maintain the 
incentives of workers to contribute to the system, the pension “reference” (the black line in 
Figure 8) increases with the level of accumulated contributions. By contrast, since this kind of 
strategic behaviour is not supposed to be possible for disability pensioners, all of the pensioners 
below the PBS would receive just the difference (Figure 9). 
As we highlighted in the previous section, the timing for the adjustment was, fiscally 
speaking, right. Pension related fiscal outlays have remained close to 5 per cent of GDP in the last 
decade, with a changing composition: while the expenses derived from the obligations with 
pensioners in the old system have been gradually falling in GDP terms, recognition bonds 
redemptions have been rising fast as those who switched to the new system are reaching retirement 
age. Therefore, Chile is close to the peak of RB expenses and they should fall fast in the next 
decade. This provided a unique opportunity, which is further supported by the fact that the Chilean 
government has accumulated major surpluses during the last years, thanks to the rigorous fiscal 
policy. As long as the new solidarity pillar is introduced gradually, and its parameters (PBS and 
PMAS basically) are set in a conservative way, the government may be able to fund this 
improvement maintaining the current tax burden. 
————— 
9 Rofman  et al. (2009), in this volume, highlight both the parallelisms on the challenges faced by the Argentinean and the Chilean 
systems, and the contrasting political approaches. As a result, the outcome and the expected effects will be different. 
10 Favre  et al. (2006) concluded that the problem of coverage was due to low density of contributions and too strict eligibility MPG 
requirements. In order to increase density, the new law makes contributions gradually mandatory for independent workers. They 
also improve incentives for these workers to contribute (similar tax treatment, extension of other social security benefits), and 
mobilizes the tax system as a tool for improving collection. With respect to the second issue, several analysts and the pension funds 
administration association proposed the gradation of requisites to get access to a fraction of the value of the MPG. Simulations 
showed that this was powerful enough to cover most unprotected workers, while those who do not make it under this scheme, could 
still apply and obtain a PASIS, once they deplete their savings. The reform has been much more far-reaching. 
11  For comparison, the average contributory minimum pension guarantee amounted in December 2008 around 115,000 pesos per 
month (slightly over 150 euros), and the non-contributory one around 55,000 pesos (75 euros). The average monthly wage in Chile 
stands around 350,000 pesos (470 euros) and the minimum wage 159,000 pesos (210 euros). 718  Ángel Melguizo, Ángel Muñoz, David Tuesta and Joaquín Vial 
 
In order to make a 
preliminary evaluation of 
the fiscal impact of this 
new pillar in the short 
and medium term, we 
have performed a simple 
exercise based on public 
information. We define 
two scenarios, one which 
follows the historical 
trends (Scenario A), and 
a second one which 
incorporates the negative 
effects of the current 
crisis (Scenario B). 
Affiliates are classified 
as regular or informal 
contributors, according 
to public information 
referred for June 2008, 
published by the 
supervisor (Superintendencia 
de Administradoras de 
Fondos de Pensiones, 
SAFP). Regular 
contributors exhibit 
a density of contributions 
of 100 per cent in 
Scenario A and 
90 per cent  in  Scenario 
B; while informal 
contribute 20 per cent of 
the time in Scenario A 
and 10 per cent in 
Scenario B.
12 This 
dataset also allows 
identifying gender, age, 
salary and accumulated 
savings in the individual 
capital account. 
Mortality evolves 
according to United 
Nations demographic 
projections, while 
disability is determined 
as a fixed percentage of 
mortality rates   
————— 
12  In the whole period, in Scenario A the overall density is 60.4 per cent. According to Arenas et al. (2008), the density of 
contributions may increase 12 percentage points, up to 66.8 per cent from 2025 from 54.8 per cent in 2006, due to the mandatory 
contributions for independent workers. In Scenario B, the density is below the reported current level (around 50 per cent). 
Figure 8 
Reformed Old-age Pension System in Chile 
Figure 9 
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(10 per cent). Data on the recognition bond (key to calculate the amount of APS) comes from the 
information provided by pension funds administrators in the bidding process for disability and 
survivors insurance (referred to June 2002 to June 2008). All of the disability benefits are 
computed as PBS. Real GDP growth in Scenario A (2.5 per cent in 2009 and 2010, and 3.8 per cent 
from 2011 onwards) is taken from Arenas et al. (2008), while Scenario B is based in the short-term 
on BBVA Economic Research Department latest projections, as of May 2009 (–1.2 per cent in 
2009 and 2.1 per cent in 2010). Annual real return of pension portfolio is 5 per cent in Scenario A 
and 3 per cent in B, real wages increase 2 per cent paper year in Scenario A and 1 per sent in B, 
and inflation is 3 per cent (the Central Bank target) during the whole period in both scenarios. 
Annuities are calculated using the mortality table RV 2004, and with a technical real interest rate of 
4 per cent in Scenario A and 2.8 per cent in B. 
Based on this methodology, annual public expenditure of the solidarity pillar would reach 
between 0.8 per cent and 0.9 per cent of GDP in 2010 (Scenarios A and B respectively), peak at 
1.0 per cent in 2016, and gradually go down to 0.7-0.8 per cent in 2022 (see Figure 10).
13 This 
would imply a permanent increase in expenditure of around 0.7-0.8 per cent of GDP per year with 
respect to the previous solidarity pillar (the aggregate of MPG and PASIS schemes). 
This projection is basically driven by the increasing number and share of pensioners of the 
private system (in comparison to those still in the INP), and by the increase in the affiliation and 
density of contributions (due to higher per capita income and mandatory contributions for self-




the solidarity pillar 
would increase from one 
million people in 2010, 
to over 1.8 million in 
2022, with an increasing 
share of those receiving 
the old-age APS. By 
comparaison, Favre et al. 
(2006) projected that 
beneficiaries of the old 
solidarity pillar will 
range between 450 and 
600 thousand people, 
mostly receiving 
non-contributory PASIS. 
Official figures are 
lower in the short run 
and higher in the long 
run. However, a precise 
comparability is not 
feasible due to the lack 
of published information 
on key assumptions   
————— 
13  Projection period (up to 2022) is limited due to the lack of disaggregated data of affiliates by sex and age, at earlier years. 
14  Although APS beneficiaries coincide in both scenarios by assumption, accumulated contributions are higher Scenario A, so the 
percentage of the pension funded by the government is lower. 
Figure 10 
Projection of the Expenditure of the Solidarity Pillar in Chile 
(reform scenarios vs. no-reform scenario, percent of GDP) 
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(distribution of APS and 
PBS among old-age 
pensioners, or pension 
returns, for instance). 
Arenas  et al. (2008), 
from the Budget Office, 
estimate that expenditure 
would increase in the 
whole projection period, 
up to 1.2 per cent 
of GDP in 2025 
(from 0.5  per cent in 
2009), with a 
permanent increase 
of 1.0  percentage point 
of output. According to 
these authors, the overall 
fiscal impact of pension 
reform would be even 
higher (0.2 per cent 
additional since 2015) if 
the subsidies for younger 
workers, the child bond, 
or the contributions for 
disability and survivors 
insurance of civil 
servants and 
independents, are added. 
All in all, the reform greatly improves the social protection network in Chile, reaching full 
coverage for poor-middle income workers. The fiscal cost would be not negligible, and the pillar 
and may be vulnerable to political pressures, but from a social and a financial sustainability 
perspective, the Chilean reform is a sensible step forward. 
 
4  Reforms in Colombia, Peru and Mexico: work in progress 
In Colombia and Peru, reforms took place in the mid-Nineties. In both cases, the design 
allowed workers to choose between the public PAYG scheme and the private scheme, generating 
some kind of competition between both, especially for the new workers. For affiliates of the old 
PAYG scheme who decided to migrate to the private system, the public sector recognizes their 
contributions with bonds to be paid when they receive a pension. In contrast, in the case of Mexico, 
the reform of 1997 “closed” the PAYG scheme for new workers who have to contribute to their 
individual private capitalization account for pensions. However those who belonged to the old 
PAYG system and decided to move to the private scheme keep the right to retire under the old 
PAYG rules, which are much more generous. Consequently, the Mexican government decided not 
to introduce a recognizing bond, and choosing that path, left the PAYG system de facto open. 
Another important point to take into account is how these governments decided to face the 
implicit debt of their public systems. Depending on their respective institutional frameworks, some 
of them implement strong parametric reforms in order to reduce their fiscal burdens, while others 
established mild changes. So, each pension systems face different fiscal and socio-economic 
Figure 11 
Projection of Beneficiaries of the New Solidarity Pillar in Chile 
(persons) 
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constraints in order to get more extensive pension coverage and to implement a sound solidarity 
pillar à la Chilean. In what follows, we will highlight the impact of some of these constraints, with 




Between 1993 and 1994, Colombia implemented its present dual system. The existing 
PAYG system, known as RPM (Régimen de Prima Media in Spanish) comprises all the various 
entities such as the old Instituto de Seguridad Social, Cajanal and other minor pension schemes. In 
parallel, an individual pension scheme known as RAIS (Régimen de Ahorro Individual con 
Solidaridad) was introduced with the participation of eight pension funds companies. Since 1994, 
important parametric adjustments were implemented to the RPM scheme that reduced the implicit 
debt from 191 per cent of GDP to 148 per cent. However, significant differences persist with 
respect of the private scheme, representing one of the most important complexities of the 
Colombian pension system. 
The combination of the characteristics of the Colombian labour market with this fiscal 
burden constitutes a clear constraint for implementing improvements for low income families as 
well as to extend the coverage of the system. According to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares 
(Colombian Household Survey), more than 50 per cent of the total workers belong to the informal 
sector, over 70 per cent of total affiliates declare incomes below two minimum salaries, and more 
than 50 per cent of total affiliates have a density of contributions below 30 per cent. In order to 
access minimum pension benefits, 23 years of contribution to the private scheme or between 22 and 
23 years to the public scheme are required. Besides, affiliates must be 57 years old (women) or 
62 years old (men) in the private system, or 55 and 60 years respectively in public one. 
The combination of the aforementioned elements explains the very limited minimum 
pension’s coverage in Colombia. As shown in Figure 12, Muñoz et al. (2009) project that in 2015 
less than 8.0 per cent of the retirees will access to the solidarity benefits (adding the beneficiaries of 
the public and private pillars). By contrast, nearly 70 per cent of pensioners will retire with 
accumulated pension savings below the minimum pension, but will not qualify for it (represented 
by the grey area in the figure; the nearly remaining 20 per cent will have accumulated “sufficient” 
pension rights). According to the assumptions considered in this study (especially in terms of 
potential growth and productivity, informality and longevity), in absence of further reforms, access 
to the benefit could increase slightly up to less than 10 per cent, so the “uncoverage rate” would 
remain around 70 per cent. In other words, only one out of ten Colombian retirees who would need 
this benefit, due to insufficient savings at retirement age, actually gets it (vs. one out of five in 
Chile). 
Another interesting perspective to analyze the access to this benefit is by looking the 
percentage of minimum pension benefit beneficiaries segmented by income level. It is clear from 
the data that low income people (who at the same time tend to be low density affiliates) find it very 
difficult to receive this benefit. Figure 13 represents the projected distribution of minimum 
pensioners according to their income level in Colombia and Peru in 2015. Only one third of 
Colombian beneficiaries are actually low incomers (defined as those earning up to one minimum 
wage), whereas nearly 50 per cent earn around two minimum wages, and 20 per cent even earn on 
average three minimum wages. 
————— 
15  For a deeper discussion of the pension system regulation and their main challenges, see Albo et al. (2007) for Mexico, Bernal et al. 




governments to consider 
some solidarity schemes. 
The private regime has a 
special fund, named 
Fondo de Garantía de 
Pensión Mínima 
(Minimum Pension 
Guaranty Fund) that 
helps to complement the 
minimum pensions for 
those who acquire 1,150 
weeks of contribution, 
but are not able to 
accumulate enough 
capital to finance their 
own minimum pension. 
Affiliates to the private 
regime make payments 
to this fund every time 
they make a contribution 
to the pension scheme. 
However, it is very likely 
that this scheme could be 
regressive; those who 
have low income usually 
exhibit too low densities 
to access minimum 
benefits, and their 
contribution fees will be 
used to finance the 
minimum pension of 
others affiliates with 
better labour stability and 
probably with higher 
income). 
In addition there is 
a very limited scheme 
named  Fondo de 
Solidaridad Pensional 
(Solidarity Pension 
Fund), a pension scheme 
fed by contributors with 
income over four 
minimum salaries. This 
fund has two 
sub-accounts; the 
Subcuenta de 
Solidaridad (Solidarity  
Figure 12 
Projection of Minimum Pension Beneficiaries in Latin America 
(percentage of pensioners, 2015 except 2035 for Mexico) 
Source: Own elaboration, based on Favre et al. (2006), Albo et al. (2007), Bernal et al. (2008) 
and Muñoz et al. (2009). 
Figure 13 
Beneficiaries of Minimum Pensions by Income Level, 2015 
(percentage of total minimum pension beneficiaries) 
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sub-account) complements the contribution of some workers with low income from rural and urban 
areas. Unfortunately, in order to access to this benefit, 500 weeks of contribution are required, 
which could be considered a demanding requirement. Besides, the data shows that it is losing 
beneficiaries, so accumulating resources may not accomplish their purposes. The other sub account 
is the Subcuenta de Subsistencia (Subsistence sub account) which basically allocates either 
monetary transfers or services to poor people over 70 years. 
 
4.2 Peru 
After the pension reform that took place between 1992 and 1994, the system is integrated by 
two regimes that work in parallel. On the one hand, the National Pensions System (Sistema 
Nacional de Pensiones, SNP), managed by the public sector, operates under a PAYG financial 
regime. On the other, the Private Pension System (Sistema Privado de Pensiones, SPP), managed 
by private specialized institutions, operates under a financial regime of individual capitalization, in 
which each affiliate makes a direct contribution to a personal account until he retires. 
SNP is in deficit, and increasing Public Treasury transfers have been necessary over the last 
few years to make up for the difference. Aggregating the “operational deficit” in SNP (the 
difference between contribution income minus pension-related expenses), the deficit in the special 
regime Law 20.530 (similar to the public one, but extinguishing by constitutional order), the 
recognition bonds, and the minimum pension subsidies, supplementary bonds and disaffiliation to 
SPP, deficit reaches 58 per cent of the GDP in 2006 (Bernal et al., 2008). Being this figure 
significant indeed, it is significantly lower than the one before the reform (the fiscal cost of keeping 
a PAYG system would have been close to 100 per cent of GDP) and, to obligations in Colombia or 
Mexico. 
The current SPP situation also presents aspects that could be improved. Indicators show that, 
currently, the coverage of the SPP labour force is at slightly less than 30 per cent, one of the lowest 
levels in Latin America, even when compared with younger systems. At the same time, data shows 
there is an important group of workers that does not have a regular contribution pattern. Three 
structural problems in the Peruvian economy help to explain the difficulties to extend the coverage 
of the system: a large informal sector, a high level of poverty, and the wide dispersion of wealth 
distribution. 60 per cent of the economic activity in Peru is informal, with 40 per cent of the labour 
force self-employed in informal micro-firms (although, even counting those people that work for 
larger firms, only 20 per cent of the labour force contributes to a formal pension plan). Poverty in 
Peruvian rural areas (nearly 70 per cent in 2006) is significantly higher than that in urban areas 
(slightly over 30 per cent). This fact is line with coverage distribution, which is largely lower in 
rural areas (3 per cent in 2006, vs. 20 per cent in urban areas). Finally, although income inequality 
has apparently decreased (the main household survey Encuesta Nacional de Hogares-ENAHO 
shows that the Gini coefficient reached 0.43 per cent in 2006, from 0.46 in 1997), still reflects an 
unequal distribution. 
The access to the minimum pension benefit has been very restricted. Bernal et al. (2008) 
show that less than 4 per cent of pensioners in 2015 will have access to minimum pensions, 
considering the affiliates of the public and the private systems (Figure 12). By contrast, nearly 
80 per cent of pensioners would need it, but do not qualify for them (i.e., one out of thirty). This 
dismal result stems from the combination of low densities with quite strict eligibility criteria. In 
order to get it, affiliates must have contributed to the system for at least 20 years and have 65 years 
old. Projections up to 2050, based on relatively favourable socio-economic trends, do not change 
significantly the picture. 724  Ángel Melguizo, Ángel Muñoz, David Tuesta and Joaquín Vial 
Besides, low income population in Peru shares with the Colombians the difficulty to access 
to this benefit. As represented in Figure 13, in 2015, less than 15 per cent of minimum pension 
beneficiaries earns up to one minimum wage, while 60 per cent earn two minimum wages, and 
almost one third earn three minimum wages. So it seems that, in absence of reforms, minimum 
pension pillars end up being a social benefit for middle income population, and not to the lower 
income segments. 
Despite this situation, there is not a formal solidarity pillar reform in progress. Nonetheless, 
law 28015 (enacted in 2008) promotes and formalizes micro and small enterprises, offering 
workers in these firms, social security and pensions. With this new law, workers of small 
enterprises may access a public subsidy to cover 50 per cent of pension and health costs. Taking 
into account that in Peru micro and small enterprises represent 54 per cent of GDP and 62 per cent 
of the labour force, this reform could be an important window opportunity to tackle the problem of 
low coverage in Peru. 
 
4.3 Mexico 
In 1997, a defined contribution pension scheme at the Mexican Social Security Institute 
(Instituto Mexicano de Segurodad Social, IMSS) was established. This scheme transformed the 
institutional design of retirement arrangements in Mexico by “closing” the PAYG scheme. The 
worker saves to an individual pension account with the support of the government and the 
employer (the system is known as SAR, Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro), but its specific rules 
have many implications First, total contribution from the worker, the government and the employer 
to the individual account is around 8 per cent, so the pension generated from the capitalization 
scheme will be modest for many affiliates. Second, the system allows workers in the private 
capitalization system before 1997 choosing between the pension obtained under this scheme and 
the one obtained under the most favourable rules of the “previous” PAYG scheme, generating an 
imbalance that is to be financed by the Mexican treasury. 
In fact, this fiscal burden constitutes one of the main problems for broad the benefits of the 
pension system to more Mexicans. The pension deficit still depends on the characteristics of the 
different pension regimes that existed during its history. According to Albo et al. (2007), the pure 
cost of transition implies an implicit debt of 56 per cent of GDP. Adding to this figure to the other 
fiscal burdens, including the pension scheme for public workers (known as ISSTE, Instituto de 
Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado) and the government contributions 
to the individual worker account, the implicit debt of pension systems in Mexico reaches 92 per 
cent of GDP. 
In addition to this fiscal problem it is important to add the difficulties faced in the Mexican 
labour market. Although individuals with a formal salaried job in the private sector should by law 
be affiliated to the IMSS, in practice, a large number of affiliates do not make the required 
contributions to obtain the system’s protection. Evidence so far indicates that within SAR affiliates’ 
contribution densities are not uniform and that, at the same time, a high percentage of the total 
number of individual accounts registered in the SAR become “inactive” for failing to receive the 
contribution payments (this is the case, for example, of temporary workers and those whose labour 
situation changes frequently, passing from being employed to unemployed or to independent 
workers and vice versa). 
The Mexican pension system considers a minimum pension benefit for workers that belong 
to the new private scheme and retiring from 2035 onwards, approximately (retirees before that 
year, will receive the benefits of the old PAYG scheme, significantly more favourable). In order to 
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scenario Albo et al. (2007) project that in 2035, less than 2 per cent of pensioners would receive the 
minimum pension benefit (see Figure 12). Meanwhile, more than half of the pensioners would 
accrue pension rights below this level, but will not qualify for it due to the low density of 
contributions. Although it is projected an important increase in the next decades, based on various 
assumptions on productivity and formality growth, a significant part of pensioners will remain 
uncovered. 
In order to ease the access of low income population to this pillar, the Mexican pension 
scheme considers a monthly contribution by the federal government to the individual account of the 
affiliate for each working day. This contribution known as social quota is the same for all accounts 
regardless of the income level of the affiliate, and its value is kept constant in real terms. Precisely, 
this scheme has been recently reinforced in May 2009, when the Congress approved a 
governmental initiative to reform the Social Security Law to strengthen its redistributive role. 
Under this new legislation, public spending through the social quota will be increased by 
5 per cent, and to reallocate such spending from high to low and medium income earners. Workers 
with an income level higher than 15 minimum wages will stop receiving it. Meanwhile, the rest of 
workers will obtain increases in their social quota inversely related to their income level: 
15 per cent for those with an income level between 1 and 4 minimum wages; 10 per cent for those 
with an income level between 4 and 7 minimum wages; 5 per cent for those with income levels up 
to 10 minimum wages and between 5 and 0 per cent increase for those with income levels between 
10 and 15 minimum wages. 
 
5  To conclude: on the exportability of the Chilean model 
Economic institutions and reform processes are by definition one-time shocks. As Barr and 
Diamond (2006) explain, in a world full of market imperfections formulating pension policy in a 
first-best framework is not advisable. Therefore, it is difficult to export the Chilean experience to 
other countries in the region or overseas, with different political and economic structures and 
institutions (as highlighted in Rofman et al., 2009). In spite of it, the Chilean reform has been a 
model not only for many emerging economies, notably in Latin America, but also has been at the 
heart of debates in industrialized ones (for instance in the US). Some key elements that facilitated 
or dampened outcomes of pension reform in Chile can be identified, so that local policy makers 
elsewhere can evaluate them and act accordingly.
16 
 
5.1  Market and public institutions 
One key element for the success of a system based on individual retirement accounts is the 
good functioning of market institutions, especially financial markets. The protection of property 
rights and minority shareholders is crucial for pension funds that have to invest across a wide range 
of debt instruments and shares of listed companies. When capital markets are not fully developed, 
pension funds will have to invest in banking deposits, so a sound and well regulated banking 
system is another key factor of success. 
In the Chilean case, private property rights have strong backing in the Constitution and have 
been reinforced by a legalistic tradition. International indexes on the quality of market and public 
institutions tend to rank Chile very high, even when compared with OECD countries (see 
Figure 14). The biggest challenge to the new system arose very early, when, as a result of a major  
————— 
16  This section relies heavily on Melguizo and Vial (2009). For an economic-theory oriented approach of the issue, see also Barr and 
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economic crisis, many 
major banks and other 
financial intermediaries 
failed in 1983-84. The 
government opted to 
protect deposits, 
allowing the pension 
funds to preserve their 
value and the system to 
survive (although at a 






experience shows is that 
it is not necessary to 
have all the regulations 
and financial instruments 
in place to launch the 
system. There is a 
learning-by-doing 
process involving 
managers of pension 
funds, regulators, central  
 
banks and policy makers. Some authors have highlighted the benefits of the pragmatism in the 
Chilean regulation, especially in pension markets, as one of its main institutional assets, thanks to a 
“political economy of the possible” approach (Santiso, 2006). 
If financial markets are not well developed at the onset of the pension reforms, it might be 
desirable to establish a conservative regulation, and gradually proceed to reform it introducing 
more flexibility. Nevertheless, being too conservative at the beginning has some risks, such as 
limiting too much the investment options and forcing too much concentration into government 
debt. The costs of excessive limitations could be substantial, as Berstein and Chumacero (2005) 
point for Chile. So, low risk international investments might be a good option if not enough good 
domestic alternatives exist, provided the introduction of some macroeconomic safeguards to avoid 
excessive foreign exchange rate volatility. 
 
5.3  Fiscal policy and transition design 
As we have analyzed in some depth, fiscal policy is extremely relevant. On the one hand, the 
move from PAYG to individual capitalization accounts will have a positive impact on economic 
growth if there is a net addition to domestic savings. Given that the transition process entails major 
fiscal disbursements, the increase in private savings may be offset by a reduction in government 
savings. Fiscal consolidation, mostly through current expenditure reallocations is needed in order to 
have a positive effect on savings and capital accumulation. According to Corbo and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), fiscal consolidation in Chile may explain an increase in the domestic 
saving rate of 2.9 per cent of GDP, financing a hike in the investment rate of 1.5 per cent of GDP. 
Note: LatAm is the simple average of Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
Source: World Bank and own elaboration. 
Figure 14 
Market and Public Institutions Rankings 
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On the other hand, fiscal policy is relevant for risks to the pension fund portfolio. 
Traditionally, public debt is considered the safest asset, because the government has the ability to 
tax the citizens. However, governments can also elude its obligations through inflation, or even 
default. In many developing countries, especially in Latin America, governments had found 
politically expedient to take the inflationary way, instead of raising taxes or cutting expenses. Data 
shows that Chile is an outlier when compared to other reformers in the region: pension funds tend 
to have a lower share of government debt and a much higher proportion of foreign assets. Given the 
experience of pension funds in countries that have defaulted or liquated their public debt, it seems 
important to evaluate the safety of pension funds investments taking into account fiscal 
sustainability. These arguments are further compounded by lower financial credit risks of reformers 
if they exhibit a sound fiscal position. 
 
5.4  Informal labour market and solidarity pillar 
The experience of Latin America shows that labour market informality severely limits 
coverage of pension systems, even in the case of individual capitalization accounts where 
incentives to contribute are theoretically the greatest. If informality is pervasive at the onset of the 
reforms, it seems almost inevitable to establish a large solidarity pillar. Unfortunately, a large fiscal 
commitment to a basic pension, not subject to contributions, can act as an important disincentive to 
formalization, so the design must be very precise. 
Informality in Chile is the lowest in Latin America, even below the regional pattern, as can 
be seen in Figure 15. The country had a non-contributory means-tested pension (PASIS) targeted to 
the poor of a value close to 80 euros per month, covering more than 400 thousand retirees, and did 
 
not seem to have had a 
significant impact in 
labour market 
informality. The new 
protection scheme with a 
significantly higher basic 
pension poses a risk of a 
drop in contributions at 
the low-income level, 
although the increasing 
“reference pension” may 
offset it. For other countries, 
the reinforcement of the 
first pillar does not need 
to be introduced from the 
verybeginning, since in 
any change of this sort 
there is a transition 
period – with high fiscal 
costs – in which those 
who enter into the new 
system accumulate resources 
in their accounts, well 
before they begin to 
retire. Only after that 
transition the protection 
mechanism are necessary. 
Figure 15 
Informality and GDP per capita in LAC, 1990-2007 
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Fiscal Expenditure in Pensions in Chile 
(percent of GDP) 
 
Old System Deficit  Recognition  Minimum  PASIS  Year 
Civil  Military  Bonds  Pensions  (Non-contributory) 
Total 
1981  1.6  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  3.8 
1984  4.7  2.2  0.2  0.0  0.5  7.6 
1990  3.2  1.3  0.5  0.0  0.4  5.4 
1995  2.7  1.2  0.7  0.0  0.3  4.9 
2000  3.1  1.3  1.1  0.1  0.4  6.0 
2005  2.2  1.3  1.2  0.1  0.4  5.2 
2008  1.9  1.3  1.2  0.1  0.4  4.9 
 
Note: The figure for the civilian deficit in the old system includes 0.3 percentage points in minimum pensions, Valdés (2006). 
Source: National Budget Office. 
 
Table 3 
Projection of Replacement Rates of Chilean Pension System 
(percentage over last 10 salaries, by cohorts, densities, salaries and sex) 
 
   2010  2025  2050 
   Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
A  111.7  78.0  69.9  36.5  67.8  50.3 
A1  106.5  72.2  89.6  46.9  128.5  79.8 
A2  112.6  78.2  62.7  35.3  102.9  67.5 
A3  112.6  74.7  68.9  36.4  67.6  44.7 
A4  112.6  76.5  67.3  35.5  66.4  44.4 
A5  112.6  82.9  66.8  35.8  63.1  44.4 
B  52.7  36.7  39.5  16.4  39.3  23.6 
C  46.3  30.0  25.7  9.0  29.2  17.8 
D  4.8  3.4  15.5  5.2  12.1  7.0 
E1              69.4  42.8 
E2              59.6  38.9 
E3              40.0  26.5 
E4              39.0  26.2 
E5              37.5  26.2 
F              32.7  17.0 
Average  54.9  38.6  45.8  17.9  44.3  26.7 
Total average     44.9     29.0     33.8 
 
Source: Favre et al. (2006). 
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Table 4 
Projection of the Pension Level in Chile 
(monthly pension, 2004 Chilean pesos) 
 
   2010  2025  2050 
   Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
    A1  1,107  750  930  487  1,336  829 
    A2  768  515  652  337  1,070  701 
    A3  365  250  323  176  588  401 
    A4  210  143  182  96  333  222 
    A5  121  79  104  50  182  114 
    B  198  140  214  91  408  245 
    C  173  115  140  50  303  185 
    D  18  13  84  29  126  73 
    E1          721  445 
    E2          619  404 
    E3          348  238 
    E4          196  131 
    E5          108  67 
    F          339  176 
Average  206  146  244  83  320  204 
Minimum pension  77    94    121 
 
Source: Favre et al. (2006). 
 
Table 5 
Projection of Fiscal Expenditure in Civil Pensions in Chile 
(no-reform scenario, percent of GDP) 
 
 
Old system   Recognition  Minimum   PASIS  Year  Deficit  Bonds  Pensions  (Non-contributory)  Total 
2010  1.7  1.4  0.1  0.3  3.4 
2015  1.3  1.4  0.1  0.3  3.1 
2020  1.2  0.7  0.0  0.3  2.3 
2025  1.0  0.2  0.1  0.3  1.5 
2030  0.8  -  0.1  0.3  1.1 
2035  0.6  -  0.1  0.3  1.0 
2040  0.5  -  0.1  0.3  0.9 
2045  0.4  -  0.1  0.3  0.8 
2050  0.3  -  0.1  0.3  0.7 
 
Source: Favre et al. (2006). 
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Figure 16 




















Note: “A” affiliate contribute over 80 per cent of the time, “B” between 60 and 80 per cent, “C” between 40 and 60 per cent, and 
“D” under 40 per cent. 
Source: 2002 Social Protection Survey and AFP Provida (data up to 2004). 
 
Figure 17 
Replacement Rate and GDP per capita in OECD and Chile 
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Table 6 
A) Projection of Fiscal Expenditure in Civil Pensions in Chile, Reform Scenario A 
(percent of GDP) 
 
Old System  Recognition  SPS   Year  Deficit  Bonds  Total  Old-age PBS  Old-age APS Disability  Total 
2010  1.7  1.4  0.8  0.5  0.1  0.2  3.9 
2011  1.6  1.4  0.9  0.5  0.1  0.2  3.9 
2012  1.5  1.4  1.0  0.6  0.2  0.2  3.9 
2013  1.5  1.4  1.0  0.5  0.2  0.3  3.9 
2014  1.4  1.4  1.0  0.5  0.2  0.3  3.8 
2015  1.3  1.4  1.0  0.4  0.3  0.3  3.7 
2016  1.3  1.3  0.9  0.4  0.3  0.3  3.5 
2017  1.3  1.1  0.9  0.3  0.3  0.3  3.3 
2018  1.3  1.0  0.9  0.3  0.3  0.3  3.2 
2019  1.2  0.9  0.8  0.2  0.4  0.2  3.0 
2020  1.2  0.7  0.8  0.2  0.4  0.2  2.8 
2021  1.2  0.6  0.8  0.1  0.4  0.2  2.6 
2022  1.1  0.5  0.7  0.1  0.4  0.2  2.4 
 
Source: Favre et al. (2006) and own elaboration. 
 
B) Projection of Fiscal Expenditure in Civil Pensions in Chile, Reform Scenario B 
(percent of GDP) 
 
Old system  Recognition  SPS   Year  Deficit  Bonds  Total  Old-age PBS  Old-age APS Disability  Total 
2010  1.7  1.4  0.9  0.5  0.1  0.2  3.9 
2011  1.6  1.4  0.9  0.6  0.2  0.2  3.9 
2012  1.5  1.4  1.0  0.6  0.2  0.2  4.0 
2013  1.5  1.4  1.0  0.5  0.2  0.3  3.9 
2014  1.4  1.4  1.0  0.5  0.3  0.3  3.8 
2015  1.3  1.4  1.0  0.4  0.3  0.3  3.8 
2016  1.3  1.3  1.0  0.4  0.3  0.3  3.6 
2017  1.3  1.1  1.0  0.3  0.4  0.3  3.4 
2018  1.3  1.0  0.9  0.3  0.4  0.3  3.2 
2019  1.2  0.9  0.9  0.2  0.4  0.3  3.0 
2020  1.2  0.7  0.9  0.2  0.5  0.2  2.9 
2021  1.2  0.6  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.2  2.7 
2022  1.1  0.5  0.8  0.1  0.6  0.2  2.5 
 
Source: Favre et al. (2006) and own elaboration. 732  Ángel Melguizo, Ángel Muñoz, David Tuesta and Joaquín Vial 
 
Table 7 





APS  PBS 
Disability  Total 
2009  160,676  510,474  211,769  882,919 
2010  208,737  562,142  232,909  1,003,789 
2011  263,102  617,292  256,380  1,136,773 
2012  323,876  671,926  282,470  1,278,272 
2013  391,562  639,614  311,509  1,342,685 
2014  463,523  603,027  343,873  1,410,422 
2015  540,616  561,307  379,990  1,481,913 
2016  621,676  524,169  379,994  1,525,839 
2017  706,550  483,218  379,997  1,569,765 
2018  807,783  425,907  380,000  1,613,691 
2019  917,376  360,237  380,004  1,657,617 
2020  1,032,257  289,278  380,007  1,701,543 
2021  1,155,115  225,093  380,011  1,760,219 
2022  1,289,472  149,409  380,014  1,818,896 
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COMMENTS ON SESSION 4 
PENSION REFORM AND FISCAL POLICY 
Geert Langenus
* 
As for the previous sessions, the three discussants for Session 4 have engaged in some 
market segmentation and I will focus in particular on the first two papers, the one by Carone and 
Eckefeldt and the one by Gonand. I have to say that I am quite happy with my share of the work: 
both papers are very interesting in my view and I enjoyed reading them. They are also 
complementary in a way: the Carone and Eckefeldt paper provides a detailed analysis of the 
problem while the Gonand one assesses possible solutions. If you do not mind, I will treat them in 
this order. 
 
1  Comments on “Economic and Budgetary Effects of Pension Reforms in EU Member 
States” by Giuseppe Carone and Per Eckefeldt 
Let me start with the paper by Giuseppe Carone and Per Eckefeldt. The Working group on 
Ageing Populations (henceforth: AWG) was created within the EU’s Economic Policy Committee 
to analyse the macroeconomic and budgetary impact of population ageing and is currently updating 
its 2006 projections of the ageing costs. The paper gives us a sneak preview of the new projections 
concerning pension expenditure. The authors show that the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP in 
the EU will rise by some 2¼ percentage points by 2050/2060 but this is an average; the increase is 
somewhat bigger in the euro area and there is quite a lot of country dispersion. The paper then 
analyses the driving forces and shows that the increase can be traced back to a higher dependency 
ratio, which is only partly offset by higher employment and lower coverage and benefit ratios. The 
authors also assess the impact of reforms, that mainly work through a delayed exit of older workers 
from the labour market but also favourably affect benefit ratios. They also perform a number of 
sensitivity analyses and I was personally particularly struck by the importance of the assumptions 
concerning migration: using an alternative assumption of zero net migration would almost double 
the increase in pension expenditure! Finally, the authors compare the current projections with the 
2006 vintage and it is safe to say that the picture is quite similar on average but there are a few 
outliers; in this connection, pension projections were revised substantially downwards for Portugal 
and significantly upwards for Malta and Luxembourg for example. 
I would like to structure my thoughts on this paper on the basis of a few general comments 
and questions. The first issue to highlight is probably that the people who thought that ageing is 
less of a problem if one takes into account new demographic assumptions (e.g., regarding fertility 
and migration) and recent structural reforms were too optimistic: the projected increase in pension 
expenditure in the coming decades has not disappeared or become significantly smaller since the 
2006 AWG update. This suggests that greater reform ambition is required and, in this respect, 
lessons can certainly be drawn from “successful reformers”. More generally, it may also illustrate 
the need for greater fiscal prudence as, for a lot of countries, finding structural solutions for the 
impact of population ageing on future budgets does not seem to be that straightforward. We should 
not be overly confident that this will be much easier in the following years. 
————— 
*  National Bank of Belgium. 
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My second comment pertains to the impact of reforms. The paper clearly highlights that a 
large group of countries have at least succeeded in shoring up the participation rate of older 
workers, mainly through downsizing early retirement schemes. However, an increased participation 
rate is only part of the story, as it was stressed in the paper by Ahuja and Paserman in the first 
session. What ultimately matters is whether the overall employment rate increases and if increased 
participation of older workers does not lead to higher unemployment. We would need to have the 
full set of AWG projections (including the macroeconomic projections and those for 
unemployment expenditure) to assess this. At any rate, it should be stressed that the employment 
rate of older workers is typically also influenced by parameters that are outside the pension system. 
One of those is the wage structure: many countries have wage structures that rise with age or 
seniority. This may give employers an incentive to lay off older workers if higher wages are not 
fully matched by higher productivity. Partly to compensate this phenomenon, some countries are 
already experimenting with targeted reductions in social contributions – or specific subsidies – for 
companies employing older workers. Finally, there is the issue of the availability of adequate jobs 
for older workers that is highlighted by Giuseppe and Per in the conclusion of their paper. All in 
all, it may not be sufficient to simply eradicate all kinds of early retirement schemes or, for that 
matter, increase the legal retirement age, a more comprehensive policy – also focusing on labour 
market institutions – may be needed to successfully raise the employment rate by delaying the exit 
of older workers. Turning to the projection models, if one assumes that the structural employment 
rate is unaffected by these reforms – and I am not sure if the new AWG projections are based upon 
more pessimistic assumptions concerning structural unemployment than the previous ones –, then 
obviously increased participation of older workers is entirely passed through to higher employment 
and, hence, automatically reduces the ageing costs. However, it is unclear to me at least if the 
policy environment is supportive enough for that to happen in all EU countries. 
I now turn to the issue of the adequacy of pensions that is also touched upon in the paper. 
The authors show, in particular, that the benefit and replacement ratios are set to decline (strongly) 
in most EU countries. This may signal potential problems in the future as the social sustainability 
of the reforms – especially taking into account the increased voting power of the elderly – may not 
be guaranteed in the longer term. However, to my mind there is also an issue of cross-country 
comparability of the pension projections. As those projections tend to be based upon current 
policies, assumptions concerning the future indexation of individual pension entitlements are not 
necessarily harmonised. In this connection, one can however raise the question whether current 
policies can be prolonged until 2060. More generally, falling benefit and replacement ratios may be 
an indicator of inequity in the pension system. Hence, it is important that we carefully assess 
intergenerational implications of structural reforms to pension and care systems. For this a broader 
approach is needed and this may include generational accounting exercises or methods assessing 
the welfare of different cohorts such as in the paper by Gonand. 
One of the other interesting issues in the paper is the comparison with the 2006 AWG 
projections. A systematic analysis of the revisions of the AWG projections is certainly very helpful. 
However, if I have one small quibble with the paper, it pertains to the fact that the reader actually 
wants more than what the paper provides. Ideally, one would want to disentangle the impact of 
reforms, revised assumptions and changes in projection models but the current format based upon 
the expenditure drivers does not allow that. It shows that countries are moving in different 
directions – with respect to benefit and coverage ratios, but also as regards dependency ratios – and 
it is not always easy to understand why if one is not very familiar with the detailed country 
projections. I assume that, at least in some cases, trends may be somewhat blurred by changes in 
projection models. As pension expenditure is the only expenditure item for which national 
projection models are used by the AWG, full transparency of those projections is a key issue. 
Despite all the detailed information given by the AWG, many people – and some of them are even 
in the room today – indeed still consider the national pension projections as “black boxes”. Hence,   Comments on Session 4: Pension Reform and Fiscal Policy  737 
it would be particularly helpful if the authors could (roughly) quantify the impact of changes in 
individual assumptions and projection models but I realise that this is quite an uphill task. 
Let me now switch to the issue of migration. The paper shows that for most countries, but 
not for all, the dependency ratio effect is now lower – and in some cases significantly so – than in 
the 2006 AWG exercise. I presume that this is due to the fact that higher life expectancy is more 
than offset by higher fertility and increased net migration. It is safe to say that all three of these 
projections are surrounded with significant uncertainty. With respect to the first element, for 
instance, Ray Barrell reminded us yesterday that people tend to underestimate their life expectancy. 
Let me just add to that that recent projection exercises have amply shown that demographers are 
indeed also people and have been known to sometimes run behind the life expectancy curve. 
However, I would like to focus on net migration because I know that the issue is very important for 
the projections in the case of some countries. First, I was wondering if the authors could elaborate 
on the procedure that makes these assumptions on net migration at least consistent across EU 
countries. My second point relates to the fact that the positive impact of net migration requires a 
certain policy environment. There is the basic issue of opening the borders to legal migrants but 
other issues such as diploma recognition and the type of migrants that countries attract are 
important as well. In the sensitivity analyses the importance of the assumption on net migration is 
highlighted very clearly. Hence, if we have doubts that the required policies are in place – and will 
be in place throughout the projection period – it is quite tricky to assume that a large part of the 
ageing cost will simply be wiped out by net migration. 
The final issue relates to the macroeconomic projections. For many countries, the current and 
the following five years were supposed to be the last period of relatively strong growth before the 
decline in the population of working age starts weighing on trend growth. How is that picture 
changed because of the current crisis? Is the current downturn assumed to have a lasting effect on 
trend growth and, hence, on the ageing costs? 
 
2  Comments on “Choosing a Pension Reform: A Framework for the Social Planner” by 
Frédéric Gonand 
Let me now turn to the equally interesting paper by Frédéric Gonand. The paper is written 
against the background of unsustainable public finances in many industrialised countries, as it was 
illustrated for the EU Member States in the paper by Carone and Eckefeldt. Clearly, population 
ageing will make structural reforms desirable and the Gonand paper looks into the different 
options. It focuses on pension systems and compares different reform strategies to a “no 
reform”-scenario, although the latter is actually a “rising tax burden”-scenario. Gonand argues that 
the choice for a specific reform should be based upon social welfare considerations but shows that, 
of the reforms studied in the paper, none are Pareto-improving. Hence, the “optimal” reform 
crucially depends on the aggregation procedure for individuals’ welfare and two parameters in 
particular, the society’s aversion to intergenerational inequality and the extent to which welfare of 
future generations is discounted. As for the previous paper, I would like to make a few general and 
one or two more specific points. 
First, Gonand shows that structural reforms typically have winners and losers. Hence, 
approaches illustrating the micro-implications of these reforms for different groups in the current 
and future population should always complement the standard macroeconomic and budgetary 
projections in my view. This can also shed some light on the sustainability of the reforms (as the 
reforms may be undone if the losers succeed in winning political support). Many governments 
face(d) delicate choices in the coming (past) years. Intergenerational equity would seem to be an 
appropriate criterion to assess different policy responses to the budgetary challenge created by 
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welfare functions such as in the paper by Gonand but also on the basis of generational accounting 
and, e.g., the evolution of the net tax burden over different cohorts. However, any concrete 
operationalisation will include a normative judgment on what is equitable. In this context, it may be 
difficult to translate analytical results into clear policy recommendations. 
Second, the comparison of utility, welfare, income and consumption levels of different 
cohorts is quite complicated. How do you account for economic progress? On the basis of Arrow’s 
critique, some discounting would seem necessary. There may be a link with the choice between 
absolute or relative poverty measures, an issue that was already heavily debated in this workshop. 
While I share many of the views expressed by Carlo Cottarelli and Laurent Paul, who qualified the 
appropriateness of relative poverty indicators, it still is the case that all papers that look into 
poverty issues in this workshop, use a relative poverty definition. I would argue that, if we seem to 
be relatively comfortable with country-specific poverty lines, it would also be natural to opt for 
“cohort-specific” welfare assessments. The application of such a relative approach to the welfare of 
different cohorts may then be consistent with linking the discount factor to, say, per capita GDP 
growth or average wage growth. There is a similar issue in generational accounting exercises that 
look into intergenerational equity: what is more relevant, the net tax burden or the after-tax income 
of different cohorts? I would personally not think that young and future and generations should be 
punished with a higher net tax burden because they have MP3 players and flat-screen TVs while 
their grandfathers and grandmothers had record players and black-and-white TVs. In addition, 
equalising after-tax income across generations would imply a continuously rising tax rate. Hence, I 
would by and large support the view that the welfare of future generations should be discounted to 
an appropriate extent. 
This brings me to a third, more technical point. In the paper a very specific procedure is 
followed to avoid the “old-cohort bias”. The social welfare function is based upon changes in 
utility generated by reforms (the difference between utility levels in the different reform scenarios 
and under the “no reform” option). Can the author elaborate on the reasons why this is necessary? I 
may be illustrating my general ignorance here but, when reading through the paper, I was 
wondering why the bias could not be dealt with via appropriate discounting (also in the ranking of 
the cohorts). The specific procedure followed in the paper at least makes the interpretation of 
intergenerational equity rather difficult as the aversion parameter is not linked anymore to 
differences in absolute levels of utility. I would argue that counter-intuitive results would then be 
possible: most people would look differently onto a unit of utility depending on whether it is taken 
away from – or given to –, say, Mr. Roman Abramovich or from – or to – a single mother that has 
to get by on welfare cheques. 
Fourth, the set-up of the model is also somewhat specific: taxes are only levied on labour 
income and are increased only if deficits in the pension system would otherwise occur. It may be 
worthwhile to consider possible extensions of the model including the introduction of a tax on 
consumption and a pre-funding strategy to finance the ageing costs. This may point to alternative 
options to make the baby-boom generations contribute more to the funding of the ageing costs. 
Fifth, the empirical results presented in the paper reveal different reform preferences for 
different countries. In Japan, for example, a decrease in the replacement rates seems to be by and 
large the optimal scenario while this is much less the case for the other countries studied in the 
paper. Can these different preferences or model outcomes be traced back to the calibration of the 
country models or to characteristics of the current pension systems? 
Finally, let me end with a quote from the Gonand paper: “democratic government usually 
does not care much about the welfare of future generations”. I am afraid that that statement, while 
somewhat provocative, is not fully inaccurate. In this connection, the question can be raised 
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objectives (MTOs) for fiscal policy that are defined for individual EU Member States in 
accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact. These MTOs will be revised in the course of 2009 
in order to better reflect the governments’ implicit liabilities against the background of population 
ageing. However, the current proposals imply only a very partial pre-funding of the ageing costs. 
This may be a missed opportunity as more ambitious MTOs than those which are currently 
envisaged could serve as a powerful reminder of the need to take policy action, either via more 
upfront fiscal consolidation or via (deeper) structural reforms. In addition, the international 
institutions could strongly contribute to the policy debate with further work on the intergenerational 
implications of different policy options. In this connection, the EC is already routinely publishing 
sustainability indicators. These indicators are just one – admittedly, big – methodological step 
away from indicators of generational imbalances. Even if the latter would require an additional set 
of assumptions, it would be very helpful in my view if such indicators could also be produced by 
international institutions in order to assess the impact of different policy responses to ageing 
(including the absence of any policy response). 
 
  
 COMMENTS ON SESSION 4 
PENSION REFORM AND FISCAL POLICY 
Per Eckefeldt
* 
1  Comments on “The Reform of the Portuguese Public Employees’ Pension System: 
Reasons and Results” by Vanda Cunha, Helder Reis, Ariana Paulo and Nuno Sousa 
Pereira 
In their paper, Cunha, Reis, Paulo and Pereira analysed the 2007 reform of the Portuguese 
public employees’ pension system. In doing so, they described the reasons behind the reform and 
notably the underlying demographic trends, the main aspects of the 2007 reform and its 
implications for fiscal sustainability. As a result of the reform, they estimate that the reform 
measures taken in 2007 significantly reduce the projected increase in pension expenditure as a 
share of GDP, by 4 percentage points of GDP by 2060. Consequently, the risks to public finance 
sustainability are markedly reduced. 
A reform of the public pension system in Portugal was motivated by the demographic 
change in the coming decades, which is shared by the other EU Member States. The demographic 
trends in Portugal are close to the EU average, as measured by the development of the old-age 
dependency ratio. However, the long-term budgetary impact of ageing was somewhat higher than 
on average in the EU. The 2007 reforms have reduced significantly the projected increase in 
pension expenditure in Portugal. 
The main channel through which the lower increase in pension expenditure over the 
long-term materialises is the introduction of the sustainability factor. The sustainability factor 
automatically adjusts new pensions to changes in life expectancy. Another interesting feature of the 
pension reforms is the introduction of a new pension indexation rule. The new rule depends on the 
level of the benefit as well as on economic growth (see Table 1). Relatively small pensions (from 
the beneficiaries’ point of view) are indexed in part to GDP, while relatively large pensions are 
indexed on prices, and the top pension income bracket in fact is not indexed at all. This will 
decrease the inequality in income distribution of pensioners as far as public pensions are 
concerned. It would be interesting to see what effect this feature would have on the total pension 
expenditure ratio as compared to a more standard type of indexation rule, like for instance 
100 per cent price indexation, or 50 per cent wage and 50 per cent price indexation. 
One aspect of the sustainability-enhancing reforms is a strong decline in the benefit ratio 
(i.e., the average pension in relation to the average wage) over the long-term. In the assessment of 
long-term fiscal developments by the European Commission under its multilateral budgetary 
surveillance, this introduces a risk element. Looking at pension for public employees (CGA 
pensions), the decline in the benefit ratio is even more pronounced than for the general social 
security pensions. But it is worthwhile noting that despite the 2007 reforms, the benefit ratio 
remains high at 66 per cent in 2040 for CGA pensions, compared with 39 per cent for general 
social security pensions. The relative generosity of the CGA pension system is also evident from 
higher replacement rates as compared with the general social security pensions. In addressing 
possible risks related to reductions over item of pensions in relation to wages, a key aspect will be 
expanding labour supply and the number of contributors. For this to materialize, the incentive to 
postpone retirement needs to be in place. It would be interesting to see further analysis of labour 
force participation. 
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Table 1 
Rule for Updating Pensions 
 
  GDP real variation 
rate less than 2% 
GDP real variation rate 
from 2% to 3% 
GDP real variation rate 
equal or greater than 3% 
Pensions 
under 1.5 IAS  CPI change rate 
CPI change rate 
+ 20% GDP real variation rate
(minimum: CPI change rate 
+ 0.5 percentage points) 
CPI change rate + 20% 
GDP real variation rate 
Pensions 
1.5 to 6 IAS 
CPI change rate 
– 0.5 percentage points  CPI change rate  CPI change rate + 12.5% 
GDP real variation rate 
Pensions 
6 to 12 IAS 
CPI change rate 
– 0.75 percentage points 
CPI change rate 
– 0.25 percentage points  CPI change rate 
Pensions 
above 12 IAS  no update  no update  no update 
 
In conclusion, the large pension reforms Portugal goes a long way towards enhancing fiscal 
sustainability. It includes some aspects that are likely to contribute to the long-term stability of the 
pension system (e.g., the sustainability factor). Moreover, it adds some interesting and innovative 
features (e.g., the income level and GDP growth dependent indexation scheme post-retirement). 
However, as for several other countries, there are some potential risks present in Portugal related to 
the relative decline of pensions. To ensure the lasting success of these important reforms, further 
steps are likely needed. In particular measures that effectively will lead to longer working lives 
would appear as one route that will be need to be explored further in light of the projected 
continuous gains in life expectancy, hopefully in good health, in the coming decades. 
 
1  Comments on “Pension Plan Revision and Fiscal Policy of Japan” by Monotobu 
Matsuo 
In his presentation, Motonobu Matsuo analysed the prospects for the public finances in Japan 
in a long-term perspective, with particular emphasis on the fiscal consequences of the 2004 reform 
of the pension system. In doing so, he described the reasons behind the reform and notably the 
underlying demographic trends, the main aspects of the 2004 reform and its implications for fiscal 
sustainability. Moreover, a medium-term fiscal consolidation plan initiated by the government was 
foreseen to get the public finances on a more sustainable path. As a result of the reform, he 
concludes that the pension system will: (i) introduce certainty as regards pension contributions; (ii) 
better balance the intergenerational equity in view of demographic changes; (iii) secure a targeted 
benefit level (vs. the active working population), but this will require an increase in the 
governments contribution to public pensions. This latter aspect is crucial and it is planned to be 
financed by a major tax reform, including a consumption tax. 
A reform of the public pension system in Japan was motivated by the demographic change in 
the coming decades, which is ageing much faster than in other parts of the world, including in 
Europe. The old-age dependency ratio is projected to rise from an already high level of 33 per cent 
today to as much as 83 per cent in 2050 (compared with the average in the EU, starting at 
26 per cent and rising to 52 per cent by 2050). As regards the medium-term fiscal policy strategy 
aimed at supporting fiscal sustainability, a successful consolidation programme (pre-crisis up to   Comments on Session 4: Pension Reform and Fiscal Policy  743 
2008) contributed to a stabilisation of the debt level. The authorities were committed to further 
consolidation over the medium-term. 
The pension reform of 2004 enhances the sustainability of the pension system and at the 
same time it safeguards pension remaining adequate in the future, which is a positive outcome in 
light of the already old and rapidly ageing Japan. The pension benefit is secured through the 
targeted basic pension replacement rate of no less than 50 per cent. It takes into account changes in 
life expectancy and changes in the labour force as a proportion of the population such that increases 
in public pension expenditure are curbed automatically. A cap is introduced on contribution rates 
by 2017, entailing an increase of some 5 percentage points as compared to 2005. Nonetheless, as 
pension post retirement are indexed (at the most) to prices, a relative decline of pension as 
compared to workers would materialize (assuming positive wage growth), which could raise 
concerns of pension adequacy over time for pensioners. It would be interesting to evaluate the 
pertinence of such political sustainability risks in the case of Japan. Another factor is the planned 
increase in the stares share of financing basic pension, rising from 33 to 50 per cent by FY2009. 
While state financing may be considered as well-founded for a social security insurance scheme 
without earnings requirements, there is still a potential political risk in the sustainability of this 
financing model and it would be interesting to highlight the extent to which such risks are present 
in the case of Japan. 
In conclusion, the Japanese pension reform enhances sustainability and at the same time 
safeguards replacement rates. As it introduces more transparency and a more effective allocation of 
pension funds, the “political sustainability” could be enhanced. The improved information to 
workers on their accrued pensions will raise awareness of retirement incomes and could lead to 
increases in private savings. Moreover, the reform seeks to strengthen the reconciliation of work 
and family life, which could in fact have a positive impact on fertility rates, something that would a 
welcome development in rapidly ageing Japan. Nonetheless, there are challenges in Japan, 
including the financing of the pension expenditure under the 2004 reform as well as reducing the 
elevated debt level, being considerably above the OECD average even before the onset of the 
global economic crisis. 
  COMMENTS ON SESSION 4 
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Teresa Ter-Minassian
* 
1  Comments on “Social Security Reforms in Colombia: Striking Demographic and Fiscal 
Balances” by Sergio Clavijo 
This paper presents an interesting analysis of reforms of the pension and health insurance 
systems in Colombia during the last fifteen years, and assesses their fiscal implications. As regards 
pensions, the paper finds that the introduction of a defined contribution system and parametric 
reforms of the public defined benefits system have contributed to a substantial reduction of the 
NPV of the implicit debt of the public system (equivalent to about 100 per cent of GDP), but the 
system remains heavily imbalanced, with a still relatively high implicit debt, and inadequate 
coverage of the population. The paper attributes this imbalance largely to still relatively generous 
provisions of the public system, both as regards the official retirement age and the replacement 
rate, which is well above corresponding rates in the private system, despite high historic rates of 
return on the portfolios of private pension funds. Accordingly, it recommends further reforms to 
link the official retirement age to the increasing life expectancy of the population (higher for 
females than males), and to align more closely the replacement rates of the public pillar to those of 
the private one. It also recommends a cut in employers’ contributions, funded by an increase in the 
VAT rate and a more even distribution of the remaining burden of pension contributions between 
employers and employees. 
I found the analysis generally careful and convincing, but have a few observations and 
suggestions on it. 
•  First, I would have welcomed some more detail on the methodology and assumptions used to 
project future liabilities of the public pension system, to be able to assess their realism. It would 
have been also interesting to see some sensitivity analysis of the assumptions. 
•  Second, it would be desirable to hear Mr. Clavijo’s views on the political and social feasibility 
of his proposal to link the retirement age to life expectancy, which might imply a faster increase 
in the retirement age for women than men. 
•  Third, what further parametric changes would the author recommend to reduce the replacement 
rates for the public system? Would he also recommend altering the present progressivity of the 
system, which envisages significantly higher replacement rates for lower than for higher income 
groups? Also, how would he view the desirability and feasibility of moving to irrevocable 
choices of regimes, eliminating the current possibility of switching back and forth between 
them? 
•  Fourth, what assumption about the incidence of employers’ contributions underlies his 
recommendation to shift a part of them to the employees? Also, could a shift in the burden of 
contributions (as opposed to their outright reduction) really be expected to reduce incentives to 
informality? 
•  Fifth, I am not sure whether in Colombia participation in one of the systems excludes 
participation in the other. If this is the case, would it be desirable, in Mr. Clavijo’s opinion, to 
allow individuals to participate simultaneously in both systems? Would this facilitate 
acceptance of policies to reduce replacement rates under the public system? 
————— 
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•  Finally, the historic rates of return on pension portfolios appear relatively high, albeit declining, 
in an international perspective, and especially in the current global environment. It would be 
interesting to extend the simulations reported in Figure 3 to assess the impact of significantly 
lower rates of return on expected replacement rates under the private pillar. Also, are there any 
steps that can be taken, in the author’s view, to significantly boost again the rate of return on the 
portfolios once the current crisis is over? 
Since the focus of this seminar is on pensions, rather than health reforms, I will not comment 
in detail on the second part of the paper. In brief, I found its analysis and conclusions well spelled 
out and generally plausible. I certainly agree with its focus on steps to improve formality, and 
thereby the level and density of contributions. Incidentally this applies to the pension system as 
well. But I wonder to what extent the quantitative estimates of the medium to long term cost of the 
system are biased (probably downward) by the fact that the analysis does not allow for the impact 
of technological developments on the cost of and demand for health services. Available research on 
the drivers of health spending in more advanced countries suggest that the rising cost of health care 
is more important than the effects of demographic developments. If data on health care costs and 
their relation with technical progress are, or become soon available for Colombia, assessing their 
influence on health spending prospects would seem a very useful extension of the paper. 
 
2  Comments on “Pension Reform and Fiscal Policy: Some (Tentative) Lessons from 
Chile” by Ángel Melguizo, Ángel Muñoz, David Tuesta and Joaquín Vial 
This paper presents an interesting overview of pension reforms in Chile, a country which has 
become an international role model in this area, as well as some reflections on the applicability of 
this model in other countries, particularly in Latin America. I found the analysis of the Chilean case 
well researched and argued. In contrast, the discussion of the cases of Colombia, Mexico and Peru 
struck me as too cursory and unspecific. Personally, I would drop them, and only use references to 
those less radical reform experiences to illustrate by contrast how the comprehensiveness of the 
Chilean approach was key to ensuring a major reduction of the implicit debt of the system. 
The paper illustrates well both the achievements and the shortcomings of the initial pension 
reform in Chile, explaining the various components of its initial fiscal cost, and the difficulty of 
ensuring an adequate coverage and replacement rate of the contributory system in an economy 
which, like those of most emerging markets or LICs, is still characterized by high degrees of 
informality or temporary work. 
These characteristics pose difficult trade offs between the social objective of preventing old 
age poverty, on the one hand, and the economic objectives of preserving incentives to contribute to 
the pension system, and minimizing fiscal costs, on the other hand. 
Clearly, the balance struck in the initial reform, which may have been appropriate in the 
context of the early 1980s, when Chile still suffered from severe fiscal and external imbalances, 
became less appropriate as the country consolidated its fiscal position, reducing its net public debt 
to a very low level, and gained strong international credibility through consistent cautious 
macroeconomic management under different political regimes. It is thus not surprising that a strong 
priority of the new administration of President Bachelet in 2006 would be an early reform of the 
pension system, aiming at a substantial improvement in coverage, and reduction of the gender bias 
inherent in it. The paper could discuss in more detail the process of this reform, which was 
exemplary, in starting with a sound and comprehensive technical analysis of the shortcomings of 
the existing system and of possible reform options, and following it up with a lengthy and inclusive 
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The paper presents an interesting projection of the fiscal cost of this reform, based on 
available published data. While the assumptions utilized in the projections do not seem 
unreasonable, some struck me as possibly optimistic in the current global environment, which is 
impacting severely the Chilean economy. In particular, how long will it take Chile to make up the 
significant decline in output expected for this year, and only slow recovery projected for the next 
one, to achieve an annual growth rate of 3.7 per cent between now and 2025. And how realistic is it 
to assume an average real rate of return on pension portfolios of 5 per cent a year over the same 
period. Given the uncertainty about the depth and length of the current crisis, I think that a 
sensitivity analysis of the main assumptions underlying the projections, or at least the preparation 
of an alternative, more pessimistic, scenario would enrich the paper. 
Another issue that could be discussed in greater detail in the paper is the foreseeable impact 
of a more generous solidarity pillar on the incentive for workers to affiliate to the private 
contributory system and to increase the density of their contributions. As the paper recognizes, the 
assumption of an increase in the number of affiliates and in the density of contributions is a key 
driver of the projected decline in the fiscal cost of the solidarity pillar after 2015. 
I found interesting, and basically agree with, the conclusion of the paper that, while a fully 
developed capital market is not a prerequisite for the introduction of a defined contribution pension 
system, a strong regulatory framework and supervisory capacity with respect to the pension funds 
are so. I also agree with the view that, if domestic capital markets are less developed, it is more 
desirable to allow early on pension funds to invest significant portions of their portfolios in external 
markets, to avoid excessive concentration on domestic public debt. 
I also agree with the focus in the paper on upfront costs of Chilean style pension reforms. 
While such costs should not discourage governments from undertaking reforms that, if 
appropriately designed and implemented, can substantially reduce the implicit debt of public 
pension systems over the longer run, they can pose substantial challenges to fiscal management in 
the short to medium term, necessitating both early reforms of the remaining public pillar and other, 
country-specific steps to mobilize revenue or reduce other spending. In this respect, timing pension 
reforms to coincide with periods of cyclical expansion can facilitate a difficult political and social 
task. 
 
  